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\lost commentators, political analysts, and even scholarly 
economic students of development� in the Soviet Uuiun - and 
in Eastern Europe g:enerally -have as yet no keen, appreciative 
understanding of the strategic position am! world-wide signifi­
CUlllT of the nou-Hussian 11.-1.tions he]cl captive within the Soviet 
Union itself. Largely as a rC'sult of the educational efforts these 
past few years of several institutions in the United States, many 
of these ohservers have, of course, comp to know that there are 
fundamental cliHt'reuccs between the people and history of 
Georgia, Armeuia, Turkcstau, \Vhite Ruthcnia, Azerbaijan, or 
Ukraine and those of Hussia. This knowledge is in itself a meas­
ure of real progress. HowcYer, it falls far short of a dynamic 
uudcn,tamling that with sound perspective can nwaningfnlly re­
late. for example, :\Ioscow's economic and political concessions 
to these non-Hussian nations with its appeasement policy toward 
Tito, or patriotic riots iu .KieY to the Hungariau revolutiou, or 
i\Ioscow's persistent propagawla in Asia about the "independ­
ence·' of Ukraine and its imperialist drive among the former 
colonial nations. In short, mere descriptive knowledge is no 
working foundation for that problem-solving capacity which the 
suhtlc maneuwrs of the imperi,tlist oligarchy in Moscow chal­:lenge daily in its implacable war against \VestC'rn ci\"ilization. 
The natural foe-al point for a problem-solving understanding 
of the machinatious and tactics of the Hussian Communist olig­
archv is Ukraine. The reason;, for this art' manv, as the Hussiau 
o!ig;rchs themselves - beginning with Khrushciiev - well know. 
One rests on the elemental fact that Ukrairw is the largest non­
Hmsian nation not ouly in the substrate empire known as the 
Soviet Uuion hut also behind the European Iron Curtain. Sec­
ond, in natural resources-agriculhirc, coal, oil, iron, etc.­
Ukraine is one of the richest am\ most diversified regions of 
Europe. Third, for a number of objectives, by geographical 
position it is strategically located in close relation to Central 
Europe. th(' :\1irldle East. the Caucasus. aml the open steppes 
of Russia. Fourth. the heroic record of Ukrainiau natimml resist­
ance to Hussian dorninaliori, whether Czarist or Communist_ is a 
permancut and yery mueh opeu chapter in \Vorkl annals of the 
struggle for personal and natio11al freedom. And fifth, as a 
manifest derivative of tht' abm·c, without its imperialist po<;ses-
sion of L'krnine. Communist Hussia couldn·t possibly maintain 
fur long the substrate t'mpire of the Soviet L'nion, no less the 
recently r,cqnircd satellite strata of th(' Hnssiau Communist Em­
pire, Briefly, in terms of history aml logic, Ukraine is the jewel 
in the sickled crown o± the Hussian Communist Empire, and no­
where. unfortunately, is this appreciated more than in the 
Kremlin. 
The lounJation o± Hussian Communist colonialism, as seen at 
work in the so-called satellite area, is set in the broad, non­
Hnssian periphery of the Soviet Union. This colonialism far 
f'xcccds in exploitation and tyrmmv anything that might be 
associated with past \Ves\ern colonialirn1. Plainly, the Sovit>t 
Union is in reality a totalitarian empire structure. One cannot 
mraningfully cast and interpret economic phenomena within 
that struclnre other than in a moni.<.tic framework of totalitarian 
technique and management in which the production, distribu­
tion, and consumption of resources are predicated on totalistic 
political ends as determined by a rnling minority within a minor­
ity nation of this basic empirP. Hegar<lless of the superficial de­
Stalinization program or the economic decentralization meas­
ures dcsignrd to enhance productivity as well a.s integrate the 
energies· of the mm-Hussian nations in the plan of the enipire, 
the substanc.'e of Ambassador Lodge's rebuttal to Vishinsky on 
August 27, 19,53 in the United Nations will remain in force: 
"Head tlw reports ahout the small minority of so-called 'Great 
Russians' who art' crowding the natin' peoples ill thP Soviet 
Union out of choice jobs and are tryiug to take ovn evnything 
for themselves. Those are real master-race tactics on the Hitler 
pattern." 
Asidc from tlw magnified effects of modern technology, the 
institutional facets of this Moscow-centered structure constitute 
a totalitarian offshoot of the autocratic structure of the Czarist 
Hussian Empire which scarcely existed for the material and 
c11lt11ral betterment of the 11nvestcd Hussian popnla(c, not to 
speak of the numerous non-Hussia11 uations it held in bondage, 
This is. an indispensable and valuable perspt'ctive for a real 
understanding of Rnssiun Communist lOlonialism sinC"e the in­
ception of the SoYiet Cnion. The Hmsian HeYolution prodnced 
no institutional hiatn, as concerns tlw continuity of Hussian im­
perialism ,ind colonialism. It is this vital perspecti\'e that Pro­
fessor Kost Kononenko supplies in thb first volume of an histori-
co.economic analysis of the Russian Empire. Concentrating on 
th<' period from 1861 to 1917, this incisive work is well Jocu­
mcntcd, factual!�· descriptive, and annlytic throughout. \Vith adP­
quatc statistical support, it covers all the major spheres in the 
economic: relationship behveen Russia and Ukraine, and demon­
strates v.:ith telling effect the consistent Russian econorni(' e,p!oi­
tation of Ukrainian surpluses. Jn essence, the solid achievem: nt 
of Professor Konouenko is seen in his realistic and objective pre­
sentation of the PSSt'ntial force of Russian colonialism under the 
\Vhite Czars in a period preceding the i11tensificd colltinuation 
of the same force under the Hcd Czars. 
There can be 1m doubt that this \VOrk is a much needed addi­
tion to the economic research now being pursued in this country 
with regard to the past aud present Hussian Empire. :\lucl1 of 
this research, as, for example, Soviet Economic Gmwth (Joint 
Economic Committee Report, 19.'57), consists of abstract, aggre­
gative an,1lyses of the economy of USSR that reveal little or 
nothing of the ecouomic differentials and inequities which 
exist behveen Russia and the non-Russian nations in this Pmpire 
complex. As the llnotccl report, the :rest>arch being clone usually 
rests 011 politically unrealistic assumptions of a "national cco110-
my," \Vith a gross national product rather thau a gross empire 
product, and consistently employs '.\.foscow-madc monolithic 
terms, such as "Soviet people" and the like. Obviously such re­
search is of little value when it comes to treating real problems 
of colonialism and economic disparities within the Soviet Union. 
This work represents a healthy balance to the usual studies: the 
promised seconJ volume by ProfessoI Kononcuko should deepeu 
American economic scholarship on the Soviet Union imrne·1snr­
ablv. 




A CLosi,; ANALYSIS of Ukraine's history brings 
into relief an odd phenomenon. It is difficult to under­
stand, how so richly endowed Ukraine could fall behind other 
lands of Europe; how it could show signs during its historical 
development, contradicting all the possibilities of its natural re­
sources. Even a superficial s11r\'ey of the various aspects of thf' 
economic position and life of Ukraine gives this astounding im­
pression. For example: this land seemingly destined to take a 
leading place in workl agriculture, has not done so. Yet, it pos­
sesses the hest soil in all Europe. From Southern Volhynia to 
North of Mykolalv, clay-laden black soil often reaches a depth 
of over three feet, and contaim; up to 10'1 humus material. It 
is also rich in the easily soluble flint-add combinations needed 
by plant life. The Ukrainian Black Sea littoral also has very 
fertile light-brown and chestnut loams. In addition, the soils of 
Ukraine contain everything that adds to their fertility: the 
Izyum and Podilla regions have rich deposits of apatites 
yielding good phosphorous fertilizer, and ammonia manufac­
tured in the Donbas provide azotes. 
The climate of Ukraine is quite favorable to the development 
of agriculture. The land is situated between the 43rd and $3rd 
degrees latitude North. True, its isotherms arc lower than cor­
responding latitudes of \Vcskrn Europe. Dut> to rnore severe 
winters, the average annual temperature fluchrntes hetwC'cn 43 
and 49 degre-es Fahrenheit, p_'aching 56 degrees in the Crimea. 
B11t it has a far greater numhC'r of days of sunshine in a year 
than allalogous regions of \Vestern Europe, and a much warmer 
sumnwr. This amount of warmth and the length of the period 
favorable to vegetation, makes possible the cultivation of a 
great assortrncnt of fann cultures; rye, harley and cotton among 
them. 
The average annual amount of precipitation in Ukraine is 
small, \'arying between 400 millimeters on the shores of the 
Black Sea rmd 700 millimeters in Volhyuia. This is in larg(• 
measure compensated, howC\'('T. hy two facts. The rains fall 
during the optimal periods necessary for agriculture and the 
soil has high moisture-retaining q1mlities. Added to this, the 
Ukrainians are an industrions people who love farming. The 
, 
7.8 
Ukrainians' ability aml knowledge is by no means lower than 
that of many nationah of \Vcstcrn Europe. 
Yet Ukrai11e is behind many lands of the Enropcan \Vest 
in agricultnral production. \Vh ·? 
,-.,
For the ten-year period before 1917 the comparison of 
average harvests of basic grain crops and potatoes is shown in 
the following table; 
T,\BL�: I 
Yicl,ls from 1 liectare in metric hundredweights (of 100 kilograms)' 
Lund Rue Wheat Ba�ley Outs Potatoes 
Ukraine 10.() L:!..O l0.0 L 1.8 8.'i.O 
Russia 8.7 \l.7 9.0 80.io
Belgium 24.7 '27.7 3().(j 26 4 HEOo
CcTIIlHll\" 20.2 23.!J 24.0 ::.1.:2 l CJ l.ll
France lUl 14.7 [."i.'i 14.5 D7.0
Other extraordinary facts make the picture clearer. Ukraine oc­
cupies at present an area of 576.6 thousand square kilometres, 
with a population of 41,250 thousand. n1is gives a density of 
population of 71.3 per square kilometre, much lower than \Vcst­
crn Europe. At the same time, in tlw past fifty years, ·ukrainc 
showed all the signs of agrarian over-population. The most 
significant result of this was the mass migration of the rural 
population from Eastern Ukraine to lan<ls beyond the Urals and 
to Central Asia, and from VVestcm Ukrniue to Canada au<l the 
United States. "-\cconling to Professor Vobly, in the eighteen 
years before \\'orld \Var I, from Eastern Ukraine alone 1,600,000 
people migrated beyond the Urals. They came mainly from 
the Poltava region, 2.3% of all migrants, while Padilla accounted 
for only 4.5%, although the density of population of Padilla was 
wcater ( over 90 per square kilometre) than in Poltava region 
(74 per square kilometre). Between 1906 and 1910, the number 
migrating from Poltava region was 174,000, 601' of the nahiral 
increase of the population, 
Consider the following fact: prior to the revolution the agri­
rnlhiral production of Ukraine of the five basic grain products 
(rye, wheat, oats, barley, and corn) was 560 kilograms per capi­
ta, per annum. while that of Romania was 880 kilograms; of 
Denmark, CiSS kilograms; a11d of France and Germany, 416 kilo-
1 L Fcshchenko-Chopi�·sky, Eko11omiclrna heohrafi'}a Ukminy (Ecouomic 
Cmgraphy of Ukraine). Ki<.'v, 19�::l. p. 36. 
grams. But during this same time, Denmark purchased 272 kilo­
grams in addition to a production of 688 kilograms and con­
sumed 960 kilograms; Germany and France purchased 80 kilo­
grams and consumed 496 kilograms each, while Ukraine, from 
its production of 560 kilograms exported 176 kilograms, and 
consumed only 384 kilograms, like Russia which produced only 
440 kilograms per person. 
An analysis of industry produces no less curious a picture. 
:\fost striking is the weak development of industry until recent 
times, \vhen compared with Ukraine's immense possibilities, and 
then its peculiar trend. The nah1ral resources of Ukraine place 
it among the most richly endowed in the world. According to 
data of 1938, geological deposits of coal in the Donets basin are 
estimated at 70.3 billion tons. They are of a high quality, largely 
suitable for coking. Coal of the Donbas includes rich deposits 
of anthracite, up to 97%. Outside of the Donbas there are 
many other coal-producing areas in Ukraine, from Chernihiv 
in the Northwest to the Southeastern border, and from Voronizh 
district in the ;\;orth to Kuban in the South. Huge deposits of 
soft coal have been discovered in the regions of Kryvyi Rih, 
Kiev, Kirovohrad, Ternopil, Rivnc, and Stanyslaviv. Large and 
rich deposits of peat are located in the regions of Kiev, Cherni­
hiv, Zhytomir, and Sumy. 
Oil, discovered in the regions of Romny and Lubni in 1936 
must be added to the fuel resources of Ukraine. In the Carpath­
ian foothills of Wes tern Ukraine, oil has been extracted for a 
long time. There are also considerable oil deposits in the regions 
of Drohobych, Boryslav, and Stanyslaviv. Ukraine is no less en­
dowed with ores, primarily iron and manganese. In the region 
of Kryvyi Rib the deposits of iron ore are estimated at 1..5 billion 
tons, exceptionally high in quality, and containing 55% to 62% 
iron. :\foch of the ore lies close to the surface, and up to recent 
times most of it was extracted by strip mining. The Kerch de­
posits of iron ore are of a lower quality ( .-35% to 45% pure iron), 
but are three times as large as those of Kryvyi Rib. 
These two regions do not contain all the iron ore wealth of 
Ukraine. Deposits of iron quartzites in Kryvyi Rih and other 
regions exceed 21 billion tons. So-called "muddy ore'' is found 
in \Vestern Ukraine, containing from 27 to 42% iron. And there 
is reason to believe that not all deposits of iron have been dis­
covered as yet. J\Jany localities have been found to be magnet-
ically anomalous, indicating the presence of iron ore. Such 
anomalies have heen found in n·gions of Kremenchuk, Zaporiz­
ha, and in the vicinity of Donbas and Kryvyi Rib. In the region 
of Nikopil are located deposits of manganese ore constituting the 
largest in Europe and some of the largest in the world. They 
contain :3,'5% to 48% pure manganese, essential in metallurgy. De­
posits arc estimated at ,'522 million tons in the Nikopil region 
alone, and there arc also deposits in the Kryvyi Hih and Odessa 
regions. 
It must be emphasized that the three basic geological regions 
of coal, iron, and manganese which are involved in metallurgy, 
are all situated within a triangle whose largest side docs not 
measure more than 300 miles." 
1-iorcover. in Ukraine there are considerable deposit.� of mer­
cury in the Donbas; of lead and zinc in Hahulny Kryah; of 
copper at the confluence of the rivers Torcts and Kalmius, in 
Volhynia, and South of Kiev. Dcposits of roeksalt in the Artc­
movo-Slavyansk region arc estimatt:•d in many billion tuus, to 
which must be added salt lakes in Slavyansk ,md salt deposits 
by nahITal evaporation on the bars of the Dnipro estuary. High 
quality days are also found in Ukraine, including porcelain and 
fire-resistant kinds. There is also cement, quartz sand for glass­
makiug, etc. 
\Vith S(l(;h natural resources, Ukraine should have <lcYelopcd 
into a highly· industrialized laud long ago. On the contrary, just 
prior to \Vorkl \Var f, the occupation of the population of 
Ukraine is characterized by the following data: agriculture, 
743[; industry, 9%; commerce, 5.3%; transportation, 6.4%; com­
mon labor. 4.8%, and all other, 5%. These percentages so con­
trary to in<lw.trial possibilities of Ukraine, appear even more 
astounding when considered not in proportion to tlw entire pop­
ulation living in Ukraine at that time, as here cited, but in pro­
portion to the aboriginal Ukrainian population. Then the oc­
cupational apportionment is as follows: agriculh1re, 87.5'.'l; in­
dustry 5.1%; commerce, .8%; transportation, .7%; common la­
bor, S,,'5%, all other, 2.4%·'. Thus despite the potential, only 
� All fii,.•1..ircs quoted are from: Eko11omich11(1 heohrafiya Vkrainy by Fesh­
cheuko-Chopiv,ky, the works of Professor Vohly; "Ekonomiehrm kh>1r­
akterystyka Ukrniny'" ( "Economic Charackristics of Ukraine") by P. 
Forn1n m .•,:am:lrnrl[la My.</ (Ed1u·atimw/ ldca.11, 11:harkiv, HJ;'.'.-\. aml 
Hnlsh11y11 Sori,•fak(lya Entsiklo.p uliya (Great Sodet E,icyc/opecli<J), VoL 
55, HJ47. 
"Fcshchcnko-Chopiv8ky, op. cit. p. 47. 
5.1% of the Ukrainian population was in industry and .3% in 
co1nmerce. 
Ukraine is sihiatcd Oil the shores of the Black allll Oziv 
Seas, which are ice-free all wiuter. These Seas are \vithiu the 
basin of the Mediterranean which has for centuries, been the 
center of European and world commerce. This location and 
wealth should make Ukraine a seafariug nation, with a dcYcl­
oped �ca trnde, good ports, a large commercial fleet, etc. Hut a 
cursory ghrncc at a map re\"cals almost HO rail cmrncctious be­
tween ports and interior. In geueral, the direction of rail li1tes 
of Ukraine are: lines cmmccting the Donbas with the metall­
lurgical rcgiou of Kryvyi Hih, \Vith Leningrad ( through Mns­
CO\V). and with the Volga vallC'y; lines connectiHg tlw South­
west of Ukraine ( basic regioll.S of sugar producti011) with Ceu­
tral Hussi,1 aml Lcriiugrad; and finally lines connecting Central 
Russia with the Black Sea aml the Caucasus, \Vhich by their 
directiou do not link the basic iudustrial regious of Ukraiuc with 
the sea. The already built Donbas-Moscow line by the So\"iets, 
once more i11tC'11sifies the com1ecti011 with the center of H11ssia, 
not with the sea. In fact thf' Oonhas is corn,ected with the 
Oziv Sea only through l\fariupil, and Kry\'yi Hih has no direct 
rail connection with the sea at all. 
When, toward the eu<l of the 19th century the Donets rail­
road was opened, Keypen wrote: "Beaching neither the Dnipro, 
nor the Volga. enclosed by the ()ziv and Kozlo\'o-\'oronizh line.�. 
the Donets railroad is piacC'd iu a po-'>ition o� complete dcpe1td­
ence Oil the other lilies, and for this reason, coal mines situated 
in its area are unable to develop their producti\'ity in full."• 
The problem of \Vater transportation is even worse. In 191� 
the commercial fleet of tcu Ukrainian ports consisted of only 
310 steamships, averaging 67:5 tons, and of f357 sailing vessels, 
averaging 54 tom." As will be seen from these figmes, the com­
mercial fleet did not in any way correspond to the position of 
Ukraine and the possibilities of p,u·ticipatiou in world commerce. 
This fleet was even ina<leqnate to take care of small-scale coast­
al trade. It is not surprising tht:rdorc, that dming 191�, the par­
ticipation of this entire fleet in commercial opl'ratiolls of ,111 
Black ancl Oziv seaports, includiug Caucasian ports, amounted 
4 N.oKeypen, Krizis 80-tikh godov, (The CJ'isi� of the '80's), l\lo.,cow,o
HJOJ, p. 29."\Ve qw1te pn·-n•volutionary figure;; ,leliberatd
;,
, becaus(• later, during the Sovic-t regimL', the very nature of forei�n tie� undcn,ent a changl·. Trw suhjc-cl will t,,. ,liscuss,:d in detail la!<-r. 
to only 11.91 of the number of \'CSscls. and -5.9% of the tonnage 
handled. The bulk of ocean freight was handled by forcigu ships, 
primarily British, under whose flag sailed 28;!! of all v{"ssels car­
rying 47 . .5'.f of all tonmge. 
Equally .striking examples are encountered at every step, no 
matter what branch of the economic life of UkrainE' is consid­
ered. 11H:• frw examples <1uotcd above rnakc it dear that any 
a11alysis of social and economic proce�sc-s of Ukraine cannot be 
condncted merely by applying data pertaining to these pro­
cesses themselves. The lifo of Ukraine was not only dC'lcrrnined 
and directed b�- such laws of development as wonkl flow from 
the nah1ral social-economic.· conditions, but by other forces and 
factors as well. The economic processes were determined not 
only by the interests of Ukraine, bnt by extraneous interests, in­
deed. the latter were often of decisive importance. 
In its historical development, the social-economic life of 
Ukraine can he understood only by umlerstamliug the role im­
vosed upon Ukraine b�· the interests of the TTussian Empire as 
a whole, he it Tsarist or Soviet. Only then will the anomalies of 
this development become umlt:>rslandable and the several phe­
nomemt will appear in a proper light. 
It is in this light that we wish to present the characteristics 
of basic social-economic processes in Ukraine during the last 
century. These characteristics should facilitate the understanding 
of the social-economic background of the Ukrainian national 
idea. 
CHAPTER 1 
TO\VARD [NDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 
The Social Structmc of 1Jkrairte after the 
1648 Revolution 
Omi ANALYSIS of social-economic processes in 
Ukraine is confined to the period of the last 100 years or, to he 
exact from the abolition ol serhlom. ThC" reason for choosing this 
<lat.., is that thC' J\Ianifcsto of the Emperor Alcumlcr II, of FcL­
rnary 19th 1. old s!ylc) lStl , provid::�d the legal basis for a new so­
cial order. From that date the Russian EmpirC' began its period of 
modC'rn history, a period of capitalist conditious. ft is under­
stood however, that a capitalist eeonom:v lwgan to de\·elop long 
before the agrarian reform; thM it conditioued the reform, and 
that it had its reflection in it. Thcrl'fore, in order to understand 
some components of the reform itself, and prccediHg processes, 
\Ve have to sun·ey them in the light of prior developments. It 
will he necessary to turn om atteution from time to time to cv011ts 
which took place before the reform. This applies primarily to 
the agric11lt1tral ecouomy, not only becallSC !he reform created 
a C'hange in the agrarian and social conditions i11 the rnral conn­
tr�'side, but also because the agricultnral economy was then, 
aud in large measure remains to this clay, the hasic branch of 
the lfkrainian national economy. It must also be added that the 
rdorrn. in its sp('cifie application to Ukraine, and against the 
backgro11ml of t\1c preceding agrarian strndurc, in large measnrc 
COllditioiic(l tbc sum total of phenomena which characterize the 
foll()\Ving period. 
When referring to the abolition of serfdom in 1561. one nmst 
first of all keep in mind that not 011k was the cxec11tiOll of th:· 
rdorm iu many respects different in Vkraine thau in Hussia, 
hut that SC'ddorn itself was qmtc different in Ukraine. It did uot 
develop in l1krnine as a result o[ social comlitious, as it did in 
Russia, but was, to a great extent imposed upon Ukraiuc, in 
( outrast to the existing order. 
2 Ukraine and Rt1s.'!ia 
Serfdom, which existed fn Eastern and \Vcstcrn Enropc iu 
feudal times met with mass resistance on the part of the peas­
ants in its diffrrcHt stages, assuming various forms, up to am\ 
including peasant wars (Germany). Similar social processes 
developed in Eastern Europe, in Russia and Ukraine, but ,vcre 
by their nature. entirely different. Although they took place in 
a single historical period, mid-17th century, political and social 
conditions in the hvo lands were <liffereJJI. Therefore the pcas­
auts' fight for freedom assumed an entirely different nature. In 
H.nssia, hy its political coutcnt_, it was purely a social strugglen
of the peasants for a change in th!." structnrc then prevailing. Itn
was a struggle of those social strata which were subject to then
laws of serfJom. It was an exclusively internal process. It as­
sumed the nahire of an armed rebellion known as "Hazin's re­
bellion," named for its chieftain, Stenka Razin. The process tak­
ing p lace in 17th century Ukraine was intrinsically different, be­
ing primarily a revolution of national liberation and a fight forn
the restoration of the rights of independent statehood. Socialn
moments played an important part, but in contrast to Russia,n
this was not an internal struggle of social forces. It was a strugglen
against a social onler which had heen forcibly imposed by ann
alien power, Poland, and for this reason it went hand in handn
with national stale liberation. Tl is significant in this connectionn
that the oppfessors were m,1inly Polish nobles, emissaries of then
subjugating government. The government of Poland was then
source of their social privile�es, ther('fore that part of the Ukmin­
ian nobility which favored Poland was also subject to destruc­
tion, because it, too, had become a factor of national oppression.n
On the other hand, that part of the Ukrainian nobility and cler­
gy v,:hich joined the common na1 ioHal front iii the struggle forn
natio1Jal liberation, was not ouly not proceeded ,tgainst by then
insmgents, but kept its privileges t'\'t'll after the yietorious eon­
clusion of the struggle, nohvithstandiug the foct that it had bee11n
exercishig the rights of the serfchim law. Thus, !he instih1tion ofn
serfdom as such was not denied. but it was eradicated to then
core iu those instances where it came into being from the fiatn
of a conquering natio11.n
This seemingly c.m1tmdictory attitude towards serfdom will 
become understandable when we consider the dissimilar atti­
tude toward this institution in Ukraine and in Poland. In 
Ukraine, personal freedom was not taken away from !he individ­
ual, but social obligations were imposed. A person was free to 
3 Toward Industrial Capitalism 
choose the manner of discharging them. either armed service in 
<lefonsc of the community or allocation of part of one's labor 
to the nt>cds of the commnnity. H did not matter how the latter 
was made available, either by pnformance of direct labor for 
governmental institutions, by delivery of the fruits of one·s 
private enterprise to the state or by work done in the employ­
ment of another. The dependence of one person upon another. 
v,,.hich came into heinµ; at that time, took place as an expression 
of the person's own will. Ile would choose this dcpcndeuce out 
of economic considerations and even if the choice were made 
under economic compulsion, it was still never imposed by law. 
Serfdom, thus, ,vas an institution of mutual agrt'crnent. i11 which 
both parties carried a legal obligation. 
In contra�t to this, Polish serfdom was based upon a legal 
incapacitation of the peasants to dispose freely of their eco­
nomic activities, and upon a personal allegiance to a master. 
llkraine's victory over Poland and th<' restoration of Ukraine's 
state independence freed the peasants from St'rvitudc aml rc­
stor<'d their individual freedoms. This applied to all peasants, 
those who had been subjects of the expelled Polish uobles as 
well as those who remained dependent on monasteries and 
Ukrainian nobles who had taken part in the fight for liberation. 
Unfortunately, legal principles of the new social order cannot 
be determined with any degree of certainty. The reason is that 
such legal forms could not be formulated withiu a short period 
of regained i11depende11ce, because of the peculiar state stmc­
tun� of Ukraine ,vhcrc fumlamcntal state po,ver was held by 
Zaporozhian Cossack military. Subsequently, J\foscow deliberate­
ly thwarted, to serve her own interest, the all-round develop­
me11t of lTkrainian statehood. The social conditions of Ukraine 
are all the more significant as they developed from practices 
be�'ond the scope of legal control. Thus they provide the main 
characteristic of the social ideal of the whole nation at that 
time. Professor �,Jyakotin, amtlyzing the social structure of the 
period, came to the follo,ving conclusion: "Old legal norms 
accordillg to which the community was socially stratified had 
been preserved, but in reality 'society' and 'the common people' 
into which the population wa� now divided constituted a 
si11gle social group with free transfer from one to the oth('r." 
"\'. )l.fyakolin, Ocherki .w,t,1-ia/1101J i.�tr,riui L'krvin11 v 17-18 c 1•. ( Outline 
of the Sncial Jlistnry of Ukraine in the 17-18 Centuries), Pra�11e, 1\)2,f, 
r. 1:J:2.
·lr Ckraine a11d H.ussia 
This classification of the time was not. however, of a permanent 
uatnrt'. :\s has been notc<l, it was a social division chosen ac­
cording to the different obliµptions to society, the <lccisivc 
tac.:tor bl'ing the kind of bnrdcn the imlividnal would he ahl1) 
and willing to carry for society. A clear and exhaustive descrip­
tion call be toun<l in the 17:2.9 records of oral reports ot old 
people of the village of Ilorchaky, Starodnb colonelcy: "When 
the pcopll' settled, the more important (wealthier) registered 
as Cossach, and the inkrior ( poorn) rcrnainu1 peasants."' 
"'Not melltioning the towuspeople," says \1yakotiu, "'even the 
peasants were then granted full citizens' rights, inclmling the 
complete owucrship of their land holdiugs. The acc111isition of 
real property rights by the peasants was complete and general 
to such e.x!ent that ii also included those peasants who remaiucd 
dependent upo11 the landed gentry a11d upon rno11asteries, those' 
that is, \dtosc holdings had been lcfl intact.",· 
Hoth the Ukrainian state and the Ukrainian soil had bcc,n 
liberated by the effort of tbe entire people. Hence, the people 
recognized in themselves the existence of the right to rule them, 
selves and their L:md, althongh the property provisions of tlic 
"Lithuanian Statute" had not been formally repealed, nor new 
laws substituted for lhcm, The common law wa�, iu effect, snp­
plemcnted by. creative decisions of the communities which felt 
authorized· to pass new mies by virtnc of being responsible for 
the regained freedom .. -\!though this caused some discrepancies 
in the manner of local soli1tion of similar problems, yet always 
aud cver�·wherC' ouc right rcmaiucd imnwhlblc: the pC'ople·;, 
right of disposition of the privileges they had gained in their 
struggle, primarily of liberty and property. Lazarevskv cites a 
vivid example of what the people umlerstood their rights to be 
after the liberation from Polish rule. The Cossacks ot the village 
of l'okoshyd1 �tatcd in 177:3: "\Vhcn with the hdp of God the 
Ukrainians nndC'r Hetman Bohdau Ziuovy Khmclnytsky liber­
ated with their blood Ukraifle from the l1olish vokc and from 
the ruk of Polish kings .. , at that time . . on both banks of 
the Dnipro ,11\ the land belonged to the Ukrainians iu foll ,m<l 
in unmnou, rrntil it was fir;,t divide<l among the tolonelcic�. 
The trrm "s<Jcidy'' ( tnvarystm) d-enotcd the milit,uy ta�tc of Cossach, 
awl tlw \corm ··l·rnn1non pcopk" (J)/JSfli/stro) 1w,1s.u1l-fa1mc·rs, or in .1 
hroi,kr c.:onnot.,Lion, tlw U�p.1ying public. 
'A Lawre,·sky, Clpisrmiyc Staray Maloros.iiyi, ( Descri71tion of Old Littlc­
ll1rn.�ia [Ukraine]), Kiev, 18b8, I, 381. 
� V. \l}akotin, op, ,:if., I, 1:28. 
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then thf' captaincies, then the townships. ,·illagc5, and h:1mlcts, 
and from the latter amoug the residences, manors, homes, and 
homesteads, and therefore all the estates became the property 
of Ukrninians by entry into possession. The Ukrainians then 
marked the boundaries of their possessions in Yarious ways, some 
fenced them, others erected markers and dug canals, and then 
built whatCYl'r they pleased withi11 these hounds:··• 
Therefore, although the v•.0ave of rebellion, haYing destroyed 
the upper layer of manorial landownership did not touch direct­
ly upo11 other types and forms of land holding in Ukraine, yet it 
did change the rclatiouship betwecu them, placiug them into 
nev,, fonns of development. Arnoug such changes the most note­
\\:orthy was that evcn the common peasants, "serfs" of monaster­
ies ant! Hobks, perceived in the regained freedom their right to 
pos�ess laud, and to he able to choost• their future social posi­
tion. i\tany such cornmon peasants chose to change their st,1t11s 
into Cossacks. Accordi11g to Myakotin, "Fiually tbe monasteril's 
had to g<ot reconciled with the fact that during the uprislligs, 
and in the firs! years following, no srnall parl of their 'subjects' 
went out frorn under th('ir <loilliniou." They \vonld regist('r as 
Cossacks, or start farming on their owu, or assume a neighbor's 
obligations, i.e., fann the land of another, taking on all the duties 
of the former owner. Even later, in 1712, the Archimaudritc 
of the Nizhyn Monastery of the Annunciation complained to 
llchnan Ivan Skoropadsk�- that the monastery's "subjects" \Vt'rP 
selling land, au<l that '·the village of Talalae\·ka is called a mon­
astery village, but many others arc in possession of it." It is 
notcworthv that the Archimaa<lrite did not request that the 
transaltious bl' made void, bnt only for permission to buy the 
land back. 
lt is obvious that both the munastcrics. and since the latter 
part of the 17th ceutury also private landrnvners \vho had had 
ten,mt "subjects,'' asserting their rights npon the m1rcpcalcd 
pnvilegcs of exercising dominion over their "subjects," hindered 
the free transfer of peasants. The llctman Coverrnne11t consid­
ncd these claims jnst, and lletman Demyan Mnohohrishny for­
hade the common suhjC'cts of monasteries to ehan_ge their status 
into Cossacks. Lih\vise the l!cttnans lvHH Samoylovych and 
" A. Lazarevsk). "li.talorossi:,-skiye pospolitiy0 kre.,tvane" ( '·Littk-Hussian 
[ Ukraini,rn l Common Peasants'"), Znpiski Chi'rn igm;sknc;o st(ltisticl,nkogo 
komitctu (Proceedings rif the Chl'rnilliv Statistical Crwm1i.\·si011), Cl1er 
,.J>iv, !bbfi, I, 2rj, 
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Irnn :\Iazepa frequently attempted to return "newly registered" 
Cossacks to "their former commou duties and obedience to rnon­
astC'rics." Hut such decisions were, first of all, not in the nature 
of a general order, and in the second plac(', they could not al­
wavs be carried into eHcct. 
'An opportunity for !\foscow to interfere in the area of land 
owuership came right after lhe conclusion of the Treaty of 
Pereyaslav in 1654. Hctmau Bohdan Khmclnytsky's envoys to 
:\:foscow, the Jud!,?;e-Gencral S. Bohdanovych-Zarudny and the 
Colonel of Pcreyaslav Teterya requested the Tsar of 1\-luscovy to 
g;ra11t tlwn1 estates and "subjects,'' and received them. True, 
these acquisitions were, for quite a long time kept S('Cret because 
at that time nobody would dare take a\vay the newly gained 
freedom from the peasants. This same Tcterya requested of the 
Tsar that '·that with whic.:h anyone has beeu emlowed. by his 
majesty, should not be ordered made public, ... because if 
the Army would find out that he and his comrades had been 
granted by his majesty such great estates, they would imme­
diately suffer ... hecaust' the members of the Zaporozhian 
Army may 11ot h.'n-e any possessions."'" 
Soon therc'.1-ftcr the Ukrainian gm·ernment was compelled 
to start endowing the Cossack officer class with "subjects," i.e., 
with tht-' right to dcrnantl of the common pvasants ccrtai11 
obligations. Giving Jarid and ·'subjects" became a mpans of com­
pensating thcise who served the gowrnment. A significant char­
acteristic of such endowments was the fact that they did not 
pass into the absolute ownership of the person n•cf'i,·ing them. 
Thl"y w,cre so-c,1lk<l "cstalcs of rank" hcnditil1g officers or state 
employees according to their rank and only for the duration of 
their office. lu this manner the common peasants did not be­
come serfs of any individual. hut rather under duty to thC' statt', 
which ceded such rights to pf'rsons performing certain state 
fuJ1ctions. Along with "estates of rank," there ('Xistcd otlwr forms 
of land tenure, i. c.: 1) peaceful aud unimpeded enjoymeHt, or 
forever; 2) .. at the plcasurP of the military," that is until such 
time when the go,·ernmcnt would effrct a change in possessions, 
and 3) "in support of the home," as temporary relief given for 
ally good reason. llut even in the first instance, when land \Vas 
granted "forever," it was still J10t the same thing as the Hnssian 
votdiina (father to son inheritance). First of all. although a 
10 \". l\ly.,kotin, op, cit., I, 63, 136. 
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father could give the land he had received to his heirs, the heirs 
as a rule had to request from the Hetman Government a confir. 
mation of their right ( of temire), a11d iu tlie sel:ond place, the 
goyernment itself never alienated its right to dispose of such 
lands otherwise. 
Reinstatement of Serfdom 
The c011tra(·tual nature of all forms of land tenure made 
them similar to "estates of rank." Moscow wanted all the endow­
ments with land and "subjects," which were being carried out 
on its orders, to assume characteristics peculiar to :tvluscovite 
votchina, absolute ownership without the right of the Ukrainian 
government to interfere. In the '"Kolomatsky articles"11 of 1687, 
on the occasion of !he election of Ivan :vlazepa to the Hetman­
ate, it wa� stated: "Whosocvn receives from the Tsar a writ of 
endowment, he shall have the right of dominion over the mills 
and the peasants, and the Hetman may not take such writs away, 
nor violate the Tsar's gracious ukase in any manner."'" 
Such violations of the rights of the Ukrainian people were 
met with decided oppositiou on the part of the masses. Wheu 
Hetman Samoylovych was deposed in 1687, !here was a whole 
series of uprisings. In 1692 a military scribe, Petro lv,menko 
Petryk, \vho first escaped to Zaporozha, and then to the Crimean 
Khan, proclaimed himself Hetmun and called upon the people 
to rise against .\lm,co\v and against fletman i\fazep,1. The Za­
porozhian ()laman of Kosh ( Corps) Husak, wrote: " ... the 
commou council had carried a resolution that there should he 
no injustices in Ukraine, and today we see that the poor people 
in the colonelcies are suffering great oppression .. , Then we had 
thought that for all time the Christian people would never he 
in servitude. and now we see that the poor people are worse 
off than under the Lakhs (Poles), because even those who have 
no right to have serfs, have them, to haul wood and hay for 
them, and to stoke their oYens .. ," Dominion hv rank did not 
evoke opposition, as in the minds of the people thi� was justified: 
"such men may hold subjects, it does not grieve anyone." Rut 
as to others, "just as their fathers ate their bread from labor. 
so should they eat." ' It must he stated that until the Po\Lava 
'' "Artid,·�" were a Ukr,1ini,-m-r.luscnvite treaty cunclmle<l at every dection ot a new Iktman. 
12 \', '.llyakotin, op, cit .. II, 79. 
1" A. Lazarcvsky, ".'.llalornll>&iyskiye pospnlitiye krestyane," p. 29. 
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catastrophe of 1709, \foscow's aims could not he \vidcly re­
alized in Ukraine, because Moscow had to deal through the in­
termediary of the l1krainian authoritie;. ... d10 were decidedly op• 
posed to letting Mosco\v lay its heavy hand on Ukraine. The 
situation underwent a radical change after the Poltava defeat. 
Tsar Peter I issued an order as early as June 18, 1709: "All es­
tates of snch traitors like \fa.-.cpa. and of others who do not bc­
lo11g to the office of Hetrnan, are to he listed and reported, 
am! cue uot to he given to anyo!le without a nkasf' of the great 
ruler, and also in the future the Hetmau may uot give anymie·s 
\H�alth nor f'states without an explanatiou as to who rt'ceivcs 
what, and for what merit, 11cithcr is anything to be lakcn away 
for fault without explanatiuu; and whenever he, the Hetma11, 
shall see somebody's service which he, even with the consent 
of the general officers would reward, he must write of it to 
the great rnlt'r. and whosoever shall he at fault for which he 
should be deprived of wealth and estates, when the guilty must 
be pruhibitl'Ll from excn:isi11g power and it must be takell away, 
then also it must he written of to the great ruler."" hi this man­
llcr. from then on the Tsar of Muscovy considered himself the 
solt' owner of the la1Jd of VkraiuP, empowered to dispose of the 
l'kn1i11ian pcop!C', and tht' Hctman Government became merely 
a delegate of the Tsar. Although the on.lcrs were not always 
strictly adhered to, especially in matters concerning holdings of 
land and "subjects" of Hussian magnates, nevertheless from thut 
time, the ;\fuscovite system of land tenure and the abolitiou of 
liberties acquirC'd by the peasallts came quickly. 
Until the time of Hetman Ivan Skoropadsky the Russians 
di<l uot have the right lo rcceiw estates in Ukraiuc .. \n exceptior1 
was ma<le in the case of the Tsar's resideuts attached to the 
Hetmall, who received ia1Jd 011 the rights of "estates of rank." 
;\ow Hussiall mag1mtcs and lesser officials hnrric<l to get rich 
with Ckrainian lamls. likrainc heiug uo longer cmisidere-d a 
separate state, hut a conquered la11d. Skoropadsky was powerless 
to resist the grcC'd of prC'tC'mkrs to Vkrai11ian lan(l a1Jd "was 
forced to embark upon the road towards which he w:ts heing 
proddetl h_v the r€(1ucsts of the Tsarist ministers. the road of 
grantin� estates in Ukraine to private iudividuals who were in 
no way rnunected with Ukraine, who had no prcvion� relations 
with l'krainc.'·i,, 
"\. :\lyaknliu. loc. t:iL 
10 \'. \fyakotin, op. cit., p. 81. 
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A letter of Count Sh(•remdiev to I fchnan Skoropmlsky is 
significaut in this respect: ··Not long ago, tha11ks to th{' high 
grace of !he Tsar's majesty, in reward for their merits, and 
thanks to your favorable goodness, his Highness Prince �fr11Shi­
kov, the c�inent gentlemen Count Golovkin, Prince Dolgorukov, 
and Squire Shafirov received estates for thcmsch·es in UkrainP; 
this example has prodded me to make this request" ... ''fleceiv­
ing cstait's formally from the llctman, these magnates wen:' in 
reality outside of his power, and the lktman could not only not 
have any cha!lce of taking away a given estate, but he did not 
have ,rny influence in this respect."11; Thns such estates, and 
peasants inhabiting them, became extra-territorial, not under the 
jmisclictiou ot the Ukrainian authoritif>s. A typical colonial situ­
ation arose; citizeus of the ml'tropolis, not subject to any laws 
of the colony, established their plantations culthivated by the 
local population, transformed i11to serfs. The Russians' appetite 
for lands ancJ "subjects" in Ukraitie was insatiable. Prince Men­
shikov provides a notable e:rnmp1e. No matter how much land 
he received or grabbed, it was still not enough. The extent of 
his acquisitions can be atksted to hy the tact that he forced 
the entire Pochepsky region to be granted to him, with 6,250 
settlements. Later, after the death of Peter I, he receivecJ, with 
others. the city of Raturyn with all tlw surrounding villages and 
hamlets. Others were not for behind �knshikov, Similar condi­
tions pre\'ailcd, particularly in the South of Ukraine after the 
lirtnidation of the Zaporozhian I lost in 1775. 
Along with the distribution of land those peasants who lived 
upon it came into servitude. The natural conscqnence of this 
was that the number of free peasants diminished at a catastro­
phic pace. Following: the amn1dments of !Ietman Danylo Apos­
tol the n11mber of estates. according to c:1tegories, in seven 
colonelcies out of ten, was: free military, 20,031; city hall. 4.'39; 
of rank, 6,173; monastery, 9,644; pri\"ale 19,776; total, 
56,063. In all ten colonelcies, the number of common free es­
tates was only 29,321. Thus, 75 years after liberation, the fret' 
common peasants in seven colonelcies constituted only one-third 
of all holdings, city halls k•ss than 1%, estates of rank about 
10%, whereas the monasteries and private penons held over .'50'.1 
of the estates. During the period from 17;30 to 17,'52 the number 
'"Ibid., II, 179. 
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The problem, however, was not confined to the servitude of 
the common peasants. l11 1710 !\Ienshikov demanded of Het­
man Skoropa<lsky that the Cossacks residing in the Pochepsky 
district which he received also be given him as serfs. Nor was 
this an isolated case. During the Hehnancy of Skoropadsky, 
some of the Ukrainian Cossacks became the serfs of Hussian 
magnates. Only much later did some of thern succeed in regain­
ing their freedom. Many of those also suffered who had previ­
ously registered as Cossacks: a number were deprived of their 
Cossack privileges and returned to the status of common peas­
ants. The Cossacks were subject to oppression pn the part of 
new landowners, HusSians who had received Ukrainian lands 
from the Imperial Government, and who, leaning on Muscovite 
authorities, flouted Ukrainian laws and customs. Receiving 
lands settled by common peasants and Cossacks, they would 
often assume property rights over inalienable Cossack lands. 
�foscoi,v would leave most complaints unanswered, and the 
I letman Government was powerless to right such wrongs. For 
example, the Cossacks of the Chernihiv regiment wrote that: 
·'Before, they could easily bear arms for the state, because theyn
had sufficient lan<l and other goods, and now they are undern
all manner of oppression from the lan<lowners."1" 
The Empress Anna issued a ukase on August 8, 1734, pro­
viding that if a Cossack sells hi:s laud and continues to live on 
it, he must henceforth carry the obligations of a common peas­
ant. This produced the practical result of making land owner­
ship a social category. The fiual consequeuce of this was that 
',- Figures eitf'd arc from V. �[yakutin, op. cif., II, 18,5-189. 
!\f. Filimonov, Mafi;ria/i po voprmi, ob ewlutsiyi ;:;emlcdmliniya 
U,latcrU1fa on the Problem of Ecolufion of Land Ownership ), Penn, 
lo!J5 (2d ed.J, p. 14. 
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in 1783 all Cossack regiments were transformed into regular 
army unit.�, and although the Cossacb did not lose their person­
al liberty and right of land ownership, they were deprived of 
their old privilege of self-rule. r-..latters were also complicated 
with the new Ukrainian nobility which came into being under 
conditions of breaking up of old po\iti('al and social forms. 
The pre-revolutionary nobility ceased to exist as a separate 
social class iu the middle 17th ceutury. Some iudividtrnls of 
the former nobility .rnrvived as landO\vners, hut without any 
special class privileges. Ultimately the introduction of the Rus­
sian order, and the servitude of Ukrainian peasants promulgated 
hy i-.loscow, hro11ght to the forefront the problem of rights of 
Ukrainian lamlowllers, bccaust' according to Hussian laws, only 
nohles had the right to exercise rule over svrfs. Therefore, the 
Ukrainian landowners who possessed "subjects" wishing to 
make their class position certain had to take some definite 
steps. They had already requested on many occasions, that the 
Imperial Government make them equal in social privileges with 
the H.ussfrm nohility. In a plea of the Hlukhiv nohility to the 
Imperial Commission charged with the project of a new s!ah1te, 
it v,·as requested: "Permit us, on the same principles as the H.us­
si,m nobility, to serve where we choose, and to enjoy all our do­
nated and acquired possessions, and such powers of the Hussian 
nobility to he confirmed by high imperial privilege to us and 
our heirs."i<• The privileges of Hussian nobility were extended 
to Ukrainian nobles in 17S5. 1lany controversies arose from this, 
the Hussian Government frequently refusing to recognize as 
nobles not only those who had ac(1uire<l estates in civil service 
of the Ukrainian state apparatus, but also military elders. These 
matters dragged on into the 19th century. The Se11atc created a 
special commission in 1828 for the ratification of privileges of 
nobility iu Ukraine. As to the Left Hank of Ukraine, the ukase 
of !-.larch 20, 1835 made a final determination, admitting to 
privileges of nobility descendants ot high Cossack officers ( in­
clusive of the nmk of "comrades-in-arms"). The problem was 
more acute on the Hight Bank where, following the revision of 
18:"IB. orily 587 persons of the former nobility were recognized 
as uobles, 22,000 were classified as doubtful cases, and 87,121 
were deprived of privileges. In l'odilla, 83 were recognized, and 
< 
L', \'. \ly.,kotin, U/1. ,·it .• u. rn:1 
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•iS,545 refuse<l, and the corresponding number for Yolhynia wasa
7;3 and ,'31,411."''a
As is well known, the Russian Government abolished the 
autonomous Hetman Covernmeut of Ukraine in li64, and in 
1781-1782 "'agulwrnial ordinance" was extended to Ukraine, 
with the enforcement of Hussian laws, and by Empress' Cather­
ine 11 ukase of May 3, 1783 even those common peasants who 
had not theretofore been "subjects .. of landowners were de­
clare<l serfs. They became ·'state peasants" (goswlarstvenniye 
krestyanc), serfs on stale lands, such lan<ls being the acquisition 
of the Hussian Government of both free lands, ami of those 
belonging to free peasants, Only those Cossacks who remained 
professional soldiers retained personal freedom and the rights 
of land ownership . 
.Freedom gained in hard struggle was taken away, and serf­
dom imposed on the peasants whose system of land ownership 
was wrecked. The land itself became in large measure the 
property of Russian magnates and nobles, the Ukrainian peas­
ants becoming sprfs on their plantations. h1 place of the Ukrain­
ia11 State, which concededly had as yet beeu unahle to perfect 
its governmental structure, came an artificial division into ad­
ministrative-police units, the gubernias, under .an autocratic or­
der. Ukraine ceased to exist as a state-political body. 
Conditions of Serfdom 
lt cannot be stated that conditions of serfdom were 
more oppressive in Ukraine th,m in Russia. The treatment 
of scrfa was perhaps even more gentle and more huma11e 
than in Hussia. The reason was th:lt alon�.�ide the serfs there 
existt>cl the free class of Cossack-pl'asants, who held on tpna­
ciously to the tradition of defenders of the people's rights. It 
was also of decisive importam:c that th<:· entire prnple had pre­
served the spirit of freedom, of struggle for it. and that memor­
ies of a free life were quite fresh. Serfdom itself was considered 
as a trampling of people's rights by an alien power. It is not 
surprising therefore, that the peasants frequently rose in rebellion 
against the oppression of the landlords. According to computa­
tions of �:f. Drahomauov, behveeu 1836 and 1848 there were 
sixty-eight peasants' uprisings in Slobidska UkrainP. with twenty 
'° U. Slabchenko, Materialy d1J ek1Jn()mir/mr,-sotsialnoyi istori!Ji Ukrain!J Hl-oJw Star. ( Materials on the Economic-Sr,cial History uf NineteenthaC1'nfury Ukraine), Kh.uk,v, Hl2J. I, ,J\-1. 
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lamlowners killed. In the Hight Hank Ukraine there were twenty­
six uprisings between 1845 and 18-19. Escape was another form 
of reaction agai11st the landlord.< oppression, the flights frequent­
ly assuming ma.<,s proportion;,. Most of the escaping peasants 
went to Southern Ukraine, to the Don and Kuban regions where 
the descendants of Cossacks, whose Zaporozhian Host was 
ruined by the Hussian Government in 177-5 had found refuge. 
There were so 111.:rn�- of these serfs-escapees that the Tsarist 
Govcrnnwnt \\·as powerless to restore them to tht"ir masters, and 
i11 1832 permission was granted "for the succes�ful settlement of 
the Northeastern niast of the Blal'k Sea. to let ·tramps· settle 
there who had come without proper documents (passports)."" 
This thirst for freedom and for throwing off the yoke of serfdom 
imposed by Hussia lle\'er died among the peasants, and it kept 
all life at a point of high tension, decidedly innuencing relations 
between masters and sC'rfs. On the eve ot the abolition of serf­
dom, Ukrainian peasants embarked upon a mass migration to 
the Crimea, just following the Crirnean \Var. From two counties 
only, Verkhncdniprovsk and Kater�'noslav, 9,000 peasants es­
caped, and :3.00  from Khcrson. Great masses also came from 
the guhi:mias of Poltava, Kharkiv, and Cheruihiv. The govern" 
ment was compelled to set up a military guard across the Pcrek­
op Peninsula: the escaping peasants staging pitched battles 
agailist the regular army. Some part, albeit a wry insignificant 
one, was plan�d in this cautious treatment of the serfs hy the 
faet that 110! all the old rules of law had been abrogated. The 
Emperor Alexander I decided to effect a codification of laws, in­
tending initially to conduct the work in two directions: for the 
whole empire, and for those preserving a differeut language and 
bws. Ukraine was s11pposed to constitute such a separate part. 
The project dragf?;ed rni, and a code of locnl laws was not com• 
piled until 1h29, hut "on the pmt of local administrators ( Hussian 
officials). the compiled code was rnet with an unfavorable at­
titmle. The Governor-General of Kiev. Bihikov, was particular\�· 
hostile, because he gave precc<lcnce to Hussian law and would 
not agree to the continuance of separate courts 011 the Hight 
Rink, adliPring to a strictly Tlussifying policy.' ""2 County mar­
shals (adrni11istrative officials) mc·cting in Poltava in 1�4() ('\> 
pressed themselves in a similar vein. demanding the abolition 
of �fagdeburg Laws and of the Lithuanian Statute, alleging 
21 11. Slabchenko, np. cit., l, 138. n I!Jid., I, Ill. 
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that "differentiating features have been erased, and one can ob­
serve au identity of laws" with those of Hussia. As a result of 
this, lhe Lithuanian Statute was repealed in 1842:,"" and general 
laws of the Empire substitnted for it. The Magdeburg autono­
mous laws of the cities of Ukraine \Vere abrogated even earlier, 
between 1831 and 183.'5. 
In the light of what has been said above, it is clear why 
the state administratiou of Ukraine freqtHcntly interfered in 
the relations between lan<llon\s a11d peasants with the object of 
regulating them, and of curtailing the nobles' license which con­
tributed to the already existing tensions. Serfdom in Russia was 
based on the principle of almnst complete denial of any rights 
to the serf. The serf was deprived of human honor and dignity, 
a!ll! therefore had no right to appeal to a court for slander. Ile 
could not testify under oath, although an oath of allegiance was 
required of him iu military service. He was a res of the owner, 
an instrumc11t11m vocale in the full meaning of the term. M. 
Slabchenko quotes the words of Tsvetayev which vividly char­
acterize the Russian understanding of serfdom: "' ... servitude 
is one of the most important political rights, according to which 
one belongs as a thing, as far as his property is concerned, there­
fore the right to possess serfs should be the privilege of the first 
estate in the nation, which consists of persons prominent, either 
by their own merits or by ancestry.""' 
Jn relation to bis serfs the landlord was not only the master 
of their land and labor, hut also their administrative and judicial 
authority. :\ccording to Hussian law. the lamllonl could, for 
transgressions against others and against himself, impose peual­
ties upon serfs up to 40 lashes, imprisonment up to two months, 
prescribe forced labor up to three months or transport to arrest 
detachments up to six months. By act of 1846 the landlords were 
permitted to maintain thcir o,vn jails and to put prisoners in 
chains. The only prohibition \-.:as inflicting bodily injury upon 
serfs. Serfs could be exiled to Siberia after 1822. According to an 
act of 18.57, corporal punishment was a mandatory addition to 
every penalty imposed upon a serf. 
The landlord also bad a right to sell his serfs. The law of 
180S prohibited the sale of serfs without land. and the law 
2·' Only soll\e provisions uf the Lithuanian Statute R'Jll.Jined in force ( par­
lic11larly i.n domestic rehti,",s and laws ol inlwritaneci . .ind were the law 
of the Left Bank of l1kraine n11til Hll7. 
H !If. Slabchenko, 011. cit., p. llfl, 
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of 1883 without the serf's family, bnt it became permissible alt­
er 18--11 to purchase serfs for resettlement on othC'r lan<l. The e11s­
torn \vas for a serf to work for three <la\·s i11 a wce1. for his 
master, and the rest of the tim(-, for himsdt, bnt th(' ukase of 
April 5, 1797 provided that such a division was only advisory, 
a11d not mandatory. In fact. the landlord himself would deter­
mine the nurnber of days of weekly servitude, sometimes the 
entire week. 
Complete enforcement of all these rnlC's of servitude throu�h­
out lTkraine was impos�ible <lue to hi�torieal circumstauces. This 
is not to say there wa� no crnel comlud agaillst serfs in Ukraine. 
ThcrC' was, not i11frcq11ently. But despite e\"C'rythiu�. the Ukraiu­
ian peasants 1wvcr lost tlwir fccli11g of human dignity. and never 
acr1uiesccd to tlw condition of scrYitudc. 1:lence thP ncc<l for 
colltrnlle<l relation� between lamllonls and serh, to prevent or 
weaken emptions of opposition. Indicative of this were the so­
called "Inventory Hules" introduced Ly the Governor-General of 
Kie\', Bibikov in the 18-!U's. According to these rules, every es­
tate had to bf' descrihed in detail, with au estimate of the labor 
of serfs i11 all categories. The serf's dut�· to render ]ahor was 
based on the amount of th(' lamllnrd's land he was using; his 
labor therefore was like payment of rent for using land. Accord­
ing to the amount of lahor to he rendercll, the serfs Wt're divided 
into: 1) draught-serfs (a draught nwaut J to 4 tcmns of o;,.en or 
hor!.es). 2) semi-draught, 3) gardeners, and 4) bohyly (landless \VOrkcrs). The serfs ir1 the first category had to \vork for the 
master thrl"c days a week, in tlw scco1td two day.�. In addilinn 
the�· had to fulfill 12 "gathering·' ,la�'S per yC'ar (<lurinp; the 
period of greatest activit�· when all the ahle-bodil•d were ··gath­
ered .. for work), and 24 days of guard duty. If a landlord was int
1wed of mPre labor, he was to pay for it a("eording to schedule. 
The gardeners had to give 12 more da�·s of labor per year in 
addition to the 12 gathering days :md 24 guard days, ,md to 
pay for the lam! they were using for themsclws according to 
S('hC'dule. \Vork in the manor. i. e. everyday labor 011 the cst::i.k 
of the landlord could only lw performed \,y bobyl.y (landless peasants) and orphaus, and for wages. An accounting of lahor 
prrformed had to he entncd into a hook of everv serf. Serfs 
obligated to perform labor wcr(' men frorn 17 to 55. aml women 
from 16 to 50. Labor for the lamllonl had to he done during 
the first days of the week. holidavs cxdnded, also davs of sick­
ness if no �11hstih1te was available. Working off dd;ts for any 
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goods received from the landlord was not permitted during 
periods of fit>]d \vork, and uo more than one day in a week 
conld he given for tliis purpose. 
After taking a detailed inventory of the cst.1te, with an exact 
description of the duties of each serf, one copy of it was kept 
hy the landlord, another was announced by the minister in 
church and h·pt by him. It is obvious that the landlords made 
a determined stand against this control of obligations, and 
wherever possihle circumveuted the rules and avoided making 
inventories. Landlords would often substitute so-called uroky 
( annual days) for obligatory lahor Llays, which was permitted 
by law. But tasks to he performed on riroky were often of such 
maguitude that it took an entire family a ,veck to Lornplde them. 
The milt!cr and more restraiuc<l forms of scrvitu<le i11 
Ukraine, as compared to Russia, cauuot he presumed to furnish 
proof that there was no oppression in Ukraine. Such a false con­
clusion could be reached by assuming that Ukraine was an or­
dinary colony, in all respects behind its metropolis, sonwthing 
on the order of Asian or African colonial buds. Hnssia, how­
ever. came to Ukraine possessing a much more bachvanl sys­
tem of SO('ial order, a system of deep social cleavages and <lark 
slavery. Ukraine, following the revolution of national and social 
liheratiou of 1641,, stood in the ranks of the- leading nations of 
Europe of the da:·-�-' 
Thus, the lesser degree of trampling of human rights was not 
the result of any privileged position of Ukraine. It furnishes 
only one more proof that the conquest of Ukraine by Russia 
constituted an act of extreme retrogr<'ssion for tlw former. Of 
equal importance is the fact that the serf's position was charac­
terized not outy by the curtailment of his human rights. In eval­
uating his positiou, the economic status of the serf was of prlme 
importance. In this respect the Ukrainian peasant was ahvays 
below the comparable Hussian. This was due nut so much to 
conditions of agricultural productivity as to the general econ­
omic conditions to which Ukraine was subjected. 
The Ukrainian peasantry was by no me,ms homop;eneous in 
the social and legal sense. It \\aS more varied than the Hussian. 
Besides the Cossacks who had not lost their personal freedom 
and right to own land, and tl1e iusignificant 11umher of free 
2'• An '1JLdlogous �itnation could be observed in Finland ,ifter its <.:onqucst 
bv Hussia. Finbm\'s social onkr W,lS without eurnpMison more libt·rnl 
a�d demoerntic th,m Russia's. 
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peasants, there were also many alien colonists in Ukraine, who 
were free and their own masters. \Ve do not mean the Hussian 
peasp.nts-serfs who were imported into Ukraine by tens of thous­
ands to provide labor to the Hussian landlords on their Ukrain­
ian plantations, but colonists from varions lands of Europe. They 
flocked to the rich lands of Ukraine. Indeed, the Hussian Gov­
ernment took pains to settle and assist such <:olonists. 'The Com­
mittee for the settlement of aliens admitted in 1870 that one 
family of colonists cost the treasmy .5,000 rubles, whik sub­
ject peasants who were migrating from overpopulated gubernias 
to sparsely settled areas, aud created the most profitable settle­
ments from a state viewpoint, were hardly ever granted any 
loans.""" One of the motives behind attracting alien colonists 
was a desire lo establish military settlements which would pro­
vide the governmc11t with better support in tnrbulent Ukraine. 
This was one of the primary reasons for settling a large number 
of Serbs in Ukraine, who established the so-called New Serbia, 
receiving a grant of 1,421,000 dcsiatynas of land. Tims, thanks to 
eomlitions created by Hussia, there was this curious phenome­
JJOII in Ukraiue that Hussiaus and emigrants from various lands 
were colonizing Ukraine, while Ukrainians were leaving en 
masse for Kuban, the Crimea, etc. 
The basic element and largest part of the rnral populatiou 
was the serfs. They were in turn divided into serfs of the state; 
crown and landowners. State �crfs were those who occupied 
state lands and tilled them. Crown serfs were those on land 
belonging to the reigning dynasty. These classes of serfs were 
created by the Imperial Government's confiscation of lands 
which were either the property of the Ukrainian nation or the 
private property of the peasants. We have previously stat(;"d what 
('Onditions prevailed in Ukrain(' after the liberation from Polish 
mle. The Hussian Government, in di�tributing the land, along 
with its peasants, among Russian landowners, and keeping the 
remainder, thns assumed property rights to the land. The peas­
ants, by acquiring rights to till the land became obligated to 
the larnllords or the govemment. Thus the duties imposed 11pon 
the serfs for the right to till the land flowed from the 11surpa­
tion of the righb of these very same peasants by the Hussian 
Government. \Ve are emphasizing the nature of agrarian condi­
tions of this period because we shall encounter analogous con-
'" J\l. Slal,chcnko, up. cit., I. 2.'.'.. 
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ditions again, iu discussing agrarian policy of the Bolshevik 
regime. 
Troynitsk_v's work "O chislc krcpnstnikh i; Rossiyi" ( On //ir 
m1mlwr of serfs i11 Russia), (p1otes the tigiires, in Tahle Ill, 011 
the number of landowners' peasants (in thousamls)." 
TAHU; 111 
Region: I f/,l7-a,� lfl-57-S8 
Volhrni,t 3·!5,3 ,15 l.,5 ..J40.3 
Katerrcmsbv 117,B t.J.5,8 1.38.8 
Kiev lSR-1 !'i0-1.6 .�21.:! 


















·roTALS:. 2,.'H0,2 2,.':i79 •. '; 2,.>63,,1 
The aho\'c figures deserve sorne study. As we can see, tbe 
total numher of serfs is almost stationary. Fur tlic 35-ycar period 
betwceu the first and second census the increase is only 10.5'.T; 
for the 20-�·ear period between the second and third census, the 
nurnher is alrnost stabilized, Such odd censu5 results rPquirc 
some cxplauation. l1y naturaJ iucrcasc alone, the number of 
serfs should have doubled in 5,5 years, and in addition thew 
were other factors contributing to the increase of the number 
of landlords' serfs. Firs! of all, at the beginning of the 19th cen­
tury !he process of distributing land among Hussia11 magnates 
still continued. Secondly, during the first half of that century 
mass settlement of Hussian serfs continued on Ukrainian es­
tates of Hussian laudlords. 
The ca11sc of these cew,us results is in a small rlegrce the 
liberation of some serfs by purchase, but the real and main 
cause is their mass flight to the Don and Kuban regions. Dur­
ing those times. Kuba11 became almost exclusively settled by 
Ukrainiaus. and thus by its national compositiou became a 
Uhainian land. 
Not the lack of land, nor its poor quality were then tht.· 
cause of a mass flight of Ukrainians �rom their homeland, but 
conditions created by Hnssia in Ukraine. 
"' N. Troynihkv, 0 ch isle krepnstnikh v Rnssiyi ( 011 the Number nf Serfs.
w Ri,.�s:11,I. l'olt.1va, HJ(l';'. p. :20. 
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TafJlc IV shows the number of slate serfs ( in thousands). 
TABLE IV 
Region: 1851 1$.58 
\'(1lhvnia 24 1')7 
Katc�y11nsl:1v 42..'j ,t;W 
Kie" :J.(16 211:i 
Pod ilia 146 1(;7 
Pol ta"·' 86(:; 94'.l 
Kharli,- 6:)8 687 
Klwrs,m 97 m 
Chernihi'" 628 6fi6 
�s 
TOTALS. 3,(J:30 J,:l\H 
For clarity the number of landlords who owned serfs, with 
a division into gronp� ac<:ortling to the nurnber of serfs ownC'd, 
should he shown (in Table V): thi;, will be uecessarv to shed 
sornC' light on comliticms at thC' time of the reform of 1861. 
TAllJ.t.;; \ 
Classific,ttiun "' Landlords " of 1837 
Regio11: to 20 '" 100 '" 500 to 1,00() over 1,000 
serfs ocrfs serfs .\er/, �-,;r/,1-
Yolhynia .Jll 708 /Fil 112 63 
K«teryuosht\" 8Sl 1,06:l ,(]() 3::1 1,3 
Kiev 188 3-'l,1 ."i63 138 78 
Padilla 310 376 570 H'l 
Pollava . . 5,HJ:5 l..'504 ,'578 ,5:3 39
1-" Klmrkiv 2,2:36 l,l08 ·- 14 .1::1 
Khns,m 1, l 7t) LO.',!J :333 :08 ,,; 
Chernihiv 3,3--l-2 \.132 3.":i() 67 46 
zo 
TOT.\LS: 11,838 4,127 623 384 
Significantly. over 80% of all serfs bC'longc<l to estate;, which 
held 50 au<l mor<· serfs, aml over 37'.'f to estates \vhich held 1,000 
ai1d mort> serfs each. This show� that the dorninaling fraturc of 
landlord possessiou was the lmgc estate, typical of an agriculhn­
al economy ot sfaye h1bor in a colony. 
Accordinp; to the ukase of December 12, 1801, a serf desiring 
to purchase his liberty had 11ot rm!y to pay for his pcrso11al liber­
ty. h11t also purchase his laud. which had prcYiously been taken 
as Ibid., p, 30. �� Ibid., p. 36. 
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away from him. After 1826, personal liberty could be pur­
chased without land. 
The obligations of a serf to the landlord consisted ot two 
main forms; panshchytw, labor for the master, and obrik, rent, 
or the product of his labor in the form of produce or money. 
The master's demand of labor can be considered the more op­
pressive fonn, inasmuch as the master could Uemand the highest 
degree of efficiency during the perfod the serf \Vas working 
for him. TI1e obligation of paying rent could be accomplished 
with a more leisurely pace of work. It would be complied \Vith 
by simply surrendering to the masfer a certain percentage of 
the crop. But them were also instances where the rent would be 
computed in an absolute figure of produce or money without 
regard to the serf's income. In such cases the tenant could apply 
more intensive methods and all the surplusage would accrue to 
him. Ile could also engage in a trade or in commerce. 
In Ukraine, labor for the master was the dominant form of 
serfdom, tenancy with payment of rent being infrequent. As 
we shall see later, this circumstance was of prime importance in 
determining the development of the nation's economy and its 
agrarian conditions. 
According to compilations of Maslov, the number of tenants 
paying rent reached 16.7% iu the Left Ilank and Slobidska 
Ukraine, 6.5% in the steppe region, \vhile it was only 1% in the 
Right Bank region."0 The number of serfs who gave labor was 
(regions); Poltava, 98.86%, Chernihiv, 97.44%, Katerynoslav, 
99.8%. There were 524 villages of rent-paying State serfs in 1851, 
whose population \Vas 182 thousand, about 6% of all serfs in 
this category.'11 
The amount of rent in prodnce averaged in the Kharkiv re­
gion one-third of the gross crop, and in Volhynia from two­
thirds to three-fourths of the crop. In addition there ·was a cash 
rent of J to 4 rubles per household, and in the region of Poltava, 
5 rnbles. On a cash computation the average annual rent per l 
dc:siutyna of ploughing soil was (regions): Katerynoslav, 27 
rubles, 91:> kopecks; Kherson, .CID rubles. and Kiev, 2 rubles, 92 
kopecks. 
Before making conclusions as to all peasant obligations. cx­
d11sive of taxes, the so-called military settlements mnst be con-
'" P. Maslov, ,\grarniy v0pros t'. Ro�siyi (The Agruri<m l'rol,/em in HuMia), 
St. Petersburg, ICJ08, ll. 141. 
'" !.f. Slahchenko, op. cir., p. l2S. 
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sidercd. The idea of military sdtlements occurcd in Russia 
iu IGS.5, at first tor the organization of Cossack military service, 
but after the Poltava catastrophe the Hussian Government 
sought a foumlation for its rule in Ukraine in the establishment 
of a lauded militia system. The :\Tapolconic War of 1812 acccler­
,1ted the plan lor military settlements in Ukraine.-'" The compo­
�itiou of rnilitary settlements \\..as quite varied. Cossacks and 
State serfs, it also inclmled Hussia11 peasants purchased from 
their masters by the government at the followiug rates: a child 
to 11 years, 390 rubles; a youth. 7.50 rubles: an adult, 1,000 
rubles. These settlers lived in separate settlements, including all 
who belonged to that category. Tu lTkraine military settlements 
were lornted iu the g11hemias of Kharkiv, Kater�·noslav, Kher­
son, Kiev, and l'odilla, totaling 3(-l battalions of infautry aud 249 
scp1adrons of cuxalry. The basic form nf obligation of the�e set­
tlers was military ser\'icc, aud also so-called "bivouacs," i. e. 
maintenance of armed detachments i1J temporary quarters, :'.vlil­
itarv settlt'rs were divided into a first and second rank. The first 
included men who haLl no less than four oxen or horses and re­
Cl'ived 1.S df'siatyntls· of ploughing soil, the seccmJ with 2 oxen 
or horst·s woul<l get half as much land. There were also such 
settlers who tilled only truck gar<leus, and received one-fifth 
as 1nuch Iaml as the first rank. They \VCre free to do their work 
whenen·r necessary. but for the purpose of safeguarding some 
of their time for military Juty, thcrl' was a certain amount of 
r<'g11lation. 
Pre-capitalist Trade and Commerce 
In order to recognize the economic conditions of the 
Ukrainian peasants, aml the degree to which they differed 
from Hussia, WP TIIUSt go hcyond an analysis of the agricnlh1ral 
economv. It would be futile to mernly mention considerahle 
differences in the conditions of production. Quality of soil. di­
mate, arnilahility of space in the Southern �teppes all nwde the 
position of the Ukrainian peasants superior to that of many Rus­
sian regions. The <liffieult situation of !he Ukrainian peasants, 
and of all other workers, was comlitionc<l by those social au<l 
economic circumstances which encompassed the entire ceononiy 
and life of the population. The natural environment did not have 
the decisive influence in this case. 
'" Ibid., p. 76. 
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As early as the 18th cf'ntnry the Ukrainian agricnlhual econ­
omy bt·gan to enter a rnotwy economy. It showed signs of de­
vdoping industries, ancl in general far 011t-distanced Hmsia, llwu 
still remaining in tlw stage oI an agricultnre strictly for <:onsump­
tion. In methods of agriculture Vkrainc was not infrrior to thC' 
leading lands of \Vestcrn Europe. Even in antiquity tools were 
used in Ukraiue which Russia adopted only scn·ral cr•utnries 
later. Aristov wrote in 1S66: ''Tools used fnr tilling the soil in 
Ukraine, were the same which we now scee in our agricultmc." 
Tlie iron plough was used more in that antiquity than l'Dklia. 
( The wooden .wiklw was the most widely used tool in Hnssia as 
late as the 17th centnrlv). Hid..:a Prarda of the 11 to JSth centur­_lies contains reference., to iron harrows and scvthPs. In the 1267 
chronicle of tlw Tartar Khan Tcmir there is mention of water 
mills. The chronicle of 907 llescribcs spring and wi11tPr sowing, 
and such cult11res as wheat. rye, oats, harley, peas, lentils, hemp 
and flax. 
Dnring those ancient times. VkraiHe-Hus also engaged ill 
{ommercial ac!ivity on the markds ot Europe, trading nMinly 
with lauds of the Danube a11d with Greeks. Accordinµ; to the 
chronicle,. the Great Prince Svyatoslav said: "J do not like to 
stay in Kiev. I would rather be in Pereyaslavets on the Dannhc 
as that is the ccr_ttcr of m;-· land, all goods _arc gathered th(�re: 
from the Greeks, gold, textiles, wines, all kinds of fruit from thf' 
Czechs and 1.fagyars, silver am] horses; from Hus, furs, wax, hori­
ey and servants.'''' It is therefore not s11rprising that, coming 
under the sovereignty of Hnssia, Ukrairn' was already at a hi14h 
stage of commercial devP\opment Among the man!· artic\Ps of 
commerce, grain oce11pied a place of prime importance because 
of nahlfal circumstances and transportation facilities. Den·l­
oping grain export.� gradually, by the middle H:lth er·11tury 
lTkrninC assumed a leading position the grain markets of ()ll 
Europe. 11 exct·cckd Hussian foreign grain trade sixty-fold. 
Duri11g the period .1846 to 1S52. l:krairic cxportPd thc following 
qua11tities of grnin in units of clwtrerf:·" to France, 4,41.'3,616; to 
Italy. 4,149.587; to Austri,1, 2,070,997: to Turkcy, •1,117,163; to 
Fugland, 4,071,3,'30; to Greece, 172,308, l'k .. , 
:1·, N. Aristov, Promishlt'nno�t drn.nny R1,si (fodus!l'y nf A11ci!'11t R11s',i, St. l'dt'rsbtll!;, 180(J. Jl, 17, '"'Clwt1:('rf is a nlf�asure of \'olurne ('qualing about 210 pounds for oats, to 350 ponntls for wlwat. 
·'0 \1. Sbhclienko, op. cit .. p. S1.'3. 
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Ukrainian imlustry also developed rapidly. Various trades 
and home industries had already existed during the I (etm:malc 
pniod, and factor; industries lud made a �tart. Tu the l,'3:}()'� 
when factories began to crowd out individual tradesmen, tlw 
region of Poltava had - t216 artisa11s; KharkiY, 3.08:3; and Kiev 
lU,0S0, of whom about cl,000 were in the City:'u Some home 
industries, in the nature of peasant ha.ndk:rafts, produced _goods 
having a wide market: rugs of Kh:nkiY county, earthenware of 
Voclolahy and \"alky; silk shawls of Okhtyrka; lace and linen ot 
Iz; um; H.eshctyliv ribbons in the Poltava region; tablecloths 
and towels from Krolc\·cts 11ear Chernihiv; fishing nets tor the 
Oziv Se,1 of Ostri; sails of NovoLyhkiv; furs of Ostri; fur 
garments in the tern of thonsands from Bcrcznia11y region, 
and 111a11y others. Industrial production alw reaelw<l wide 
proportions. \Vr;wing of wooltms was an old aud highly de­
yeJopcd industry of Ukraine. Looms (for wcaYing cloth) 
were standard equipment in most households.a" The flow­
ering of the woolen industry reaches the early 18th century, 
whell Ukrai1w already had huge shet'p ranches of a high tc..:dmi­
cal stan<l:ud, with a rich and Yaried assortrneut of produdiou. 
The regions of ChernihiY and \"olhy11ia produced mosl of tht• 
heayy cloth. Kiev, Padilla and l'olhn'a produced fine doth. 
Similarly, the manufachITe of linen.<, developed at a fast p,1ce 
after the 18th century. The main ce11ters wen• in the regions 
ot Chernihiv ( Pochcp, Shcptaky, Topril), Volhyuia ( Hinw) and 
Kiev ( Shpola). ()thcr devt>lopi11� hranchl'S of iud11stry were 
glass, porcelain, metal ware ( mainly tools fm agricnltme) and 
others. 
\VC' are not now att(•mpting to giw a detailed description 
of the level and condition of Uha.inian industry of the 18th 
cent11ry. The data briefly furnished merely r'inphasizes 1ha1 as 
Par\y as the period rdcrrc<l to, ln1 krainc was already wdl on the 
\\·ay towards a broad developing industry based on natural a11J 
economic conditions, and had achieved a position of prominence 
in international commercl'. The retreat tram this path of histori­
cal development occurred under pressure of alien forces, in {'011-
scqul'nce of Hussia's colonial policy in Ukraine. 
"'' Ihirl., p. 201. 
"'0. Ohlohlyn, Ochcrki istoriyi Ukminskor1 fabn;ki. Manufaktura v. 
Ilrtmanshc/1yni (Outline of History of [:kminUm Factories. Manufactur­
ill!! /11 tfw Ifchmm P,·,·ied,. ;,:icv. lc):!3. p. S7. 
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Ohloblyn gives an accurate estimate of the situation which 
came ahout a;, a result of an a<lva1H.:c<l and strong(•r ec0110m11.: 
sy;,tem being corn1tien:d by a weaker and u!ldN-developc-d sr­
tem: "Th<' foun<lation of the l'krainian and Hussian economy 
of th(' J8th century was the sam(': rural agriculture. But at a 
time wheu tlie products of the Ukraiuian economy were al­
ready, for a tew cenh1riee>, known abroad, having trave\le(l a 
beaten path there, the Huc,sian agricultnrnl economy had only 
j11st started on that path. Hussian corrnnercial capital. taking a 
freer look at Europe through a window just openeJ, ;,houl<l 
have taken pains to close some door�, primarily to iHdependent 
Ukraini'im trade, in on\('r to keep out draft;, d('trimcntal to it­
self. Hussian industry, young and weak, could not alonf' com­
pete with the old an<l strong \Vestcrn European industry tor 
the Ukrainian markf't. The interests o[ Hussian husiness un­
er,tuivocally dictated the liquidation of Ukrainian commerce. The 
problem was to divert Ukrainian commerce to m:w aml 1rn­
known paths.38 
"In thC" struggle against the economic independence of 
Gkraine, Moscow attt-mpted not only lo takt' tliis forcigu trade 
into its own hands ( apparent in tht' first stages from the desire 
to curtail lllack Sea tr.ulc), but also to crowd Ukr.1inian goods 
out of the Hussian market and to transform Pkrniuc into a mar­
ket for Hussian products. These attempts became evident even 
in Khmelnytsky's time. whl'n duties were imposed on Ukrainian 
goods ... " Hussia madl' ·wide application of its customs duties 
policy in the strugglf' against Ukrainian industr�· and conm1C'rce. 
"The Hussian hourgt'oisic ot the 17th and 18th centuriC's did not 
feel comfortable when Ukrainian factories grew and ,voulcl send 
their goods to \Vt'stern lands and to Hussia, wher{' Ukrainian 
products competed with the Hussian easily. The reasons cikd 
brought harriers to industry and Lommcrcc, wilh whose aid the 
Imperial Governnwnt could regulate LTkrninian exports and im­
ports. The fiscal interests ol the Empire were hcing simultan­
eously s,1feguarded:t3� 
Customs duties was not the only weapon of Hussian policy 
against Ukrainian industry and commerce. tfany oiher mi'ans. 
including outright wrt'cking of industrial plants "·ere employed. 
At the election of fktrnans. it became almost a rule to introduce 
"Ibid .. p. 3".l. ·'" \1 Sl<1.hchf'nko Orhanizr.tshJ(< khozuatll"lt:a Vkrainy ( Organi;:ation ofih� Economy of {.?krai,w}, Klurkiv, 1925, II, !J2.
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"a series of articles prodding for the curtailment of Ukraiuian 
trade within the- borders of th"' Hussian State.";,, In 1718, the 
erection of nt'\\' potassium plants was prohibited. Then came 
the prohibition of free Pxports of potassium, tars, and saltpeter, 
which ultimately resulted in complete decline of these previously 
highly developed i11d11stries. 
A simibr fate befell the Ukrainian glass industry, which had 
reached a high stage ot development awl was Hussia's chief 
supplier of glass and glass products. Legal restrictions pnt this 
indnstry into a difficnl! position. "Ukraine could not only no 
longer sell her glass on the Hussian market. but her own mar­
ket begau to feel insufficient production of this article."" 
A stage was read1"'d where some branches of Ukrainian in­
dustry encountered artificial barrif'rs erected by Hussian com­
petitors. Thus, for example, in place of ready made products 
of the porcelain \Vorks of the \'illage of l'oloshky, Illukhiv 
COlmt:', clay was exported to :\foscow and l)dersburg, to plants 
of Russian manufacturers. Hussia did not hesitate to wreck 
Ukrainian cntC'rprises outright. The fate of the large linen fac­
tory of l'ochcp \vas sealed by an ordi1iance stating: "this sum­
mer the factor�· is to be transported to Great Hussian cities," am\ 
it \VHS dismantled am\ re-erected in Russia. In general, the 
woole11 and linen imlustrics ,vere the object of the most acute 
oppressiou 011 the part of Russia. This cau be readily understood, 
since their wide]:· usl'd products offered the most tempting op­
portu11ities in Ukrah1e for Hussian ma1111facturers. The Ukrain­
ian tf'xtile industry was brought to a decline by a .\eries of onli­
nances, especially of a customs tiscal nature. Thus, for example 
the \VOO]en industry of Kiev region declined 44,1% between 1842 
and 1847, from 668.5 thousand rubles to 3i3 .. '3 thousand. Other 
lol.liitie� had a similar dt'clirw. 
All this had repercussion.� 011 sheep ranching. The demand 
of wool mt the part of the Ukrainian mills, as well as Hussian 
manufacturiug and the markets of Western Europe. caused thC' 
development in Ukraine of fine-fleece sheep. From the ver�' 
be�inniug, the ranching \Vas of a colonial nature. :\ferino sheep 
made their first appearance in Ukraine i11 the late 18th l.:entury. 
In l "lO·-t the Hnssian GovemmeJtt, through •t German named 
11ill('r, brought a large flock of merino sheep to the Odessa re­
gion. Thi, kiud of sheep ranchillg took great strides with the 
'" Ibid., III, 146. "�I. Slabchcnko, op. cit., 11. 150, 
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establishment of huge ranches, main!? in Southern Ukraiuc, 
and thus Ukraine became a ,...-ool center both for Hussia and 
Europe. In 1848 thf'rc ,verc 3,700,000 meriuo sheep in the s011th 
of Ukraine, with some ranches raising tens of thousauds Exports 
of ,vool through Black Sea ports reached the follo\ving figures: 
l/:J:31, 3,140,000 pounds; 1840, 6,418,000 pounds; 1860, 20,577,-
000 po1mfk and in HUS, the Hussian mills purchased 3,200,000 
poumb on the Troi!sky market in Kharkiv. '" 
Af!n closing the borders of Ukraine to \Vestnn European 
tf',;tiks and \vrccking the Ukminiar1 woolf'n and linen im.lus­
trics, Hussia, ill onkr to procnrc for herself a monopoly of lhe 
Ukrainian market and its tolonial exploitation, undertook meas­
\lfCS to prevent even Polish textiles from reaching Ukraine. "An 
increase of imports of Polish manufac.tnres, mainly cloth, an<l 
primarily into Ukraine, was the cause of initiating special tariff 
measures in 1832 to curtail Polish imports into the borders of 
Hnssia and Ukraiuc."•·1 
In this ,-onnection Slabchcnko wrote: "'l\ussiau merclHrnts 
\W"n� partic11larly i11tercstcd in Ukrai11ian markets, lwcause there 
the�· 1101 only got raw material, bul .1lso disp(N'cl of goods of 
infnior quality .. goods <ldivcrc<l fro11J Hussia were of much 
lower quality then those distribute(! iu Russia itself, and prit'CSh_h
obtained in Ukraine \\TIC 15'.: to 20:,; highvr. The tariff of 1822 
secured particular privileges to ;\:[oseow merchants, and in this 
urnncction a lot of"so-callcd 'fancy goods' ( te:..-tilcs) were pushed 
into Ukraine. The Krcshdwnskv au<l rllinskv fairs alone handled 
almost 22 million ruble:> \\Orth of Hussian m,mufachtrcs, which 
was about one-third of the total production. Hussian textik, 
goods crowdcd 011t the Ukrainian altogether."'' 
Ohloblyn gives this exact analysis of the Ukrainian market 
of the p1:rind: "In tht: middle l850's the proc('SS ot capturing 
the Ukrainian market by Hussian capital was almost cornplctc. 
Hussian ind11:>try sold on the markets of th(• Left Hauk and 
Southern Ukraine 20 million rubles worth of textiles aloue. (Al­
most one-third of the gf'1wral textile production of the Empirc). 
In 1854 this was 86.9'.; of the total sales of textiles, and ucarly 
a <jUartcr (28.8'.;') of the gross sales at Ukrainian fairs. The parti­
cipation of foreign capital in the textile trade of the llkrainian 
-12 ;\I. SlalK·h(·nko, .Hlltcriuly . "p .. 31. 
<1 i\l. Volohuyl'\", "Do Prnhlemy Ukrajuskuyi F.konorm\..} ., ("Ou th" Prohh·rn of th,· UkrniuiJn F.(�momy"), Bol.1he1:']k C'krainy. Khnrkiv, 1928, (''From .\l.>nu�cript''). 
H \I. Sl.,lwh,·nko, "I'· l'it., p. 228. 
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market in the middle of the century amounted to onl\' l million 
rnblcs, constituting 4.3¼ of the total sale of textiles."'" 
The graiu trndc was mor<" complicated. Hussla could not do 
the sanll' thing as in industrial products, S(lueezt, the Ukrain­
ian agrk:ultural economy and put Hussian production in its 
place. Ilut the large grain trade volume opened wide possibilities 
of increasing national commercial capital. Exports of Ukrain­
ian grain in great ,pianhties facilitated, because of the influx of 
foreign exchangt\ exports to Ukraine of \Ve�tern European in­
dustrial products, with ,vhich Hussia could not hope to compete. 
\loreover, the inclnsion of foreign importers in the actiYities of 
tlie Ukrainian market in connection with grain trade was fraught 
with dangers. particularly i11 the graiu price policy. Thus, the 
grain trade of Ukraine became the main problem to be solved 
before Hnssi,1 could C'onquer the Ukrainian economy complete­
'"tly.t
\Yhat made the sihmtion even more complex was the fact 
that Ukraille, situated on the seaboard, was naturally drifting in­
to participation in world ocean trade and was thus becoming 
an organic part of the European ec<momy. Under such circmn­
stanccs the development of Ukrainian grain tra<le based on 
Black Sea routes was self-evident. As early as 1802 Napokon 
wrote to Tsar Alexander T: "Your Highness' State and Franct! 
would benefit much if direct trade were opened bchveen our 
ports through the Black Sea. \Vt' could bring from �Iarscille to 
Black Sea ports products of our colonies and of onr manufacture, 
am.l in E'xcha1Jge would take grain, lumber, and other �oo<ls 
which are easy to carry down the great riYers flowing to the 
Black St'a,"4• 
The attractive power of the I3lack Sea was being frlt to such 
a degree that not only Ukraine, but also Russian gulwrnitLS bor­
dering on Ukraine directed their gonds to this arterial highway 
o1 commerC'e. During the 182U's, 90% of all goods from the 
gubernias of Orlov, Smolensk and Kaluga went down th<" Desna 
and Dnipro rivers to the Black Sea. 
These nah1ral factors of the Ukrainian econom,· were so 
strong that in spik of all obstacles, Black Stea trade kept 
increasing considcrnhly. Shipbuilding increased, hoth of seagoing 
"" 0. Ohloblyn, Peredkapita/istyclm11- fabryk.a (Pre-Capitalist Factmics), 
Kfr·v, HJ2.7. pp. 4-1-1-5. -rn M, Sbhchcnko, op. cit., p. '11.t
-1; K.t Skalko.-sky, Rt.ssky torgu-i:iy flot (Russian :'llerchant Marine), St,t
Petersburg, HJ09, p. 17.
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and river vessels, and seaport impron,mcnt was begun. Follow­
ing a plan of Count \'orontzoff, a guild of so-called "'free sailors' 
unions" was established to guarantee erews for ships. 
An important stage in the development of seagoing trade, 
suhscriucntly playing an important part iu its further growth. 
was the granting to Odessa, in 1817 of free customs zone privi­
leges, finally effcchiatcd in 1819. This made Odt>ssa a ware­
housing point for foreign goods and guaranteed dut�·-frec cx­
cha11gc of goods within the prcscrihed zone. The C'Xtcnt of the 
BL.ck Sea foreign trade is shown h) tlw fad tlmt hdwccn 18,51 
an<l 18.):1 the nnmhcr of vessels entering Black Sea ports was 
:3,!::116 and sailing for foreign pmts, 11,074. 
This situation created for the Hussian industrialists and mer­
chants a dual problem. First, they had to remove from the 
Ukrainian markets the foreign exporters dangerous to them and 
replace them with their own capital, and then they had to impair 
the significance of the Black Sea and turn Ukrainian grain north­
ward to their ports on the Baltic. The Crimean \Var of 1854 to 
1856 helped rl'alize the firsl task, "removing the foreigner and 
putting in his place the Hussian exporter aided hy tariffs." The 
war also helped in lessening the importance of the Blad. Sea not 
only by halti�g all traffic for the duration, hut also h_v destroying 
the mcrcbant fleet. The restoration of this fleet proceeded under 
the new form, completely in the hands of Russian capital of the 
"Hussian Company for Steam Navigation and Commerce." 
The channeling of Ukrainian grain northward required 
more complicated steps. One of them was the price policy of 
grain. In Ukraine, local prices were kept at a mnch lower levd 
thau in regions which gravitated to Baltil· ports. Freight rates 
and duties were much lower in the Haltie than in tllf' Black 
Sea ports in spite of a greater distance of grain producing areas 
J:rom the former. 
Table Vl gives comparative pri('l'S of grain in Bailie and 
Black Sea ports (per unit of I chct1wrt (approximately 360 
pounds in rubles). On the other h,md freight and duty per cliet­
u'rt were 1.67 ruhles in the Baltic ports and 2.99 rubles in Black 
Sea ports. "'The growth of the Ukrainian grain trndc could not 
he looked upon with comfort by Russian hlack�soil landlords, 
therefore they ma<le demands that duties he imposed on Ukrain­
ian grain in tbe i11\erests of Hussian black-soil ,1grie11lturc."·" 
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This (lifference in freights a11d tariffs was f1,lt even more acutely 
wl1cn Hussia started building railroads, and baited them iu 
Ukraine. In the correspolldence of a Ukrainian landlord, .-\mlry 
Storozhenko, with his son. we read: "But they did not hurry with 
Ukraine, although Ukrainian merchants and landowners were al­
ready vociferous about this matter ( wnstruc:tion of railroads). 
Conversations started in connection with the fact that AmC'rican 
grain began to take the place of Ukraini,t'l on foreign 
markets. Our wheat was locally cheaper: in Odessa in 1840, 6.10 
agaiIJst American i.92; in 1841, 5.60 agaiHst 7.85; in 1842, 5 . .'55 
against 7.39, in 184:3, -1.85 against 7.00. But both freight and iH­
surance were higher in Ukraine (insuranec from Odessa to Lon­
don was 2..'W aud from New York to London LS:.:. lt took almost 
twice as long to ship grain from Ukraine as it did from .-\meri-
ca. ,,,�
Ukrainian lamlo\vners were very busy in the matter of build­
i11g railroads, but "the Government made such severe demands 
on corporations that they could not be complied with,"'''' 
The results of this policy soon became apparC'nt. "'ln the 
1850's Englaud was lost as a purchaser, now being able to buy 
the same Ukrninian grain in Baltk ports, the Scandina\'iun 
nations also, although the Black Sea still offered stiff resistance 
to encroachments of Baltic ports and Hussiau exporters, even 
during periods of lowest depression.".-,  
The Black Sea grain track itself finally canH� under Hussian 
control, being unable to avoid the general process of colonial 
exploitation. Table VII shows ethnic division of industrialists 
an<l mcn-hants of Uhaint' for 1S3Z. 
"Hussian merchants and owners of factories often lived in 
Russia, and admi.nistned their Ukrainian cnterprist'S from 
thcrc."5" 
,,. Ibid .. p. 24i::i. 
oo P . .Fomin, "F,konomio;hna khaqktery,tyku Ukrainy" ("Economic Charno;­
teri,tic1 of Ckrainc"). p. 51 
51 /I.I. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. 146. 5" 0. Ol1Joblyn, 01;. cit., p. 47. 
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Even tht-' sugar refining imlu�try, where Ukraine was dearly 
oubide of any compditiou hy reason of havillg the greatest yield 
per area and the lowest produ('ti(m costs, was snhjcct to attempts 
to haw its development thwarted by a system of tariffs. There 
were 4-5 sugar retiuiug plants in Ukrai11c in 1840, and 229 iu 
185:2, but uotwithstanding the prime position of Ukraine. con• 
sidcrablc quantities of unrefined sugar were shippc<l to nussia 
for refining (e.g. the Koenig plant in Petersburg). 
The position of Ukraine as a result of this policy was aptly 
characterized in 1S1:3 by V. Karaz;·n. the fonnder of the first 
Ukrainian 1111iversit\' in Kharkiv: "\Ve arr forc('d to sell Ollf 
product.� iri that form in which uature has giYe11 them to us, 
and bcin;:i; rich iu all material for rnannfacturillg, almost all our 
needs have _to be satisfit'd by imports from afar, paying for 
freight tO inside Russia and bad., and paying with our poor 
money the net gains of middk,meu through whose hands pa;,s 
first of all rnw materials extracted \\ it.b our hands. and then 
when thev (;Ome back to us in the shape of manufactured 
goods."-" 
\Ve refer again to the basis of the Ukrainian population, the 
peasants. In the light of what was said aboYe, it is dear why 
their position was much worse than that oJ the Hussian pt>asants. 
The pro<lul'tivc nature of Ukraiuian agric11ltnre induced the 
landowners to increase its cxtt'nt imposing �('rf labor upon the 
peasants. 1 lcm:c tlw practical absence of a rent c.ystern in 
l1kraiuc, the complete depell(lencc of the peasants on the man­
ors and the .�erdtude, :\<lded to this arc the extremeh· limited 
opportunities of wage labor, hecause of an artificial s1:ifli11g of 
Ukraiuian indnstry. The Ukrninian peasant simply had no place 
to earn wages en•n if he only had to pay land rent. Tht' policy 
of low grain prices in comparison with Hussia, diminished even· 
further the income from tliat part of the peasants' productio11 
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that ,wnt to market. At the same time, the fiscal policy of thP 
Imperial GovcrnnwJJt based on the prim:iph- of privileges for 
the bndowners and favoring young Hussian industry, trans­
ferred the gwater part of the t.ax load 01i1o 1he shouldt•rs 
of 1he peasants. The landowners' peasants paid a head tax 
ol 95 kopecks, 49 . .5 kopecks of land dues, and a whole 
�,,ries of local assessments, such as qnartering soldiers, fnrnish­
illg labor tor road COJ!Strnction. am.I traction power for hauling. 
D.l Zhurnvsly in his Statislicheskoye Op i.rnniye Kierskoy G11ber-
11iyi, computed the easli cxpcmlihtn·s of a peasant family in thel
1S30"s in Kiev reg;ion at 29 rnblcs, 25 kopccls, of \Yhich 15 rublesl
went for taxes, 3 rnbles for eommunal dues. and 1 ruble tor re­
ligious elm's. The balance ,vent primarily for tools, scythes,l
whct'ls, a:>..lq�rcase, etc. Only tiny amounts were available forl
consumption and clothing, the rn,lin item being the cost ofl
�alt . .-,il
Thus, the purchasing power of the main part of the popnla­
tion, a decisive factor in any nation's ccouomy, was c:-.tn·mcly 
low. But cvcll these modest financial ll('ecls could not be met 
by fanning. Comparing the cash income and cash outlay of a 
medium sized houschokl. we find an average annual cash defi­
cit per family of 7 rnbles, 25 koped,s. This caused a continu.11 
accruing of huge tax deficiencies owrn.l by the peasants, which 
the government was frequently compclletl to write oft as not 
collectible, only to have them pile up again, in even larger 
arnouuts. In 1817 the landowuers' peasants owed 879,000 rubles 
in deficiencies, which \Vere written off. lk 1839 there was a 
new (kfidPncv of 5.5 million rubles. ,\ ma11iksto of 1H26 wrote 
off similar defieiencies ot state serfs. !mt in 18,58 the latter again 
mwd 797,000 rublt:s in rents all(! 7�7.000 ruhl<'.\ in taxes. :\n ex­
tremely tight money situation was then charackristic of the 
Ukrainian farm economy; caused on the one halld by agranan 
conditions existing iI1 Ukraine, ,mcl on the other by the colonial 
position of the Ukrainian economy, particularly of in<lu;,try and 
commerce. This crisis, as we shall see, played a decisive role 
in the ;,ubst'l}llt'nt history of Ukrainian agriculture, and of the 
economy as a wholt'. Ukraine entered the period called tlw �era 
of industri:"tl capitalism" undPr these handicaps. The beginning 
of the period is the abolition of serfdom, in February, 1S61. 
' .\/. Sbhrlic11ko, op. cit., p. 1-18. 
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Earlier, Empress Catherine TI wrote to Prince Vyazcinsky: 
"\V(' must eradicate the indecent idea [of the Ukrainians], ac­
cording to which they consider themsl'lvcs to Le au entirely dif­
fer('nt Hation from this [Hussian]. Little Russia, Livonia, 
and Finland arc provinces governed by privileges confirmed to 
them; it \\'onkl not <lo to viola((' them all at one<·, but neverthe­
less calling them forPign (nations) and treating them on such 
a basis is more thau a mistake, it can b(• called sheer stupidit:'• 
These proviHccs, also thr) Smolensk, must be brought by c,1sy 
s!'agcs to sud1 cornlition that 1hcy become Russianizcd, and stop 
lookiug to the woods like wolve�."c,·, 
Tile policy of Hussiauization was, as is we.II known, the 
hack hone of Hussia's attitude toward Ukraine over the centuries. 
Tt would, however, be a grave mistake to believe that tltP aim 
of this policy was complete unification of Ukraine with Hussia. 
i.oc. tl1e transformation of Ukraine into an eqrn1l Hussian terri­
tory. On the co11trary, Hussian economic policy alwav� aimed ato
�!iffercntiating l:krainc fnnn Hussia, and of keeping L:kraine ino
the status of a colonr.o
:;:; Serhiy Yelre,nov, Islorit1 Ukraimkul.o T"/Mmi,1.1·/1:11 (History of Ukrt.1ir1i1m 
LitPratrm')_. Kiev. 1924, I, 272. 
CHAPTER 2 
POST-REFORM AGRARIAN CONDITIONS 
IN UKRAINE 
Pre-conditions to the Reform of 1861 
THE :\..fAKIFESTO of February 19, 1861, abolish­
ing serfdom and introd11cing a change in agrarian conditions, 
instead of solving the diffic11lties of the Ukranian peasants re­
sulting from the economic subjection made them even more 
complicated. The causes of this were both the nature of the re­
form itself, as well as the peculiar situation in which the Fkrain­
ian peasants were placed in relation to Russia, again in the 
interests of the latter. 
The abolition of serfdom had at that time become an his­
torical necessity, moral motives never being decisive in the poli­
cy of the Russian Government. The main compelling reason 
was the comse of Russia's economic development. A further 
growth of industry, already occupying in Russia an important 
position was meeting with two insurmountable obstacles. First of 
all, iudustry needed a mass consumption market for its pro­
duction. because at that time, light industry was the domimmt 
mass production manufacturer. Serfdom excluded the possi­
bility of creating such a market. The labor of the peasant on 
the landlord's estate was in the nature of work dues (a certain 
number of days in the week), having no reflection in the peas­
ant's cash budget. His own enterprise was also of a natural­
consumpti011 character, and his connection with the cash-com­
modity market went no farther than the purchase of salt, axle­
grease, scythes, etc. Ylost satisfied their needs with their own 
farm and handicrafts products, or by bartering food products 
for products of other artisans. This characterized not only the 
level of the needs of the peasants, but also the style of, their 
living, reflected in the commercial relations of the period. The 
produce of the peasants' farms (bread, vegetables, milk, meat) 
had no local market, and the masses of the local population 
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had to be their sole consumers. If a person nccdccJ such prod­
ucts, he would lmy them not for cash, but for repayment in 
kind. Consumer goods produced hy the peasants then could 
only get a market value upon reaching a city market. Bnt the 
distances from such markets with almost no cstablislwcJ roads, 
and the small amount of production, were an ohstack to the 
participation of the pr)a\ants in market activities. Cash was bad­
ly needed for the payment of taxes, and thi� determined the 
l'xtcnt to which the serf farmers took part in market activities. 
Accordi11g to hudgetary research, in 1858 in the: Kiev rt'gion the 
payment of taxes and local assessments reached two-thirds of all 
cash expenditures of the ;n'r'ragc household. Jt is quite dear 
I hen, that under s11ch internal market co11ditions, any large-scale 
UPvelopment of capital industry was ont of the question. Life 
Uemanded a breaking down of the natnrnl fomis of the econ­
omy. It demanded the incln.�ion on a much larger scale than 
before of the pcasanh as thP basis of the population ( coustit11t­
ing over 7,5% of Empire's entire pop11lation) in the system of 
monetary circulation. For this purpose it wa\ rit'ccssary, on the 
one barn!, to endow the labor of the peasants on lamllords' es­
tates with the fom1s of hired labor, paid in wages, and on the 
other, to increase the peasauts' nct"ds for cash, mai:ily by increas­
ing their taxes am] other obligations. 
The Imperial Trqasur�· had a direct interest- here. The econ­
omic condition of the Hussian Empire, backward in relation 
to \Vestem Enrope, was becoming hard pressed and threatening. 
The aureole of glory and the lcadiug rok in Europe secured 
by Russia as a result of the war against Napoleon vanished 
quickly, and Hussia faced the danger of ,1 decline of her impor­
tance in Europem1 politics. The Crimean \Var of 1834-56 gave 
the situation a vivid emphasis. It was becoming clear that it was 
no longer possihle to base the powl'r of the state exclusively 
npon the human masses, \Vith th<' gigantic itlllnstrial develop­
ment of \Vestem E11rope d11riug the 19th century, if Hns�ia wert' 
to remain industriall�· stagnant, she wnnld invariabl�· lose all 
her positions gaiucd in almost uninterrupted wars of aggression. 
( According to the Hmsian General Kurop,1tkin, dnring the 200-
year period of the 17th and 18th cn1turics Hussia had 72 years 
of peace and 12S ;·ears of \var, out of which 101 years, :2.2 wars, 
were for the conquest of alien territories.) 1 
1 "l\"atsionalrw pytannya n,i skhodi Fvropy" ( '"llw l\·uti0nulity Prubkm in 
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The necessary tempo of development could not be provided 
by Ru;,;,ian industry's own resources, because up to this time 
it had been existing under favorable r.:onditions of the natural 
ecouomy of serfdom and did not possess sufficient capital. 
Therefore, in order to achieve its goal, the government had to 
embark upon the development of a state industry, and furnish 
aid to industry in the form of grants, credits, and a favorable 
customs policy. This required a considerable increas{' in the state 
budget, impossible to realize under conditions of serfdom. In 
a natural economy, the peasants could not become the basic 
tax-beariug category. On the other hand, the class nature of 
the Tsarist Empire, the privileged position of the Pobility, and 
the political weight of the latter, stood in the way of increasing 
the tax load of the landowners. 111us, this facet also demon­
strated the need for abo lishing serfdom, so as to change the 
peasants into a basic source of the state's income. The main 
emphasis was that only by liberating the peasants, would Rus­
sia, as the metroepolis, get rich at the expense of her colonies. 
This was, in fact, realized in full measure, as we shall sec later. 
Colonial exploitation had, in the case of Russia, the same de­
cisive meaning in the development of industry, as it did in the 
case of \Vestcrn European empires. 
The interests of industry also demanded the abolition of 
serfdom, because the problem of availability of labor hinged 
upon this. Binding the peasants to the soil caused a lack of labor 
for industry, and snpplementing the cadres of labor from the 
ranks of rent-paying peasants (relea;,ed for wage-earning by the 
landowners) created on the other hand a condition of Huiditv 
which precluded establishing a permanent class of qualified 
labor, a prerequisite for the ever-increasing technical level of 
the industrial process. 
The government had earlier songht a solntion to the problem 
of industrial labor by submitting state-serfs to serfdom in in­
dustrial plants. The metallurgical industry of the Urals was 
based upon such serf labor, and the Luhansky State 1.fetallur­
gical Plant in Ukraine was also based on this plan. But this 
proved to be so unproductive that it was impossible to even 
think of organizing any normal production schednles with it. Tn­
dustry needed a free market of hir-cd labor; it needed the aboli­
tion of serftlorn. 
Eastern Europe"), Uaterualu i Dokumeuty (Matcrfrds and Documents), 
Prague, l\J2,5, p. 31. 
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Finally, the landowuers themeselves were, in a large majori­
ty, inte-rested in such reform, not because serf ownership was 
onerous to them, hut because it \\'ould provitle a means of rl:'m­
edying their hopeless financial position. The crnx of the matter 
is that the monetary �ptem of the economy was unable to in­
clll(le in its orbit even the landlords, whose economy, as has 
bC('ll mentioucd above, was hase<l upon a natural system. The 
11ew stde of life created an acute need for rnoucy which the sys­
tt·rn of the time was unable to satisfy. lfeuee the gre:o.t indebted­
ness of the landow11ers, the mortgaging of properties, etc. Re­
demption paymnils, due the landowners according to the 1861 
reform, the land becoming the property of the pecL�ants who had 
been tilling it just as before the reform, thus became a consider­
able financial aid to the landowners. In reality endowing the 
peasants with land along with their liberation was nothing but 
compulsory purchase, and at pricE's much in excess of the real 
market valne of the land. This was the reason behind the interest 
of the landowners iu the reform. It is true that they hecame ap­
prehensiw, lrst after the liberation a lack of labor for their es­
tates might ensue, and that cash payments for laLor may become 
a great load upon their ecouomy, and for that reason they de­
manded certaciu guarantees to be given along with the reform 
which would safeguard. them against such dangers, and this, as 
we shall see later, they were successful in getting. 
Abolition of Serfdom and Endowment 
with Land 
The abolition of serfdom was then an historical necessity 
of the period. It was not ouly in the interests of the commer­
cial and industrial classes, but also of the whole state, and 
even ol a large part of the gentry. Serfdom was abolished 
on February 19, 1861, after lengthy preparations by the gm·­
ermnent. The Tsar's Manifesto granted the peas:.u;ts personal 
freedom and abolished their subjection to the landowners. 
bnt the peasants were still a class of limited rights. They 
had no right of absolute freedom of mo\"ement, they were sub­
ject to the jurisdiction of special courts, corporal punishmeut 
could be inflicted upon them at the hands of so-called Zemsky 
nanhalnykty (Landchiefs) an office created in 1889 of a purdy 
administrative 11al11re, though also endowed with certain judi­
cial functions. These conditions wen\ however, uuiform for the 
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whole Empire, and in this respect Ukraine did not differ from 
Hussla. Rut in applkation of n1les the Hussian lmn•aucrats in 
Ukraiuc displayed much more nf a ''fightiu� spirit," mentiornxl 
by the Hnssi:m jo urnalist DaniloY in his work Ohshdwya poli­
tika prat:itelstrn i gorndarstDCnniy Stroy. He wrote: " ... this 
(policy) was didate<l by a desire to bolster among the organs 
of the authorities that 'fighting spirit' which is created h
_v 
a mili­
tary command i,1 borderlands; it was dictalC'tl by the ti<lP of a 
mnltipliecl hnreacracy which was directly augmente(l from the 
milieu of the Jarid-poor gentry, clergy and officialdom, running 
after jobs and rewards .. Finally, this 'fighting' policy was, 
in relation to borderlands, peopk of other race and other faith, 
the means suited best for diredi11g their feeling nf anger and 
dissatisfadion on a false path, a frding 11wt was embracing 
more and more of the ,ihorigi,w.l Hussimi population which was 
heing fon·ed to take it out against other nationalities by oppress­
ing them. for their own miserable and poor existence,"" 
Tn Ukraine, this "fighting spirit" became more acute hy 
special efforts of the government directed at eradicating every­
thing that had any relation to national separatelless. ln 1S6:3 
the Ukrainian language was prohibited iu rt'ligious, popular and 
scientific printing and textbooks. Later, in 1876, a circular letter 
extended the prohibition to all forms of works in thP- Ukrainian 
language. A11ything that contained traces of nationalism in any 
form was placed outside the Lnv. 
But the Hussian Government did not slop at national op­
pression or cruel administrative policy. lu Ukraine, the reform 
itself wa;. surrounded hy a whole series of legal norms, differing 
from those for Russia, such that they not only preserved the 
colonial position of the Ukrainian agricultural economy, bnt 
umd.itioned its increase. 
The ernlowment of the peasants with land, hy way of pur­
chase from the landowners, was it;,clf very unjust, as far as 
Ukraine was concerned. \Ve ha\'e already mentionccl in the pre­
vious chapter how serf<lom originated in Ukraine. lt was noth­
ing hut an usurpation of the peasants' property rights to land. 
lln\ike Hussia, the intro<lnction of serfdom in Ukraine mnsistcd 
not only in depriving; the peasants of their personal freedom, 
� F. Danilo,, "Obshchaya pn\ityka prnvitelstva i gnsn(lar�tvcnni\· �troy" 
c·c.,nernl Policy of the Governme-nt and State Stnwture"), Ohslidie.�t­t:ennuye dd:d,cniye t: Rossiyi (The Social Mm:emenl in Ru.�sia), St Petersh11rg, 1910, I, 2l l 
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and impming labor obligatiom on them in rdation to landown­
er,, llllt also in robbillg them of their own land properties. 
The l'krainian peasantry has always remembered this viola­
tio11 of ib prop(Tty rights to laml. 1t loJJg contimie<l, co11trary 
to alien legal rules, to exercise property rights in land by alien­
ation, lea�c, etc. And these acts of the peasants were recognized 
even by the landowuers as part of the commou law augmented 
by traditioJJ. Thus, the very dccisioJJ com:cmiJJg purchase of 
laJJ<l from the lamlowJJcrs hit hard on the consciousness of the 
Ckrainian peasants. To them it was nothing, but this: the pur­
chase of their own property from those who had stolen it from 
them. 
The average price of one dcsiatyna of land at the time of the 
abolition ot serfdom was 12,3 rubles in Ckraine, and 187 rubles in 
Enropean Russia. This differential was caused by the low 
price of land in the steppes where, at that time, little \Vas under 
cultivatiou, The differeutial of the price of land is given varying 
analyses by differeJJt authors. Some stress the privileged position 
ot the Hussian lamlowners as compared to that of the lamlowu­
ers of Ckraine; others, contrariwise, mentioJJ the better position 
of the Ukraine peasants than those of Hussia. \Ve hdieve that 
a correct estimate of the situation would he to look at it from 
the aspect of- its future influence upon the Ckrainian peasants. 
First of all, the figures cannot he taken in their absolute dimen­
sions. \Ve have menti011ed before that the cash budget of the 
-Ukrainian peasants was because of the suppression and deliber­
ate wrecking of Ukraillian indushy, relatively lower tha11 of thee
Hussiai1 peasants, \vho had opporhmities f-or extra wage incomee
in industry. \Ve shall sec later what a large Humber of Hussiane
peasants had \Vinter home-wage opportlrnities in, for example,e
textile industry, preparing thread for weaving. Hence the pay­
ment o!- 123 rubles was llO less onerous to the Ckraillia11 peasante
than 187 rubles to the Hnssian. :1\""either can we overlook thee
fact that 123 rnhles \vas an excessive price for the period, ine
rnmparison with the real value of the land. Professor Slabchen­
ko cites computations of Professor Khodsky, according to whiche
the pnrchase price exceeded average bank valnations ( aml these,e
as we shall see were higher than average market prices) in thee
Chernihiv region by .3,9%; in Khcrson, 11.27; iu Katerynoslav,e
18:l'; in Kharkiv, 2:3.2%; in Poltava, 3'5;;; in Volhynia, 81%; ine
Kiev, 96.'5\/'; and in Padilla 10O,9'.l'., In localities of the greateste
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density of population, arnl the least land availability, thcv were 
lloublc of the current real values.'·· 
Even thi.� cxt·t::ssively high price of land in Ukraine did not 
a!ld to the landlords' desire to transfer larger areas of land to 
the peasants thau \\"8.S done in Russia. The naturctl aml economic 
comlitious in Ukraine at the time determined a capitalisti(' na­
tun; of large agriculh1ral enterprise.�. This was the can"c of the 
landowners (ksire to hold on to as nrnch laud as possible, be­
cause land pbyed the role of capital. This process of capitali£a­
tion of the a�ricultmal economy clid not reach the same degn°e 
in Hussfa, aml mon·owr, the higher price of 187 rubles fa\"ored 
a larger distribution of land among the peasants. 
A dccre,,se in the amount of pC'asaut holdings in Ukraine 
was also in the interests of the Imperial Gm·ernmcnt. In it was 
pc-rcr:in'd the best guarantee against tlw <langn of a lack of 
human labor on the large estates, in whose conseryation it was 
i.utereshcd, hecau:,e they provid<"d the main sourcC" of exports of 
goods, the profits of which, as we shall indicate later, benefited 
the Imperial Treasury. The nine-year C1blig;ation of former ,-crfs 
to work 011 lands of their form-er masters authorized by the 
Polo;:J1c11i!f(' and the so-called "obedience'" provided a lcrnporary 
sol11tion of the problem. The "peasant i. nh)rmetliarie�," author­
ized to conduct the land refonn put into effect in that spirit the 
matter of emlO\dng the peasants with land. 
The rcs11lt.� \\"Cfe these: thC" peasants nf the- C'entrally located 
and more imlmtrialized regions of the Empire lost only !J.9T 
of their former land uses. \\·hile in Ukraine, where the land \\·as 
the sole so11rce of income for the mass of the population. the 
1 arc•a of land used by the peasants decreased by 30.8%. The re­
form t·ost the peasants almost one-third of that land, off which 
they livetl heforc 18(·il. Hu! of itself this large awragc loss of 
peasant bnds does 11nt provide a cn1Hplt>!e picture of t!w dl'­
erease of peasant land uses, nor of its economic con:.equcnces. 
ht>l'n11sc that average was in large measure determined by the 
land-rich steppe, where the amonnt of such losses wns much 
smalln, arnl where the peasants' purdia�t's wvn' much larger. 
The real um! eatastrophic si;.;nific.am:e of these land losses \\'('H' 
felt in regions where '·Jand \\'JS tight,'· and wlwre lhe population 
was dense, on the Right Bank and iu Slobozlmnska regio1,, where 
"\I. Shbdwnko, ,\fotcriu/y .... II. 3G. 
• N. Olczhko, Agrarna politr;ka Balsh,:.0Tykit (/igmri,m l'oliq1 of tin· Rol­
shniks). Mm,ic-11, 1041, p. 8.
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the losses were greater, and the area of land coming to the 
peasants did not warrant the normal development of the econo­
my. To compute the •·hca<l-tax," a periodic census of the popula­
tion was taken following the revision. Between the two revisions 
the real number of the population exceeded hy for the number 
uf "taxahk souls." Thus, pC'r "taxable soul" there were 3.5 dcs­
ialynas of land before 1861, and only Vi after. Less than 3 
desiatynas per "taxable soul" were given to peasants in the Kiev 
guhcmia to 72¼; in Podilla to 77.,'5:C; in \'oll1yHia to 3:).7'.f.; in 
1':harkiv !o 3,'3.5'.f; in Poltava to 70.5%. and in Chernihiv to 
4(14:.' Un the occasion of the rcfom, the peasants of thf' Poltava 
guhcmia lost 449,76.5 dcsiatynas; of Katerynoslav, 198,838 des­.
iatyrws; of Kharkiv, 187,128 desiatynas; of Chernihiv, 59,015 _
desiatynas, etc:: It must he added that the extent of the losses 
varied. depending on the area of the estates .. \s a rule, the larger 
the estate, the larger the loss(•s to the pcasauts of la11d which they 
had been using. Tll('se loss<·s amou1ited to 50;; and more. P. i\Ias­
lov. in the work riuoted gives collected data on the guhemia of 
\'olhv11ja. According to him, the peasants suffcrt'd the losses 
showu in Table VIII on the occasion ot tlwir liberation in 1861. 
T.-\BLE \'JJI 
% of their former /rind usr 
On Pslalr'S of /c,1.1· than 100 d,-,siatynas. 8,2'.:. On e8tates /mm 100 to .'500 ,ksi,itvn.is. 2)Ul'.i­·nOn estates fmm ,=;oo to 1,000 desiatynas ..n J0.4'i On esh1lcs from 1,000 to .'5,000 desiatynas,n 43.4¼ On estates from .'5,000 to 10,()00 desiatyn.as.n ,"ifl..'5% Ori l's/a/es ol"Cr 10,000 tlt·siutyuasn 74.fl;l:n
There were theu �erfs who received ouh one-fourth of the 
amount of land which they ha<l been using before the reform. 
\Ve must hear in mind tlMt land-rich owners holding 1,000 
desiatynas and more, \\:ho had taken the most land from the 
peasants, held on the Left Bank 7Ll% of the total area of land 
owned by the landlords, on the Hight Bank 86.9:.l and in Sonth­
ern t:kraine also 86.9%.n8 
5 P.n!1.faslov, Ra:witiye zemledeleniya c Rossiyi ( Dccelol)mv11t of Landn/Jfatribution in Rr,�sia), :\loseow, H!L2, p. 12:J.n,. �I. SLdwlw11ko, loc, cit. 'I' !\b,!r»· ov. !'it., p. J :'.9. 
8 M.nOgonovslcy, Individtwlno!/e ::emlc.-.ladcniyc (fodiridual Land O!L'ner­.,hip), �1oscow, l'Jl2. p. 7\J.n
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Monetary Restrictions 
Thus the Ukrainian peasants had been robbed twice: when 
serfdom began their land property was taken away; when 
serfdom ended they were robbed by means of payments and 
decrease of the land area used by them. Land-tight conditions 
thus created, became as \Ve shall see later, a decisive factor 
in the entire development of the Ukrainian economy, and 
in the stTTJcturc of economic conditions. It determined a stand­
still, and in some fields even a retrogression of agricultnral pro­
duction. It caused an awful breaking up and differentiation of 
farm units. It created an exceptional increase in differential 
rent and land value, as capital. Tt finally created that crisis of 
the means of production and costs in the agrarian economy 
which characterized the entire system of agrarian conditions, 
and in large rncasme predetermined the position of the peasant­
ry in the social processes of following periods, including the 
Bolshevik period. All this, in turn, brought about the fiscal forms 
of colonial exploitation of Ukraine; a decline of large-scale agri­
cultural production; diffinilties in the accumulation of national 
capital which is a basis of the development of a national econo­
my; a sui gcneris capitalization, and its capture of foreign capi­
tal. It is difficult to find any branch of the Ukrainian economy 
during the last century, whereiu in greater or lesser degree, 
conditions of the agrarian economy did not have repercussions. 
It is quite understandable when we con sider how important the 
agricultural economy was to the basic mass of the population of 
Ukraine. \V(' noted in the introductory remarks to this work 
that as late as the eve of World War I, 87.5% of all the Ukrainian 
population. or 74.5% of all the population of Ukraine were en­
gaged in agricultnre. These are tl1e reasons which compelled 
us to consider all the foregoing, for without it one c0uld not un­
derstand the nature of many social and economic processes in 
Ukraine. And one could not uncover. in full measure, the colon­
ial position of Ukraine. 
The oblig.i.tion to pay off thfc' "purchase price·· of land nnoer 
conditions of a natural-consumption eharacter of the agricultural 
economy, and in absenee of opportunities for gainful employ­
ment outside the home farm, coupled with a decreased land area 
used by them. descended as a great weight upon the baeks of 
the peasants, it immediately created a deep internal economic 
and financial crisis, which influenced tlH' economy for a long 
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pcriOll of time. It was uot within the pt=>asunt's own powers to 
rnpe with the obligation. Ile was therefore cornpcl\('<l to apply 
for a stale loan. authorized bv the reform of 1S61. This trnus­
formed the "purchase price·' into a form of obligation to the 
state, turning the go\'ernment into a wllcction agcm:y. lu the 
minds of the peasants the borderline het\veE:n the current pay­
menh of these obligations and onlinary taxes \Vas thus often ob­
literatt'd. 
Nobody was able to pay the purchase price of land i11 the 
g,uhernias of Podilla and Yolhoynia, in Kiey gubemias only 0.1%; 
Poltava, 2J-l%; Chcrnihiv, 3.0%, Kharkiv, 5.41, and only in the 
lan<l-ricb regions of the steppe the percentage was higher. 
re-aching 13.8% in Khersun, 32.3% in Kateryno�laY. and 35% in 
Tavria. Almost all peasants signed up to buy land. (Sec Tahle 
IX). 
TAHLEJ\ 
Tntol mmilwr X11mbcr 
In the rqj,m nf !uwl,/c s,m/-1o ,s·imJiH/;!l/J 
Kharkiv .. 179,2. 18o 164,211- 97.8% 
Kl,nsnn 117.0\):J '.J 1..')RO - !J4�' 
Katerynoslav 130,596 82,467 - 63.8% 
Cl,eruiluv 23C'dl6 ISJ!)..385- B8.'J'. 
Poltava 284,078 21U.T56 - 76.S'f. 
In other regions almost all peasants signed up. But still, hy 
1874. when tlw aforcmelltionell nint'-year term of "ohedieucc" 
·ofinally expired there remained, in different regions, a certaino
number of peasants obligated to the landowners, and unable to
perform them partially. The number of peasmits so obligatedo
rt>adwd 26.7% of all peas,mts in the l'olbwa region. Ami in allo
regions without exception, from the Ycry first year of account­
ing for endowed land there were deficjt'n<"ics, peasant indcbt­
eduess for vurreut payments whid1 often, increasing frorn Je­
fidendes of prior years, readied the dimensions of the peasants'o
total cash expenditures dnring an entire year. The pktnre be�o
comes morP dear when \Ve consider the Pxtent of·th('sc obliga­
tions. Tn thr Klwrson region. for each "soul endowment'· theo
following paymeuts had to be made ammally: 7 rubles, 20 ko­
pecks for the purchase price amount, l ruble, 80 kopecks to theo
hndlord for the same account. 2 rubles head tax under theo
"ta,able soul" revision asses�rnent, and 80 kopcvks for localo
net>ds. All this excluded assessments in kind. The totttl arnouutedo
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to 2 rnhks_ 12 kopecks pC'r dr:siotyna. Assessments were C\'l'Tl 
higher i1t otlwr regi011s. According to data of !he Klmrkiv Conn­
ty Administration for the year 1Sfl9, ttw assC'ssnwnts for ever:,,' 
dcsiatyna of land were: Kharkiv, 3 rnbk-'s, 79.5 kopecks; Poltwa, 
.3 rubles, 70 kopecks; Kiev, 4 rubh's, 27 kopecks; Po<lilla, J rubles, 
Si kopecks; \'olhyuia, 4 rnhles, 27 kopct.:ks, ck.,i 
Professor Slahche11ko savs that "conditioTJs became such th,1t 
in some localities payments l'xceC'de<l laud im:ornc." This m,iy 
sound im:redihlc, hut we nmst consider that the tax amount of 
4 rubles from oHc dcsiaty1w, under the..: then prevailing agricul­
tnral svstcm of rotation which ldt one-third of tlw lan<l fallow. 
really rne,mt 6 rubles in relation to the crnp-yieldillg area, equal 
to 25�' of the gross crop (less see(\). Au cndkss mnnbcr of other 
taxes i11creascd the bunlen. Beside the purchase price, the:,,· had 
to pay state and local property taxes, city tax<"s, the ht'ad-tax, 
military le\·�·, assessments iu killd aud many others. A large part 
of the taxes ( especially those imposed locally) changed fre­
quently, usnally increasing, making accounting of the peasants 
out of pwvions payrnPnts morl.' difficult. ln some ;::;£'ms/ros1 •1 
tlwsC' taxt's equalled, am! sometimes cxCl'(•ded, the totals of ;11\ 
othC'r assessrnellts. Thus. e. g. in the Vovchansky county of Kh,tr­
kiv gubcrnia, the taxe.� reached almost 5 rubles per dcsiatyiw. 
In addition to cash taxes the pC'asants had to beM a whole 
series ol asscs.�meuts in kind: "ro•tcl dnt�·," labor mt road co11-
stnictio11 aud maintenance; hauling duty, tntnsportiug gomls 
and people; desiatske, police aid work with local authorities, de. 
Such taxation of the pe,tsa11ts was without comparisou higher 
than that of the landlords. Prof. Bogolepo\' compiled the follow­
ing table of land ta,es ( e-.:dmin· of redemption price paymentst, 
militar) Jen', as;,ess111cnts i11 kimL etc. of which the laudlonh 
were c·utirely free). Ile compared, see Table X, the taxes pail\ by 
peasants and lanrllords dming the periods of 1:-,91 and !S99 
( in rubles aud kopecks per dc.siatyna, per a1111u111,) 
ln some counties. loc,11 assc.'ssrnents narrowed the gap, hut 
the difference was still great. Iu the PoJtaya regiou, the peasant�t
"Id. Slal,dH·nko. np. cit., pp. 267-26\J. "' Zcrn1tu, \\as an org:m r,f l,w.LI ,;clf-gov,·mnwnt m "hid, rqJresentall-t', of tit,· nohilit_v "",-,' in a dorniJJ:\llt rn;ijorit} llel,•g·,lo's nf ti,,· 1wa,11,t� 
numbered no more than one-third of the voting land d<cputie:;. l'artieipa­tion of thC' pc:is"nb in the e�c<:utive organ of the ::t'11�itco. Upra1:a, was in,ignifio,;a11t. Among the <cornpetem:rs of zcmst1:os were; rum! 11rim.iry edt« :ltion, health_ n,.,_intenan,·c of rn.«lc;_ vihl �L1tistic>, :1!.'n.morni<: andt,·ctuinarhn ,iid, and otlwr similir 11u·,1�11r<� in nid nf the pt•nsants.tFinan"ial!y tlw ::cm;"h:us relied on the powr,r of ta,ing the peasants. 
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TABLE X 
1891 1889 
Rq;i,m Pe11srmt1· L<1ndou.m1·rs Peasants Lmdo1L"t1crs 
Left Bank 1.60 0.40 1.80 0.70 
Right Bank l.U3 0.3-5 2.(16 0.18 
Steppe .. 1.1 i 0.26 1.70 0.2H " 
paid from 10%- to 150% mon" than the landowners and in Cheroni­
hiv, 8%:, to 71%. This difference became greater when, following 
requests by the landowners, their land taxes were twice reduced. 
True, some taxes of the peasants were also reduced. Thus, 
the head or soul tax was abolished in 1883, and the passport 
fee in 1892. But in general the taxes increased by means of new 
forms, mainly local colledions. For the three-year period, 1875-
1877, zcmstvo averaged 6.2 to 6.5 kopecks per desiatyna per an­
num for landowners lands. Those of the peasants were 13.9 to 14.8 
kopecks. Along with a decrease in direct taxes, there was, as a 
rule an increase in indirect taxes. Between 1881 and 1892, direct 
taxes in the whole Empire came down from 1:39.9 million rubles 
to 91.3 million rubles ( not including local taxes, whose sum total 
did not decrease, but increased). But <luring the same period 
indirect taxation increased from 327.7 million rubles to 46fi.9 
million rubles. Per capita indirect taxes amounted to about ,'3 
ruhles iu 1871, and to'5 mhles, 20 kopecks in 1901.o1' 
�loreoveL there was an unequal distribution of laxes within 
the peasant class itself. Former stale serfs were better positioned 
than former serfs of private owners, and they also, as we shall 
show, received more land. In the Poltava region. as has been 
noted, former landowner serfs paid an average of 3 rubles, 70 
kopecks per dcsiatyna, while former statr- serfs paid only 1 ruble, 
63 kopecks. Corresponding figures for the Kherson region 
were: 2 rubles, 12 kopecks and 1 ruble, 19 kopecks. lt may seem 
unnecessary to devote so much attention to the matter of taxes, 
since neither the sole fact of taxation nor its amount, if figure� 
are taken in the abstract, reveal an unusual situation, However, 
when one comi<lers the total position of tbe peasauts these pav­
mcnts and all other money burdens which descended upon the 
peasantry of Ukraine as a result of specific measures applied to 
them on the occasion of the reform. the picture differs. 
11 P . Bogolepov, Cusuda,-stt>enniyc i micstniye nalogl ( Stotc ,md l,ocal
Tli:Us), Kharkiv, 1H02, p. 3\J. '" lhiJ., p. 53.
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?\Ioreover, tax itself is not of basic importance, but 1he ex­
penditure of tax money, lu this respect Ukraiue was again i11 
a ditferent position than Hussia: thP bulk of taxes was not ap­
plied to the servicing aml development of the Ukrainian popula­
tion ·s economy. All taxes went into the Imperial Tn·asury and 
came hack to Ukraine only in insignificaut amounts, mostly 
for the upkl't'P of the Imperial govcrnmeutal apparatus which 
was by its composition, mainly Hussian. Thus on the Hight Dank 
for example, out of the eutirc Ukrainian populatioll there were 
employed, on government jobs in the army, administration. 
courts and police, as well as in the free professions, only 5,,3'f. 
The nnmbcr of Russians was 47S:; Je,vs, 17.57; Germans, 
8.8'.f; and Poles 29'.i."' 
:\lost of the taxes paid hy Ukrainian peasant's went toward 
the ecouomic development of Russia and toward increased 
armed forces. necessary for the realization of her policy of ag­
gression, particularly in Central Asia and in the Far East. 
\Ve have already indicated that the Hussian CovC'rnment 
organized state industrial enterprises, and developed a network 
of statl' railroads in Hussia proper, excluding non-Hussiau terri­
tories, lTkraine among them. In 1876, when Hussia already pos­
sessed 17,652. i:ersts" of constructed railroads, Ukraine had only 
5S7. Later, wheu railroad construction assumed a much faster 
pace in Ukraine, its financing was carried out not by the state, 
hut by private capital, mostly foreign. 
All these expenditures were labelled i11 thP budget as "ex­
traordinary.'" Ukraine's position in the Imperial hudget will be 
an,ilyze<l in detail later, we now mcntiou these "t•xtrnordinary" 
expeudihucs only to stress the fact that taxes both exploited 
the rural ecmwmy, and failed to invigora!e the national ccon­
omv. 
The best in<licatioH of burdensome h!x loads are tax deficien­
cies. From year to year these deficiencies invariably character­
ized the ability of the peasantry to pay. Tax indehtness grew 
constautly, notwithstanding the fact that taxes were collected 
very ruthlessly, and their coll('ction was facilitated by the exist­
ence of the so-called Kmhorn poruka (liability), which will be 
described latl:'r. There were many instauces of the auctioning of 
the peasants· household effects and livestock for these tax de-
" 1{. Porsh, "fa sl.alystyky Ukrainy" ( '·From Ukrninim1 Statistks"i, Ukrnirw. 
Kiev, 1907. m . .1--1. "' l i;erst "-" 1.066 km., or roughly two-third� of a mile. 
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ficiencies. But tht>se mcasmt's \\·e1-e incapable of solYing t!w 
prohlem, awl the govcrnmeul was frequently compelled to ,vrlk 
off, or rcJuce the ddicil'ncies . .-\ml nevertheless they grew 
anew. For the five-year Jk'riod, 1891 to 1895, tax ddicie11cies of 
the Ukrninfan pcasauts reached 85.2'.'; of the aumial tax ,tssess­
ment. "· 
.\ vivid illustra!imt ot the fad that taxes ,vcre an unhearnhlc 
load is the rcmarh1bly l'XkJJsiH! practicl' of usury which fed 
on the peasauts' miser;:. Professor Slahchellko cites the follow­
ing: "in the villages of the Right Bank, Jews, who paid the taxes 
for the peasants chargcJ 3 kopecks per ,veck interest per nibl<' 
(155:f a year), or if Ilic peasant borrowed ::i rubles from the laml­
lord for that purpose, he had t<J work for tlic landlord for two 
months of 30 full days under peualty of ,) rnhles.'·,., 
Of cours<' the govcrnmellt. in spite of its attenipts to collect 
from tlw pop11latio11 as much as possibl<', could not be blind 
to tlw great economic degradiug of tlw peasants not only in 
noH-Hnssiau territories, hut also in Russia. ThC' famine of 1891-
92 ill the Volga rq.!;ions was partic1ilarly hanl-felt. Struck by 
it, the Secretary of the Trca,my \Vitk wrote: "The village is 
impov<'risbcd under the tax load ... It would be better to halt 
the comtrnction ot railroads temporarily. or to build them ,vith 
borrmved funds, tht\ll to continue this financial policy, ruinous 
to the population 111lder which money is collected not fro111 in­
conw, \mt from capital.''" 
l11 a confidential note Strain rm the l'aying i\l:iilit11 of tlw 
Population ( 1903) ·witte wrote: " . . we canuot dose om eyes 
to the indubitable- bet that the df'velopment of the people's 
prosperity is going at an 1rneve11 and rn11d1 too slow p:l<'C, arid 
in places tlie level of the c-umo111y is even dec-li11ing.'"l1' \\'ith­
cites in support of his stah'rncnt tlw ,vonls of the Chief of the 
Council of Ministers of 1591 Bunge, that "under l·xisting condi­
tions of life in the villages. the people will not come ont of the 
hopeless .<.ituation. 1t is imperative to think ahout rcmoYing the 
evil. If we <lo nothillg to get the rural popula! ion out of tlw posi­
tion in which it remains_ then famines whic\1 OlTnr almost an-
10 F. D:milov, op. cit., J, 187. 
''' !-.!. SLihdwnko, "I'· I.it .. p. 27,1. tr Ihfr/. 1'"�. I. \Vitt<:, 0 1Wf]1r1Jllzlumiyi plulezlmik/1 sil r1a.wln,iy11 ( The Strain Oil 
!he Ptl!/ing _\hi/ilrJ of lire l'op11/o/i1ml, Stuttl(,ut, Hi(\.'), p. 21.').
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nnally, will become more frcqnent, and will encompass ever 
larger territories."''" 
In seconding this idea, \Vitte was also worried about reper­
cussions on the state treasury: "The total amonnt of postpone­
ments and cancellations of deficiencies equals this year the sum 
of 41.5 million rubles. In addition, for 1894 there remains 1,074,-
000 rubles dderred, and not paid Oil time, and we can expect 
a further increase of this debt; in 1898 taxes in kind for 1891-
92 were forgiven in the amount of 170 million rubles; a quite 
sizable rednction of state land taxes was put into effect; the pass­
port tax was repealed, etc."20 But all these worries apply to
"tensions of the paying ability of the population of the central 
Russian gubnnias." This character:istic of the peasant situa­
tion did not consider those in borderlands, nor in non-Russian 
territories. On the contrary, unable to foresee an improvement 
at the expense of alleviating the tax load of the central regions 
(because this would be a bnrden on the state treasury), Witte 
openly proposed transferring this load onto non�Russian terri­
tories. "All states," said VVitte, "'profit by their colonies as a 
source of income and a means of increasing their prosperity; 
we, however, apply quite contrary principles, . . we place the 
burden of taxes upon Hussia proper."21 He claimed that in 1896 
expenditures in the Caucasus exceeded collections by 6.5 million 
rnbles, and in Central Asia by 6.6 million rubles, although basic­
ally these expendih1res were related to the maintenance of the 
imperial apparatus in the l'Olonies, and to the army maintenance. 
He was indignant that "the above mentioned regions do not par­
ticipate in general expenditures for the central government, in 
payment of interest and retirement of state loans," although the 
loans were taken for the construction of railroads in Russia 
proper and for fiuancing her wars of aggression, and the retire­
mf'11t of these loans, as ,ve shall see later, fell almost exclusive­
ly upon Ukraine, to the detriment of Ukraine's favorable foreign 
trade balance. 
In the opinion of Witte the colonies should reimburse Rus­
�ia for the military expense of their enslavement. He said: " 
the great expenses which Rnssia bore for the annexation of these 
borderlands and for their cultural development [ which in reali­
ty consisted of the introduction of a Russian administration and 
10 Ibid., p. 218. 20 Witte, op. cit., pp. 220. 221. 
�, JbUl., p, 218. 
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a destruction of native culture-( Author)] have fallen upon, and 
continue to bear upon European Russia with all their weight.""� 
\Vittc resorted to unusual calculations in order to prove the al­
legedly insufficient taxation of the colonies and to justify a 
transfer to them of a greatn measure of obligations. Ile ignored 
problems as: reutability of the ec011omy, nature of market rela­
tions, cxteut of production of goods, place of accumulation of 
differeJJtial re11t and the e11tirc system of economic relations, of 
all that, in other words, vvhich determines the amouut of pay­
ments a given population is capable of beariug. Iustead he took 
the total of all tax payments per capita of population, including 
not ouly land, and other taxes, but also income from realty, in­
come from industry and commerce aud redemption payments. It 
is obvious that such taxes, as those from commerce aud iudustry 
which were more developed in Russia, increased the total sum 
of taxes. The same applies to income from realty, naturally much 
higher in the industrialized regions of Russia. But he did not feel 
restrained to Compare the per capita tax load of Russia ill the 
amount of 1 ruble, 84 kopecks with that of 92 kopecks of Central 
Asia, nor to deem this an "obvious illustration of the burden 
carried by.central gubernias in favor of borderlands." Ile stated 
that a correction of this, the transfer of a great part of the tax 
load to the colonies, will be "the subject of <\etailed studies and 
measures of the Ministry of the Treasury.""a 
Even this dubious method of computation showed that the 
tax bmden of black-earth regions, including Ukraine, of l rnble, 
97 kopecks per capita was in excess of the tax burden of thf' 
central industrial region of Petersburg, where the per capita tax 
load reached 1 ruble, 3 kopecks.24 
Subsequently, when we shall analyze state budgets of these 
times, we shall indicate what huge amounts were annually drawn 
from Ukraine in favor of Russia. 
The Granary of Europe 
Such an approach to the probl('m of taxing the population 
of the borderlands, wherein the amount of taxes was not deter­
mined by the total economic conditions of the land, but a colon­
ial obligation to serve the development of the prO!ip('rity of the 
metropolis, and its policy of military aggression, brought about 
2f Ibid .• p. 228. 2" IbUJ,, p. 221. 2• Jbid., p. 221. 
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a situation under whidl the excessive taxation of the Lkrainian 
peasants was one of the prime caus-es of thC' impoverishment of 
large masses of them. An acute shoTtage of tools of production, 
au<l to a certain extent a deterioration of the (icouomy re­
sulted. ExcessiYe taxes and curtailment of the area of laud use 
were hvin dilemmas for the Ukrainian peasants. Their very life 
was suhjcct to an attempt to �olve tl1e problem: how to feed tbc 
family, and ·where to get the money for taxes. l:u<lcr existing 
conditions both problems were, to a majority of the peasantry, 
incapable of solution. \Vhat is more, the natural increase of the 
population, whoS(' surplus could find no outlet in industry even 
during the period when industry began to grow quite notice­
ably, made the problem more ,rnd more acute. ff we compare 
the area of land use<l by the peasants in 1860 with the area in 
1890, considering the increase in population, and losses suffered 
as a result of the reform, we get the figures in Table XI!·' 
TABLE XI 
Land art'a pt'r 
1 /JOO pn))iilatfon JH60 JH90 % of dcf'rease 
Rigl1t Bank 
Left Bank 










This decrease in land holdings was a continuous process, and 
by 1900 the average holdings per household, as compared with 
lb6.3 ( the year of separating the holdings of the peasants) are 
shown in Table Xll.26
TABLE XII 
Region 1863 l9()(J % of decrease 
Kharkiv ·1.S desiatynast 1.9 dcsiatyna� !57-6 
l'oltava 2.S dcsiatynast 1..5 <lcsiatyna� 40.0 
Chcrnihiv 3.4 dcsiatynast 2.0 d .. stutynas 41.2 
Kiev 2.9 dcsiah-·nast 1.2 desiatrn,ts 58.5 
\'olhynia 4.2 desiat}·nast 1.7 dcsiatynas 51..'5 
Pudilb . . . 2.6 t!<'siatynast 1.2 dcsiatyn'-ls 
Khcrson 0.1 (l,.siatynast 2.2 desiatynas 63.9 
Katerynosbv 6.0 <lcsi;1tynast 2.3 desiatrnas 61.!i 
2.-' V. Kosinskr, K .·\gramomu u>prosu (The Agraria11 Problem), Moscow, 
1911, I, 47!:l. "' M. l'orsh, loc. cit. 
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Under pressure of such C'Urtailmcnt of cultivated land, the 
peasants utiliz<"<l every bit of suitable land for ploughing. Ev('TI 
considering this, the decrease of land under cultivation 1wr 1,000 
people was: on the Right Bank, 29.9%; on the Left Bank, 42.3%; 
and iu Southern Ukraine, 26.7%. The utilization of land for 
ploughing reached such an extent in Ukraine, far in excess of 
analogm1s imlices for other European couutrics, including Hus­
s1a. (Sec Table XIII). 
TABLE XIII 
l'loug/1cd 
land and Grass- Total area 
County gardens lands Forests Un.witable of cult/ration 
Ukraine 70.3 12.3 10.6 6.8 82.6 
Englund 12.9 6-':i.8 3.n 17 1 78.7 
Italy . . . . . . . 42.6 25.0 15.7 13.l 67.6 
Frnncc ,5().1 10.,5 1.5.8 14.3 69.!:l 
Germany 48.7 16.2 2-5.k 64.9 
Russia 28.2 16.4 .3\J.2 Hi.2 4'1,(j 
At the beginning of the 20th century there were, per 100 
dcsiaty1ws of arable land, the f-ollowing rural dwellers: England, 
79; France, S4; Germany, 107; and in Ukraine's regions: Kiev, 
178; Padilla: 160; Chernihiv, 157; Volhynia, 147; Kharkiv, 137; 
Polta\·a, 124, an<l only in the regions of Katerynoslav and Kher­
son were the figmes equal to those of Gcnnaqy and FrancC', re­
spectively,�• 
It is evident that such a density of the rural population per 
arahlc unit of !aJJd, coupled with a lower fertility than that of 
\Vestem European countries, did not provide sufficient food for 
the population. This is a seeming contradiction of the general 
estimate of pre-revolutionary Ukraine as the "Granary of Eu­
opc" which exported its grain produc!s in gr('a! q_uantitics to 
foreig11 countries. Judgi11g by grain ex:port figures, it would be 
erroneous to explain these e;-,;ports solely by tlw cxiste!lce of 
grain surpluses. Exports were in large measure the result of 
economic difficulties of the peasants, and the tax policy illus­
trated above contribute,1 in no small degree to the existence of 
these difficulties. Tahlc XIV Is a ('ornparison of an.·rngc annual 
yiPlds of tht' chief cultun'S for the ten-year period of the end of 
the 19th an<l beginning of the 20th C(>ntury ( in pounds per 1 
desUttyna) _n 
"' Feshcbenko-Chopivsky, Ekonomichna hf.'Olirafiya UkraimJ, p. 36. 
,,; Ibid., p. 41. Tlw original quotes fignr<•s in ;ioorfs whi<;h the translator has 
cakulatl:d in pounds at 36.113 pound� per poud. 
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TABLE XI\" 
(,\,w1/rlj /)!JC \\"/war HarlqJ Oat.1 Corn Potato,w 
Hu�,i., U,78 l,W17 2,0<�4 1,fJ"iO :'.,.-128 17,n8 
Ckr,1iw, 2,l."3C 2,1:i(JO :'..172 2,464 3.3'51-l IS.--117 
Bdgium .J.34➔ .5,\-J�J4 6.608 .S,70,'5 41,-5:J() 
G�rmany 4.J6J S,164 4,!lWl 4,.',36 ,32,7.'5,! 
Frnncc 2.-+04 3.l7S 3.3,38 3.142 2,1)89 20.940 
\Ve have already indicated that the "Granary of Europe" 
consumed kss grain per person than any other \:\/estern Euro­
pe-an country. (Sec Table XV).�r, 
TABLE:,,.\' 
Crain production Crain Per cap/la 
per capifo imports consumption 
Uenmark J/i52 !bs. 614 2.16/i 
Cerrn,rny 9.39 180 l, l Hl 
Fran,·,-. 939 144 1,083 
Ilungary 1,--180 210 ("<pt. 1,264 
Bulgaria l,:J00 ,125 expt. H7.'5 
Ukr,iine l-2.G4 3\-)7 c,;pf. 8(J7 
Russm 1.011 1-H npt. 867 
One must not lose sight of the fact that the extent of grain 
consumption stands in reverse ratio to the consumption of other 
products. Therefore Ukraine, where hrmd is the basic food, has 
more need of grain than for example, Denmark or Germany. 
Thus, the amount of bread alone per person is, during this 
period. not nearly enough to satisfy the population's grain needs. 
llencc, the annual export figure of almost 14.4 billion pounds 
of grain is no indication of a sated internal market. The surplus 
is comparable not with the need, only with the purchasing pow­
er of the population, especially of the rural population, a major­
ity of whom appeared on the markets as bread consumers when, 
a short time before, thev had been yendors. 
The rcsnlt was that Ukraine, producing 25% per person more 
than TTussia, exported :397 ponnds ot �rain per capita, as against 
Hu.,sia-s per c.1pita export figure of 144 pounds. Thus Ukraine 
brought her consumption down lo the same level as Hllssia's, 867 
pounds per capita. These figure� become mul'h more convinci11g 
if we appl�- thew not to the average data of Ukraine as a whole, 
but to the peasants" comtmiption. If we consider 7'20 pounds 
"'' Fc•slwhc11ko-Chopivsky, ,>JI. cit., p. 30. 
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per capita as the norm of peasant co11sumptio11 ( induding fod­
der), an absolutely inadeqnate qnautity, then we see that en'n 
under this norm, the Hight llank has a deficiency of 216 pmmds, 
or 31.5%, the Left l3ank a deficiency of 2:34 pounds, or 32.5'.i:" and 
only the steppe region has a surplus of 644 pounds, or 89%. 
Kminsky condudes that "people and cattle were equally under­
nourished.""(' 
As has alrcadv bee11 noted. the taxes were assessed 011 the 
laud area without regard to the fact whether this unit yielded 
au income, or ouly miuirnum livelihood. Iu addition, the statis­
tics refer to total cultivated land areas, iucluding leased laud, 
the rent for which. as we shall see later, was extremely high. In 
order to satisfy the need for cash, the weakest ecmmmic groups 
had to be vendors of grain in the fall, Ollly to become purchasers 
soon after Christmas, or else cousumers of substitutes for bread, 
most often potatoes. This explains why the price of rye, which 
constituted the basic ingredieut of bread in the peasants' con­
surnptiort, went up much faster than the price of the most valu­
able grain, wheat. Even during the first decade followillg the 
abolition of serfdom, the price of rye went up more than 70%, 
while wheat.rose only 38%. In order to uuderstand the exteut of 
the nuaJ· economy production in relation to its population, and 
in order to be able to realize the real naturt; of the so-called 
"relative agrariau overpopulation" iu Ukrai11e, which is always 
referred to as the most characteristic feature of the Ukrainiall 
rural ecouomy, it is necessary to consider in more detail the mat­
ter of peasants' land holdings. 
Land Shortage 
\Vhen the peasants were endowed with land, they lost a 
considerable part of the laud which they had been using before 
the reform. In 1877, after the [and allotments were almost com­
pletely finished, the entire agricultural area of 37,460,633 des­
iatynas was divided i11to the following categories: private prop­
erty, 17,952,886 desiatynas, or 47.9%; endm.ved property, 16,762,-
066 desiatynas, or 44.6%; state, church, etc., 2,745,681 or 7.51."' 
Dming the next 10 years the geueral arable land area was iu­
creased by 1.4 milliou desiatynas by putting hitherto unused 
·"' V. Kosinsky, op. cit., I, 482.
31 :\I. l'orsh, "Statystyka zemlevolodinnya i mobilizatsiya zemelnoyi vlas­
nosty v Ukrainy" ("Statistics of Land Ownership and :'.\fobilizatim, of 
Land Property in Ukr;,ine''), Ukraina, .ll-12, p. f,J6. 
53 Post-Reform .Agrarian Conditions 
land under cultiYahon, incr('asing the total of 38.8 million dcs­
iatynas. During the same period, the area of peasant endow­
ments was increased by 1.5 million desiatyrws so that peasant 
endowments increased to a total of 18,169.922 desialynas. Since 
that time, there were no changes of any significance." 
The endowed lall(_I was divided, on an average per house­
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Thus that average land endowment per household in Ukraine 
was 6.3 dcsiatynas. But this figure does not sufficiently charac­
terize the problem of land use. Besides regional variations, we 
must bear in miml that fonner state serfs were in a much better 
position on land endowment and tax assessment ( See Table 
XVll). 
The matter will hecome even more clear when we consider 
in Table XVIII the groups of households among which the en­
dowed lan<l was divided. 
Thus, from the very beginning there existed a deep discrep­
ancy in peasant land holdings, where 32.3% peasants' farms had 
only 13.3% of the land with an average holding of less than 4 
desiatyrws per household, or under the minimum required for a 
bare living. But outsi<le of that there were also landless peas­
ants, constituting 19% of all peasant households, 3,595,500 peo­
ple. If we take all peasant households who conlrl not he provided 
with a livelihood from the land, their numher rises to 44.7%. In 
other words almost half of the Ukrainian peasants were land­
hungry immediately following the land reform. 
A question naturally arises whether such lan<l hol<ling was 
peculiar only to Ukraine, or whether the same picture is pre­
sented hy all European Russia in the post-reform period? Un­
fortunately we have no data pt>rtaining to the last quarter of the 
19th century, because not all zem.stvos kept statistics of land 
holdings. There are some data pertaining to the first years of 
the 20th century, but these, to some extent, indicate a better 





State serfs rC'ccivcd . . . . . . . . ......... 8,616 thousand de�iJtynas for 1,137 thousand housC'holds, °' Un'rnge 7.,5 
Landowners serfs received . . . ... 8,167 thousand dcsiatynas fo, 1,617 thousand households, '" average 5.0 each 
Fn·emen received - - - - - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2'l thous,m<l desi,1tynas fo, 5 thollsan<l lmuscho!<ls, "' avernge •Hi 
L,,.os.,holding sprfs received 110 thousand <lesi,!tynas for II thousarnl housdiol<ls, "' ,iverage 2.6 <,adi 




(households) area in 
Group number " desil1tynas ' 
Under 1 dcs!utynu 8-1,6911 3.0 3�1,074 0.2 
1-2 <lisiatynas1 132,1041 4.6 208,387 1.1 
2-3 <lesiatymrn1 .'326,0871 11..5 841,617 4.7 
3--t desi.itynas1 376,6071 13.2 1,318,8,'52 7.3 
•'±--"i <lesiatynas1 38.:3,6671 13.4 1,731.603 '.J..5 
!5- 10 desi:ityn"s1 1,155,667 40.,) 8,269,232 4-5.71
10-.C,O dtisiatynas1 ,'3!J7.174 13.9 5,592,86--1 30.!J1
.')().l(J(I dcsiatyrrns ..1 1,378 0.0 82,373 0.41
Over 10() dcsiatynas1 ws· ().() 30,128 ., 
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position of Ukraine because, as we shall see later, the Ukrainian 
peasallts were buyi11g up the landowners' estates on a large 
scale. There are grounds to helicvf' that immediately after 
the reform, conditions were evc11 worse. But under any conrli­
tions, the different situatio11 of Ukraine bcrnmes imme<liatdy 
apparent. 
If we divide all peasants into three groups, those ,vith in­
significant land holdings, medium holdings., and large holdings 
( including in the latter gronp all farms of ten desiatynas, and 
over), then Table XIX gives proportionate figures for differeut 
regions of the Empire (in percentages),'� 
TABLE XIX 
Region; Smail holdir,g., ,U,·,liwn Lar{!.F 
Central Chornuzem 21.7 36.0 20.3 
t-.!iddk-Volga . . 17.9 ilO.O 32.l
Ukraine 
South 33.4 36.fi 28.0 
Rigl,t Bank 57.6 33.0 g.4
Slobozhan�b 4-1.1' 43.0 12.2 
Industrial region 16.8 58.7 2-1.5 
ByPlorussia 7.9 63.6 28.5 
Litliuarna 4.0 19.0 77.0 
Lake region 5.1 43.5 51.4 
Sallie region 1.5 0.7 87.8 
lJr:il region 10.0 11.6 
'\Jorthnn region 24.7 5�4 
Lower \'olga 5.4 3,5.4 
As can be seen, Ukrniuc differs greatly from the other ter­
ritories of 1he Empire by the large prt>pondcrance of small peas­
ant holdings and by an insignificant percentage of large hold­
ings. Only northern Ukraine has .a number of large holdings 
equal to that of other regions, but the number of small hold­
ings here is also much greater than elsewhere. 
This single comparison suffices to prove that Ukraine, as a 
result of Russia's colonial policy, was under entirely different 
conditions. An additional factor must be noted which was of 
great importance in the matter of land holdings. It is of servi­
tudes, or easements. Ukraine is poor in pastures and foresls: only 
12.3'7 of lhe usable land area is pasture lam.l, and 10.6% forests 
'·" I'. \hslov, A,;ramiu u;µros t: Rossir1i, L 
,)6 Ukraine and Russia 
( comparL·<l to the respective figures for Russia of 16.4;;: and 
;39.2%.). For this reaso11, tlte accumulation of hay aml fodder for 
cattle was always an acute problem. During the land reform 
a large part of such lands ( pastures and forests) were excluded 
from peasaut allohncn!s and reserved as servitudes, or lands of 
tommou nse. For example in Volhynia in 1885 there were 1,926 
thousand desiatynaR of servitude lands; in Kiev, 6,f/ thousand 
dcsiatynas; in Podilla, 991 thousand desiatynas, etc. But in 1886 
the sena1c passed a ukase which gave the landlords the right 
"to decidP 1he matt('r in the interest.� of farming." From that 
time the landlord had a right to "'place his sown field according 
to his convenience, without considering the servitudes.""' 
In reality this was an abolition ot' the right of easement which 
deprived the peasants of the opportunity to use pastures and 
meadows, and transformed these lands into the private property 
of laudm.vllers. :\lass litigation ir1 this matter hrought 110 changes. 
Thi:, causet1 a la11d shortage, th(' amount of land in possession 
of the peasaJJts conld not absorb all available labor of the peas­
ants. A surplus rural population came into being and contiuucd 
increasing. thus causing all '"agrarimi overpopulation" which is 
justly •·relative,'' because at its basis by not an absolute lack 
of land, 011ly its artificial apportionment. This land shortage, in 
relation to ecouomic conditions, of which it was "th(' main cause, 
became the chief obstacle on the road toward an intensification 
of thC' rural economy, and prevented the increased use of labor 
per area of surface. 
As early as the 1870's the land with which a peasallt liou�chokl 
had to work. under t'Omlitious of t!w period iu the PoJtaya re­
gion, snfficed for only onc worker. "·The seco11d am\ following: 
workers in households of no !rind and small lam! holdings were 
supcrfluou�, unless the farmer leased other land.""� 
S.t Korolenko estimated the surplus rural population for thet
1S80"s to be 5 million, with only about half able to fiud work 
locally, or in the immediate neighborhood; tht' remainder leaY­
ing for work in distant places. Thns, the entire naturnl imTe'.1se 
of the rnral population, with the very small exl'eptions pertaining 
to larger farm holdings, became "surplus" and had no opportun• 
ity to earn a living. Ukraine had neither sufficient iudustry to 
s, M. Slabclicnko, or,. cit .. p. 169. 
·" S. Va<,y],.,,ko, Kw,tarni pmm11�·/y ( lloml' lnd11\'fr1u; l. Kiev, 1913, p. �3.
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absorb this surplrn nor oH-sca,011 liomc-wagc ean1ing opportun­
ities \d1ich woulJ cmnpemate for the inarkquatc i11come rkrivcd 
horn agricnlture, and \vould emplo�· people bc�·oll(l the period of 
sea,m1,ll Lum "vork. 
Tlie peas.mt; of i11drntrially developer! Hussia \Vere, in this 
respect, in an ci1tirely different position. In addition, they liaci 
much better farm la11J. The peasants ot Hu<;<;ia no! only founJ 
ample employment opportm1itic, i11 i11d11strial pla11b, but also 
haJ good cliances of additio11al wages by worki11g for tlw same 
i11Jlls-tries at home dllring the \Vinter ,ea,on. "Over and almve 
factory industries, i11 the guhcrnias adjacent to \fosco\v, home 
cotto11 man11fachJri11g i11d11strics were widesprcaJ. They em­
ployed 350 thousand people." Tlmse pca,a11b, employer! at home, 
tllrned out semi-finisher! products for tlw factories. "In arldition, 
outside of the factories. the line,1 industry employed 3 million 
spinners and half a million weavers, and in the preparation of 
flax another half millio,1 peasants follnd work. This worki11g 
population lielongerl to the northcn1 and ce11tral gu/;ernia.1."·'' 
The Ckrainia11 pca,ai1!s did not have such opportu11itics nor 
any real chance of full-time employment in indmtry. Their home 
i11dustry of preparing flax and hemp, \vhich also existed, had an 
entirely different ch,1racter. For the most part it \Vas merely to 
satisfy tlicir own familv needs. 
A situatio11 thereby aro,c in which the peasants found them­
selves chained to tlie soil. Outside of agriculture they did not, 
in fact, have any chance to work. It is the11 natural that the in­
crease of the population contrihuterl to the splitting of peasant 
holdings arnl to the increase of the nmnlier of landless peasants. 
Professor M. 1. Tuhan-Tiaranovsky cites changes which occurred 
in the division of pcasai1! lanJ holdi11gs i11 ni11c cotm!ics of the 
l'oltava guhcrnia Juri11g the ten-year pcrioJ from 1S89 to 1900. 
( See Tuhlc XX.)'" 
\\'e have here a very diaracteristic pichue. The general in­
crease iu the numher of farms \Vas 11%, at a time wh(m changes 
among the groups are far in e"<cess of this increase. \\'c sec then, 
110! OTily a distriliution of the increase of the pop11latio11, but 
also !ranslocatim1s withi11 tl1e groups. The most stable appear 
"" l'\ Ya1,nnpnl,ky, •-�:knnumidicskaya buduehmic;t yuga Ro,siyi i sov­
n,m,,mrnya yqm ot,talost" ("The Econom,c Fulllre of South Rusc;ia
and Its Pn,1,"llt llaekwardn,,s,"), Otechco-tm:rmiyc Zapiski' (Ilome Soles), 
�t. Pder,bm;(. lh71. p. '2cl.2. 
'" Q1Joted from Fornill'1, "Fkunomic.,lma kl,araktcrystyka .," p. 59. 
2.!;J 
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TABLE XX 
1889 
llou.w,holt.i (farm�} in thm1Jtmds 
Land- Un<lcr 1-2 2-3 :J-(:; 6-9.
less 1 des. a�. des. Jes. des. 







6.�J 6.3 235.2 
2-).2 1::1.2 10.8 �6.0 1,!.2 8.1 2.9 2.7 100 
li:JOO -18.2. 1.5.2 30.6 32.0 7L7 30.6 18.5 8.9 13.6 269.3 
18.3. 5.8 11.6 E!.l ::?.7.1 11.6 -··-' 3.4 2.H 100.
Approximate 
perccntagt'S 
plus and mlnu� 
changes -15 ! 124 +60 +20 +8 -H -3 +29 +117 +l•I.
to be the three mi<l<lle groups, from 9 to 15 desiatynas, The ex• 
treme groups uuderwent significant changes, such changes being 
more prouonnced in those groups ,vhich are farthest from the 
center. This rneaus that there was a process of land splitting; the 
weaker units of the middlc groups joined the lower groups. and 
tht? latter went down ev("n further. On the other hand, the more 
wealthy farms of the middle groups, went higher. 
Regarding the decrease in the mimbcr of lamlless house­
holds, we have not an acquisition by them of land, but, nudoubt­
•cdly, a complete abandonment by them of farmiug. This finds 
support first .of all in the insignificant percentage increase of 
the total nnmber of fanns in relation to the natural innease of 
population, and in the second place in the fact that by 1900 the 
Donbas indnstry had already grown considerably, and was able 
to accommodate a large number of workers from the neighbor­
ing Poltava region. Such a large percentage of landless peasants 
and a constant increase of the number of small holdings was 
prevalent not only in the Poltava region which cxpo;ricnced the 
worst '1and shortage," but also in the land-rich regions of South­
ern Ukraine. Peasants who could not cultivate laud ( a certain 
percentage of the landless took land on lease) numbered; in 
Bcrdyansky county, 6.7'.i'; of the total number of households, in 
Melitopil county, 7.51; Olebandrivsky, 16.81, Ananievsky, 
13.11. Bakhmutsky, 15.4%. Slavyanoserbsky, 22%, etc. 
The data regarding \fariupil county. shown in Tahle XXI are 
entirely analogous to those of Poltava. only in a different numer­
ical expression, and in reference to farming not only the peas­
ants' own land, but also leased land.11 
·" A. Knipo\"ich, K Voprosu. o dikrentsiyutsiyi krestyunsk"g" k/w;:IJUfjstw.
(On the Problem of Diffen'nliatirm of the Peasants' Economy), Katerynu­
slJxskoyc Gubcrn. Zcmstvo, 1903, p. 78. 
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A statistical study, conducted in Bakhmutsky county in 1886, 
gave tbc results shown in Table XXIU' 
We sec then that even farms of medium land holrling joined 
the landless class. 
'n1is loss of land in certain counties and within certain cam­
gories of peasants reached extraordinary proportions. In 1882, 
Table XXlll shows numhers of landless peasants in Poltava re­
gion. 
In 1917, in general, the peasants of Ukraine were divided, as 
Table XXIV shows, into categories according to land holding:'l 
TABLE XXI 
1886 1901 
Nnt culti,)(lting .. 


















Xumber Receiving Land Qr,�ntity 11cr Recamr 
inl861· household landless 
4581 11p to 4 desiatyn:1s 9i7 -21.4% 
6Hl3 over 4 desiatyrus 444-7.2i-
6402 up to 8 desiatynas 990 - 15.4'.-i'.-
8075 over 8 desiatynas 846 - 10,8%-
TABLE XXIII 
M'}rhorod Polt1wa Zilikiv 
cowitr1 cmml'} county 
Among Cossacks 16.ci'�,- 29.8'.li lH.8% 
Among l'msants ;l(j_:y;- 36.0't 53.8% 
TABLE XXIV 
Amount owned Families in thousands 
Landless, or with only ,i house and vard .. 700 - 15% 
I to 3 desia!ynas... 800- 20%-
3 to ,5 desiatynas ................ . 1,000 - 22ll'. 
,5 to 8 desiatrrn1s. 950 - 21% 
8 to 10 dcsiatynas .. 600 - 13% 
10 to 20 dcsi<ltynas. 300 - 7% 
Over 20 dcsiatynas. 80- 2%-
Total 4,430-100% 
'" :\I. Slabchenko, op. l'it., p. 17\:l. 
•·1 F,·shchenko-Chopivsky, op. dt., p. G3.-
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It should be noted that this last listing of land holding shonld 
be considered in relation to the time, 1917; the process of mobil­
izing laml by the peasants had been going on for several years 
by means of purchases of land by the peasants. This will be 
discussed in more detail later. 
Lease of Land 
The land situation of the Ukrainian peasants here described 
brought about quite naturally a situation, under which all the 
peasants' attention was concentrated on the problem of getting 
more land, because they had no place to earn a living outside of 
agriculture. The peasants had only hvo ways open to them: pur­
chase or lease. The third way, one of fighting for their rights, at 
first assumed the form of mass lawsuits for lands held by prescrip­
tion, for rights to servitude (easement), and btet, of rebel­
lion and open revolutionary warfare for land. This did not, how­
ever, bring about any changes in peasant land holdings up to 
1917. 
Speaking of leasing land, we must first of all note its peculiar 
nature which has given rise to the apt designation, "lease in kind." 
For most peasants, the taking of land under lease was not in 
contemplation of increasing production in order to take in an 
increased profit, but merely a means of getting additional pro­
duce in order to fee<! the family. A lease was "a continuation of 
the farmer's work on his own land, the former and the latter 
constituted a single economic activity." The large number of 
people who took land on lease can be explained by the fact 
that the area of land per household was two to three times 
smaller than necessary.e44 
To determine the essence of the "lease in kind" we must 
understand first the objective the peasant had in mind when he 
decided to take land under a lease, and secondly the price he 
had to pay. The decisive factor was that the grain from his own 
farm would not suffice the family for a year, and a certain 
number of pounds must supplement it. He could not buy the 
grain for money earned elsewhere, because he could not find 
work during the off season in agriculture. What remained was 
to lease some land, not for reward, but on the risk that the ad­
ditional amount of grain, after payment of rent, would suffice 
·0 V. V. Oclwrki krestyanskngo k/w;:;yaystu, (Outline of the PN1:,ant Enm­
omy), ]\foscow, 1903, pp. 83-100.
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to rnver his deficit in kind. The essential attributes of a lease 
were its compulsory nahire and tlH· attempt of the peasants to 
solve their subsistence budget with its aid. not stopping to 
consider its economic fallacy iu the sense of a mm:h lower re­
,nucl lor labor wll{'n compared with the prfr:e of labor. Profes­
sor Slahchc-nko wrote in this conrn'diou: '"The peasant (lid not 
stop to consider tlw obvious in(onvcnience ot a lease. in the 
Poltav,1 rcgiou, e. g. the gross income from 1 dcsiatyna of lam! 
was 19 rubles, 26 kopecks, and the cost of tilling 11 rubles, 76 
kopecks, while the rent was 9 rubles, 6 kopecks. This meant there 
was no profit, only a loss of 1 ruble, 51 koped..s.''·1'· 
Thus rf'nt for land was not determined hv the intl'rest on 
]arid as a capital investment. ( not by the level of an ahsolute 
land r<·nt). Instead, secondary considerations fixed it, consid<'r­
aticms which had no (lirect relation to the amount ot industrial 
iucomc from thf' agricultural e11\t'rprisc. cost of labor, and 
pric('S of agricultural products. The r('nt \Vas created hy condi­
tions resulting from post-reform laud relations. It became. of it­
self. a factor which determiucd the value of land as capital. 
In Table XXV, Professor Kosinskv, in his K :\gramumu vop­
ros11 shows a balance. quotC'd in foll, of economic results of till­
ing leased laud in five counties of the steppe. They dt'arly 
show the ecouomic nature of this kind of land area exploitation, 
when the problem is approached from the criterion of normal 
industrial entC'rprise interests:'" 
TABLE XX\' 
nz,,ks. E[11savc- Anan-
( In Ruh/es) andriu thrad in: Odessa Khcrson 
Nd ineome from 
l dr:oi,tlyna 3.98 . .>.91 1.01 fi.27 7A8 
R,,nt (Jr, ]png-tcrm lc,1,,, fl.28 .'i.,56 5.00 4.81 -'5.52 
Rt·nt 00 l year lease . . ,  . . .
i.e. loss (-) or profit l+I
\:l.\IB 9.60 7.,58 7.97 8.7"6 
l.'ndcr long-tenn kdS(' -2,30 -1.62 -0.9V +I.43 +1.96
l.'ndcr l year leas(, . . . . . . -5.98 -.5.Gl -3.57 -l.70 -L28
The nature of the phenomenon becomes even more apparent, 
when we consider gross income as seen in Table X.'\TI." 
,-, J\f. SJ;,bd,enko, op. cit., p. 268. ,,, \'. K(,oin.,ky, op. cil., p. 2Dl. 
"Il>i,l., p. 2H2. 
+4.72. +5.-B.
-5.W;
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'lABLE XX\"l 
To!,tl gross ioclu<led 
from 1 dcsiatyna 






thrad in OdeSM 





I yc,,r lcci�,_. I 2.3-1 +2.70. +o .oo
llin·<l Labor per 
l. dcsiatyna .... 8.32 8.3ti. 7.2ll. 7.1:l. 7.3�.
Hc·ncP, the rc�u\t uf 
long-term l,·a�c -1.:H - 1,36 -0.1-:l'J +l.4J. +HJfi
1 year kasc. -."i.fitl -2 .. '57. -1.70. -1.32.
As we can see, the economic nahue of a peasallt'S work 011 
leased land was such that it was rewarded at a much lower 
rate than the hired labor market offrrf'd. On a 011c-ycar lease, 
the peasant of Oleksa11driv coullty received only 28$ of what 
he would earn working as hired labor. The remai11iug 72% of 
hi� labor accrued to the landowner, creating a differential land 
rent. To the peasant there was significance not in the reward 
for his labor Itself, lml in additional sum total of natural prod­
ucts. To that end, he increased the leased area ( calliug 011 C'Xi�t­
iug manpower in the family) to sueh a degree that as a result, lw 
would eithe� get the amount of produce needed, or else he 
would have to curtail his needs either by reducing the number 
of cattk, or simply by undcrnourishi11g the cattle ... aml his 
own family. Obviously the existe,1cc of such high reutal rah$ 
for land determined by its "yield in kind" uature is, from the 
economic viewpoi11t, an anomaly. The explanation has to be 
sought both iu the diYision of land on occasion of the reform, 
and iu the cco11omic s11bjectiou of Ukraine to Russia. The former 
created au artificial surplus of thf' rnral population with its 
"relative agrarian overpopulatiou,'' the latter tied this popula­
tiou to the soil. 
Thus, a constant and e\·er growing demand for land on 
terms of lease was created. A coutinual increase in land rent 
resulted. 
In the J.'ollava region. rents illcreascd at the following rate 
(in rnbles): lS(H, 0.i5; 1Si2, LS0; 1S9:2, 10.14; 1900, 11.92; 
1901, 13.00, aud 1902, 13.85.e48 
In 1916 average rents in Ukraine were on the following level 
for spriug sowing ( double for wiI1ter sowing): Volhynia, 12.00 
4s M. SLibchenko, up. cit., p. 312. 
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rllhk,, Kiev, 12.50; Podilla, 16.00; Kher,on, 12.00; l'oltarn, 18.50; 
Kharkiv, LZ.00; Katerynoslav, 12.00; Tauria, JS.00. The average 
for all of Ukraine was U.00 rnblcs. "Tliis gave tl1c bm.lowncrs 
110 less than 17.) million rubles. Before, the entire servitude gave 
the landlord, le,, than only tlie land rent now . .-\nd at that, as 
thev ,av. withollt aJff tnmblc."·"·a·,\nll ,o it wa,. in the 18q()'s, in the same l'oltava regiona
tilling ot l dr:siatyna hy the landlorrh cm! 27 rnble,, arnl the 
income was :H ruble�. But C\-Cn at that time. rents were liigher 
than tliat difference of 7 rnblc, a11d the landlord could g·e1 a 
higher iuconw from rent without tlie trouble of: cOT1dllding an 
ci1terprise. 
Althougli �i,1lC that time yields became higlier, and the 
prices of grain i11crcased also, neither the former nor the latter 
went hand in hand \\·itli the increase of rent. The increase 
in rent wa, in no rkgree dctcnni11cd b)' the market for grain 
or tor labor, only liy tlie hopclc,, po,ition of: the pca,anb, for 
wlio1n the lease was for tlie most part the only meam of: pre­
serving life, This, in tmn, cal!serl a rlemand for lam!. If the 
l'oltava peasant in 19.16 had, from .1 dc,1iutyna of leased land 
2,27.S pound, of barlc;,,; ( or corresponding amollnts of other 
grain. the lmn·e,t tl1at ;,,;car being about a\-crage); then, after 
deducting the ,eccl, lie had a marketable product ( grain a11d 
�traw) \·alued at 2.q to 32 rnhle,, out of wliicl1 he paid a rent 
of .IS.,30 rubles or SSZ to G,1'.f of the total. .-\fter rlerlucting all 
otlicr expenses, Sllch as traction, tools, threshing, etc. onlv a 
miserlv amount \\·as ldt on�r for his O\n1 lahor. But the deci­
sive factor was tlmt otlicrwisc he would liave had notlii11g, and 
lie had tlii, arhlitional amount witl1out leavi11g his farm. 
It must he noted that these average rental '1Jms contain 
large hidden difference,, depending on the term of the lease 
and 1he area of the lanrl leased. \Ve harl the opportunity to 
observe, on s!11dying fin� co1111ties of Sollthern Ukraine, that a 
one-year lease \\·as 60�! to 65% more cxpcnsiyc tha,1 a long-term 
lease. J)iffrrcllcCs arc even greater \\·lien the area i� con,iUcrcd. 
Thus, in llcrd;mn�ke county, for example, a lease of up to 5 
desiatynus of lam! cost 11 rnhlcs while larger lea,e, of over 
50 desiatyuus called for a rent of onlv cl.20 ruble,. The corres­
ponding figures for Dniprnv,kc county were JS.2,:i nihles and 
"' S. O,t,p,,nkn, "'Kapilalizm. na Ukrnini" ("Cap1lnl1.1m in Ckrnmo"), 
Cherrnny Shlakh (fled Pn1h), Kharl,iv, lfl24, p. 2(i. 
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3.!'i.5 ruhles. It was like this all over. This naturally gan,• ris(' 
to speculation in leases. ··rn the l'oltaYa regiou, a speculator 
would take land at 8 rubks and sublease it at l.'5 to 35 ruhh's 
and eveu at .50 rubles. depending on the culture for which the 
land was used." ( Truck garden rents \\·ere as high as 60 
rubles.)"', Extra high rents ,n're also charged for grazing. On the 
Left B;mk, they Wf'IC 7 to 10 rubles per dcsiatyna, between one­
quartf'r and one-third of the value of the cow itsel!-. 
J:hcre are no <lata availahk showiug t·lw C'.xact amount of 
land leased hy the peas,mts. Professor Slahchcnko dtes estimates 
of Vasylchykov pertaining to the 1870's, according to these esti­
mates the peasants lea;,ed. ( See Tuhll' XXVII). l'roft'ssor Ogon-
TABLE \.\.\ lJ 
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ovsky reports for appm:-;:imatcly th(' 5amc' p('rioll that in SoutJwm 
lJkraine the peasants took on ]C'ase :2,761,,500 di:siatynas of 
land.''" 
fo total, this gives a s11111 which ('fjllals 7:1',- of all private 
larnl holdings, at that lime 17 million rlcsiatynns. \Ve are in­
c lined to believe that these figures rtre excessi\'1:. They might 
indu<lc st'rvitude lamb \,·hich still ('xisted at that time, arnl com­
prised scver,tl million dcsiatynas. The estimates of }', Maslov 
may lw eonsfdered as the more accurate, also those of Posnikov. 
Both state that at the h('glnning of the 20th centmy, the land­
lords culti,·atcd only S(i'T of the land they owned. If we' take 
this figure, and if this percentage is not umlcrcstimatcd, it 
woul<l appear that at that time about 4 .. 5 milliou drsiatynas 
were taken in lease by the peasants annually ( the awa owned 
hy landowners had hy then declined to 10 million desiatynas). 
''" r..t. Slahehcnko, op. cit., p. 37�. . -,, Ibid. 
'" �I. Ogonov;;ky, op. cit., p. 161. 
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The average rent then as has been stated above wa�, in Ukrame, 
4 rnLlc� per desiatyna. Thi� means that cvcrv year 68 rnillion 
mbks were taken from the peasants in the form of payment for 
temporary use of land. \Vhere this money went, anJ what the 
rcpcn.:11ssions were upon the entire Ukrainian economy, we 
,hall ,how later. 
Kuipovich gives a vivid picture, reprodl!ced in Tahle XXVIII, 
of the meaning of land leases among the various groups of 
peasants in his work K 1:oprosu o differcntsyalsiyi krestyanskogo 
kho;:,yaystu1. ''' 
.\lthough the data apply to the relatively laud-rich Katery­
noslav region where, a� we see, the percentage of lanJless peas­
ant,, and of those who only haJ a cottage, cquallcJ only 8.1'.t 
as against 36'1'. in the l'oltava region, and although the data 
are cited for the period when the Kateryno�lav region had an 
alreaJy noticeahle imlmtry which, to ,omc extent, freeJ the 
peasants from the lanJ. :\"everthclcss, even under such cor1Jitior1s 
we can sec what a decisive role lcasillg of lar1J played in the 
lives of the pcasaJ1ts of that region. Only in the last group of 
those having over 25 de.1"iaty11a.1· does the lea�e occupy an auxil­
iary place in the general land holding, and at that, at the cx­
pcmc of land acfp1isition. Bllt even in this group the percentage 
of farms which took lanJ in lease was not lower than in other 
groups. In general, more than half of all the farm� re�orted to 
leasing. It is a striking fact that along with a general land lmn­
ger and mass resorting to leasing, all groups include a certain 
part which gave out laud under lease. This is particularly noticc­
ahle in the groups holrling fom 5 to 10, and from 10 to 15 des­
iatyrw.l" per farm, precisely in the miJJle groups, where the 
ef111ilibrillm bchn�cn labor available in the family and the 
amount of lalld is at au optimum. This phenomenon resulted 
from many cames. :\mong them, the rnore significant, though 
llOt decisive, was au insufficient supply of fann tools. But the 
main cause was that the region of Katcrp1oslav, unlike many 
other parts of Ckraine, was a guhcmia governed by the Hus�ian­
imposed system of community land holding, a sihiation to which 
we shall rdurn later. This form of land holding causcJ a great 
spli!lir1g of lanJ into strips, where one farrner would have to 
11se many small pieces of land each in a different location. lu the 
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steppe area these distances sometimes reached eight an<l more 
miles. The cultivation of a small piece of land at a distant loca­
tion was naturally a losing proposition; hence the owner would 
let it out iu lease, in ordl'r to lease for his own usP more closely 
located land. This was the canse of mutual leases in tht' groups 
of farmers. 1n the higher groups, however, leasing of land as­
sumed proportions of normal industry. As far as the group hold­
ing 1 to 3 desialynas is concerned, the fact Iha! 167 of them gave 
land in lea�e cannot un<ler any cin:umslanccs mean that they 
had a surplus of land. This is a group which abandone<l farming, 
and appears to he artifidally tied to the laud by norms of the 
so-called Stolypin law of community property, obshcllina. 
Likewise the huge percentage, 26.1%, of labor hired by the 
landless cannot be considered proof of a lack of labor in com­
parison with the land area. This is nothing but hiring to till the 
land of thost' who possessed the needed tools. by those who did 
not. In genernl, wc can see that the utilization of hired labor 
by all groups, with the exception of the last, was so insignificant 
that even on farms with sufficient land ii could not be taken as 
proof of the lack of an a<lequate labor �upply in relation to the 
land. \Ve should also not overlook the significant percentage of 
farms in all groups that engaged in home industries. The nature 
of the home industries and their dlffncnet's from those of Hussia 
have already hecn commented upon. This was not factory work 
which would bring in extra income. It merely satisfied their 
own net'lb. primarily in textiles. This fact proves that the econo­
my wa� of a consumer nature, and that tllt're was a lack of rncm­
ey which prt'veuted the peasa11ts from joining in the market turn­
over. 
The "lease in kind" nature of leasing land in Ukraine ( the 
most appropriate name for it would probably be "lease in order 
to live") was, according to the number of leases, the most wide­
spread. Its chief mark was that it was dictated by the hopeless 
situation of the peasants. Ncvertlwlt'ss, there were forms of 
leases which peasants undcriook not by compnlsion. but out of 
consideration of a more rational and more profihble comluct 
of their farm enterprise; tlwre were also hnsiness leases dt"­
signed to effectuate a large production of cereal goods. In 
his Opys l'oltacskoyi hulNmiyi, 1 mshenetsky divides leases 
into thrt'c groups: 1) lease out of nt'cessity. in which he 
includes all leases under 10 clcsiatynas; 2) economic leases of 10 
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to 30 desiatynas, and 3) industrial leases of 30 desiaty11as and 
over. A division into the above groups gives the picture shown 
in Table XXIX.'" 
T.\BLE XXIX 
Group I Group II Group Ill 
Land given in lea,e 13.9% 3-5.7,; .J0.4% 
Leases ........... . .'51.7% 37.2% 11.1% 
Mobilization of Land 
It is quite evident that the Ukrainian peasants were seeking 
a solution of the artificially created land shortage by means oth­
er than taking land in lease. Strenuous efforts were directed by 
them toward acquisition of land outright. Here again, as in the 
analysis of leases, we shall encounter a series of phenomena, 
basically different from their analogies in Russia. They came 
into being as a result of specific economic conditions to which 
the entire economic life of Ukraine was subject in the interests 
of the metropolis. 
The process of diminishing landlord land ownership is 
characteristie of the entire European part of the former Hussian 
Empire. Its causes were many. First of all, the huge area of land 
acquired by the landowners during the reform; by far exceeded 
present adequate production capital in the shape of tools, mate­
rial, cash, etc. necessary for the exploitation of such great areas. 
Prior to the reform, the majority of labor was performed with 
agricultural tools of the serfs. In the second place, the diversion 
of the economic attention of the peasants towards their own 
land created, particularly during the seasonal peak of activity, 
a lack of labor available from local reserves. Thirdly, capital 
invested in agricultoure brought much lower rehirns than in other 
forms of production because of the poverty of the internal market 
caused by the agrarian nature of the country, underdevelop­
ment of transportation, etc. 
In Ukraine, however, in addition to the general causes, there 
existed others, created by peculiar conditions. It is obvious 
that the demand for land, prompted by the "land shortage" con­
tributed to a greater increase of prices for land than iu Russia. 
"''.\. Im�hf"nf"tsky, Opy.� Poltnnkoiy huherniyi (TJcscription nf Poltava Gni;ernor.l'hip), Poltava, Hl07, p. 43. 
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Bnt i11 a rn11ch greater degree leasing wa, a coantrihnting fat:tor. 
l::1.trcmcly higl1 rental vallle, of land given in lease determined 
the capitali1:cd valllc of the land. Similarly. as the market value 
of stock risc, according to higher dividends declared llpon it, 
aiming toward an an;ragc yield on i11ve,ted capital, so also prices 
of land ch:rnge(l continually, cktcrminccl hy lease rcnb a, land 
rent. 
lf we adopt the figurc 100 as the price of laml arnl tlw rent 
Yalne for thc period HJ()4 to lfJDS, s1 hseq1 cnt changes an: in 
tlic fol\mving rdation slmwn in Tahir: XXX_.-,.-, 
Runt l'l'ic,, of fond 
11J04-08 100 ](l() 
l\J09-181J 138 1:m 
l81J 1(-i,"i Hi.'} 
,b we cai1 sec, there is a complete concurrence, and it is 
also clt:ar tliat the decisive role is played by the rent, i.e. the 
price paid for using land. 
This is where \Ye liave to look first for an cxplanation of­
\vhy there occmrcd c.'1.ln:mc variations in prices of laml whicl1, 
during tlie reform, were more or less on an even level and rlnring 
the determination of reform acqlli,ition payments \H�re higlwr 
in Hnssia than in Ukraine. Land i11 Ukraine in f-act l.wcame sev­
eral times more valnahlc than in H11ssia. 
1n Tahlc XXXI \Yt: gin: a comparison of and prices in vario1 s 
regiorn of- the former i-:mpin: dnring the period of 1SS4 to 18.'5'� 
and lS\-JS to Hl02 from '"hirh one t'an also set: to wlut e:-:.:tcnt 
T.-\Hl.E '\:\\.I 
l'ri,-,, /Jl?r 1 dl'sial!Jntl of land in outright purdrnsc (ruhlcs). 
Satinn ]8.S1 J,\58 18%-1')(!2 
C"nl"Li industrial n,p;iou M.82. .�(i.25 
\Ve,tern hml 15.(i:i. ·12,76.
l<a1tern land -�.82. :12.0:,.
Ukrai1w: 
l.dt B.1nk. 17 78 118.80 
HJ1sl1t Bank 12.7', 99.12 
Srn,rJ,,,rn 11..14 l:'.J.'l7 
·. ' S. O,t.qwnl.o, op. cit., Jl. 120. '" l'. \lasluv, "P· cit , 11, 211..
TAilLE X\:X 
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the prices fixed at 187 and 123 rnhles at the time of the reform 
exceeded the rc,11 value of land at that time. 
Snbsequently the price differences became even grf'atcr. At 
five-year intervals the purchase value of lanc..l iu Ukraine, per I 
desiatyna increased at the following rate; 1868 to 1872, 28.1%; 
1873 to 1877, 21.9%; 1878 to 1882, I4.9'I; 1883 to l8S7, 
38.2'{; 1888 to 18U8, 16.8'.?; 18\.J.3 to 1897, 17.3'.f; 1898 to 1902, 
'.Xi.l'.�.--
\Vliercver the rental valne reached its highest peak, the pace 
of price increases of land was also the fastPsl. Thus, in the Pol­
tava region the price of l desiatyna in 1897 was 103 rubles; in 
1902 it was 207 rublc5; in 190,'5, 2-36 rubles; in 1908, 281 rubles; 
1909 to 1912, 236 rubles, and in 1913, 451 rubles.'' Within six­
teen years the price more than quadrupled. It is understood 
that neither the profit income from land, nor price profit from 
land could, or r.lir.l grmv in the same proportion. It was nothing 
else but robbing the peasants under specifically created concli­
tions. 
:\ similar process went on in all other parts of Ukraine, al­
though not in the same degrc-t' as in the l'oltava region. In 
Southern Ukraine, the increase of prices of land for the eight­
year period ·from 1892 to 1900 went on at the pace charted 
in Table XXXII. 
TABLE XXXII 
Cmmty of 
Olehandriv Ananiei: Kherson 
1892 97.5 88.3 94.9 
1893 126.7 100.l llD.6 
181)4 1,113.3 96.0 117 .. 'i 
]H(),5 113.2 9:J.:l 12213 
11396 1:2.0.5 97.7 J.10.6
1B\-J7 1-17.l 101.7 132.8
1898 1.}t-;_:l IJ0.5 14f:Ui
189':l 174.2 J3:lq 174.fi
190() :2.01.5 139.V 188.6 
And people still continued to buy land. During the period 
1893 to 1896, the peasants bought land for the followirig amouut 
( in thonsands of rubles): Left Bank, 10,188; Hight Bank. 10,208, 
Southern Ukraine, 15,8.'32.'° 
" ll,id., p. 21-3. ,,a Tbid., .1lso S. Ostupenko, op. cit., p. 128. 
,, �{. Slflbehenko, op. cit., p. 378. 
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\Vhen we emphasize the mass and increasing demand for 
laud on the part of the peasants, we may no! lose sight of oue 
factor which proves conclusively that it was not the demand 
which created such an unbelleveable increase in the price of 
laud, because offers of land always exceeded the demaud. 
During the first decade following the refonn collections of 
rcdemptioll paymenls by the laudlords contributed in large 
measure to the betterment of the finaucial position of the land­
lords who, as has been stated above, felt a lack of capital for 
conducting their enterprises under new couditions. The capital 
rent on their own grain production was immeasurably lower 
than the average capital gains of the period, thanks to general 
economic conditions aud, primarily, to grain prices, tariffs, cus­
toms policies. the details of which will be discussed later. 
Land purchase ( under lhe reform) payment allevinated the 
sihiation to a certain degree. Rut already iu the second decade 
they collected ouly 25% of the previous decade's amount, aud 
during !he five-year period of 1893 to 1898 only 1% of the iuitial 
amount. Against this background there appeared, on the part 
of the landlords, a continuing demaud for credit. 
In 188-5 the "Gentry's Land Bank" was established, for the 
purpose of iss11ing land mortgage loallS at 5.25% iJ.Jterest rate, 
as against the lowest prevnailing rate of 6%. In 1889, a lottery 
premium loan was floated by the bank which increased its 
capital by 90 million rubles. and reduced the interest rate by . .5%, 
�fortgage loaIJS extendiug from 60% to 75'.f of the bank's valuation 
of the land were given. 
Already in the 1890's, 41,788 landlords' estates in Ukraimo 
or 42.1% of the total 11t1mber were pledged with banks. They 
\vere valued at 1,129 million rubles, and were pledgnl agai11st 
loans of 714 million rubles, 63.5% of their valuation."" 
The extent of indebtedness was re-ached by reason of the 
over-evaluation, conducted in 1888. To the old indebtedness 
was added a new oue, in the followiug amounts per dcsiaty11a: 
in Volhynia, from 26.25 rubles, to 32.61; in the regious of: Ka­
tervnoslav, from 21.05 to 27.85; Kiev. from 27.97 to 35.08; Pol­
ta\:a, from 39.96. to .53.20, etc. During the same period the land� 
owners possessed in tools per 1 desiatyna in Volhynia, l.92; 
Poltava, 6.0.'3; Padilla, 2.70; Kiev, 4.07; Chernihiv, -1.77, etc."'-
so .M. Porsh, op. cit., p. 46. "' M. Slahchcnko, op. di., p. 361. 
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From the reports of the "Land Banks .. of Kiev, Poltava,t
Tauria, Khersou and Kharkiv one can get an approximate 1Jea 
of the indebtedness of the gentry's lands in Ukraine. As of 
January 1, 191.'3, these banks reported loans issued in the amount 
of 596,800 thousand rubles, and unpaid loans in the amount of 
54.'J,800 thousand rubles, or a total of 1,140,600 thousand of 
rubles. This was far in excess of the indebtt:'(lness in Hussia. For 
e:1.arnples, for ] desiutyna of land, there were loans in the regions 
of: Kiev, fi2 rnbles; Poltava, 69 rubles; Kherson, 70 rubles; 
Kharkiv, 7,3 rubles; Tanria, 77 mbles; while al the same time the 
figures for the Petersburg and Tula gubcmias were 32 rubles; 
!\loscow, 43 rubles; Nizhegorod, and Samara, 14 rubles.°' 
By government decree of .!\lay 18, 1882, the Peasants Land 
Bank was established for the purpose of facilitating the purchase 
of land by peasants from landlords, or, to be more pret:ise, to 
facilitate the landlords' sale of land. A source of capital of this 
bank was au annual issue of 5.5% government bonds in the 
amount of ,'5 million rubles, which wne subsequently quoted 
on foreign exchanges. Already in 1884 this issue proved insuf­
ficienL It was increased from year to year. In 1894, the interest 
rate on bonds was reduced, and in the following year the hank 
was autho_rized not only to give loans for the purchase of land, 
but also to give mortgage loans against previously purchased 
land. In addition, it-wuld purchase land itself for the purpose 
of resale. 
The bank's favorable attitude towards the landowners was 
manifest from the very outset, when prices for land sold to 
peasants were fixed at a higher rate than their existing market 
value at the time. Thus, the Kharkiv Peasants Uank valuated 
1 dcsiat!)llO in 1893 at 102 rubles, as against the current value 
of 8-'3 rubles; in 1895 at 102 rubles against 88 rubles. Similarly 
the Podilla Bank sold estate lands in 1894 for 127 rubles against 
the current value of 116 rnbles."·1 
Banks paid these high prices for the landowners' land in 
spite of the fact that the demand never equalled the supply Int. 
1905 to 1906, filled with hopes resulting from the revolution, the 
peasants sharply curtailed their purchases of land; but this did 
not prevent the banks from making further purchases. At 
the same time, as we have had occasion to observe in the Poltava 
region, the prices went up at an even faster rate. As of May 1, 
az S. Ostapeuko, op. cit., p. J:30. "l M. Slahchenko, op. cit., p. 381 ff. 
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1907 the bank owned already 2,()95,:365 desiatynas of land val­
ued at 205,401 thousan<l rubles, and the hank sold, from Novem­
ber to :\fay. only 170,00() desiatynas. ThC' remainder owned by 
the bank, yielded only .15% interest.,;, 
The above cluoted facts are quite ;,nfficient to prove that 
the mobilization of the lan<llorcls' Janel by the peasants and the 
prices paid for land were in no way the result of a hc•althy com­
petition between two fonns of an agricultural economy: the 
large and the small, :\'eitlwr did they indicate healthy market 
conditions. At the basis of all this lay, on the one hand, the 
"land shortage," and on the other special measures taken by 
the Russian Government which was interested in the exploita­
tion of the Ukrainian economy. Russia made ?;OOd use of the 
consequences of anomalous land conditions ereated by it at 
the time of the reform. The operations of the land banks per­
mitted the govnnment to place the bonds of the banks on 
foreign Pxchanges, and thus to draw into Russia the capital ne­
cessary for the development of Ru;,sian iuJustry. Just as in the 
matter of leases, the "land shortage" compelled all groups of 
peasants to participate, similarly in the purchase of land all 
peasants took part, the poorest included, though of course, 
in unequal degree. 
Land purchased through banks, amounted to the quantities 
per person of a peasant household shown in Table XXXIII. Out 
TABLE XXXIII 
Landless 1 .4 dcsiatyna� 
Those owning less than 1..5 dc�iatvnas. 0.8 desiatyna� 
Those owning from 1.5 to 3 de.�intynas 0.8 desiatyn,is 
Tho�c owning from 3 to 6 dcsiillynas 2.6 dcsiatyuas 
Those owning over 6 dcsiatynas 5.6 desiatynas 
of the land purchased by the peasants personally between 1875 
and 1895, small purchases ( under 25 desiatynas) acconnted for 
16% to 20% of all land alienation, and the greater part 
(800: to 84i) were larger transaction ( over 25 desiatynm,) ,tsh
During the refonn the Ukrainian peasants possessed, as pri­
vate property, much less land by far than the Russian peasants: 
only ·132 thousand desiatynas oul of a total of 5,745 thousand 
�, P. �faslov, 011. cit., II, 227. 60 P. M:i�\o.,·, loc. cit. 
• r I • • • • r • • • I • • • • • • • • • ~ • , ~ • • • • • • • • • • • 
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desiatynas of peasants owned land, i.e. 7.5% in proportion to 23% 
of the population. By 1877 this private property increased to 776 
thousand desiatynas and continued to increase very rapidly, 
leaving a similar Hussian land mobilization far behind.66.
As has been noted, in that vear there were 17,95:3 thousanJ 
dusiaty11as of privately owned '1am} in Ukraine. This land was 
distributed among the categories of owners shown in Table 
XXXIV. 
TABLE XXXLV 
L,md()wners (gentry) , .................. . 1-5,17-1 thousand dcsiatynas
�lunast€ric's and churches ..........•...... Jlf:i tlumsand tksiatynas 
r-.frrc:hants .........•..•...•...•.•.•.••.• 1,172 thousand dcsi.ttynas 
Tuwnspt•ople ................ , ......... . :Hf:i thousand dt•siatynas 
Pca,,rnts .............................. . 776 thous,tnd dcsi,ttym1s 
Aliens •................................ l."il thousand dcsiatynas 
Others ..•.............................. 76 thousand dcsiatynas 
U nc lassificd ........................... . 162 thousand clesiatynas 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17,953 thousandclesi.atynas 
Subsequently the redistribution of real property among the 
categories of owners took place almost exclusively at the expense 
of the landowners (gentry). As early as the latter part of the 
19th century, the landowners' property declined_ in some regions 
to its former ha.If, and at the beginning of the 20th century the 
process quickened noticeably. If we assume the extent of the 
gentry's holdings to he represented by the figure 100 as of 1862, 
the year of the reform, the decline of these holdjngs _is repre­
sented by the figmes in Table XXXV.0� 
TABLE XXXV 
.1 862 1867 1877 1887 1897 
Ldt Bank . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 100 98 9(1 79 68 
Ri).(ht Bank . .  ' . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 101 97 93 87 
Snuth(•rn Ukrnine .. . .  ' . . . . . . 100 84 66 ,56 
By 1905 the area of landowner holdings decreased ( frcm 
l:'5,17 4 thousand desiatynas to 9,985 thousand desiatynas) by 
5,189 thousand desiatynas. Those 5 million des·iatynas were dis-
�� Stnti:;tika po ddzlrnniyu wmlt!t:ladeni11n v Rnssi11i, 1911 ed., p. 17, 
67 1\.1. Pnrsh, op. cit., p. 148. os P. �-faslnv, lnc. cit, 
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trilmte<l among all groups, the greatest area being taken over 
by pcasa1Jts.0'' 
J )ming the same period, Talilc xxx,:1 shows changes which 











Total (in desiatynas) 
17,,H7/l74 
22.7<:6.4..J7 
lncn.•Jse 1,487,856 3,760JH7 -'i,2)'i8,473 
\\"e have data for the same period referring not ouly to 
peasant homchul<ls, but all farms, induding those of colonists, 
townspeople settled in villages, and others. VVe quote them in 
Table XXXVII because they provide a more complete picture 
of the structure of productive peasant landholding:n71 
Land from the landowning gentry was purchased not only 
by the peasants, hut also by other categories of land holders. 
;\Jerchants increased their holdings during this period by 160 
thousand dcsiutynas, townspeople by 524 thousand dcsiatynas 
and others by 451 thonsand dcsiatyna.s.'n2 
.-\ftcr 1905, when by ukase of Nowmhcr 1905 the operations 
of the Land Bank were considerably broadened, the mobiliza­
tion of landowners' land by the pcasan1s, which had subsided 
during the years of the re\'olution, increased again very quickly. 
In 1906 the Land Bank in Ukraine had been offered 1,453 
thousand dcsiatyrws of land for sale, of which 1,289 thousand 
desiaty,ws were offers of the gentry landowners." 
During the fo\lowiug five years, up to 1910, the peasants of 
Yolhynia, Kiev and Podilla regions acquired an additional ,'HO 
thousand dcsiatynas; of Poltava, Kharkiv and Chernihiv regions, 
4:25 thousand dcsiatynas; of Katcrynoslav, Tauria and Kherson 
regions. 711 thousand desiaty1ws, or a total of 1,476 thousand 
dcsiatyrws.'' 
Professor Peshckhonov wrote in 19:22: "Dnring the years fol­
lowing. the transfer of absentee o,vners' lands into the hands 
"" !vi. Pun!,, op. cit .. p. HA '" //,'·' 
""Sils'ke ho,;podarstvu Ckrainy" (Ukrainian A>!riculturc"). Narkomzcm 
Ukrainy! (l'cop!es' Commiss.a: nf A.gr/culture), Khnr�iv, JY:23, p. JO..., _.·· \I. Por, 1. nn. c,t., p, 14B. • \I. Por,h, op. cit., p. 1,:,3. 
l; P. Fo:11in, "F.konnmiclrna khamktcrystyka Ukrainy," p. \-)7. 
TABLE xx.xnr 
l'er lwuselw/d 
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Tot.i] L,r Ckraine 18,722,687 1,152,979 19,875,666 6.1 9.7 0.6 10.3 
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6 guhernias of Left Bank and 
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Total for Ukr:iine 20,127,454 3,613,609 25,741,063 27.9 6.7 1.9 8.9 
... 
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of the peasants went on at an even faster pace, and holdings 
of the peasants increased annually by 200 to 22:0 thousand des­
iatynus. Hy 1917 the peasants of these nine gubernias possessed 
as we can assume, over 28 million desiatynas, or 64% of the total 
,,,oarea. 
It appears, therefore, that the Ukrainian peasants acquired, 
between the time of the reform and the 1917 revolution, over 
8 million desiatynas of land. 
Average prices of land increased from 72 rubles in 1888 to 
1896 to 196 rubles in 1906 to 1914.o7� Inasmuch as the bulk of 
the land was purchased by the peasants at the end of the 19th 
century and the beginning of the 20th, it would not be too risky 
to assume that the average price for the entire period was be­
tween 160 and 170 rubles. It follows therefore, that the Ukrain­
ian peasants, besides paying an ammal round fi�ure of 60 mil­
lion rubles for rent, also spent another 1,360 million rubles in 
purchasing land. 
If we take to consideration that during this period the 
Ukrainian peasants paid over 3 billion mhles in rent, then the 
sum total is very close to 5 billion rubles, This sum i.� to be ac­
cepted at its value then, when it was much higher than the sum 
total of all capital invested in the entire Ukrainian industry on 
the eve of the revolution. 
Thus, over a period of more than half a century, the huge 
aggrc_!!:ate of the labor energy of the multi-million Ukrainian 
peasantry, instead of being spent on the acquisition of products 
of human enterprise went merely for the right to use the land, 
i.e. to use the natural property of the people. What neocessitatedo
the shifting of the right of the use of laud was at first Moscow'so
wanton disregard of existing land conditions in Ukraine, ando
later an even further deterioration of these conditions during theo
reform of 1861.o
Such an accumulation of the national income, effected at the 
cost of pitiful living conditions of the great masses of peasants 
and the halting of the development of their economy could be, 
if not excused, at least understood, if these accumulated values 
had gone toward the development of the national economy, 
toward the development of national industry, or at least toward 
n A. l'<'shekhonov, "Zcmlevladeniye" ("Lanrl Ownership"), Narodne 
Klwzyaystvo Ukrainy (Natinnal Economy of Ukraine), Kharkiv, 1922. 
"
ti "Sil�"ke hospodarstvo Ukrainy." 
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a rational organization of production of the large agricultural 
enterprises themselves. 
Nothing like this ever happened. The overwhelming part 
of those huge material contributious of the Ukrainian people 
was completely excluded from the Ukraiuiau economy. Those 
huge amouuts flowed from Ukraine in a wide river to Pctcrs­
Uurg, Moscow and abroad. 
This statement is not too difficult to prove. If we divide all 
the landowners according to the extent of their holdings, we get 
the figures shown in Table XX.XVIII for the year 1877. 
In the Kiev region, owners of over 10,000 dcsiatynas held 
17% of all private land holdings, and in Volhynia, 24.2%. 
Discarding the group of landholders under 100 desiatynas, 
the overwhelming majority of whom were peasants, we have 
the right to come to the conclusion that Ukraine was a land of 
large estates. Three thousand owners of large estates who con­
stituted only 1.5% of all landowuers held more than 50'.i: of all 
privately owned land. Tho.�e billions of purchase price money, 
rents and other payments went into their pockets. 
For the most part the owners of the large estates did not 
administer them directly. They did not even live on them, visit­
ing them orlly once in a while, They constituted the close circle 
of the Tsar's court, the upper echelon of the government hierar­
chy, the higher aristocracy. In short, they were the haut-monde 
of the hvo capitals of the Empire who also filled the fashionable 
places of France, Switzerland and Gennany. It was into the 
pockets of the Koenigs, Kleinmichels, Sheremetevs, Bobrinskis, 
Sangus,.kos, Branickis, Potockis that the Ukrainian peasants, 
money flowed. :.\:loncy in payment for the right to till their own 
Ukrainian land. The peasants' concentration on extending their 
land holdings absorbed all their economic resources and became 
the main obstacle to the development of agricultural production 
commensurate with its natural potential, a potential which 
would have guaranteed Ukraine a foremost place among the 
countries of Europe. This is what prevented the intensification 
of agriculture and increase of the amount of lahor per unit of 
area, and which gave rise to that so-called "relative agrarian 
overpopulation." 
As is well known, the basis of a rational organization of agri­
cultural production is a harmony between its three basic factors: 
land, labor and tools. The land conditions created in Ukraine 
She of ho/,ilings 
L'n<ler 10 <lesiatynas 
11 to 50 desiatyna., 
51 to 100 desiatynas 
Total under 100 tfrsiatynns 
10 I to fi00 dcsiatrnas ..... . 
501 to 1000 desiatrnas .. . 
Total under 1000 de$iatynas 
1001 to 5000 dc�iatynas .. 
5001 to 10,000 <lesiatynas .. 
Over l 0,000 dcsi.ttym1s .. . 
Total ov"r 1,000 ............ . 
.-, :\I. Porsh, "/!- cit., p. L58. 
TAlll.E xxxvm
Number of holdings Amount nf /mid 
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pro<luce<l a surplus of lahor in relation to the hmd: finaucial 
burdens came into existence as a result of land conditions, a 
deficiency of tools, even i11 relation to the insufficient amount 
of land. What is more, already toward the end of the 1880's, 
when rents began to rise much faster, the payment of rent was 
in large measure accomplished at the expense of a reduction in 
the basic tools of produdiou. This was a Jirect sign of a decline 
of the economv. It was felt most acutely in the supply of working 
and production animals. Censuses of horses, TufJle XXXIX, for 
military purposes comlncted between 1888 aml 1901. show the 
changes in the supply of horses (the vear 1888=100).'" 
TABLE XX.\:JX 
Far!llS witl1011l horse, 122 Farms with 4 liorsc>s. 57 
Farms with l horse .. , . . . . . 125 Farms with 5 horses_ 45 
F.irnis with 2 horses 96 Fanns with 6 horses. •II
Fam,s with 3 horses . . 65 
This indicates that the number of households with one horse 
and without any increased at the expense of a sharp decline 
in the number of multi-horse farms. 
As ear1y as 1882 the number of farms without a horse was, 
in relation to the total number of farms: in Chernihiv, 31.4%; 
Volhynia, .39.87; Katerynoslav, 40.9%; Kharkiv, 41.7%; Kherson, 
44.7%; Podilla, 51 .41; Kiev, .'58.2%, and Poltava, 58.6%. rt is not 
surprising therefore that even in such a relatively wealthy county 
as that of 11ariupil "teaming up" by several neighbors for com­
mon tilling of land reached 5.3.57 of all field work: hiring of 
horses, 21.4% and only 20.7% of the area was cultivated by the 
farmer's O\VIJ animal power.'" 
A similar process of impoveri.�hment could also be observed in 
relatior1 to fo d animals. The number of animals in the wealth­
iest food produciug Kherson area is shown in Table XL!'' 
Maslov noted the relationship behveen this phenomenon and 
anomalous land couditions in these words: ''The process of the 
impoverishment of the peasants permitted a continuation of lease 
of lan<l, a� kmg as there wa� au opportunity to supplement the 
budget of the household by mcaus of curtailing the tools of pro­
duction."'' 
7a P. Maslov, op. cit., II, 63. 7� �I. Slabclienko, op. cit., p. 111. 
"o Ibid., p. 112. -' 1 P. i\-laslov, op. cit., II, 69. 
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TABLE XL 
I'er 100 popiJlation Per 100 dcsiatyuas of Ulna 
Cattle Sheep Cattle Sheep 
1882 64.4 206.0 
1887 70.2 1:ll.2 34.8 60.5 
18% 46.4 76,5 24.5 ·10.7
HJ()() 44.2 65.7 22.9 32.0 
An even more vivid illustration of the impoverishment of 
the peasants is provided by Tahlc LXI, a closer analysis of the 
s.p82 supply of production tools and d\vclling
TABLE XLI 




Fann per one per onr 
Building.� tooL� Animals desiatu1w dcsiatuna 
I d"siatyua and less 236 8 14 22 238 
1-2 dt'siatynas 266 ()() 35 fJ.1 260 
2-3 c\c;iaty1rns 207 104 i3S ,57 140 
3-4 ,lesialynas 256 160 74 67 1-106
4-,) desiatyna; 27-1 167 70 ,)3 111 
5-6 dc;i<1tyn,1s 3SU 212 104 <'58 126 
6-0 dc;i<1tyn,1s 44<') 312 1:3 .1, 46 1()6 
fl-1.'i clcsiatynas ,598 ·102 136 45 05 
15-2.') dcsiatynas 361 807 195 40 58 
25 to 30 clc�iatymis . . . 2,080 B81 400 .54 J�lO 
Noteworthy is not only the 10\v amount of invested capital, 
but also the fact that its absolute increase in the higher groups 
of land holding is so insignificant that it conclusively indicates 
rather an increase in tools of prime necessity, such as ploughs, 
harrows, etc., rather than any application of improved machin­
ery. \'ery significant also is the fact that the value of buildings 
in all groups except the last is almost unchanging: all peasants 
live in primitive <.:ottages an<l have primitive quarters for their 
animals. 11ost indicative is the extTemely low value amount of 
animals, which even in the groups of (l to 9, and 9 to 15 des­
iatynas does not exceed in value 2 lo 3 hcml, horses included. 
Even in the ISSO's only the pcrccutage of peasant land hold­
ings �hown in Table XLll v ...ere tilled with the aid of machines. 
o; S. Ost.tprnko, op. cit., p. 119. 
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TABLE XLII 
Sou:ing Reaping Threshing ,viimou.:ing 
Right B□nk 5.7 1.3 29A ,'32.1 
Steppe 20.7 20.3 36.3 no data 
ss 
Ac1.:ording to the census of 1917, when the peasants were in 
fad cultivaling nearly 27 million desi;,itynas of area, they had: 
2 million metal ploughs: 1.5 million tillers; 4 million harrows; 
2.6 million carts; only 7,000 steam threshers; 55,000 seeders; 
4-'3,000 reapers; 156,000 winnowf'rs, etc."' 
From the mere fact that there was one seeder for every 500 
ilesiatynas and one winnower for 175 desiatynas, we can judge 
the straightened financial circumstances in which the peasants re­
mained as far as equipment is concerned. This situation was 
caused primarily by the burden of payments for land. 
It must be stated here that in the enterprises of a capitalisteic 
nature. of the landowners au<l of other owners, the sum total ot 
capital investment in buildings, tools and animals equalled only 
1,145 million rubles. It was far smaller then, than these enter­
prises received for land and in the way of annual income from 
productioQ. This is convincing proof that a great part of such 
imome· was kept from use in the national economy and con• 
sumed beyond its_ borders. 
In the light of the data quoted above, we must now come 
back to a matter discussed before, the problem of the so-called 
"relative agrarian overpopulation." This very term contains 
within it the source of many misunderstandings, On the one 
hand, nobody dare deny the existence of a '1and shortage" which 
hy itself indicated a surplus of farm labor in relation to available 
!and; and on the other hand, the fact that a certain number ofe
peasants from Russian gubernias migrated for seasonal work toe
the steppes of Kherson and Tauria gave an opportunity, to thosee
who wished to avail themselves of it, to generalize this phenom­
enon and to maintain that Ukraine represented a market of un­
filled farm labor and high wages where, as the saying went,e
"the more unfortunate Russian peasants" sought relief from theire
ill fortune. Those who so argue wish to see facts which allegedlye
contradict the statements about the colonial position of Ukraine.e
�.1 Trudi Kharkovskogo obshchestva sel�kogo klwzyayslm ( Proceedings of 
K/wrkiv Agricr,ltural Society), Kliarkiv, ·1889, I, 19. 
o-, S. Ost.ipenko, op. cit., p. 12.1. 
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Even if we were not disputing that sud1 were the facts, the�· 
still coHld not preclude the existence of a colonial slatus, be­
cause, for example, when America was an English colon�·, its 
status was in no way altered by the fact that emigrants from 
tht' metropolis came seeking a better living. However, the very 
inkrprt'tation of migration of Hussi.:rn peasants seeking work in 
the Ukrainian steppe is entirely incorrect. \Ve do not pretend 
to idealize the' position of the Russian peasants, and arc far 
from denying that their fate was hard when compared with that 
of the peasants of economically <len:>loped countries of \Vestem 
Europe. Here, in the Russian Empire, the formula was even 
more true than elsewhere that "whoever oppresses other people 
inevitably oppresses also his own." Particnlarly since in Hussia, 
subjected nations were included within contirmous borders of 
the state compelling, in large measnre, the making of identical 
legal norms of conduct. \Ve do not pretend that the Ukrainian 
peasants were badly off, am! the H.ussians well off. \Vhat is of 
essence is that the entire economic development of Russia, 
whose complexion also included agriculture, differed from that of 
Ukraine, and the difference was determined by the colonial po­
sition of Ukraine. 
Agrarian Overpopulation 
\V c have already brought together such basic factors as de­
termine agrarian conditions: land holdings; rent; mobilization of 
land; density of the mral population; outside income, and local­
intirm of the national economy. \Ve have been able to sec thf' 
much worse conditions under whid1 the Ukrainian peasants 
came after the reform in comp,trison with the Hussian peasants, 
bemuse of specially directed measures of the economic policies 
of the Imperial Government. Further we shall sec an economic 
policy even more flagrantly in the interests of Russia in indus­
try, tariffs, finances, foreign trade, etc. 
But let us return to agrarian overpopulation, and see if in this 
respect Ukraine was also in a position different than Russia. Let 
us see if at its base we can again see a specifically directed 
policy. 
lllumination on this point is of importance for yet another 
rf'ason: there is an unconcealed Russian tendencv to treat the 
"relative agrarian overpopulation" as absolute, and to base on 
this the thesis of the inevitability of a connection between 
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Ukraine and Russia. Only in this situation, it is alleged, does 
Ukraine preserve an opporhmity to have the necessary leben.�·­
raum on the peripheries of lhe Russian tcrritorities for placing 
the surplus of the Ukrainian population. 
First of all we must define the tenn, "overpopulation." Do 
we mean the inability of the given territory to feed its own pop­
ulation, or to employ it? Neither the one, nor the other is, as we 
well know, something that can be measured in absolute figures. 
As far as the second factor is concerned, the scope of employ­
ment of a population is determined b? the general tone of the 
economic development, natural resources of the territory, and, in 
much lesser degree, its extent. Concerning the first, the ability 
of Ukraine to feed its population, no one can have any serious 
doubts about it. The quality of Ukrainian soil, climatic condi­
tions, density of population, an<l a comparison of all those factors 
with Western Europe indicate the immense possibilities Ukraine 
has to increase consumer products and to satisfy the needs, not 
only of the existing population, but also of the natural increase 
for a long time to come. In addition, the food balance of a popu­
lation is determined not merely by the consumer products of that 
share of the production of a given country in the world division 
of labor. Hence, an�· analysis of the overpopulation of Ukraine 
in this aspect would be superfluous. 
The matter is then reduced to the problerri of employing the 
population. nut even in this respect we must distinguish be­
tween two situations: paucity of natural circumstances which 
make the development of productive activities of the population 
difficult, and artificially created social-economic conditions 
which prevent such development. Only in the first instance, and 
relatively at that, could we speak of an absolute overpopulation. 
The second must, in all justice, be anal
y,,:
cd as relative. 
It is the latter that \Ve encounter in Ukraine, and in relation 
to the peasants we consider it to be a relative overpopulation. 
\Ve must include in this tenn the absence of a surplus of means of 
production in relation to agricultural productivity. This came 
about as a result of: 1) insufficient land holdings of the peasants 
coinciding with the availability of the necessary land area, 2) 
compulsive necessity of increasing the holdings of the peasants 
at the expense of narrowing their production possibilities, 3) 
preventing the peasants from reorganizing their economy in the 
direction of absorbing more labor, 4) a one-sided development 
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of the national economy or, more precisely, the absence of a 
total national economy which ,vould waITant a normal 
social division of labor and provide a certain part of the natural 
increase of the population with ,m opportunity of employment 
in other branches of socially useful work. \Ve have already in­
dic'ated the existence of such factors in Ukraine, and only they 
can explain the existence of a surplus population among Ukrain­
ian peasants. In this, and not in a comparison to the existing 
life conditions, or of a standard of living, lies the difference be­
tween the Ukrainian peasants' life and that of the Russian. This 
cause of the surplus population was not felt as acutely by Russia, 
and in a majority of Russian localities was entirely unknown. 
The difference between Ukraine and Russia cannot therefore 
be reduced to the fact that Ukraine had an average density of 
population of 64 people per square kilometre, and Russia only 
22, and that in Ukraine 79% of the people were engaged in agri­
culture compared to 68% in Russia. The gist of the matter is not to 
what extent the Ukrainian peasant had a harder life than the 
Rus.�ian, but in the fact that the former was unable to utilize 
the opportunity to live better, and in the fact that conditioens 
made their appearance under which a part of the peasant popu­
lation could not make a livelihood at all. 
It is unnecessary to repeat many illustrations previously 
given in this chapter, but we wish to provide some additional 
proof that during the period under discussion the agricultural 
economy offered opporhmities for a considerable increase in 
employment. Few people know, for example that the geograph­
ical boundary of sltgar-beet culture extends far into the South­
east. but the spreading of this culture was stymied by an absence 
of refining establishments. At the same lime, rotation of sugar­
beets with grain crops triples the amount of labor needed in 
comparison with grain cultures. The same can he said of vinicul­
ture which did not nearly reach its northern boundaries. \Vide 
possibilities existed in Ukraine for such culhires as tobacco, 
hops, flax and many others providing raw materials for industry, 
and requiring much more labor per unit of area. \Ve could list 
many more products for which Ukraine's nah1ral conditions are 
favorable, cotton for example, widely planted at present. 
Tims, it was not a lack of nah1ral opportunities which pre­
n•nted the increase of the number of employed people, but the 
level of deveelopment of industry bast'd on agriculh1re, and the 
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peasants· lack of capital indispensable for snch a reorganization 
of production. 
This also explains the fact that Ukraine, utilizi..1tg the high­
est percentage of arable land of all territories of the Empire, 
nevertheless had 24% of it lying fallow, either under pary, or tolo­
ka.�0 Under multi-field rotation and proper eradication of weeds 
the unexploited area wul<l ha\·e been considerably reduced. 
We could cite imrnmerable examples of increasing labor per 
unit of area known to agriculture and to the peasants themselves, 
but this is superfluous. \Ve m11st stress again that the "surplus" 
of the rural population cannot, under any circumstances, he 
regarded as an absolute overpopulation. It is only the result 
of conditions created for the Ukrainian economy. 
It is impossible to give accurate figures for this "surplus." 
Different authors take a different approach to make their esti­
mates. \Ve have already noted that S. Korolenko estimated this 
surplus for the 1890's at 5 million, of whom 2.5 million could 
find work only beyond the bordPrS of their own territory. J'ro­
fcssor Ostapfcnko wrote in this wnnedion: "On the eve of the 
revolution, the Ukrainian peasant:/ agricultural economy had a 
'surplus' of_ 7,778,866 workers."86 It is not important whether the 
surplus ·was 7 or .5 million, or even less, but the very fact that 
richly endowed Ukraine had millions of peas�nts who, by virtue 
of created conditiOns, could not make a living. 
This also caused the mass migration which marks so vividly 
the differing positions of Ukraine and Russia, the latter not ex­
periencing such phenomenon. 
The numbers of peasants who left Ukraine, and migratell in 
the main beyond the Urals, to the so-called Zeleny Klyn (Green 














\Ve must note that this migration was spontaneous, and 
against government orders. In 1894, the number of spontaneous 
"' Para is fallow grournl lying plowed, while to/oka is fallow ground under 
sh,hble left on it. 
s-0 S. Ostapenko, op. cit., p. 119. "' M. Slabchcnko, op cit., p. 174. 
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migrants constituted 78'1, of the total. But in 190.S. the govern­
ment set up the so-ealle<l Central Commission for Hesettlemellt 
which subdivided land in lomlities of uew settlement, provided 
aid for transportation, etc. After that, mi1,;ration assumed great­
er proportions. Taufe XLIV show;, tlie numbers of peasants rc­
scttle<l dnring the period between 1906 and 1912. 
T.\BLE XLIV 




















Professor Vobly estimates the number of emigrants going be­
yond the Urals during the period between 1896 and and 1914 at 
1,600,000. The Poltava region always occupied first place, 2'3%, 
of all emigrants; then Chernihiv, 17%, and in last phtce Podilla, 
4.51."' These proportions are very telling, because Podilla, as has 
been stated, had the smallest extent of average land holdings, 
thongh sugar-beet culhue and a well developed refining indus­
try provided mi entirely different utilization of labor per area 
unit. From the Poltava region on the other hand, during the same 
period 60% of the natural increase of the popnlation cmigrate<l. 
(See Table XLV). 
T,\BLE XL\' 
Among the emigrants were: 
Landless ..... 16.6% 
ThosP owning up to 1 d .. siatyna 12.Wn
Those owning up to 3 desintynas .. 27.7%n
Those owning up to 6 dC'siatynas 32.!Yfn
Thos<" owning up to IO desiatynas . 7.8%n
Those owning over HJ desiatynas .. 3.0:!n
o-'I i.:P�hchenko-Chopivsky, op. cit ., . p. 47.n
'" K \'o"fJly, 1-:konomichna lieolirafiya Ukrniny (Economic Geography of .-
t kminel, Kiev, 1927, p. 73. 
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This proves conclusively that migration from Ukraine was not 
in the nature of a colonization of new and unpopulated regions, 
so well known in world hbtory, and which was the nature of the 
Russian colonization of Siberia during the 17th and 18th cen­
turies. Here we have neither the hazards of enterprise, nor seek­
ing of wider opporhmities for utilizing capital and energy which 
were peculiar to this colonization. Ukrainian migration was 
simpl�· an escape of the hunbtry from famine and in search of 
bread. 
1n this respect this phenomenon of migration is analogous to 
those mass movements of peasanh. within Uhainc in search of 
,vagcs. involving hundreds of thousands each year. Not an ab­
solute insufficiency of labor in an annual balance, but an accu­
mulation of seasonal work during harvest time, created a lack 
of labor in the Southern steppes which was filled by migrants 
from Poltava, Chernihiv, Kharkiv, the Right Bank, and partially 
from central Russian guhernias. In the 1880's an average of 
63,205 migrant workers left the Poltava region annually, and 
later the number grew to 125-150 thousand. In 1884, from Chcr­
nihiv region, 43,957 migrants went out; in 1893, 110,334, and in 
00 1896, 148,1�7.n In all of Ukraine the number of migratory work­
ers, not counting local unskilled labor and industrial \vorkers 
reache<l the figure of 600 to 700 thousand every year, among 
whom the Russians constih1tctl an insignificant percentage, 
smaller than the number of Uk.-rainian migratory workers in the 
Russian gubernias of Kmsk, Orlov, Voronizh, Samara, etc. and, 
in particular, in Don Military Region. 
The statement that Russian migratory workers were attracted 
to Ukraine by higher wages compared with what they could 
make locally, is incorrect. If this were true, it would contradict 
the large surplus of rural population in Ukraine. In reality, a 
comparison of wages at sowing and haymaking time (meals in­
cluded) for the years 1902-1906 gives the picture shown in 
Table XLVI91 (in kopecks per day). 
1foch more important than migratory workers in the balanc­
ing of labor surpluses was local unskilled labor offering itself 
for hire. This applies both to the number employed, as well as 
to steadiness of ,vork and locale of work in the peasants' budget. 
Hiring of unskilled day laborers by landowners and wealthier 
farmers was conducted in the immediate vicinity. In Bakhmut 
�o :'IL Slabchenko, op. cit., -p. 263. 91 P. 1fablov, op_ cit .• II, 181. 
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TABLE XL\'I 
!902-04 1905 190() 
Smc- IIa11- Sotc- Ilay- Sow- Ila11-
/legion. ir,g rrwkir,g ir,g mukir,g fr,g making 
Kherson /48 7:i 4,) 70 .'is ]()f, 
Ta,Hia (:i:l lO l (:iS 7:i 8,) 1:m 
Podilla :J,) :i,'i 1., 45 OS 
\'olhynia :rn 40 :iS 00 45 00 
Poltava 40 O:l 45 70 so 85 
Kharkiv 4,) 70 30 75 GS 80 
and c.,mi1pare \\•ith the above: 
\"olodimirska gubemia . 08 105 70 110 80 1.30 
]\,fo;cow gubernia .. 03 85 70 100 80 90 
county, in 188?), among 3,819 annual clay laborers, there were 
only 244 people from other localities; among 2,022 seasonal 
workers, 60; among 177 monthly workers, l; and among 3,713 
day workers, 86. This is tniical. Hence, unskilled day labor be­
came the steady occupation of a certain part of the local popu­
lation, bestowing on them the badge of a rural proletariat. A 
system of ecouomic intcrdcpeudcnce came into being behveeu 
this proletariat aud the employers. A large number of peasants 
with little or no land turned to unskilled day lahor as a hasis 
of their economy. Hence, their conditions dctcrmiucd the eutire 
economic interest. This explaius the appearance of peculiar phe­
nomena, known only in Ukraine during the revolution of 1904 
to 1906. Herc along with a mass struggle for land, there was a 
dctcrmiucd struggle of the village proletariat for a change in 
the legal and economic couditious of work. As early as 1863, at 
the time of the abolition of serfdom, temporary regulations re­
garding rural workers were issued. The employer had a right to 
punish a worker with up to 2 days wages for leaving work with­
out permission, laziness, carelessness, etc. IJe could discharge 
for sullenness or insolence. Ou his part, a worker had the right 
to leave work if he was beaten, insulted or not paid for hi� 
time. In addition, by decree of July 12, 1886 an employer had the 
right to punish without recourse to a court of justice. It com­
pelled the workers to deposit their passports with the employer, 
depriving them of the right of free movement. It raised violations 
of labor coutracts by workers to the classification of crime�, 
punishable under the criminal, and not civil law.92 
9, F. Daoilov, op. rit., I, 179. 
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From this we ean sec that the present Bolshevik dassifica­
tiou of labor contrad violations to the category of criminal trans­
gressions had a precedent in the former Russian Tsarist legisla­
tion. 
In differentiation from agrarian revolts which for the most 
part consisted of seizing lands of the estates, wrecking of es­
tates, etc., the struggle of the village proletariat for a cbange of 
legal conditions and wage.� assumed the proportions of organized 
strikes with well-defined demands. In the village of Dyakovo, 
o! Haysin county, during a period of five years, the day laborers 
condnde<l a hoycott of t·states. In the town of Sorochyntsi, near 
Poltava, striking laborers demanded an increase ot wages: fnr 
inen from i,5 kopecks to 3 rubles, for women, 50 kopecks to 1.50 
rubles; monthly \Vagcs from ,S or 6 rubles to 30 rubles, etc. Dur­
inµ; this period, .\imilar demands assumed mass proportious. 
Professor Ostap('nko estimates the total number of agricultural 
workers as of 1916 at 964,000. This is 7% of the number of \Vork­
ers among the rural population between thP ages of 20 and 59, 
whose total at that time \vas 13,740,000 (6,768,000 men and 
6,972,000 women). According to his data, during the same pe­
riod there \�·ere in Ukraine, of the total number of day laborers, 
4S.s;z were employed by small farms, 46.9% by medium sized 
farrns, and 4.6% hy large farms."" 
\Vages of day lrihorers were lower than t!ie average reward 
for work on the peasants' own farms which Professor Ostapenko 
estimates at 203 rubles per annum for an able bodied man. A 
day laborer mack 110 rnhlcs and meals ( meals cost the employer 
20 kopecks per day, or 73 rubles per year), therefore the total 
\Y:l.S 183 rubles per year. Rut if we compare these wages with 
the income of a poor farmer on his own holding, then they ap­
pear twice as large. The total sum of the pea,�ants' incomt: in 
the year 1916 reached 2,235 million rubles, of which 449 million 
rubles were made by poor farms, 1.341 million rubles by medi­
um farms, and 44-5 million rubles by tht' wealthy. This giws a 
total for each work�r in the corresp11nding dass of 91 rubles, 2S3 
rubles an<l 812 rubles per year. 
Thus, the "relative agrarian overpopulation" was character­
ized not only by the fact that part of the Ukrainian peasants 
could find no work on their own land and had to leave it. nor 
only that certain masses of peasants had to mo\·e over Ukraine 
n, S. Ostapenko, op. cit., p. l 18. 
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each year in scan h of work, lmt also bv the fact that some oi: 
thmc: peasants had a lower illcome than the average wages on 
the lalior market. 
Common Iloldinf!,s 
;\s a final illustration of agrarian conditions which came into 
lieing in Ukraine follO\\·ing the reform of 1801, we mllst consider 
one more factor which played a very important role in the lite 
of the peasauts. It was likewise not peculiar to Ukraine, and was 
imposed on Ckraine liy Hl!ssia in the interests of the treasury. 
\\'e have in mind the so�called obshchyna or common holding. 
Jn H11s,ia it has a history of manv centuries. The essence of 1t . . 
is that the land is the property of the commllni!y, and it is rli­
vided among J11emliers of the community no! on the basis of 
outright property, bu! of temporary individual la11d use. The 
basis for the division is the number of people in the family, 
i.e. a 11orm in kirnl. Changes in the composition of families liringo
about either periodical redistribution, or an equali:--ation of normso
by means of sulitraeting from some and adding to others. Thus,o
the Hussian peasants did 11ot feel tied to a particular piece ofo
land as being their O\Vll property and they dirl not feel that theyo
were acquiring property grarlually along with payment, for laudo
endowed accorUing to the reform. Their at!i!llde was one of con­
sidering la11d as something to which to apply their labor. Thiso
form of land holUiug vvas favoreU by the interests of the gov­
ernment_ to �ome extent abo lw the interests of the Hussiano
peasants themselves, and was much idealizeU liy the politicalo
trc11d \\·hich was mos! acceptable by the peasa11ts, the narodnikso
or populi�ho
[t gave the government an opportunity to apply the princi­
ple of the so-callerl "comm1mity liability"' in the interests of the 
trea,ury, i.e. the respomiliility of the e11tire commu11it;--· tor the 
pa;--•J11e11! of taxes b;--· all its members. lnUividually unpaid taxes 
were as�c��eU am(mg the remainder and paid by them. 
The peasaub wished to see the obshchy na as guaran!eei11g 
an equitalile di,trilmtion of land, and a safeguard givi11g them 
additional di,tributio11 when there were more mouths to feerl 
i11 the familv. 
Finally, the so-called narorlnitski (populist) !rend in the 
Socialist political movement perceived, in the principle of oh­
slicho!flW or conimunito;--· propert;--· of laud, the pattern of a future 
socialist society. 
9'2 Ukraine and RWJ.da 
Ukraine had never known obshcltyna. In old times, even 
before serfdom, there was community property in Ukraine, but 
only to a very small extent, and exclusively applicable to lands 
of common use: pa<;tures, forests, etc. Community enterprises 
were encountered even before the reform of 1861, but this was 
an obshchyna sui generis, on a contract basis, and not connected 
with results of labor. It was simply a cooperative enterprise of 
labor and capital. This was not an obshchyna of the Rnssian 
type, although in some places immigrants from Russia made at­
tempts "to get organized according to the Russian pattern."�• 
Nevertheless, at the time of the abolition of serfdom, obshchy­
na was widely imposed upon Ukraine. "\Vhen peasants received 
endowments, 9,056 thousand desiatyrw.s, or 53% of usable land 
was given to 1,945,000 people ( 42.7%) as community property, 
and the remaining 7,913 thousand dcsiatynas or 46.7% was given 
to 2,605,000 people (57.3%) as household property."% 
Or, if we take into consideration not individuals, but house­
holds, then 1,191,643 households ( 41.5%) were on rights of 
obshchyna and 1,683,477 households on household property 
rights.�6.
In some gubernias, obshchyna then Qecame the dominant 




Obs-hchyna Ilouselwl.d Total household 
Region: land land property 
Chernihiv 969,238: 913,799 1,883,037 48,3 
Poltava . . . . . . 239,107 1,839,692 1,878,799 84.1 
Kharkiv . . . . . 2,450.925 121,23(:i 2,572J61 4.7 
Khf'rson . . . . . . . 1,915,368 241.678 2,157,046 11.2 
KakrysnosLv ... 2,535,770 ,i2,:n1 2,628,101 3.5 
Kiev . . . . . . . . . . 326.864 1,619,967 1,946,831 83.3 
Volhynia . . . . . 480,331 1,6!JO,867 2,171.l98 77.9 
Podilla . . . . 90,606 1,576,0,58 1,666,66� 94.6 
such form of land holding upon Ukraine according to the Rus­
sian pattern, although "the obshchyna was not applicable to the 
very nature of the economy, as accepted long before the reform" 
( Slabchenko) was exclusively for fiscal purposes; to lTansfor the 
1H M. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. 1--t �s M. Parsh, op. cit., p. 44. 
�o Ibid., p. 166. u, M. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. 20. 
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guarantee of collecting taxes, even from those households which 
were unable to pay, to the backs of others as an additional bur­
den, even if they were already overburdened, and applying for 
the purpose a "community liability," Ukraine did not, as a mat­
ter of fact, accept this obshchyna imposed on her. "Among the 
obshchynas, a total of 80.2% did not comply with the re-allot­
ment requirements of obshchyna."98 
But the Russian authorities did not take this into consider­
ation, as Professor Slabchenko appropriately says: "One of the 
most interesting scholars of agrarian conditions in Ukraine, 
Shymansky, is right when he says that individual enterprise 
dominated in Ukraine, while the Russian authorities were certain 
that obshchyna existed in Ukraine and erected their financial 
policy on this. Thus obshchyna itself was a fiction, imagined by 
the central Petersburg authorities; in Ukraine they knew only an 
individual, albeit a three-field economy."99 
Nevertheless, although the Ukrainian peasants violated the 
rules of obshchyna and used the lam! on the basis of household 
holding, its detrimental results, as of the formally existing form 
of land holding, laid heavily upon the economy. Even disregard­
ing "community liability" noted above, it presented an insur­
mountable obstacle to the general effectiveness of land distribu­
tion by massing all the land of one farmer \Vithi:n one boundary. 
Splitting, which had its source in it, augmented by family divi­
sions, became one of the decisive factors which excluded a ra­
tional organization of the productive process. The distance sep­
arating pieces of land from each other, and from the farmer's 
abode even reached several kilomeb:es, A large part of the land 
was thus wasted on boundaries and field roads. 
In a<l<lition, obshchyna forms of land holding frequently 
compelled the peasants to apply involuntarily forms of crop 
rotation. For the most part the three-field system was revived 
( winter planting, spring planting, and then fallov,· land, toloka 
fiel<l covered with the previous year's stubble and grown with 
wee<ls which were used for animal pasture). The need for pas­
hues preserved this system, preventing the more developed 
farms to change over to a many-field system, with grass sowing 
etc., not to mention the fact that a fallow field with stubble con­
tributed to deterioration of the soiL 
98 Jbid. 
00 M. Shl,d1rnko, Orhanizatsiya khnzym1.1frl/ l'kr11in11 (Orgmiization of the 
f:cmwmy of Ukr11i11e), Kharkiv, 192.5, I, 64. 
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Another important factor was that ob�hchyna land holding 
made documentary proof of any household's rights to land im• 
possible. The application of Russian practice, where obshchyna 
encompassed more than 80� of all households, brought about 
in Ukraine a situation where the peasants were deprived of a 
legal formulation of their prop<.'rty rights to endO\w<l land. "It 
is a terrible thought," wrote later Minister With:, "that farmers, 
both under household, as well as obshchyna land holding, do 
not have in their hands any documents which would prove their 
rights.",,),) 
AU this was written, however, in face of the fact 0£ the agrar­
ian revolution, when community liability was being repealed 
(190J), when endowed land had been paid for, and whm the 
order of the day was the Stolypin reform. But 40 years earlier 
this obslu:hyna was imposed on Ukraine by force, contrary to 
the existiug sitnation in Ukraine, and caused the rural economy 
great harm. Such were the agrarian conditions created in 
Ukraine following the reform of 1861, and such were its conse­
quenc<>s. 
It is understood that the colonial policy of Hussia iu relation 
to Ukraine was not only mirrored in the area of agrarian policy. 
Of such nature was the agrarian-economic policy in general. 
\..Ye shall show this in subsequent chapters of this work, where 
we sball illustrate this policy in connection ·with otlwr social­
economic processes of similar kind. 
We here are deliberately not taking into account the rea<> 
tions of a national and political content which the agrarian con­
ditions produced in the Ukrainian peasants, as did all Russian 
policy in relation to Ukraine. The social-political processes in 
Ukraine are complicated, to such an extent, peculiarly revealing 
in tlwir prnsentation of a national entity, that they cannot be 
considered superficially. They demand a separate and independ­
ent illustration. 
Precisely within the Ukrainian peasantry these processes 
showed themsekes most clearly, often assnming very acute 
forms. Beginning with the 18/0"s signs of mass opposition ap­
pear, sometimes taking form of fairly well organized peasant 
movements. The opposition reached its culminating point in 1902 
when the peasants of the regions of l'oltava and Kharkiv started 
an agrarian revolution. The revolution spread all over the Em-
IOU \Vitte, np. cit., p. 221. 
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pire in 1905 to 1906. No repressions were in a position to break 
this spirih1al opposition, hecanse rca\it�.- left no alternative, but 
to fight. The hopelessrtcs� of the situation fouud the most vivid 
expression in the words of peasant participants of revolts. 
during the punishment by the whip: .. _ . althougli we shall per­
ish." sho11h•<l the peasant Khoma P-r·yadko, a participant of the 
Chyhyryu revolt, "at least our children will get better land." And 
Trokhym Shay<la, a Poltava insurgent of 1902 yelled: "Slaughter 
us, beat us, just the same we shall have to die without !awl" 
The thirst for Land and Freedom is not onlv a revolutionarv 
banner-word aroun<l which all the peasantry gathers in struggle, 
it is not merely a formula of economic and political demands. 
Land and Freedom is the ideological basis of the entire outlook, 
of the understanding of the natural right which penetrates 
deeply into the comciousness of the peasantry, having its roots 
in religion;; faith and feeling. 
The Stolypin Reform 
Th(� revolution of 1902 to 1906, as is well known, ended in 
failure, although under its pressure the Government agr<"e<l to a 
series of concessions. These included. a declaration of the free­
dom of religious beliefs; repeal of "community liability"; aboli­
tion of corporal punishment by judgment of village courts; aid 
for resettlement; etc., as well as greater civil rights and introduc­
tion of population representation in the State Duma. But the 
most important problem of agrarian conditions, the mainspring 
of all the peasant movements, the problem of bnd, remaine<l 
unsolved. It was not solved bv the State Duma in all of its four 
sessions, although a new land reform bill was the center of all 
of its legislative programs. The first Duma was dissolved pre­
cisely because of its radical attempt to solve the laud problem. 
and it called upon the people to continue their fight. 
Of the 458 legislative demands that were served upon mem­
bers of the second Duma. 2ITT demanded a solution of the land 
problem, and even the rightist, monarchist circles saw the dan­
ger of any further procrastination in this matter, and the threat 
to the preservation of the Tsarist Empire itself, The electors of 
the Stavropil county demanded: "l) Antocratic government with 
participation of representatives of the people; 2) Preservation of 
the entirety and unity of the Hussian State on coudition of equal­
izing all the rights of nations constituting it, hut in no event 
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should any land or nation be permitted to separate in an inde­
pendent political government; 3) All the lanrl should be pro­
claimed common state property, etc."io, 
The idea of "nationalization of land" had wide support 
among a majority of the deputies from the central Russian re­
gions, but it "created sui gcneris separatist trends among the 
representatives of the borderlands, because to those who had ex­
perienced the decrees of the central government in the matter 
of 'unifying the nationalities' the danger of nationalizing the 
land was dear." 102 
As far as the demands of peasants are concerned, and these 
came from all nine gubemi-as of Ukraine, their content can be 
reduced to the invariable demand of the free transfer of all 
Ukrainian lands to the Ukrainian peasants, a reduction of the 
tax burden and a guarantee that the people would have a right 
to determine their form of life. 
Having conquered the revolution which threatened not only 
Tsarist autocracy, the gentry's landownership, the integrity of 
the Empire, and still preventing the State Duma from a legal 
solution of the agrarian problem, at least to the extent of blunt­
ing its acuteness, the Governmetnt nevertheless understood that 
some changes were inevitable, and that it was imperative to take 
the initiative in this matter away from the stormy peasants. This 
is where Stolypin's law came in. 
Credit for this law should properly go not to Stolyp in, but 
to his predecessor, Count Witte. In 1904, in his Zapiski po kres­
tyanskomu delu which was based on resolutions of 11,000 meet­
ings held in this matter, Witte posed the problem of abolishing 
the compulsory form of community land holding under obshchy­
na, Even the <leer<'e of 1861 foresaw the possibility of quitting 
an obshchyna, and the compulsion to remain within it was tied 
only to the final payment of installments for land, Article 165 of 
the Payment law stated: "If a peasant, who desires to separate 
will pay to the county treasury the entire amount due for land 
from him, then the community is obliged to separate for this 
peasant the appropriate part of land, if possible in one location." 
This article was repealed in 1893, however, because by that time 
the fiscal interests, and not land payments, demanded the pres­
ervation of obshchyna. One cannot say therefore that the nega­
tive properties of obshchyna, from the viewpoint of agricultural 
P. Maslov, up. cit., II, 379. ioe P. Maslov, loc. cit.101 
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production, were not clear even at the time of the abolition of 
serfdom. In dfoteryali Redaktsfonnoy Kommissiyi (materials of 
the editors· committee) of the law of 1861, we read the following: 
"In the further economic development, the commnnity structure 
will change into a burden on the peasants themselves. A change 
of commnnity land holding will, most probably, be inevitahle."m 
Thus, Count \Vitte's proposal, expn�ssed in the above cited 
Zapiske po krcstyanskomu dclu, of facilitating an exit from obsh­
chyna was foreseen long before. He argued for his proposal in 
the following manner: "Such an order of land holding kills the 
main stimulus of any economic culture, the consciousness and 
certainty that the fruits of his labor will be enjoyed by the 
worker or people close to him by blood relationship; a member 
of a commuuity cannot have such certainty by virtue of a tem­
porary use. Economic expectations, the initiative and e1JPrgy of 
individuals are futile, and in many instances cannot be realized. 
Such mai.11 carriers of any material culture encounter insurmoun­
table obstacles under conditions of community structure.''e104
The law of Stolypin (Nov. 9, 1906) gave nothing above the 
opportunity to acquire private property over endowed laud. 
Article 9 of this law stated: "Every head of a household, who 
holds land according to comnumity right, may demand any 
time that it should be determined as his individual property, or 
property in common with other members of his family." Article 
32; "Every head of household whose land holding is detcrmiued 
has a right to demand that the community give to him, in place 
of separate pieces of land, an appropriate piece of land, if pos­
sible in one location." This land will become outright private 
property without any restrictions (Article 47).1°5 
Stolypin's law did not, therefore, completely abolish obshchy­
na. It only facilitated avoiding it, and made possible the estab• 
lishmcnt of farm enterprises, either so-called otruby ( all the 
land iu one piece, but the home of the farmer is in the village) 
and khutirs ( the land and home all in one location, much like an 
American farm), \Vith this law, as has alreadv been noted, the 
operations of the Land Bank were authorized to facilitate the 
sale of Jami to peasants. 
ioa Materyali Redaktsionnoy Kommissiy! ( Materials of the Editing Com­
mission), St. Petersburg, 1876, IV, 45. 
Il>4 S. I. \Vittc, Zapiske po krestyanskomu dclu (Notes on Peasant Affairs), 
Stultg�rt, 1903, p. H7. 105 Y. \'ozncscnsky, Deytt'uyushche zakony o krestyariakh (Binding Laws 
Pertuiriing to Peasants), Moscow, HHO. 
, 
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This law was dictated hy far-reaching political aims. and by 
no less important economic rcason.s. The year 1903 proved that 
the government had very weak support in society. Even the 
industrial bourgeoisie, including that of noble origin, joined in 
the opposition to the government. And the landed gentrY, weak­
ened by its parasitic existence, ,vas unable to create any strong 
political force. This created the idea of favoring the establish­
ment of snch a social force, whid1 hy its nature would he con­
sPrvativc, and on which the throne could rely. The law was con­
structed in such manner as to favor such a d.iss, with its credits 
for land, khutirs and otruby, in other words, a landed middle 
class. In addition, for the Russian peasants, where 80% of tlwm 
were within obshchyna, facilitating their quitting vhshchyna 
and becoming an industrial proletariat. Obslich1pia land holding 
and in this rcspi.ct Stolypin's law provided a certain relief to 
the tension resulting from the agrarian revolution. Under the 
conditions of a well developed industry in Tiussia, the peasants 
with small land holdings had long since heen leaving tht• land 
and becoming an industrial proletariat. Obshd11;na fo.nd holding, 
prohibitit1g the alienation of his land as his own property, hound 
the peasant to the land artificially and tied him a� a proletarian 
to the land. The new law made it possible to become an outright 
owner of the land and to sell it, thus improving his financial po­
sition without changing the basis of his livelihood, i.e. hiring out 
as labor. Such a sale of land by the proletariat, the former small 
holding peasants, was at that time ver�· widespread in Russia. 
ln this respect the Stolypin law gave the Ukrainian peasa!lts 
no benefit at all. The liquidation of obshchyna forms of land 
holding hardly introduced anything new into the lives of peas­
ants with small holdings. As has been noted, the instih1tion of 
ohshchyna w,1s in general alien to the Ukrainian peasantry. In 
that degree in which it had been imposed on Ukraine by Hnssia 
it did not take deep root, remained a fiction, therefore its re­
moval was nothing very significant. The main thing is that, with 
an undeveloped industry which could not provide for the em­
ployment of peasants with small land holdings, these pr-asants, 
as before, remained affectionately tied to their piece of land as 
their 50\e means ol subsistcncf'. 
The Stolypin law had, hmvever, a devp significance for 
Ukraine in a different aspect, which \Vas, undoubtedly, one of 
its most important political aims. The revolution disclosed in 
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Ukraine more than the wiH of the Ukrainian peasants for a 
change of the existing or<ler. 111 no less a degree it indicated a 
unity of the peasant mass('s i11 the strugglt• am! a weldi11g of all 
its social strata. This gave the revolution the character ot a lla­
tional deed. In the slogan "Land aud Free<lom" the term Frel'­
dom spread to include an introductiou of "our own order in our 
own land." This contai11c<l the grnvPst danger to Hussia that the 
peasant revolution in Ukraine offered. 
lt was dear that suppression by arms did not halt the proeess 
of the revolution. And it was not the inteution of the govern­
ment to solve it by mc>ans of a change of agrarian conditions. 
Hence there arose the uecd to change the uaturc of this process. 
to deprive it of the hallmark of a natioual movement, to break 
the unity of the riational community by way of planting and 
sprea<litig within the peasantry social controversies, thus crea­
ting a cleavage between the wealthy and the poorer peasants. 
As we shall sec, suhsequently, the Bolsheviks mac.le use ot this 
device to the fullest extent. 
It must he adrnitte<l that in and of itself, the form of farn1 
enterprise is in the highest de�ree comml'nsurate with the spirit 
of the Ukrainian peasantry. it is therefore not surprising that in 
this respect the Stolypin law found favorable acl:cptance amoug 
the better off peasants. i\'owhere else were khutirs and otrul)y 
as widespread as iu Ukraine. The wealthier peasants began to 
consolidate their lall<ls into siugle units iu a mass mo\'ement, de­
tcnnining thereby in large measure a more rational farm ecou­
omy. Likewise all !and purchased through the bank assumed 
the form of khutirs aud vidruhy. During the period from 1906 to 
191-'3 this land w,ts divided accor<lir,g to the form of: use as sh0\•.'11 
in Table XLVIII. '"� 
T.',BLE XLVJll 
Gubemia % uf kh utir l,md � of vidrnbr, la11d 
Chernihiv 48.9 !51. l 
l'odilla 25.1 74.9 
Kkv ."iD.l 40.9 
Pr.!h\"d JG.O 64.0 





,., '"'Sils'h· hnopodcir�tvo . .," p. 24. 
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Such a transformation of the wealthy group of peasants in 
Ukraine constituted the economic object of the law. The decline 
of the Ukrainian agrarian economy, nnder pressure of land con­
ditions and of general economic circumstances faced Russia 
with great difficulties. Grain crops of Ukraine constituted 23% of 
the entire Russian crops,107 and in exports of grain Ukraine 
participated to the extent of almost 80%. This grain of Ukraine 
was a basic export product, at the cost of which Russia covered 
in large measure her payments of foreign loans. Therefore the 
maintenance of a production level of grain in Ukraine and of its 
export goods part was an absolute necessity to Russia. 
'Without a change of agrarian conditions, with a general im­
poverishment of the peasant masses, and under a general decline 
of agricultural productivity, Russia sought a solution of the prob­
lem at the expense of the wealthier peasants. 
The material condition of the Ukrainian peasants was, includ­
ing also land taken under lease, as is shown in Table XLIX. But 
TABl.E XLIX 
Poor peasants ( 0 to 3 dcsi,1tynas of land) .. . 61.7% 
�lid<lk pP.asauts ( 3 to 9 desiatynas nf fand) .. . 33.4% 
\\.'calthy Peasants (9 to .'50 dcsiatynsais of land) ... 4.9% 
the top echelon of those in the middle and of the 4.9% of the 
wealthy held over 60%'. of all peasant land and were the chief 
producers of commercial grain. 
Favoring this part of the Ukrainian peasantry, the Stolypin 
law had as its objective the preservation of a source of income 
for Russia. Hence, the new Stolyp in refo1m did not change 
agrarian conditions in Ukraine created by Russia. 
The acuteness of the agrarian problem, as well as of the gen­
eral economic conditions, not only did not subside by 1917, but 
grew even worse as a result of the war. 
'"' B. Dz.inkevych, Prod11ktsiya khli/m tc Ukraini (Grain Production in 
[.'krniuci. Kl,ark1v, 192-3. I, 19. 
CHAPT.ER 3 
UKRAINIAN INDUSTRY, CONDITIONS OF 
ITS EXISTENCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
Explanation of Colonial Dependence 
Two SHARPLY DIFFERE!>."T periods must be distin­
guished in Ukrainian industry following the land reform: the 
period of decline to the 1880' s, and the rapid growth since the 
1880's and in particular since the 1890's. We can accordingly 
discuss two stages of Russian economic policy in relation to 
Ukrainian industry. 
At this point, we take the liberty of making a slight digres­
sion from the main subject in order to concentrate on the idea 
of colonial dependence. The concept of colonies, as we know, 
is given various meanings, especially with reference to conditions 
in industry. \Ve make this digression, however, not to refute 
various extreme concepts, nor to lecture on the subject. This 
work is an analysis of Russian-Ukrainian relations, in the eco­
nomic sphere, during the time of Tsarism. The subsequent, second 
part of this work is devoted to Ukraine's position under Com­
munist Moscow. The latter professes to be continuously fight­
ing against colonialism. The main emphasis of Moscow's for­
eign policy is upon this point, particularly in the recent, post-war 
period. Much space in Soviet works on politics and economics is 
devoted to coloniali!';m. Thev all refer to countries of Asia and 
Africa which, until recently, had been colonies of western em­
pires, or remain eve11 now in some relation of dependence. 
There was a time, however, prior to the seizure of power by 
the Communists in Russia, when they similarly eYaluated the 
position of nations conquered by Hussia: Ukraine, Turkestan, 
Georgia. etc., defining the position as colonial. In support of 
this, they cited in the literature of that and of the subsequent 
period, definitions of the very concept of colonialism and of 
those manifestations which determine the position of one or an­
other country as being in the category of a colony. These <lcfi-
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nitions provide in general a fairly accurate definition of the 
concept of a colony. Therefore, our object being to shed further 
light on the colonial nature of Ukraine's economy of that perio<l, 
we believe it would be proper, before corning to the analysis of 
the posit;on in the branch of iudustry, to state how a colonial 
natur(' of an economv is to he understood when confronted with 
it as understood by the Communists themselves. Theu, in an 
analysL'> of the present position of Ukraine, we shall only have 
to rnutinue to stay with those definitions which the Cornmuuists 
themseln·s applied earlier to Ukraine as a colony of the Hussian 
Empire. 
We have done this advisedly in the chapter devoted to in­
dustry because de\·elopment of industry in a country is most 
frequently the cause of a confusion of the real nature of tlw 
economv inasmuch as the center of attraction then becomes 
dC've!Op,ment as such, and its nature is ignored. 
There arc many authors who treat the rapid industrial devel­
opment in Ukraine as proof of equality between Ukraine and 
Hussia. The location of different forms of industrv O\'er the ter­
ritory is, these say, the Empire, a result of a social division of la­
bor \\"ithin a single ecoonomic hod�-- The high level of industry 
in Ukraine· reached at the beginning of the 20th century 
is. in their opinion, higher than in many regions of Hussia prop­
er, and would of itself disprove the condition of colonial depen­
dence of one economy upon the other. They \\,'Ould inject into 
the term "colony" a content applicable to that term in old times: 
of an industrially and culturally backward land whose economy 
is an annex to the ccouomy of the metropolis, and the latter 
drawing products of consumption aud raw material for its in­
dustry from the colony, and supplying it in tum with its manu­
factured goods. 
Such an understanding of the tC'nn colony is correct when 
applied to relations between old Western European empires 
,md their tl\'erseas possessions. But these relations changed as 
time went by, and the subsequent process of imperialist conquest 
of new terrains also assumed different forms. It is not surprising 
therefore, that hvo terms made their appearance in literature 
for the designatiou of colonies, i.e. colonies of the so-called 
"Asian h type and of the "European" type. The respective adjec­
tives denoted not their geographic location, bnt a different form 
of economic <lepemlcnce. 
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The direction of industrial development, not its level, is the 
determining characteristic of a colony of the modern type. In 
other words, whether the development of industry, its extent 
and form, is dictated by the h1terests of the metropolis, rather 
than the demands of the total complexion of a national economy. 
The main characteristic of a colonial condition is the enforced 
accumulation of a major part of the national income beyond 
the borders of the national economy. 
The product of society is the result of the labor effort of the 
community, and ought to be used for the satisfaction of the 
needs of the particular society. There is the realization, however, 
that among such needs there is atso the necessity of providing 
work for coming generations, and a drive to broaden the satis­
faction of the needs of the present community. All parents have 
a natural desire to provide by their own labor an existence for 
their children, either in the form of giving them professional 
il1tel!igence or skill, or in the form of creating new enterprises 
for them. These desires of each generation of parents accumn­
\ate in society and contribute toward the exclusion of a certain 
part of production from consumption, a<l<ling to the amount of 
accumulated capital goods. 
Likewise in the satisfaction of their O\'v·n needs, both of those 
that exist already, of those which are created by invention and 
the production of new articles of use, and to shield themselves 
from complications of all sorts, people try to restrict their every­
day consumption. thus nearing these goals. In this case, also part 
of society's production is saved. 
Therefore, the presence of a national reserve ( production cre­
ated in the process of society's labor, bnt excluded from direct 
consumption within the given productive drcle, either for the 
purpose of increasing the tools of production, or increasing the 
satisfaction of personal needs) is a phenomenon common to every 
society. We have gone into these common tenets to recall mat­
ters logically connected with our study of Ukrainian economics. 
We wish to emphasize, that by the term "nationaol reserve" 
we mean part of the national product but do not identify it 
with the Marxist "surplus production." \Ve reject the Marxist 
theorv of "value of labor," already discarded bv life, and the 
theoyY of "surplus value" emcrgi�g therefrom,· as well as its 
understandillg of surplus product. 
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In the process of creating values the market is, to a large 
extent, au independently acting factor, as is also the so-called 
"law of widening renovation of capital" of Marx, which is far 
from encompassing the entire process of industrial capital ac­
cumulation. In this, an essential part is played by that part of 
the national product which is created by excluding from cur­
rent consumption of a part falling due to men as the equivalent 
of their labor. This is a conscious act on the part of man which 
is effected by means of personal savings, social undertakings 
(insurance, union funds, etc.), stock participation in enterprises 
and so forth. The sii:,'llificance of these kinds of sources for cre­
ation of capital can be observed from the fact that, in the United 
States, out of 240 billions of bank deposits, nearly one-half con­
stitutes personal savings and communal funds. 
Hence, in the given instance, we should not speak of the ac­
cumulations which are created within the process of production, 
but of that part of the entire national income which is excluded 
from consumption in the form of savings, profits or compulsory 
curtailment of consumption, and is not used up in the national 
economy. 
This accumulation of a part of personal income takes p lace, 
during the very process of creating the given goods as a manu­
facturing profit, in the process of exchange '.1-s a commercial 
profit, in the form of savings of the community, and in the form 
of taxing the people to a greater extent than the eApenditure 
budget requirements. 
The diseposition of these resources, and directing its location 
is the most distinct indication of the muhial relationship of two 
complexions of a national economy. \.Yhenever these resources 
leave one national economy to join another, he it in greater or 
lesser de&rree, we have sufficient evidence to make a statement 
that there exists a colonial dependenee of the former upon the 
latter, regardless of the degree of their industrial development. 
In this instance there is a violation of the very root of human 
action which stimulates this exclusion of part of the national 
product from consumption in the interest of further develop­
ment of the naliollal community. All, or a major part of accumu­
lation of this kind, then goes beyond the circle of this commun­
ity's living organism, and this automatically creates a cleavage 
bchveen the causal purpose of the phenomenon and its effect. 
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Thi� acts with equal force upon all countries regardless of 
their degree of c:olqnial dependence, be it, "Asian" or "Euro­
pean." 
"All the confusior> arises from the fact that it is considered 
the mle for a colony to be more backward than the metropolis, 
and that colo!lial policy is confined only to the 'exploitation of 
the colony's backward economy.' "1
"The shapf' of relations behveen a metropolis and colonies of 
a 'European type' is undoubtedly different from its relations 
with 'Asian type' colonies. Colonies of the 'Asian' and 'European' 
type are not separated by any insurmountable barrier. There 
are many tr.msitional forms behveen the one and the other, and 
a ·European type' colony is merely a glimpse into the future of 
its 'Asian' counterpart, provided its economic development will 
continue to proceed on the basis of colonial dependence ... The 
exportation of capitaL being the most important form of ex­
ploitation of an economic terrain during periods of imperialism, 
by means of decomposition of pre-capitalist forms of the econ­
omy and favoring the development of the productive forces of 
a colony in capitalistic form, transforms such an 'Asian' colony 
into a 'European.' "2 
Thus, any characteristic of the economy of Ukrainian industry 
cannot, by any means, be confined to a finding of its "stormy 
development" toward the end of the last, and the beginning of 
the present century, as is frequently done by those economist;; 
who deliberately refuse to consider the true nature of such de­
velopment, They fail to consider the basic element: the drain­
ing of the n:ci.tionnl h1come which comprises the most essential 
feature in describing the position of Ukrainian industry, "because 
in relation to Ukraine, no other but a colonial policy was con­
ducted. as a rcwlt of which sllfplns values were siphoned to i:;n 
beyond the borders of the colony, and this started a general 
impon-rishm<'-nt of all classes_''.J 
Let us take one facet which we shall consider in more de­
tail: "The value of Ukraine's annual exports was 1,022,780 
thousand gold ruhles, and imports \Vere Yalued at G.-17,900 thous­
and gold rnblcs. It is clear from these figures that th e dragon 
1 M. Vololmycv, "Do probk-my Ukraiuskoyi ekonomiky" ("On the Prob­
lem of the Ukrainian Economy"), lfo/iihetJyk Uk rainy ( The Vkrair1ian 
Holshct"ik), Kharkiv, 1928. Quoted from a rcpTint. 
2 ibid. 
3M . .Slabchenko, Uateri,ilu do ckonomfr:hno-.snt.1·ialnoyi ...• p. 37.'3. 
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of c'.lpital, wb.ich •p�ntured into Ukraine, drained away into its 
centers, for the purpose of capitalist "acc�mnting," an annual 
s11m of ,'17,1,&20 gold rubles. or the equivalent of the annual labor 
of 1,874,000 Ukrainian workers."' 
"The matter becomes more clear when we compare the ex­
change of goods beh,.,een Ukraine and all the lands of the 
former Empire. Ukraine delivered to different lands of the 
former Empire goods of the \'.alue of 551,760 thousand rubles 
which comtitutc<l 54% of Ukraine's total exports ... All the 
lands of the former Empire exported to Ukraine-a total of 
2.91,320 thousand rubles, or 45% of all imports of Ukraine ... 
\Ve have here therefore, a difference beh•;een exports and im­
ports amounting to 2.60,4,10 thousand rubles, or 70% of the entire 
difference ... In general, this difference can either he canse<l 
by the fact that 'foreign' capital dominated Ukraine, with the 
aid of which the Ukrainian worker was exploited, or by the 
fact that Ukraine was simply being robbed, as they say by 
'highway robbery'; to pay for wars, or for b0rrowings for 
such w ars, or for both. But one may state at the outset that 
in thh case bdli foreign capital and highway robbery are of 
equal force."·' 
"This co:i:idition cannot under any circumstances be dimmed 
by the fact that the development of Ukrainian industry, as we 
later shall see, took place at th€ expense of \Vestern European, 
and not Hussian, capital. This did not change the nature of 
Ukrainian economic dependence upon Hnssia . . . There were 
wide discussions among us, as to whether Russia was a colonial 
land, or 11ot, whether we had a colonial type of development, or 
not. They took into consideration that Russia was itself a colony 
for \Vesteru European capital. But they did not pay any atten­
tion to the other side of the question, that Russia it�elf is one of 
the greatest colonial states in the world .... Regarding the area 
of Russia's colonies, Russia held first place ... , But if we under-
stand the term 'colony' to mean what it means to all literate 
people. i.e .... such a land which serves the latter (metropolis) 
as a so•ircc v£ raw material, and in modern times as a place 
from which capital is exporlcd ... then all these lands ( Siberia, 
Central A.,;ia) appear as the most typical colonies."s 
4 S. Ostapenko, "Kapitalizm na Ukraini," p. 114. 
0 Ibid., p. 207. 
6 M. Pokro�·sky, Marksizm i osobe:nnosti istoricheskogo razvitya Rossiyi 
(Marxism and Peculiarities of Rllllria's Historical Development), Moscow, 
HJ23, p. 47. 
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The development of industry in Ukraine and the growth 
within Ukr"ine of riroductive forces, not only did not weaken 
her cC'lonia! (�cpen<lcnce, but on the contrary. brought about 
an even <lcepf'r entrenchment of that dependence and a great­
er accentuation of differences existing hetween Ukraine and 
Hussia, It could not be otherwise, as both the nature of this in­
dustrial <l0•,rekpmn1t, its direction and its economic results, all 
this on the �Le hand, defined more clearly in the minds of the 
Ukrai11ian community the meaning of the national economy. On 
the other ll'm<l, it ma<le that community feel the dependence on 
a will and in�-crf'sts alien to them. "The gigantic development 
of industry '.lffnted only the mining and smelting branch, which 
conceutrat0d ii.s enterprises in the Southern Left Bank region. 
Other hranche� of industry. first of all light and artisan industry, 
were far behind heavy industry, and were also far behind Rus­
sian industry of the same categories. TI1c reason for this back­
wardness of Ukraine in this line of economic development was 
that Russi?n competition diligently guarded its colonial privi­
leges in Ukra!r.e from the mass consumer."• 
This is the only criterioa applicable to an analysis of the 
condition of Ukrainian industry, if we are to understand the 
natur<.. of the telling <..'Ontradictions which appeared in its de­
velopment throughout the post-reform period. M. Volobuyev is 
right when he says: "The essence of the results of colonial de­
pendence h1 the case of colonies of the Europeau type lies pri­
marily in a divergence of the development of productive forces 
in favor of the economy of the metropolis. For an aualysis of 
the degr�e of colonial dependence of such a colony, the follow­
ing elements are of importance: the level of development of 
rnam:facturing industry which indicates the extent to which the 
colony has left its p0sition of raw material market for the in­
dustry of the metropolis, further ( and this ties in directly with 
the ufores:,i!l) such changes in the economic structure which 
imported en.pita! brought with it ( of special importance is the 
problem of what kind of capital was imported, in loan, or in­
dustrial inveshnent form); of no less importance are data which 
indic1.te the <11rect, pi eying exploitation of the colony ( even if 
it is only the equalization of imported and e:\.J)Orted goods.)"� 
'M. Y:worsky, Ukrni11a v epokhu kopitalismu ( Ukraine in the Era of 
Cu1,it,,/ism), Odessa, 1924, 111, 17-18. 
';\-1. \"olobuyev, luc. cit. 
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Volob11yf"v is <ilso right in his statement that the particular 
form of coloufr,l dependence which is understood under the 
connotation "European type" does not occur as a mutation fol~ 
lowing the prim "Asian" form, but is only its supplement or fur­
ther ttage. 4..s a rule the old form keeps its place, and they both 
exist together. Ukraine is a prime example of this. Precisely all 
that is connertul with the modern system of colonial relation­
ships, i.e. investment of capital in the colony and the develop­
ment 0£ industry on the colony's territory, are characteri:.tics of 
the economic position of Ukraine during the period of about 
twenty years before World War I. They related in the main 
to the mining -:i.ml smelting industry. ln all oteher respects that 
system of conditions was maintainerl and spread which combined 
to make for the political dependence of Ukraine on Russia dur­
ing the entire period of such dependence and which basic­
ally had their origin in such political dependence. 
Ukrainian Industry Within the System of 
Russian Industrial Capitalism 
It has b�en slated in the introrluctory part of this work that 
from the time.of the Treaty of Pereyaslav of 1654, Ukrainian in­
dustry, which at that time was far ahead of the Russian, was 
subjected to 2 ruthlc_ss political and economic .oppression, not 
only hy means of granting Russian industry and commerce a 
st'rie, C1f privilt>;�cs, and imposing legal restrictions upon tho 
Ukrainian, but also by means of direct destruction of Ukrainian 
industrial enterprises ( e.g. the Pochep textile plant and others). 
The aim of Russian economic policy was not merely to shield 
their imlnstry and commerce from dangerous Ukrainian compe­
tition, but also the transformation of Ukraine into a source of 
supply of raw m:1terial and a market absorbing their production. 
Simultnaeom:ly Ukraine was being turned into a market com­
pletely isobte:1 from economic relatiom with the rest of the 
world, with which it heretofore had had ties by rea�on of its 
geograplu<' pos'tion, natural resources, and historical economic 
deve'.opm0nt. Tlw dirnatic moment of this isolation was the 
above• menti011L'd tariff law of 1822 which virtually stopped the 
flow of any goods to Ukraine except Russian. Hussian goods were 
not ba�r<-<l by any customs border, because with the loss of 
statehcod in the form of the Hetrnanate, and even earlier, 
Ukraiflc lmd bf't11 deprived of any tariff rights. 
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Up to the time of the land reform, which, as has been stated, 
signified thf' t,-an.<:ition to modern forms of capitalist develop­
ment, Ukraine did not, as a matter of fact possess any large in­
dusU)-· ot her O\Vll, Only in sugar-refining, distilling, milling and 
coal-mining were there enterprises of more or less considerable 
size. But we must r.:'mcmbcr that the process of centralized 
production, even in these enterprises, occurred at a later period. 
In addition we must note that a greater part of these enterprises 
were not owned by Ukrainians. 
The basic form of industrial enterprise of that period was 
the t:aic.'-!inna factory, a factory owned by the landowner as part 
of his inherited estate. The "t:atchinna factory was based on its 
own raw material, it ,vas many-sided, and used local serf labor." 
But e,-en then "the city factory appeared as its competitor, hav­
ing been established by an alien Russian or Jewish merchant-en­
trepreneur ."0 
During 1857 the average number of workers employed by 
an enterprise was: (regions of) Kiev, 107; Poltava, 93; Kharkiv, 
148; Khers-:m. 70, and Chemihiv, 62. Considering the very low 
level of mc.•eh·mization of that period, manual labor predomi­
nating, snch numbers are indicative of a semi-artisan nature 
of thc�e industrial enterprises. The value of goods p roduced 
attests to the same facts. In Volhynia the value was measured in the cl.mount of 984 thousand mbles, which gave an average 
of 2.2 tl1011�'.1ml rubles per enterprise, and corresponding figures for other regioi.s are: Katervnoslav, 813 thousand and 10 thous­
a'ld; Kiev, -4,107 thousanl and 21.3 thousand; Podilla, 1,078 
thom?ud and fi.3 thousand; Poltava, 671 thousand and 7.5 thous­
and Khcrson, 806 thousand and 8.8 thousand; Kharkiv, 868 
thousand and 6 thonsand, and Chcrnihiv, 1,688 thousand and 
8.5 th,nmm,1 mbks.1� 
At tbat time the production of the factory industry of the entire Russian Empire reached 224,332 thousand rubles. Of that figure lHl,769 thousand mbles or more than half. were con­tributed by four gubemias, Moscow, Petersburg, Volodimir and Perm.'' 
By the time of the land reform the value of this production 
grew umsidcrably, but its coi>eentration in the same regions 
n \1. Sla!Jd,.mko, op. cit., p. 205. 
10 Ihid .. p 200. 
11 Statistich,:wkiye tablitsi Ros8iyskoy imperlyi zo 1856 g. ( Statistical T"h/n of the H11s�ia" Fmpire far the Year, I85t;), St. PetP1sburg, p. 2.75. 
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did not change. According to data £or 1865 and 1866, for ex­
ample, out of the total value of the cotton industry's output of 
72,10-l thousand rnbles, 70,80/) thousand rubles, or more thau 
98'.i, came from the gubcrnias uf: Hyazan, :\1oscow, Petersburg, 
Volodimir, Kaluga, Kostrom, Tversk, Yaroslavl, and onlv an in-
significant percentage from Livorda and Estonia." 
In addition, in the guhernias around \foscow, a puttiug-out 
cotton industry was very widespread. It t>mployed :350,000 work­
ers while the factories themselves employed only 80,000. A 
similar concentration of industry in the Hussian gubP.ruias can 
be also observed in other branches, particularly those of a mass 
consumption nature. "Olli: of a total of 28,.517 thousand rubles 
value of products of cotton goods, the gubeT11it1S of Volodirnir, 
Moscow, Ryazan, Petersburg and Tversk contributed 28,0;36 
thousand rubles, or more than 98X. Out of 46.1-'37 rubles worth 
of woolen goods, 39,700 thonsand rnb\es, or 88'.i came from the 
gulicrnias of Moscow, Grodno, Symbirsk. Kaluga, Petersburg, 
Penza, Tambovsk and Livon;'.l., while \1oscow g11hcmia alone 
accounted for 53%. Out of 13,8]5 thousand rubles worth of flax 
awl hemp products, 11,9.)6 thousand rubles or 86.5�. ag.1."n came 
from th� gubernia ol Tversk. Volodimir, Yaroslavl, Kostrom, 
Vologda and Petersburg. Moreover, in the processin?; of flax 
there were, at that time, engaged in the same. guhemias. in put­
ting-out industries, ;J million -�pinners alld 500.00'.J weavers. 
Out of a total of 3,736 thousand rnbles' worth of silk goods, 
3.645 thousand rnbles, or 97 .. 5%, fell to the \loscow and Peters­
.bnrg gubernius; in gold-weaving goods of 2,090 thousand mbles 
worth, Moscow gulwrnia alone produced 2,0:19 thousand mbles 
\Vorth, or H?.57. Out of 3,267 thousand rubles worth of chemicals 
and dyestuffs, Petersburg '.lnd \fosrnw guhcrnias produced 
1,957 thousand ruhles or 00%. The machine building industry 
produced J6,57l thousand mhles worth of prodncts and Peters­
burg alone participated to the extent of 13.292 thousand rubles, 
or 800:.o13 The same is noticeable in other branches of industry. 
Copper manufacturing plants were also centered in the North� 
em part of the Russian Empire. on Russian territories. More 
than half of the copper products came from the guhernia� of 
Moscow, Petersburg, Tula and Volo<limir." 
1� Sbomik Svedeuiy I Materyalov Minister�tva Finansot: za 1867 f!,Od. 
Yun' (Coll,xtlon of Reports and Materk1l.1· vf the Ministry of Finance for 
the Ymr, ]1.ne, 1867), St. Petersburg, pp. 3l:H-348. 
'·' N. Yasnopolsky, "Ekonomicheskaya b11d11chnost .," p. 242. 
14 V1,reslnik Evrop11 (European News), St. Pe-tcrsburg, Nov. 1870, p. I3a 
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Even such activities as pro,·t-ssing tobacco and distilling spir­
its were better developed in the North than in the South. Out 
of 14.5 million rubles' worth of processed tobacco, 9 million 
rubles worth. or 62%, came from the guhemias of Moscow, Pe­
tersburg an<l Livonia. Similarlv, out of a total of 6,771,394 bar­
rels of spirits produced in tj1e Empire in 1862-6.1, 4,045,000 
barrels, or nearly 60% came from the guhernias of Petersburg, 
i\Ioscow, Vilna, Grodno and Kaunas. (Some non-Russian guber­
nias are included here, such :.ls Livonia, Vilna. etc, but the ex­
tent of their production, compared to that of the Moscow and 
Petersburg guhemias, was qnite insignificant.)" 
Such disproportion in the industrial development and in­
dustrial concentration, mainly in the central Hussian regions, 
was by no means the result of natural conditions prevailin� in 
these regions, of abundance of raw materials nor of sources of 
energy. It was all the result 0f a deliberately directed economic 
policy of the Imperial Government, according to which the "bor­
derland" was destined to be the source of suppl�- of raw mate­
rial for Hussian industr�·- and markets for Tiussian goods. This 
policy had its most vh·id illti.�tmtion in tariffs. details of which 
will he discussed later. 
Ukraine playt'd the role of one of the most important sup­
pliers of raw material. As has already been stated, 88% of the 
woolen i11dustry was located in central Hussian gubernias. At 
the same fonc "out of a total of Spanish ( fine wool) wool pro­
duced in the Ernpirt>, 21,667',S00 pounds (deaned), the South 
produced 14,986,88<'5 pounds. This total amount of wool was 
allocated in the following manner: exports abroad. 36,11,'3,000 
pounds ;to Petersburg and :\fo�cow, .HL'300
)
5-14 pounds; to Bialy­
stok, ;1,791,86.'5 pounds; to Higa, 1,986,21!5 pounds; to 1-Iinsk, 
650,.544 pounds; tc> Chemihiv. 1.986,215 pounds; to Kiev. 6:50,­
J,'34 pounds: to Podilla, 722 .. '260 pounds; to Volhvnia, 252,791 
pounds. (The -figures are for 1867.)'" Thus only 2,'5% of the wool 
produced in Ukraine remained in Ukraine, while Moscow and 
Pctcrsbmg received 70� of it." During that year a total of 16.-
106.:.19S 110m1ds of all kind� of wool ( Spanish and rnmmon I was 
exportf'd from Black Sea and Azov Sea ports. Baltic ports sent 
''' \l.1t<-ri"l t.1k('n from Ye:lwgndnik ministcntrn finanrn!" ( Am11wl Hnmrl 
of tlw ,\finistrr; of Financr), St. Pcter.1hmg-. 1869 (1st Pd.), 3rd. ,lept. 
,,; \I. Yasnopo\�ky. or. cit., pp. 281, 282. The weight nnit ll.l('d i11 tJ,,. 
origi11,1l i� Jl!JOds. tr.1n�late,l into pounds at the ratf' of 36.113 P"""d� 
pn pnnd. 17 Ibid .. pp. 281, 28:!.. 
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4,947,481 pounds. "It must be noted that a major portion of the 
wool. hides, lard, and other goods \vhic:h went abroad through 
Baltic ports, originated in the South of Russia." ( The author 
quoted here means Ukraine for South Russia.) "Similarly, hides, 
over and above the quantity exported ahroad, were directed to 
leather manufacturing plant� of 1foscow and of the central 
gubemias, and came back from there in the shape of a variety 
of manufachued leather goods ... Also 1,805,650 pounds of high 
quality porcelain clay from Hlukhiv county went hither, out 
of which 90% of all porcelain goods of the Russian Empire were 
manufactured."'' 
A large portion of cotton arrived in the Black Sea ports of 
Ukraine, but not for the purpose of assuring a place for Ukrain­
ian industry. 'With tremendous outlay for transportation, this 
cotton went to Russia, to rch1rn again to Ukraine in the form of 
expensive manufactured goods. 
"To wll'lt extPnt this land (Ukraine) is poor in plants and 
factories, can be seen from the fact that in the Katerynoslav re­
gion in 186(! the total of locally produced goods amounted to 
2 ruhles, 71 kop(·cks per inhabitant," while the corresponding 
figure "for Petersburg gubernia was 51 rubles; for Moscow gu­
bernia, 4i rubles, 47 kopecks, for Vladimir gubernia, 25 mbles, 
2.5 kopecks."10 
"It is evident that such a preponderance· of the Russian light 
manufactm+1g ir.dustry over the Ukraine . . . delivered the 
Ukrainian m,,rker- into the absolute power of Russian industrial 
capital. which could peacefully continue its colonial policy in 
Ukraine, a polky already existing since the 18th century, and 
introd•.1ced bv Russian commercial capital ... this proves un­
equivocally that Ukraine was as yet unable to satisfy her needs 
out or her e,vn manufacturing industry, and was compelled to 
import mam,fac':-ured goods from Russia." 2,) 
This was the position of Ukrainian industry after the aboli­
tion of scrfd,m. on the threshold of the era of industrial capital­
ism in the llussk>.r, Empire. Such disproportion could not go un­
noticed. both in rt'lation to the number of population ( at that 
time the population of Ukraine was 22.6% of the Empire's en­
tire poptulation), and, what is even more important, in relation 
to he� natur'.ll resonr,:;es. 1t was a fact that even then, Ukraine 
, s lliid., p. 28.J. 
"' J\·. y,,,nupo\sky, vp. cit., p. 2tkl. 
io M. Yavorsky, op. cit., p. 118. 
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had very goori prospects of developing her coal-mining industry, 
being alrcaJ
:v 
an important supplier of coal. 
",\n abu,,dancc of cheap hard coal as fuel has, at all times 
and in all phce�. hcen of the highest importance to manufac­
turing. Therefore, m.turally, a question arises: why should not 
the South now utilize this mineral ,vealth, and would it not be 
more profitable to process raw materials on the spot, which have 
hercl.0fore been disp'.ltchcd to a <listancp of thousands of miles."" 
The op::!11ing c,f the Suez Canal in 1869 added to the econom­
ic importance of the Black Sea considerably, and made possible 
a wide scale development of Ukrainian industry, in accordance 
with the existing natural wealth. It is therefore not surprising 
that even people, ,vhose ideas were entirely free from any 
thoup;ht of a partition of a single Hussia, as for ex:ample, Profes­
sor 1-1ykola Yasnopolsky, could not ignore the fact of the im­
poverishment of Ukraine which \Vas the result of a deliberately 
directed eccno:rr.ic policy of the Government. Guided by the 
thought of :l rat!rnal organization of the state economy, and far 
from any admission of the colonial nature of the existing phen­
omPca, Yasnnpolsky began his work on the economic backward­
ness of the South with a paragraph which is worth quoting here 
in it'; entirnt•,:; 'Tntil this time, the South of Russia constituted 
a lam! extraordir.urily endowed by nature, but it lacks any im­
provements 0f civili.mtion. Thus far the economic progress is 
disproportionMely more marked in Northern H.11ssia. There, since 
tlw time of Peter the Great, much energy has been spent to aid 
its development: canals ,�·ere built. roads improvt'Cl, credit insti• 
tution, estaHish<'d, private ente1prise was favored and helped, 
and finally in 1 �22, an uninterrupted <levelopment of factories 
was guanrn�':'ed Ir, brief. much \Vas done of rnch nature as 
woulci mflucncP lhe fortune of the North. A lam! without natur­
al wealth, covered for the most part by forests. marshes and 
sand, with poor ;.oil ' it wonlil be more appropriate to say: a 
land which neglected to develop its own wealth because of a 
more profitable exploitation of annexel.l lands-Aut1wr). It has 
become at �he rrc�ent time a factory for thf' far-flung Russian 
Empire, and for th,1t reason, under a favorable tariff, capital 
from almost '."Ill parts of Hussia began to flow there in the form 
of overpayment for products of the factories which could be 
brought fn,m abwad for much less. Now au SQ.million person 
;>,;_ YHsnopolsky, n11. cit., p. 2.70. 21 
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mar1,et is �urroumled by a tariff wall in the interests of the 
manufacturing r<'gion, and the latter, it might be stated, devel­
oped at the ,-,xper,se of other regions of Russia. Our two capitals, 
are located in •his region which, as capitals of a centralized 
state, draw unto themselves the wealth of the most widely ex­
tended stak in the world ... But even for these successes our 
industrial regions with both our capitals are to a great extent 
indebted to other parts of widespread Russia. The a1-,rricultural 
half of our state served, and (.ontinues to serve, as a provider 
for the indu,;tri?.l region for both our capitals, and pap for it 
by its backwardness in respect of its economy.""� Even M. V. 
Wolf, who entire,y Jejected the thought of the existence of any 
colonial conditions in Ukraine, was compelled to admit: "It 
would be a Jreat mistake to look for the causes of the develop­
ment of t!1e Central-industrial region ( Moscow and adjacent 
gubcmias-Author) to its natural resources, i.e. to a wealth of 
raw tralerhl and foe!. Local fuel and local raw material is used 
by only an insignificant part of the industry. of the land; the 
most important manufacturing is dependent on imported fuel 
aud raw material. On first glance the metal divetrgence of the> 
industry of the Northwestern region (Petersburg) may appear 
to be_ somewhat incomprehensible. Having neither iron, nor fuel 
suitable for a metallurgical industry . . the region was com­
pelled to import both the metal, and the fuel, either from 
abroad, or from the South and the Urals. Therefore, the dcwl­
opment of a strong metallurgical industry in such a region may 
appear to b0 irrational."2' 
\Vol£ wishes tG find in �loscow's cetntral location a justifica­
tion of the firr-t re,l;ion's development and in the second instance, 
Peter�b,,rg, in the abundance of qualified labor. There were 
also attempts to explain this phenomenon by the fact of the de­
velopmed 0f comrnunicatious iu these central regions. Hegarding 
the Me>s�o'.v reton, whose basic branch of industry is the tex­
tile, the statement with respect to its alleged ceritral location 
bean nn relatio'l to the truth either with regard to fuel or raw 
material. A', ha� ulready been stated, a large amount of cotton 
went to �loseo,v {rum Black Sea ports, in transit through 
Ukraine, a land of abundant fuel. Even in relation to Turkestan 
�� Ibid., p. 269. 
s3 M. \". Wolf, Gcngruficheskoye rinmycskcheniye Russko11 proriiio·lilen­
nosti (Geographic Distribution of Ru;;siau Iudustry), �loscow, 1925, 
[l. 2i. 
115 Ukrainian Industry 
cotton, :\Ioscow ca1111ot under any circumstances be called "cen­
trally locatF'd." 
C0nctmtration and development of communications is not a 
factor of spontac,eous appearance, only a consciously directed 
effort for the :calization of a certain goal. Therefore, in this 
case, the b1<;ically important question is: why did the develop­
ment of tr.:insportation take a direction safeguarding the interests 
of Moscow? The resulting influence of transportation upon in­
dustry can be moulded by adopting a certain course of policy. 
The same goes for an abundance of industrial labor. This 
factor piar� a rn!e in the development of industry, but it does 
not appear as a gift of nature. It is only the result of the exist­
ence of inrlustrial plants which teach the appropriate skills. 
Petersburg did not become an industrial center because it pos­
sessed caJn's of qualified labor, but it had cadres of qualified 
labor hecause i� was an industrial center. Therefore !vi. Volo­
buyev is right when he says: "The basis of the errors of those 
economists, as well as of many others, lies in a misunderstand­
ing of thr importance of the role which the colonial policy of 
Tsardom played in the geographical location of industry with­
in the oord�rs of Hussia."" 
An explanation of the causes of industrial development, like 
that of any other economic phenomenon, requires calculation 
and a11:1lysis of the whole gamut o f  factors which determined, 
favored, or hindncd certain processes. A correct illustration of 
our theme, the r.atn:re of economic conditions in Ukraine and 
in Russia, requi1es an insight into the official course of the 
economic policy, '.nto those norms of a legal nature which de­
termined the clin:cction of the economic process. Such economic 
policy reaches far beyond mere enforcement. It should embrace 
an appropriate direction of policies of tariffs, customs, money 
credit, market conditions, etc., which give rise to immutable 
economic impulses rind create a certain economic climate, and 
most important. causes the absorption of the surplus production 
of the na �ional income 
We shall be more detailed later. Here we shall only analyze 
the Ccvernment's tariff policy in relation to the textile industry 
in order to illw:trate the catastrophic backwardness of Ukraine 
in industry during the period of the first decades following the 
land refm-.-,. WP are considering this branch of industry not only 
a M. Volobuyev, op. cit. 
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bemuse I Jkrai:ne was the most backward in this branch, but also 
becanse the textile industry provides a product of mass con­
rnmption 0ffering great opportunities for a colonial exploitation 
of the population. 
''Th8 customs tar!ff of 1822, proposed by Minister Kankrin­
in, introduced a system of protectionism. Very high import du­
ties v1e::-e imposed on foreign goods and many goods were pro­
hibit('d entirely. Exports of products of the Empire were facili­
tated ... The tariff of 1822 was very detrimental to the Ukrain­
ian economy. Its first repercussions were upon Ukraine's foreign 
trarle."�1 
UkraiT';:m protests were of no avail, because the precise ob­
ject of the tariff act was to free Muscovite industry from foreign 
competition, to give it monopolistic privileges on the internal 
market a;d to fac.ilitate the securing of excessive profits. The 
intert'St of that industry were looked upon as the interests of 
··the whole" which h,1d to have a priority over local interests."o
The Ko,.,wrr:heskaya Gazeta editorialized in 1826: "Southerno
Russia c0mplain., ahout th(' prohibition of importing goods ando
about high tariffs. They say that nothing can be sold becauseo
we do not want to buy anything from foreigners, and that every­
thing i:, either prohihited, or burdened with a customs duty ino
excess Of :r.!1y measure ... Stwh complaints are of a local nature,o
which show a lack of understanding of the interests of theo
whole . , . Even the official organ of the Ministl'y of Financeo
had to �dr.--it that if the tariff of 1819 were restored ... theo
ports of t\,e Bhck Sea would certainly gain a great deal. A hugeo
amount of goods would come here, commercial profits and theo
income of the population would be generally excellent in thiso
case.''•••o
Bur the Govt->rnmont was not concerned with the interests of 
Ukraine· cr0rtai•�ly m,t at the expense of a loss of income from 
cust,ims duties that were creating artificial conditions for the 
develcpmer,t of industry in ceutral Hussia. "The prohibitive 
system, introduced in Russia in 1822, awoke the national euergy 
in almost all branches of factory, plant and trade industries and 
contnhulerl to tht' establishment of many· factories and plants; 
but tl·e ar:complishrnent was made at huge expense, on the one 
ea 0. Ohlohlyn, "Prohlcma Ukrains'koyi ('konomik;. v naukoviy i hro-madskiy dumtsi" ( '''nw Problem of \},., Ukrainian Economy on SdPnlific 
and Comrnumty Thouglit"), C/wn:nny Shlakli (lkd Path), Kharkiv, 10:31-1, '.'<o. '.J-HJ, p. 107. eo Ibid. 
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hand of The G,_:vernrnent, on the other, of thr� consumers; the 
whole state became, for a period of several decades, vassal of a 
certain number of industrialists. As a result of this, common and 
widel_v used goods were sold to the people at prices 60% to lOO�f 
in excc>ss ,-,f nornal for the benefit for the manufacturers.''"' 
In and of itself, a protective tariff .system is nothing unusual. 
It was aprlied by Jther states wishing to shield their undevel­
oped industry fro1i1 ruthless competition. Henee we \Vish here 
to ur:derlirc:' no,_ the mere fact of a protective tariff, but of the 
peculiarify of its application, In the first place it strengthened 
an artificiall�· eTcated industrial center at the expense of an in­
dustrial lkvelopmcnt of other terrains which were more suitable, 
Under such Conditions these non-Russian terrains \vere trans­
fonned into markets for compulsory consumption of the prod­
ucts of Hn:;siau industry, and the above mentioned 60% lo 100% 
overcharge� for these goods became nothing else but colonial 
expl(Jitafrm. In the second place, the application of customs 
dutie� as a protective measure �vas of a un il a tera l nature. \.Vhile 
prohibiting or hindering the importation of machines essential to 
the Ukrainian economy ( e.g., fann machinery), the importation 
of weaving machines was entirely free of customs duties. \Vhat is 
more, not onlv iri the act of 1822, but in its subsequent changes 
of 1847, 1�50, 1857, 1868 and later, one principle was constantly 
adhered to, disproportionately high duties on ready textile goods 
( e.g. fine woolen cloth, 60%; mediuhm, 100%, and coarse 
200% ud calorem) and very low duties on raw material ancl semi­
mam1factured goods. \i\Thenever the interests of two fonns of in­
dustry cla,·hed, spinning and weaving, of which the fonner was 
intercstP1_1 i•.1 high duties on yarn, and the latter, just the oppo­
site in l0w dutie!:, the Govemrnent would step in to protect both, 
DuriPg dlscussion� on the tariff of 1850, the weaving industry 
demamlPd a lowering of the duty on yarn from 6,50 rubles per 
36,11 p-''nnds (1 pond) to 5.75 rubles, because. it was alleged, 
this duty, together with additional expenses, amounts to 8,50 
rubles, equal to 50% of the value of the yarn, They wrote that 
"a co11tinu·1tiou of this duty will benefit only a small number 
of spinners, be..:::tusc the Moscow spinners, who do not feel the 
comretiticm 0£ English yaru, will be able to raise the price of 
yarn as much as Lhey please.""' In their tum, the spinners wrote 
27 \1. Soholcv, Tamozhmwaya politika R().1·siyi (Rusoiti'� Customs Policy), Tomsk, H.111, p. 22. 
"" !hid., p. 39. 
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that they :ire not in a position to compete with England, where 
yarn was halt as cheap as in Russia. The Stale Council complied 
with the r<"quest vf the former, lowering the duty to 5 rubles 
per pood, but compensated the latter by leaving unchanged the 
duty on cotton at 25 kopecks per pood, against the wishes of the 
Treasury which wanted it increased to 1 ruble, for the follow­
ing reason: "As for as cotton is concerned, the Tari££ Committee 
thought it desir<1ble to leave it untaxed by any duty; but due 
to the fad that the duties on cotton constitute a considerable 
item of the Treasury's income, it has agreed to leave the present 
duty at 25 kopecks per pood, calling, however, the Govern­
ment's atte..:.tion tu the desirability of, if not a complete aboli­
tion, then at least a reduction of the duty to 5 kopecks. 29 After 
1,'36.'3 cotto1 was, for a considerable time, entirely free of duty. 
But such meticulously attentive attitude to industrial benefits 
in the sami<> tt>xtile industry is quite absent when it comes to 
matters concernir.g Ukraine, because the objective was to de• 
prive Ukraine of any influence upon the monopolistic rule of 
Moscmv over the textile market'. As has been noted, at the be• 
ginning: of the ]9th century Ukraine was well advanced in fine• 
wool sheep rancl:.ing, and ,vas a large supplier of wool to Russia. 
Wool, like cotton was taxed very lightly, and by the tariff of 
1850 the dnty on wool was reduced from 1.90 rubles to 20 ko➔ 
pcch vvhir-h W'lS a heavy blow to Ukrainian sheep ranching, 
uneable to cumpe:te with British exports of wool, mainly because 
of the lack of communications. Nevertheless frequent endeavors 
of Ukraine to l:ave the duty on wool increased produced no 
resul�. Duri'lg Ci3cussions on the 1877 tariff act "representativeS 
of the Klnrkiv corporations trading in wool indicated that the 
fine•'-'·ool sheep ranching industry of Poltava, Kharkiv and Kater­
ynoslav regions is at a standstill because of the considerable and 
almost duty-free importation of foreign wool.''" They requested 
that the duty 1:ie increased to 3 rubles per pood and that the 
importation of" noi substih1tes should be prohibited. The same 
requFst was mf\ck b�, the Rural Economic Congress in Kharkiv 
in 1874 and in Odessa in 1878. At a Congress held in Kharkiv in 
1386, the regior,s of Poltava, Kharkiv, Katcrynoslav, Tauria and 
Kherson again requested that the duty be raised to 2.50 rubles 
or even to 4 rn'!:iles, but Moscow was always against it. The 
duty was r'lised only in the late lSSO's hut not out of considera· 
20 Ibid., pp. 38 and 44i. 
ao Ibid. 
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tion for the Ukrainian economy, only in the interests of the Treas­
ury \'.'hich was :·nmpelled to find a way out of the unfavorable 
trade bahmce. IJu-L by this time the Ukrainian fine-wool sheep 
ranching industry was already completely ruined. 
Thus, the de-velopment of industry, in this case of the tex­
tile i11d11stry in the central Moscow region, was, from the very 
beginning, dictated by the interests of Russia as the metropolis, 
and based rn thf' solid supporl of the Government, with a delib­
erate disregard and rejection of the interests of the so-called 
'1)orderlands." And in spite of the fact that this monopolistic 
situalion on th{:' internal market and the high prices of textiles 
causl>d loss�s to all consumers, the Russian consumers included, 
this was compensated for by the extension of the labor market, 
and Ly the fact that the accumulation of industrial and commer­
cial profits went lmvard strengthening the Hussian economy. On 
the other hand, Ukraine became from all this a real "vassal of 
Russiau industry," giving up a large part of its national income 
for tle ben'!fit oI its development. 
Notewo,-thv :lrf'. the motives expressed by the industrialists 
on the desirability of high duties on ready textiles during discus­
sions on th,.. tariff act of 1850. It was alleged that not only in­
d11strialL'>ts were interested in the development of this industry, 
but a!so the peasant.'., because they make wages on it. Therefore 
the protec+ive policy is justified, because it is directed "in the 
interests of the textile industry, mainly the weaving industry, 
vd1ich emp!oys hundreds of thousands of the peasant population 
without taking them av.,ay from their family life. Therefore it 
deserves a mon' fowirable attitude on the part of the state than 
does the �pinning industry."�1 
Conceming regions which had no textile industries, such as 
Ukraine, it was maintained that "the peasants of agricultural re­
gions will not suffe.r from high prices on the internal market 
became they have no money, don't buy and wear home-spun 
clothes.""' 
Tl-c impoverishm(·nt and primitive life which came in the 
wake of c0lonial exploitation were treated as conditions which 
justified a further exploitation! 
From the motives mentioned above we have been consider­
ing th£' textile i1:Justry in more detail, as a leading industry of 
the timf, and as most clearly illustrative of the colonial condi-
31 Ibid., p. 111. 
30 Ibid .. p. 150. 
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tions. But the same thing existed in other branches of industry. 
Until th� end of the 19th century even at a time when foreign 
capital bcgim to flm,v into Ukrainian industry freely, it was iu­
comparably \.ve'lker than the Hussian. And as of old, the Ukrain­
ian market wa� under the complete domination of Russian indus­
try. 
"In the Ukrainian economy of the period following the re­
form, we \'.'ere rble to note a continued growth and strength­
cr1ing of t-hc• domin:mt positinn of the Russian manufacturing 
indm,try. In Table L arc telling data. illustrating this dominant 
position (the figures refer to the year 1904). 
(The total of consumption goods is mbsing from the column 
referring to Hussia. We have <:!Omputed it as the result of the 
difference behveen the sum total and the addition of single items 
in the table.) 
TJ;e first thing that strikes us upon closer analysis of the 
.ibove table is the conspicuously unilateral development of in­
dustry. Processing of consumption goods constitutes 66.1% of 
Ukraine's total indmtrial production, and together \\-'ith metal­
lurgy, rninhg and processing of minerals, 88%. All other branches 
of industry add up to only 12% of the total, and some, like tex­
tiles, chemicals, processing of animal products are virtua1iy lack­
ing. Every nati0nal economy is characterized by a comprehen­
sive industrial deVelo!_]ment. One or another' branch of industry 
may be lacking, because its development \vou!d, due to natur­
al condition�, be unpwfitable, but \Ve never encounter a normal 
sihmtion where Ollly two or three branches of industry would 
prosper, and in all other respects a national economy would 
make itself dependent upon an outside economic body. Such a 
situation gravely contradicts the economic interests of a nation­
al community and can only exist under circumstances wherein 
these intere�ts are subject to some other interests, whenever in 
other words, an eronomic system is merely an adjunct of another, 
dominant system. It is the most convincing sign of a colonial po­
sition. 
For a better illuslrntion of this disproport[onate development 
of industry, we give in Table Ll, another variation of the previ­
ous table, i.e. a compilation of the relative importance of each 
branch of indus�rv in Ukraine and in Hussia. 
It must be noted, for a proper evaluation of the above table, 





Number of cnterprfai-s Production total in thm,.�und rnl,lcs 
Branch nf Indust11J Ukraine Rus.1·/a % [.:kraitw Ukrnine R1rn;-i11 % Ckraine 
of cotton J.1 886 1..1 475.0 llfn,mfacturing 928,486.6 0.5 
48 1,037 9,461.3 225,3..Jfl.7 4.2 /1.!anufacturing of wool 
l\la,mfacturing of silk 277 (1,(1 ,14,f;, W.4 ()_() 
i\hmufacturing of li11,·11-liemp •!O 175 J2.8 6,:567.7 9-1,491.4.
\lanufacturing of othn textiles 
Paper mmmfact11ri11g ... 
Mec.:hankal womlworkin.g .... 
Mdal working shops arnl machine builUing. 
Ri\p1dr shops 
Other metal m.1nufactnring 
Railroad sho11s 
Shiplmildin::i: yards 
/1.lanufactnring of minerals 
\lannfactming industry of mining products .... . 
























































.Proccs�ing of ,·onsurnption goo<ls 
nndcr internal tax .... l,!:.l68 24.8 503,482.2 1,51-5.513.3 33.3 
Clwmical industry 80 801 10.0 18 .. )1-l.6 387,812.6 4.8 
TOTALS: 3,465 19,845 17.4 762,184.9 4,498,679.8 16.9 .n 
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TABLE LI 
RelatiVi! Importance of Bn.mchcs of Imlustry 
Branch of irulustTy '{ Ukmiru: 'f l/us.,ia 
Manufaduring of cotton goods ............. . 0.05 20.6 
Manufaduring uf wookn go<Jds., 1.2 .s.o 
Manufacturing of silk g0ods 0.0 0.8 
Manufacturin.g of linen-he1np O.\J 2.1 
Uannfacturing of other textiles. 0.J. u 
Paper manufacturing .. J.5. 2.8 
Me('hanical woodworking 14. 2.9 
Metal working and machine building,. 7.9. 7.7 
Rep,air slH>ps .. 0.2. 0.3 
Other metal mannfacturing L5 
Railroad sh,1ps ........... . 3.0. 1.6 
Shipbuilding 0.05 LO 
Processing of minerals ... 2.0. 2,0 
Processmg of mining products .. . 11.l. 4.8 
Prottssing of animal pro duel, .. . 1.4 3.5 
Processing of t>0nsn111ption good�. 66.l
Ch,,mi<:al ind11stry ..... 2.4 
100.0 100.0 
and Russi., lacked their own raw material yet in relation to 
sources of supply (Egypt, India) Ukraine was situated closer 
and in di,rl:'ct ccntact by sea. We must not look therefore to 
natural c( 1uditions to find an answer to the query why Ukraine's 
cotton indmtrv was 412 times smaller than Russia's. The same 
appl;es to the· foitr times smaller wool mariufach1ring industry 
which is absolutely unjustified when we consider that Ukraine 
was a large supplier of wool both to Russia, and to foreign 
lands. Even the et,u:a.l figures in such an industry as metal work­
ing are not normal, hecause, at that time Ukraine was supply­
ing 57.2% r,f all the ore extracted in the Empire, and the Urals 
only 20.8'.i'. In tl,e production of pig iron Ukraine stood at 52%, 
in ready imn ard ,ted, 44.7% against the Urals' 22.4%. Coming 
back to the indices of the totals of production we must not over­
look the far-t th:, l the total production of Ukraine amounted to 
only 16.9% of the Russian Empire (see table on p. 189), at a time 
when the popuhtion d Ukraine was 22.6% of the Empire·s total, 
and 40% of the prpulation of Russia. The figure of 16.9% is only 
due to the large extent to which Ukraine participated in the 
proc,�ssing of foorl. pwducts. Without that item the participation 
of UJ.raine would fall to a mere 8.7%. 
Lr-� lb consider the food processing industry of Ukraine. 
Out of the wide variety possible in this line, Ukraine had only 
three comeparatively strong industries: sugar refining, milling, 
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and Cistilling. All other industries, even those like tobacco pro­
cessir.g and wine making for which Ukraine possessed ample 
uw rnakri:ll, were very insignificant. Out of the three territorial 
parts into which the Ministry of Commerce and Industry divided 
Ukraine-Southern agricultural, agricultural industrial, and min­
ing industrial ( a division which did not exactly correspond to 
the border5 of Ukraine), only two were really producers of 
food products. In the third, food accounted for only 9.1% of its 
total industry. The other two above mentioned parts produced 
87% of all processed food and 68% of the sugar.l3� 
Tim�, thP abcve mentioned figure of 503 million rubles for 
the food processing industry in Ukraine creates an imagiuary 
conception of a high stage of development of that industry when 
ht fact ovn tw0--!"hirds of that figure applies to the sugar refin­
ing industry. On the contrary, on closer analysis, the low level 
of th{' de"Ploprr:ent of the food processing industry becomes 
obvious, aml in qny event is nowhere near the natural possibili­
ties. If we consider only the agricultural-industrial part which 
takes in thP rei{ons of Kharkiv, Chemihiv, Kiev, Padilla and 
Poltava, regions with the highest level of that industry ( 329 
million rubles out of a total of 401 million of all industrial prod­
uds of the regions, or 82%), then the division according to 
branC'hes Clf production is characterized by the figures of values 
and percentrges in Table Lll. 
TABLE LII Brmichcs of industry Thimsamh of rubles % 
Sugar rcfinnies ... , .... 237,121 72.0 Milling 47,679 14.4 Distilling .......... , ........ . 18,441 5.5 Tobacco 11,729 3.6 Oil pressing ..... , . 2,944 0.9 Coofodinnerie� . , , 2,514 OS Grits and cereals .. 1,991 0.6 
Baking ..... l,7.'54 0.5 
SauS<1ge-making 732 0.23 Distilling-cordials 247 0.07 Slaughterhouses 196 0.06 Starches-molasses 156 0.05 
Cooling drinks 125 0.04 Others, not specified 4.250 1.25 TOTAL .... 329,405 100.0 
·" Mhiister Torgovli i Promyshlcnnosti ( Minister of Comm<'rce ,1.nd In­dustry), Torgoda i promy.�hlcnnost Ycrrop,·11skloy Rossiyi 1w rayonaml(Comm,,r,·e and Industry of Europem1 Russia by Districts), St. Peters­
a., lbid., pp. x-16.l
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.-\s we can see from the above, all industrial enterprises with 
the exception of the first four categories produced such insig­
nific,Lut amounts and participated in such small fractions of pcr­
cent:igcs th:t ont° should rather speak of their absence than pres­
ence. The one indisputable fact is that the sugar refining indus­
try of Ukraine was highly developed, but its growth did not 
comP abont wi�hout many obstacles created by the nature of 
�com1mk Plati1,rcs with Hussia. 
The Sugar Industry 
The concen�ration of the sugar-refining indush)' in Ukraine 
wa� caL.scd primariJ;, by factors of an objective nature, the 
main one being that the transportation of sugar-beets over Jong 
disbnccs is �conomically unprofitable. This industry is in the 
category of focalized indush·ies where the raw material is pro­
cessed a'. the place of its production. The geographic line of 
sugar-beet cnlhvation almost coincides with the Northern bor­
der of Ukraine, encompassing Southern parts of Russia's Voron­
izh and Kursk gu.bernias. Farther north, the beet loses its per­
centage of sugar, In Ukraine, one d.esiatyna under beet cultiva­
tion gave. 971.-1 pounds of sugar, against 657.2 pounds from 
neighboring regions of Russia. One berkovets of beets, between 
356 and 396 pounds, yielded 13.72 pounds of sugar in Ukraine, 
and 10.29 pounds in Russia. 
I� would seem that such favorable natural conditions in 
Ukraine should have prccludctl any doubts as to the desirability 
of conce'1!Ta.ti1,g 1he sugar refining industry in Ukraine. But 
such was not the case and Ukraine had to exert itself to secure 
a position of primacy, and still this industry, as opposed to the 
textile ind1:strv (lf Russia, experienced severe handkaps. When 
the pharmacist Tiindheim originally proposed, in 1800, that a su­
gar industry should be organized, the Emperor Paul I favored it 
and began to f'!ldow his favorites with land for the purpose. 
But the first refinery did not become established until after the 
Napolf'c,,.ii(' ,vars, in the 1820's. From that time on, refineries 
began lo ,1r1war at a fast pace, but in South Russia, not Ukraine. 
The first �11gar refinery in Ukraine was established in the Kiev 
region in 1827. By 1840 there were eight of them in the Kiev 
regic:n and about forty-five in all of Ukraine, less than one-third 
of the number in the whole Russian Empire. Newrtheless, fa­
vorable conditions gave Ukraine so much superiority that the 
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industry's rate of development always kept ahead of Russia. Hy 
ISS2. Uknint.' hu(l 2�9 sugar refineries, half the Empire·s total. 
Snb"c'quentlv, bq,;inning with the 1880's, the growth of this in­
<lm,tr) in qkrniue took the shape not so much of an increase 
in the nunber of e"tablishments as an increase of their produc­
tivity. 1n some localities there was even a decline in the number 
of relin.•rics. For example, iu Surny counly near Kharkiv, there 
were half '.l.S many refineries in 1880 as in 1859, but the produc­
tion of !>ug:1r had r.iscn nine-fold. On the eve of \Vorld ·war 1, 
compared with 1890, production of sugar increase<l 2.5 times, 
and the 'lnmher of plants by only 29%. According to average 
productiou figures per refinery, Ukraine occupied first place 
among all cour,tric!> of Europe. In Ukraine one refinery pro­
duced 16,034,172 pounds; in Austria-Hungary, 11,556,460 
pouoris; in Hussia, 9-281.041 pounds; in Poland, 8,883,798 
poun<ls; in Germany, 8,739,346 pounds; in Belgium, 6,.'536,453 
pounds, and in France, 4,478,012 pounds."" 
}_nd although Ukraine ha<l at that time only 62% of all the 
rdinc,rics of the Empire, 75.8% of sugar beet cultivation an<l 
68.4% of the industry's employees, Ukraine produce<l seven 
time� as much sugar as Hnssia, together with H,nssia's part of Po­
land (the Kingcfom of Poland). According to the amount of 
sugar pro,luced, Ukraine occupied, in 1910-1911, second place 
among all the capitalist countries of the world: ( in millions of 
pounds). For CT:,ta, see Table LIII. 
TABLE LIII 
Cauntry 1900-01 JU05-06 1910-11 
Gennany .3,9 L4.649 4,74.5,248 4,037,4:17 
Ul..rnim, 1,487,8:5:5 l ,,5fi:l,696. 3,690,748 
Au�tri,1 Il,mgury 2,148.723 2,964,877. 2,470,[29 
France 2.[81,22.."j 2,134.278. 1,592,,583 
U.S.A. 32,5,017 624,75.5 1.000,,330 
Belgium 63-"i,,588 6,50,0'34 491,137 
Poland 249,179 332,239 444,190 
!Iollam\ -143.907 408,077 356.409 
Switzerland 227,.512 24l.9,'i7 24D,17!1 
Spain. 180,.56,5 234,7:!4 
It,1lr . . 162,501) 166.120 
Dcnmar!., l0l.l l6 l.1:'!,6l8 130,006 
Russia. 25,279 2.5,278 86,671 
"7 
'6 S. Ostapenko, op. cit., p. HJ7.
-" Ibid., p. J 99. 
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During 1914-15 Ukraine had 241 sugar refineries, 731 thou­
sand desiatynas of land under sugar beet cultivation and pro­
duced 3,900,lE million pounds of sugar. 
We h:ive considered the development of the Ukrainian sugar 
refining iw}u�try at considerable length in order to cmphasi1:e 
the great opportunities which Ukraine had for an all-round 
growth of this industry. The opportunities were far from realiza­
tion because "it can be stated with certainty that with the devel­
opment or electric power near the Dnipro rapids, at least half 
of thf' agricultural activities could be turned to the sugar indus-
try."a,, 
N•:dher em W(' underestimate the tremendous importance of 
this imlnstry a.,; one of the most important labor markets for the 
Ukrainiau peasants, who always felt a need for employment. 
Nor can '•'.'f' lose sight of the fact that sugar beet cultivation 
contributed to significant changes in the agriculhiral economy 
of the villa1P�. The industrial cultivation of sugar beets necessi­
tated a brC'rrk wi_._h the conservative and backward three-field 
sy�1:em, gre3tly increased the amount of labor per unit of land 
and thns the income from Tand, aided in the claeaning of fiC'lds 
of we,:cls, contributing to its fertility, and finally it created a 
fodder brtfis fo!' the development of productive animal hus­
bandry. 
These circumstances make it obvious that the Ukrainian 
interf'sts Jnmandecl the widest possible develaopment of oppor­
tunities and �pPC;aJ considerations. But Russia's approach to 
the maltf'!' wa<: r-ntirely different. 
When the idrn of centralizing this industry in Russian re­
gions encountered defeat because of the unsurpassed nahiral 
condition<; in Ukraine, and when it became quite clear that in 
this branch prinity would have to be conceded to Ukraine, 
Russ;a transformed this industry into a source of her enrichment 
and put it in the service of her interests. First of all, Russia put 
sugar, an :uticlc •::if universal consumption, into the category of 
goods subject to excise taxes, like spirits, tobacco, t>tc. "The Mos­
c,•ow Cnvernml'nt held a really heavy hand on this deparhnent. 
In 1881 tPe excise tax on sugar was established at ,"iO kopecks 
per 1 poc� (3fU13 pounds); in 1884, 60 kopecks; in 1885, 75 
kopecks; in 1890, 1 ruble and in 1895, 1 ruble, 75 kopecks. Dur­
ing the fo('al vear 1911-12, the Moscow Government collected 
&i Ibid., p. 195. 
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131.8 million rubles in excise taxes on sugar, plus seven million 
in thP for111 of a direct, so-called industrial tax."'"' 
The C'1Pise ta:>.. was over ,10% of the sale price. But the prob­
lem rnnn0t be confined merely to this burden. It had far-reach­
ing "'Conrnuic consCl\uenccs; the high price of sugar, by reason 
of the tax burden, narrowed the internal consumer market con­
siderably, and in this manner sugar was artificially compelled 
to b2come an export article. The Government was interested 
in tPis ph:i.,;c, desiring a favorable foreign trade balance. Al­
though !he popt,Jation of Ukraine increased its consumption of 
sugar somf-'what, Ukraine remained in second place in produc­
tion and in last plal·e in consumption. Producing over 3.5 bil­
lion pounds of sugar, the Ukrainian peasants were deprived 
of an opporhmity of consuming it The average annual consump­
tion of sug'.'r pt>i capita in Ukraine in 1850 \vas 2.2 pounds; in 
1887, 7.5 pounds, and in 1914, 17.7 pounds, v..!1ile figures for 
the {'t'rrespon<ling vears for other countries were: England, 
100 pot1nch, U.S.A., 97 pounds; Denmark, 89 pounds; Germany, 
50 pLuuds, Rk. "If that excise tax were taken off, then the price 
of Ukrainian sugar at home would be 6 to 7 kopecks per pound, 
that is, it would be sold , , . at the same price at which Ukrain­
ian sugar was sold abroad,"•0 
Pursuant to a 1O-year Russo-German trade agreement of 
1904, condnd,-,d during the Russo-Japanese war, Ukrainian 
sugar was 0xportcd lo Germany at 5 kopecks per pound, and 
Germany, the largest producer of sugar in Europe, considered 
it profitable to import that sugar as feed for hogs! 
But the exci.�e tax was not the end of the subjection of the 
Ukrainiaa sn�ar refining industry to the interests of Russia. A 
customs policy also f'xerted its influcJJcc, aimed at favoring an 
artificially creatf'cl refining industry in Petersburg, and partially 
Mos(:OW. 
It has been noted before that Moscow, and in a larger meas­
ure Pctcr.0hurg, without possessing any natural requirements 
for it, developed a sugar refining industry. Moscow received 
the necessary raw material, semi-refined sugar, mainly from 
Ukraine, especially after the construction of the Kursk-Kiev 
railroad which connected Moscow with mass producing sugar 
regions of Ukraine. Petersburg's refining industry was basnd on 
colmdal white and yellow cane sugar mainly imported from 
31• Ibid., p. 197. ,o Ibid., p. 198. 
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England. This situation determined the position of lhe Govern­
ment \\·ith resp�ct to imposing a duty on imported sugar. The 
Petersburg refineries were interested in getting the imported 
raw material dnty-free, and exerted pressure upon the Govern­
ment. It ,Jpenly admitted that otherwise it would not be able 
to c,)mpt t� with Ukraine. The Moscow refining im.lustry was 
abo interested, although it ran in the main on semi-refined 
Ukrain:atl sug1.r, because it created a convenient position under 
whicb it could depress prices, bringing out the threat of com­
petir,g prices of English sugar which came in through Baltic 
port�. 
The Ukrainian sugar refining industry suffered from the fact 
that the •�mtoms policy favored the interests of these Russian 
refineries by cutting off the path of Ukrainian sugar northward 
and pladn� Ukraine in an awkward position in exports of sugar. 
Ir. 1849, the importation of raw sugar was permitted under 
a duty of 3.80 mbles, while refined sugar was under a prohibi­
tive tariff. \Vhen the Committee of Customs Tariffs spoke in 
favor of permitting the importation of refined sugar, arguing that 
refinnics ".'ere conocentrated exclusively in Petersburg and that 
the p0pulation was �uffering because of high prices for sugar, 
the !\Hnist.rv of the Treasury cxpressf'd itself against the propo­
sition, and defended the interests of the Petersburg refiners. It 
stated that "the refining industry aids many branches of indus­
try connected with it."11 
The prnblem ol customs duties came under discussion many 
times, always with the object of a further reduction in order to 
aid Petersburg refineries. The motive was not only to permit 
them to cnntinuc taking profits, but also to facilitate their com­
petition with the Ukrainian industry and no secret was made of 
it. "Ht·re the coDtra<lictory interests of Southern owners of sugar 
refi:nnies and Northern refiners clashed."'" 
The Cm·ernment wished to hinder rapid development of the 
Ukr:1iuia.n �ugar industry. In 1854 the !\.Hoister of Finance intro­
duced in �he State Council a project of reducing the duty on 
raw mgr.r ... "The arguments for such a reduction ran thus: 1) 
A noticeable decline in imports of raw sugar; 2) An excessive 
growth of the sugar industry in Russia ( what was meant was 
Ukraine-Author); 3) The extraordinary growth of the sugar beet 
indu.,trv r:.111ses an apprehension that imports of foreign sugar 
42 11 .\I. Sobolev, op. cit., p. 2\J. ;\f. Sobokv, op. cit .. p. !J8. 
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will fail o(f further, and might stop entirely." The :\'linister of 
Finance ly0•lieYe<l that the existing high import duty on colonial 
(imported) raw �ug:ir was entirely unnecessary for the protec­
tion of the Russian (i.e. Ukrainian-Author) sugar industry," he­
caust: "under the existing duty the refiners of the Northern 
gubernias pay 7.55 mhlcs for sugar (per pood or 36.113 pounds) 
and refm::d sugar is !>old locally for 9 rubles per pood. There­
fore the refiners get for their cost of refining, labor and interest 
on cL1pitat only 1.45 rubles per pood. At the same time South­
ern refiner-; who Plake the end product from their own material, 
which costs them, including the excise tax 3.30 rubles, therefore 
sellin; the refined product locally at 8 rubles leaves them 4.70 
rubles. Under such circumstances the northern refiners will 
not be ahle to !>-taud up ag:ainst the southern." Therefore, they 
argu:'d "by making the colonial (imported) raw sugar cheaper, 
the ,�xces�lve development of the sng:ar beet industry could be 
haltc<l."4l 
Tliis makf's it clear how different the tariff policy in relation 
to the Russian textile industry was from that policy in relation 
to the Ukrainian sugar industry. In order to benefit the artificial­
ly created and economically unprofitable refining plants of the 
North, the order of t he day was, hy application of a customs 
policy, to hinder the further development of the Ukrainian in­
dustry, and to prevent Ukrainian sugar from capturing the in­
ternal market. "Thanks to it ( customs policy), northern refiners 
will be in a position to compete at least partially with those of 
the South in marketing sugar in the central gubemias."H 
The �Iinister of Finance. set nn accomplishing this did not 
hesitate to violate the basic principle of the Russian customs 
policy, i.e. its fiscal nature. Out nl a total income from customs 
duties in 1852, 48.2 million rubles, the duty on sugar amounted 
to 7 million and was the largest single item among all others. 
After the tariff was reduced. this i tem fell to 2.7 million for 1856. 
Such policy quite understandably produced an appropriate 
reaction on the part of Ukrainian industrialists. At the request 
of 23 owners of refining plants, the Kiev Governor Prince Vas­
ilchikov sent a protest, demanding a change of attitude toward 
the interests of Ukrainian industrr. He wrote: "The sugar in­
dustry requires much capital, proper knowlt•dgc and labor; in 
addition it provides work for thf' rnral population, and the cul-
,, .\I. Soholl'v, op. cit., pp. 86-87. 14 Ibid. 
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tivation of sugar beets, which aids new industries, is extraordi­
narily profitable to the land." Polish sugar refiners also wrote 
that the tariff support of Petersburg refiners who run their 
plants on imported raw sugar is without merit, inasmuch as 
such plants "cannot hope to prosper because of the fact that the 
home industry has advance<l so much that competition with it 
cannot succeed."'' 
The figures of the Minister of Finance were also proved 
wrong: refined sugar sold in Petersburg iu 1856 not for 9 rubles, 
but for 12.80, and the manufacturers' cost of sugar in Ukraine 
was not 3.30 rubles, only 4.71 rubles and the refined product 
sold for 8 rubles. But the protests were of no avail: the duty on 
foreign raw sugar was reduced many times. Even at a time when 
the tariff policy of the Government in the 'seventies and 'nineties 
embarked upon a path of a general increase of duties, raw sugar, 
like other industrial raw materials, was affected only in a re­
duced proportion. 
If Ukrainian sugar was finally able to win, and largely 
pushed foreign sugar off the market, it was only because of high 
profitability. But even then, at the cost of special railroad rates, 
the Petersburg and Moscow refineries were kept alive. Ukraine 
sugar was hauled almost 1200 miles, in order to return to inter­
nal Hussian markets and, partially, to Ukraine. 
The fight for the subjection of the Ukrainian sugar industry 
to the interests of the metropolis did not end with this. As has 
been noted, this industry became a source of considerable in­
come to the treasury by way of huge excise taxes collected on 
sugar, and it contributed to foreign exchange balances through 
exports. Subsequently, as we shall indicate, the Ukrainian sugar 
industry itself was taken over by Russia through banking car­
tels. 
\Ve thought i t  worth-while to dwell on this phase of Ukrain­
ian industry a little longer and dispcll many impressions such 
as: the large amount of "processed food products," 503 million 
rnbles, of which sugar constituted the major part, are proof that 
industrial development went on in accordance with the true in­
terests of Ukraine, and in this matter no colonial dependence of 
Ukraine is noticeable. As we have seen, even in this branch of 
industry, given Ukraine by nature ibclf, there was no freedom 
from Russian subjugation. 
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To study other branches of this industrial group wou!<l be to 
repeat the same story: oppres.�ive excise taxes; Ukraine's inter­
ests ignored in tariff policies; obstacles on the internal market, 
etc. Thus, for example, the well developed distilling industry 
was much hindered by the law O piteynom shore ( Alcoholic 
Beverage Tax). As a result of this law, the number of distilleries 
in Northern Ukraine declined between 1863 and 1883 from 
180 to 52.'� In the regions of Kiev, Poltava and Katerynoslav 
there were 887 d istilleries in 1863 with a production of 4.2 mil­
lion barrels of spirits; in 1864, only 678 distilleries v,rith a produc­
tion of 3.4 million barrels; and in 1866, 499 distilleries with 2.7 
million barrels. 't7 
The only reason this industry did not fail, and by means 
of increasing production per plant still gave a considerable out­
put, was that the price of potatoe,; and grain was extremely low 
locally, and processing them into alcohol was still profitable. 
Dut here too, the main profit went into the treasury as excise 
tax. In 1913 Ukraine paid into the state treasury 182.7 million 
mhles in excise taxes on spirits.•-� 
Low duties on wines, imported from Hungary and Greece 
hindered the development of Ukrainian viniculture, and the 
treasury <lid not wish to part with the income from this source 
in order to favor the Ukrainian economy. The same can be 
said of tobacco of which Ukraine was a major raw-stage sup­
plier though processing was done in Petersburg. 
The Coal Industry 
DiHere,at ccnditiom developed in the coal-mining, metallur­
gical and metal working industries. The factors contributing to 
the situation were many, but the most decisive of them were: 
1)t Huge natural deposits of coal and iron ore, easily and con­
veniently extractable. [Coal deposits of the Donhas are estimatedt
at over 6.5 billion tons suitable for coking. lron ore deposits oft
Kryvyi Rih are estimated at 56 million tons (recently revised tot
1.5 billion tons) of 50% to 62% iron content, and of Kcrch at 175t
million tons of :351 to 45% iron content. Deposits of maugaueset
ore in the Nikopol region are estimated at 500 million tons of at
35% to 48:Z manganese content. J-9 2.) The fact that these larget
4G _\f. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. mt. .., '.\!. Ya�n,ipol�ky, op. cit., II, 74, 
4' S. Ostapenko, op. cit., p. 19:3. 
•� Bo&haya Sodetskaya Ent#k/opediqa (Grnat Societ Enl.'yclopedio), Vol.
55, 1947. Title: Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Also Feshchenko­
Chopivsky, op. dt., and P. Fomin, op. cit. 
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iron ore deposits in Ukraine were discovered at a late date. 3) 
Russia's protracted lack of interest in Ukrainian coal due to a 
complete lack of rail communications, the isolation of the coal 
fields from the sea and a narrowly limited market for coal. 4) A 
sudden change of this attitude toward both coal and iron when 
Russian began large railroad construction. 5) Tariff policies of 
the Hussian Government aimed at protecting the Hussian metal­
lurgical and metal working induslries. 6) The Ukrainian popu­
lation's acute nee<l for employment, and the consequential cheap 
labor and acquiescence of the workers to the most primitive 
standard of living. 
During the last decades of the 19th century, as a result 
of tl'esP. influences, Russian and Ukrainian capital, active in 
the de\Tlopment of the Ukrainian coal industry, was joined 
by a tlmd force, foreign caapital which contributed to a special 
system of economic conditions in this branch of industry. But 
notwithstanding the stormy growth of industry since that pe­
riod, Ukraine did not come out of colonialism, and now the con­
solidah ..d and organically related Hussiau-foreign factor became 
the proponent of colonial exploitation. By its influence it pene­
trate-1 into other branches of industry, as well as into transpor­
tation, admfnistration of municipalities, etc. 
Although coal deposits were known to ex_ist in the Donets 
basin early in the 18th century, yet until the late 19th century, 
the extradion of coal was in the nature of a semi-trade. Even 
in 1840 thB amount of coal mined equalled only 4,000 tons. By 
1855 it wa� 72,000 tons, and in 1860, 96,000 tons. After 1870 
coal mining rleveloped very rapidly, and along with it the parti­
cipat'on of Ukraine in the total amount of coal mined in the 
Hus�1an Empire. 
The dymmics of that incrcase are shmvn in Table LIV. 
The great jump in coal mining made in the l870's ( from 240 
thousand tons to 1,376 thousand tons per year within ten 
years) was connected with the possibility of the coal mining 
indush-y supplying the Black Sea shipping with coal. For that 
reason tl1e atnount of anthracite, which was the grade preferred 
by �teamsl-iips, accounted for more than 50% of all the coal 
mined. Ilnt within '.'l. few years prospects of supplying shipping 
dwindled because of British competition. An important factor 
in this connection was the fact that prohibitive tariffs caused 
exports horn Black Sea ports to be miich higher than imports 
38.4 
TABLE LIV 
The figurus, stated in original sources in millions of poods, ha vr been converted into tons at the rate 11f 1,000,000 )JOods 
= 16.000 tons. The figures are in thousands of tons. 
Poland 
Dombrot:a Moscow \Ve# East Percent 
Yem Ukraine hasin Ural region Caucasus Turkestan Siberia Siberia Total Ukraine 
1885 l,8.'38.4 1,748.8 174.4 340.8 .'3.Z 6.4 8J) 4,158.4 44.l.
HmO 2.9.'31.2 2,412.0 242.2 208.8 9.6 ·1.8 19.2 14.4 5,842.2 ,50.0 
189.5 4,601.8 3,5!J6.8 281.6 IG3.2 17.6 8,0 22.4 l9.2 8.710.6 5.3.7 
moo 10,749.2 4,028.8 363,2. 281.6 62.4 !:l.fi lSOA 1'.l7.6 V'i,i82.S 68.2 
190,5 12,564.8 3,483.2 481.6 209.6 28.8 38.4 428.8 1,001.6 18,236.8 69.l.
1910 16,300.8 5,4.'51.2 688.0 222.4 48.0 54.4 .'lO.'l.6 1,076.8 24,.347.2 ti7.l
1912 20,347.2 6,312.0 920.0 220.8 68.8 9G.() 691.2 1,289.{J 29,'J4.5.6 68.6.'" 
HJI3 2.4,700.8 6,820.8 1,176.0 W2.6 70.4 I.'34.4 857.8 1,147.2 35.200.0 70.3 
1914 26,940.8 3.697.6 1,347.2 320,0 6S.6 1,50.4 968.0 1,320.0 34,809.6 77.-1 
191.'i 26,02-5.6 1,2ci9.2 433,6 60.8 164.8 1,251.2 1,294.4 30,48\1.6 85,4 
1916 27,816.0 1,268.8 (i76,8 .'57.6 196.S. 1,257.6 " 
so D. Shary (ed.}, Statistid,cwkiu Ye:r.hegodnik na 1914 god ( Statistical Y eorbnok for 1914), St. Petersburg, p. 147.."M. Colman, "Russkiy lmpcryalizm" ( "Russian Imperialism"), Pribou ( The Surf), Leningrad, 1926, p. 444..
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into them, and for that reason foreign ships arrived empty at 
these ports with l:Oal for ballast. Ukrainian coal at that time, 
was depriv,_,.d entfrely of rail lines, had very sparse connection 
with the seabond, and suffered high railroad tariffs. Under 
such circumstances, Ukraine could obviously not successfully 
compete. The hrgest shipping concern in the Black Sea "Russ­
koye Ob�hC'hestvo Parokhodstva i Torgovli" (ROPIT) used 
55,344 ton., of British coal and only 10,656 tons of Ukrainian 
coal in li378, and the corresponding figures for 1880 were: 
51,492 tons and 22,768 tons. 
Under conoditions of very limited home consumption of coal, 
there being then no Ukrainian metallurgical industry, and weak­
ly developed rail communications ( the railroads would not only 
aid in widening the market, but would themselves become a 
large consumer), the Ukrainian hard coal mining industry was 
faced with a serious crisis in the late 1870's. There was a catas­
trophic decline of prices, and coal fell from 7.32 rubles per ton 
to 1.22 rubles. Large stocks piled up at the mineheads with no 
customers in prospect. In seeking a way out of this impasse, the 
Ukrair,1.an coal industrialists faced two basic problems: either 
to lowet railroad tariffs within Ukraine and in the direction of 
the seaports,· or, in view of the light demand for coal on the 
part of Ukrainian industry, to push coal into the industrial cen­
ters of R1mia. H11t the latter way out faced the obstacle of im­
ports from abroad. In 1876 a special railroad tariff rate appli­
cable to coal wns introduced which was openly contrary to 
the interests of Ukrainian industry. "The coal industrialists 
urged lowering railroad rates within the state. The railroad 
tariff was set up in the interests of Russian plants. Analyz­
ing the tariff of 1876 one can easily see that for example in the 
Southern sector of the Kozlov-Voronizh-Rostov railroad, from 
Shakhty to Rostov ( in the direction of the Oziv Sea) the charge 
per pood-verst was one-thoirty-sixth of 1 kopeck, while in the 
Northern �ector of the same railroad ( in the direction of Mos­
cow) the pood-verst charge was only one-sixty-first of 1 kopeck. 
.. Even if we take the rate to be one-fortieth to one-sixtyieth 
kopeck, still the coal industrialists would have to lose against 
English coal which went to Moscow and the Moscow industrial 
region at the freight rate of one-seventh of 1 kopeck per pood­
verst.""" 
52 M. Slabchonko, op. cit., p. 216. 
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Only those conditions, imposed upon Ukraine prevented her 
from successfully competing against British coal, at least on 
the Hlack and Oziv Seacoast, because otherwise both the quali­
ty and the location would work in favor of Ukrainian coal. In 
O<lessa imported coal was sold at 10.37 to 10.98 rubles per ton, 
and Ukrainian coal, under such high freight rates at 10.93 to 
11.51 rubles per ton. Even Odessa, one of the largest consumer� 
of coal ( annually 320,000 tons) which also derived benefits 
from the importation of coal ( that is why the people of Odessa 
were against in�roducing an import duty on coal) maintained 
that "Donets coal could pu:,h out foreign coal, if only freight 
were cheaper an<l a sufficient number of coastal ships were 
availahle."·" 
Tl e fight against duty-free importation of coal began ac 
the vi'rv mitset of the crisis. The problem of imposing a duty 
on coal was raised at the Second Congress of Mining Industrial­
ists of "South Russia" in 1877. Even earlier Ukrainian business­
men trie<l to convince Moscow of the advantages of converting 
her industries from wood to coal, and the coal coming from 
Ukraine. "In l'etersburg, a ton of foreign coal costs 9.76 rubles; in 
Riga, 17.08 rubles and in Moscow between 18.91 and 21.-'35 rub­
les. At the same time a ton of Donets anthracite equals one cubic 
sazh('n ( eight cubic metres) of wood, and even at a price of 
2.40 ruhles per ton ( as we have noted, the price at that time 
fell to 1.22 rubles per ton-Author) coal would cost locally 2.40 
per ton while wood at Ivanov ( near Moscow) cost 20 rubles 
per sa:du:n.'·,.,a
The Sixth Congress of Mining Industrialists of Ukraine 
again raised the question of duty-free importation and ap­
proached the Ministry of Finance with a request: "in order to 
provide a market for Donets coal in the Northwestern and Mos­
cow regions, a duty on coal should be introduced in the follow­
ing amounts: coal coming into Baltic ports, 1 kopeck per pood 
( about 60 kopecks per ton); coal in transit to points inside Russia 
-2.5 kopecks per pood ( 1.50 rubles per ton); coal coming througha
inland points on the Austrian and Prussian bonier 3 kopecksa
(I.SO rubles per ton) and through Black Sea ports 3.5 kopecksa
(2.10 rubles per ton)." But the Minister of Finance, althougha
inter<·�ted in raising revenues from duties, stood, as umal, pri-
'' N. Yasnopolsky, op. cit., p. 95. (R,•ferences to poods in the original have 
h� ... n conv«rtrd to tnns.) 
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marily in defense of Hussian industry, whose interests were al­
ways above those of the tariff policy of the Empire. He wrote: 
"HevPmw trom duties will in no event compensate for the dam­
age done to our industry and the national economy through an 
increase in the cost of fuel, particularly in the North of Russia 
where manv hunches of shop and manufacturing industries, 
comnming muC'h. fuel, would not he able to operate under the 
smallest duty burden imposed on coal."·•� 
rnsistent demands of Polish coal industrialists were partially 
satisfied, and a duty of l kopeck per paod of coal was introduced 
on the western border of Poland. The Seventh, and in 1883 the 
Eighth Congress of Ukrainian Mining Industrialists brought up 
the matter. TI1cv indicated that 3:3% of the coal consumed in the 
Empire wn� forf'igu at a time wl1en, in 1883 in the Donets basin 
2,112 thousand tons of coal were mined, of which 240 thousand 
tons were used locally, 960 thousand tons were sold, and 912 
thousand tons rf'mained unsold. "0 
The manager of the Kharkh• Commercial Bank, Alchevsky, 
told the Eighth Congress; "Defending the interests of Moscow 
manufacturers, the interests of our land should also be consid­
ered; if ther� were no favorable tariff policy in relation to goods 
which our land receives from Moscow, then many branches of 
MosC'r,w's manufacturing industries would not reach that stage 
of high development which lhC'y now enjoy."" 
Thus, as we can see, the other basic Ukrainian industry­
coal, just like the sugar industry, cannot boast of a famrable 
attitude of the Imperial Government. On the contrary, every­
thing possible was done to serve Russian industry at its expense. 
The Government quite openly tried to hold the price of Ukrain• 
ian coal at the lowest possible level lJy putting it into a position 
of having to fight hmvy competition. 
Only in 1881 was a law intrnduced which imposed a duty 
of 2 kopecks per pood on coal_. coke and peat in the ports of 
the Black and Oziv Sea; 1.5 kopecks on inland border points in 
the West, and 1.5 kopecks in ports of the Baltic Sea. In 1887 the 
duty was rai�ed to 3 kopecks in mack Sea ports, and to 1 kopeck 
in Baltic p(irts.�" 
But it would be a mistake to think that this denoted anv 
change in the Government's attitude toward the Ukrainian coal 
indu.,trv. H was mused by a complete change which took place 
r;c, M. Snl,ukv, up. ril,, p. -13fi. "'' !\{ So!mkv, op. cit., p. 514. 





in Ukrair1c at the time, the rapid development of a Ukrainian 
metallurgical industry which became a large consumer of fuel, 
as well as the construction of railroads. also creating a demand 
for c_ial. This C'ontnhnted to an immense increase of the local 
market. �tr-:-ngthcned the position of tlie coal industry, drew for­
eign c.ipital inv1�st,nc11ts in it, aud facilitated organized market­
ing of coal. Subsequently, a syndicate for the marketing of coal 
"l'roduhol;· was cstc1hlished, which almost monopolized the mar­
ket, bt1t b:v that time Ukrainian capital had already been 
sq11et-zt'd out of the coal industry. This high prosperity of the 
coal market permitted the �-tinistry of Finance to ntili7e the 
opportunity of increasiug revenues from this item, and that is 
why au import duty was introduced on coal, 1.mt privileges 
were nevertheless reserved for the Petersburg industry. 
Later, ht>h-veen 1901 and 1906, when the production of coal 
was ah�io�t stabilized, the prices always rising and the industrial 
centers of Hns�ia !eeling a dependence on Ukraine, the duty ou 
coal was r2duced. In 1913, it was abolished entirely.'·� From 
HJOK the annu;,J import of coal was 400 thousand tons. 'l11c 
kadiug position of Ukraine in the coal industry of the Empire 
hro11ght atlont a cornlition where Ukraine's place was becoming 
more ::mJ more important in the Empire's fnel balance. Al­
though most of the coal w.is consumed in Ukraine, "a tendency 
became nolicc:i.hle in the direction of caphiring distant mar­
kets: transportation of Doncts fuel increases faster than cost of 
froi£;ht to th(' Southern market, closer to its source:· 
Hcgions of destination of coal hanled by railroads ( in thou­
sands of tons) arc shown in Tahle LV. 
TAB! .E !.\' 
'; of /M-1 I<Jl.'J irirrul.'N' 
Sm1tlH·rn rc,:i"n ( r,1 ilrnarls within 1:krainc) 7.81-1 J.'l87:! 




,\,.ll(l yet, in �pile of a growing consumption of Donets coal 
beyo,1d the borders of Ukraine, the internal market grew even 
more. t,1kiof over 50% of the total production. The nwtallnrgica! 
in<lmtn· bcwm·· a reliable customer, contrihutill_!!: in large meas• 
''" \f. Colrn 111. ''/J. rit., Jl . .3.5'3 ''" l' Fornin, "Ek"nomiehna kh<1rakter} ,tyk,-1. l"kraiu; ," p. 09. 
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ure bJ �'.1e inderendent action of the Donets basin. In addition, 
the kudin½ position of the Ukrainian coal industry in the Em­
pire fuel b,1!ance changed the nature of the consumption of its 
prodt,d bcvond the borders of Ukraine. Not only did the rail­
roads become organically dependent on it, but many other 
branches of the Empire's industry also. This added to the im­
port.nee of the Ukrainian coal industry. In 1912 the fuel balance 
of the whole Empire, railroads excepted, was characterized by 
the figures in Table LV I ( in thousands of tons). 
With the exception of Poland and the Urals which had their 
own coal +posits, only the Northwestern region ( the industries 
of Petersburg), under the protection of an official tariff policy, 
relied on foreign coal. In all other regions Ukraine gained a 
dominant position in the supply. The Donets basin played an 
even greatFr role in supplying the railroads. The railroads' coal 
consumpti0n re,iched 4,123.2 thousand tons in 1913, of which 
2,4lfl t!10us:md tons were used by the railroads of Ukroaine. At 
that time the production potential of the Ukrainian coal indus­
try was already much greater. Beginning with 1005 the "Pro­
duhol'' coal syndicate, in order to keep p rices up, stabilized the 
extraction of coal at an annual level of 24,000 to 24,600 thousand 
tons. In yiew af that the Government, favoring the industries 
of Petersburg, reduced and later abolished the duty on foreign 
coal. Thus, during the period of the last few· years before the 
outbreak of \V0rld \Var I, a situation arose under which the 
coal indnstry h<1d made a great sweep and had grown strong 
econ'1,nic:illy, yet was restricted in the utilization of its full po­
tential. Many factors which contributed to this sihmtion will be 
discussed later. The railroad rates, determined by the Govern­
ment, played no small part in this. For example, a distance of 
only KOO kilom•_•t;-es ( 500 miles) would double the cost of coal, 
in SJJite of the fact that the rates were lower than North-South 
rates. The excessively high freight rates toward Black Sea ports 
as well a.<, high ocean freight rates, and a limited freight fleet, 
excluded the possibility of extending the Ukrainian coal export 
market t:'l !::mds of the Near East where British coal reigned un­
diallnigcd. Wh,�1' is significant, is the fact seen from the above 
table, that Ukraine ( to be exact, the ships of the Black Sea) 
consumed 152 th,il1sand tons of foreign coal. Exports of Ukrain­
ian coal amounted to: 1911, 28.8 thousand tons; 1912, 16 thou• 




Categories of Fuel 
Rcgim1s of Donets Polish Coal of other Foreign 
Cmisumption coal regions coal Petroleum Wood Peat 
Baltic aud Northwestern gubemias . 272.0 64.0 4.8 3,72.1.2 176.0 1,001.6 81.6 
Poland 56.0 3,934.4 1,688.6 24.0 161.6 240.0 
Ceutr.11 Ru�.�ia and Volga region .. 2.268.8 ,10.4 75.2 30.4 3,112.0 7,05\),2 731.2 
l'rnh 30-4. 393.4 8.0 2,148.8 152.0 
Ukrnirn::, and Don 8.963.2 142.4 3.2 1.52.0 192.0 480.0 22.4 
Cauu,sus 248.0 32,0 480.0 19.2 
TOTAL', 11,838.4 4,171.2 513.6 5,602.2 4,0?)G.O 10,870.4 1,227.2 " 
'·1 P. Fmnin, up. cit., p. 73. 
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It must be admitted, however, that the Ukrainian coal in� 
<lustry o,·crcamf' in large measure all the difficulties which had 
stood in its way and, within a comparatively short time reached 
a po.;ition d cof'.Sitlerable importance. It grew into a basic source 
of fuel, contribnting 77.4% of all the coal of the Empire before 
the 01,tLre�k of Wnrld War I. 
The ce,al industry also grew strong as an organized holly. A 
dose network of railroads was developed in the Donets basin, 
whos;e dl'rnity i•1 that area exceeded that of Germany. The coal 
industry acted .;s a nuit in its approach to matters of marketing 
and a fairlv livdy process of combining the coal and metallur­
gical industries in �usts was begun. 
The essential fact is, however, that the more successful the 
Ukrainian coal industry became, the less Ukrainian it became. 
It Wc''.: dominated completely by Franco�Belgian capital which 
was tied with R11ssian banks. The influence of this foreign capi­
tal playc,l a maJor role in the very development of this industry. 
\\"here;,:; in the bcgim1iug the position of the coal iudustiry 
was dett'r�1i11erl by the colonial depemlt'nce of Ukraine upon 
Hu�sia, subsequent changes did not touch the system of colonial 
rnanagr·m:'nt. The changes merely introduce-cl more modern 
forms, approprir•tc to the new nature of exploitation. The only 
diffeTei)ce was that during that period and in that branch of 
indust•-y, TTkrainto wa� no longer an objec t of exploitatimi b) 
Hussi;. alone, but also of foreign capital. 
The mitter of complete domination of Ukrainian i11dustry 
not only in coal. but elsewhere will be discussed later. 
The Metallurgical Industry 
We h·we al�c-a<l�· rioted that Ukraine is a land rich ill hip;h­
qualit�· iron ore deposits. According to latest research and esti­
mates by the Soviet authorities iron orC' reserves of Kryvyi Hih 
are 1'�thnatf'd :i.t 1.5 billion tons with an iron content between 
50% to 62%. The Kcrch reserves. are even larger. In addition, 
Kryvyi Rih and other regions have huge deposits of iron q11artz­
itcs (over 21 billion tons). Magnetic anomaliC's northC'ast of 
Kryvyi Rih also indicate the presence of iron. There arc also 
magnetic anomalies around Kremenchuk, Chortomlyts'ko-Vcrk­
hotsevsk, Orikhovo-Ilyanivs·ka (near the Donets basin), Kon­
kins!.a. \,,,Jhvnh, arnl Western Ukraine. 
The unit1 iron ore base of Khyvyi Hih is locate<l close to the 




coking. It is also close to the Nikopil region of mangane,e ore, 
orn, of the dchest in the world with depmib of over,)()() million 
tons. The:,e regLm,·, tied organically to each other in the mctal­
lurgicril industry, forrn a tight triangle \\·hose lo11gest side is only 
about 300 rniks lo11g. 
11.oi, not siupri�ing that �uch conditions contributed to theo
fact that, shortly after the beginning of iron smelting in Ukrai11e, 
it OC"!ipied first place in the production of pig iron iii the Em­
pire, ai1d bccanw the rnai,1 ce11ter of the iron-ore industry. 
But all !hi� hap1)c11cd only in the last decades of the 19tho
cenh•ry. lt happcmxi OT1ly as the result of a stubborn struggle, 
and �cq-:.1ired peculiar features, as with other hranches of 
Ukrctinian industry. How odd that the Ccnnai1 traveler Kohl 
should w1 itc about this land in 1841: "ln all of the South of 
Rus�ia !h1:rr is cot one place where one could find any metal. 
This huge area of Europe i� deprived of metals; not enough 
iron can i:ie found to make a �ingk nail.""" 
Actually, the smelting o± Kryvyi Hih ore did not start until 
1871. Pri'lr to that time, the iron industry of Ukraine depended 
upon the im:?ortation of Russia,1 pig iron. The Luhansky \Vorks, 
which �eFrxi primarily the military, used Vkrainian coal, but 
pig in,n fnm the Urals. 
The hbtory of mining iron ore, and the increase of the part 
which Uknine played in the Empire is shown bv the figures in 
Tahic l,V!l (in thousands of ton,·). 
TABLE LVll 
Year Fkrainu Poland ['ra/s }lnscnu; Region 
()uanlity ' ()uanWy :r OuanWy ' ()wmlity i, 
1870 20.8 2.G 105.G 13.G 45G.O 58.5 134.2 !HJ 
1880 13.2 1.3 lH.O 14.1 Gll.8 Gl.5 140.8 14.1 
18\)0 3GG.4 2!),9 212.8 12.l Ll8D.2 51.1 185.2 ILi 
1\)00 :i,:mo.o ,SfJ.0 471.0 7.\l l.Gl\l.2 27.2 377.G G.3
HllO •1. Hlll.O Hll.fi 2.9 1,171.2 20.G 123.2 2.2
HJJ:l fl.'120.0 72,2 :m2.-1 .'3.2 1,747.8 18.9 ,513.l 5.5" 
\Vithi,1 twenty-three years the amount of ore rnined in 
Vkumt• i1,crt'a�tcl almost twenty times, while the increase in 
the nhl H11�sian ore center of the Urals merely doubled. Ukraine 
became the rnaiJJ .�011rce of iron ore, coJJtributing dose to 75% of 
."' 0. Oliloblyn, uµ. cit., 11. 171 , ,, S. (hlapenko, Inc. cit. 
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the Empire's total. Dnring the same period, Ukraine surpassed 
Austlia-Ilnngary, although Ukraine was still far behind coun­
tries with a highly developed metallurgical industry. In 1913, 
the production of iron ore in thousands of tons was: Austria­
Hungar.v, 4,800; Sweden, 8,608; Great Britain, 15,872; France, 
21,600; Germany, 35,200, and USA, 54,848. 
ThP- gr0wth of Ukraine's participation in the Empire's pro­
ducti0n of pig i�on was equally stormy. Production of pig iron 
is shown in Table LVlll (in thousands of tons). 
Production of iron and steel ( in thousands of tons) is shown 
in Table LIX. 
We Ine>St n0t be led to believe that such fast growth of 
Ukramian metallurgy and the accession to a leading position in 
the Empire is explained merely by the presence of rich 
iron ore deposits. It is true that the quality of the ore and its 
geographic loC'ation in Ukraine surpassed all other regions of 
the Empire, but ::i.s to the quantity of deposits, the position of 
Ukraine in the Empire is nothing exceptional. According to 
data of Professor Bohdanovych, iron ore reserves and the 
amom,t of iron in them are characterized by the figures in 
Table LX ( in thousands of tons). 
It was therefore not the presence of rich iron ore deposits 
alone then which determined the leading position of Ukraine 
in the iron ore and metallurgical industries. Many factors con-
TABLE LVIII 
Year Empire total Ukraine (Quantity) Ukraine i 
1860 313.6 0 
Hl7.''i 398.4 14.4 3.6 
1890 883.2 214.4 24.3 
HJOO 2,828.8 1,464.0 51.8 
1910 2,872.8 2,020.8 68.l 
1914 4,22,5.6 2,97\l,2 70.6 
TABLE LIX 
Year Empire total Ukraine Urals Ukraine 'JI- Urals% 
1860 197.9 161.7 81.9 
1870 232.0 148.1 63.9 
1880 s'}Wi.9 25.9 211.0 -4..5 37.0 
1890 2,149.7 95:3.7 477.6 44.4 22.2 
moo 2JJ47.2 I •. 582.4 592.0 5:3.6 20.1 
1914 3,835.2 2,302.4 649.6 60.0 16.8 
u 
''4 P. Fomin, np. cit., pp. 89, 90, 
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·i .\Bl.I-: L'\
O,·c I ro" in tlie ore 
llkr.iinc 523,13(:l 227,800 
Urals 275,100 1:12.400 
Ce>ntr.:il Russia 771,360 :307,400 
Poland 288,000 117,120 
Caucasus .. 13,600 8,096 
trihuted to this, a major one oI them heing the high technical 
prodl!dk,n kwl. The plant<; of Ckraine were estahlishcd from 
the heginnini; \\·ith all the technical improvements. They were 
estahlished on the pattern of concentrated enterprises of \Vestern 
Europe. The production capacity of the plants of Ck.mine, com­
pared with phmts in other regions of the Empire shows the 
Table LXI figures of pig iron prndudion in 1891 and 1900 ( in 
thousands of tnrs per annum, plant capacity is also indicated 
in thous,·m,!s of tons per annum): 
Therefore, Ukraine surpassed all other metallurgical regions 
as far a� concentration of production was concern('d. Tn 1900, 
in Ukraine-. 66 .. 55'. of all pig iron production came from plants 
with a capacity of 80 to 160 thousand tons, and over 160 thou­
sand tons per annum, while in the rest of the Empire outside of 
Ckraine 54.6'.f was pro<lucod iu plant� of a capacity helow 16.000 
tc,us. Hv t�t' 20th c._•ntury Ckraine was approaching such a b.nd 
of highly developed metallurgy as Gcnnany. The average plant 
of Uhain,� would havt> an average of 2 on•ns, 345 workers and 
,votild W',1rk 74.8 thousand tons of ore per oven, the correspond­
ing fi).!ur;:��· for Gt'rm:my are: 2.5 ovens. 322 workers and 86.1 
tlmu!:aml ton�. The technical and productive superiority of 
Ukrainian metallurgy is even more ohvious when we compare it 
,vith thnt nt the l'.rals, the most developed region in Russia. This 
supcrinrity mu�t be emphaSized because of the role it played in 
the r0btmmhip hetween Ukraine and Hussia in this field. i_ See 
Table T.XTT.) 
Snch incompar,ihly higher prod11dio11 indices were the re­
sult d a lT'Ort' p1Tfeet techllique and orga11izati011 of pro<ludio11: 
hot hlast furnaces, use of milleral fuel. .\-lartin ovellS, Bessemer 
:md Tl1oin:1s conv(•rters. etc. Thus, from the very beginning, the 
Ukrainia11 metallurgical iudustry dl'velopecl as an imlustry of 
hi�h capi• .11 im"",tmr·nt. For this. a sonrcc of suppl? of capital 
,,·as necessary, as well as conditions favoring the influx of such 
· \' . .Fomin, l!/1. cit., p. fl'.)_
G5 
TABLE LXI 
Plants with a woduction capacity of: 
Total pig On:r 160 RO to UiO 4R to RO 16 to 4R Under 16 
Y<"ar iron Rest of Rc�t uf Rest of Rest of Rl"5t of 
Ukrninc Empi.c LTkmine Ernpir.- Ukraine Empire Ukraine Empire Ukraine Empire 
1891 9!53.8 80.7 151.6 50.8 127.0 ,543.7 
1900 2,828.8 474.3 496.3 94.8 ,'l'i3.7 lll.2n 111.0 441.2 746.6 
es 
.-,o :--r. Vanag, "Finansoviy bpita! v Rossiyi nakanunc mirovoy vuyny" 
('"Finance Capital in Russia on the Eve of the World War"), Proletariy, 
( Tho Proleturian ), Moscow, l!J30, p. 17. 
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1900 
Ukrniuc l/r(lls 
iron per plant 
( in thou�ands of tom l . 
Power of plant iu HP ....... • 




}',oduction of pig 
23.8 4.0 51.l 6.9 
1.530.0 135.0 6,159.0 244.0 
1,505.0 1,281.0 1,841.0 1,496.0 
Production per ov,-.n 
(in thousands of ton�). 15.3 32.5 -"i.4 
Production per worker 
(in tom) 15.8 3.1 27.4 4.7 
Or•:" mined per worker 
(in thousands of tons). 171.2 38.4 .'308.8 52.8 " 
capit�l, such as good market conditions and a high margin of 
profit. 
The sonrce of these investments was foreign capital, in or­
ganic relationship with the already existing financial oligarchy 
of R11s•:ian bank�, Ct'ntered mainly in Petersburg. In an unequal 
struggle ap;ain�t this strong Government-backed faction, local 
capi\ai wa<; t-'ither ruined, or completely snbjecte<l. 111is hap­
pened not only in the metallurgical, but in all other important 
industries 0f Ukraille, coal, sugar, etc. 
Foxor::ihle market conditions for the metallurgical in<lnstry 
were created primarily by a great <lemand for metals, caused 
by t�e ma!'s C0'1struction of railroads. But this did not happen 
suddenly The initial "skeptical attitude l'oward the ore wealth 
of Kryvyi Rih dominated both Government au<l scientific circles 
almost until 1880," in other words, we have here to deal with 
another aspect c.f R11ssia's desire to hold on to an industrial 
monopoly. "This historical conflict of the region of Kryvyi Rih 
and the Urals was resolved by the interference of foreign capi­
tal, .:·entrn,v to the interests of national Russian capital."66 
Until that time, even the dC'veloping railroads' acutely felt 
hungrr for metals was powerless against the negative attitude 
toward the development of industry in Ukraine. A solution was 
being sought in facilitating the importation of metals from abroad, 
but in such degree only, as not to hurt the interests of the 
Urak D,1ring rliscussions of the proposed tariff act of 1857, 
the ,,\l"ll lc1own economist Tengoborskiy, who was chief speak-
"'I. Glivits, Zhdez()dclatelnaya promyshlennos( Rossiyi ( The ]ro,1."\'\"nrki11g 
Industry of Russia), \foseow, 1911, p. 114. 
''" M. \Volf. ())I. cit., p, 42. 
. . . .... ... - ... 
146 Ukraine and Russia 
er, smtl: "The prohibition of the importation of iron and pig 
iron �hould be repealed, and the duty on these essential metals 
should be lowered tn 2.0 kopecks from 1.03 rubles for pig iron, 
and to 60 kopecks for iron coming by sea and 40 kopecks for 
iron eomiP.g: by land from 1.38 rubles." The need for such reduc­
tions was argued as follows: 1) Iron is one of the most essential 
products for all brarn·hes of industry, aud all are interested in 
getlir-g it cheap. But the existing tariff does not permit it to 
become ci1�ap hcc,wse its importation by sea is prohibited, and 
importation by land is prohibitively high. Transportation of 
mehl frorn th<' UrRls to industrial centers costs more than the 
metals themselves; 2) The amount of iron manufactured in Rus­
sia is at a standstill, regardless of the growing demand for it; 
3)nCompetition behveen Russian and foreign iron is quite pos­
sible thanks to the high cost of freight from the seaboard ton
inland points.''e9 
The Strte Council went even further. They repealed the im­
portation by sea ( with the exception of Black am! Oziv Sea 
ports, Odessa excluded) and set up a rate of duty: pig iron-
15 kopecks, bulk iron-50 kopeck�. sheet iron-60 kopecks etc. 
This brought a radical change in the extent of imports: "the 
anmd imrort figure of pig iron and iron increased from 3,168 
tons b€twcen 1><51 and 1856 to 311,000 tons between 1867 and 
1871, and to 470,400 tons between 1877 and 1881. 
" , .. Even for the construction of railroads in the Urals, the 
center of black metnallurgy, not only locomotives and rails were 
imporh:d, !mt '.l!so various small metalware like screws, bolts, 
etc.""� 
"The tot:>! ya]ue of imported iron goods and iron for the 
constrnction and servicing of railroads during the ten-year pe­
riod betw�"'n 1870 and 1880 reached one billion rubles.'"" 
Such a solution of the iron supply problem obviously went 
against the interests of Ukraine, whose productive capacity was 
thus automrltically ignored. 
"The Kbarkiv Committee of Commerce and Manufacturing, 
reprc�enting thP interests of the Donets region, pointed to the 
exist�ncc nf hu�e rleposits of iron ore in this region." This Com-
"� \l. Sobolcv, np. eit .. pp. 33-34. 70 B. Brant, Inostra,miye ka/Jitaly ( Fnrcign Capital), St. Pdersburg. 1899, 
III. SO.
'' P. Lnshchenko, Istoriyu nurodnnlw khn;:ya!J,fm SSSR ( History of the 
Nuti,mal Economy of the USSR). L,·uiugr.1d, l'.Y,:'., ll, 110. 
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mitkL' tl1 .1\g:ht it wise to solve the problem of the supply of 
iron iu tllC' dc,,.c·lopnl('nt of Ukrainian mf'tallurgy which "has 
been lultcd. in its clevclopmcut, and duties should bf' kept iu 
fore(• in order t" aid it. The growth of the mining industry in 
the Don<'ts land will provide a large amount of wages for the 
pea�;i.n1.�, heretofore restricted to a siJJgle agricultural pursuit.""' 
These just aud understandable claims of Ukraine did not 
meet ,vith '.l positive response. On the contrary, two years later 
came a1;0ther prnposition to lower the duty on pig iron to 5 
kopecks ( from 15 kopecks) and for assorted iron to 45 kopecks. 
It was carried into effect. :,\foreover, on motion of the Minister 
of FiI,ance, duty-lree importation of iron and pig iron on special 
requ<'st of individual plants was allowed. This duty-free impor­
tation was considerably high even in the 1870's, and constituted 
a lar�.e pcrc-mtrge of the total. Table LXIIT shows these figures 
in thousands of tons. Thus, the economic policy of Russia regard-
TABLE LXlll 
Of that, Sheet and Of that, 
Tear Pig iron duty-free a:,wrted ir,m dv.ty-free 
1875 56.I 44.3 85.6 42.6 
lSifi 47.4 38.8 80.,', 30.6 
1877 51.6 47.4 50.5 28.4 
1879 181.1 122.5 96..''.i 30.8 
ing me�als was not determined by the interests of the Ukrain­
ian eco1 ,,mv, no-:- ul the development of the metallurgical in­
dustry nf Ukrnine ,vhich, as has been noted abo\"e, was soon 
to rise to a leading position. Russia ignored those interests en­
tirely. Russia's colonial policy toward Ukraine required a con­
tiuu-uicc� d it !:IS an agricultural economy. But the extremely 
favornblt' ,n:irkf't conditions and the growing demand for metals 
created an interest on the part of foreign capital, in investing 
in Ul.:n.ini:111 indu,,try. The opportunity to balance foreign trade 
ccmpr-•i!,:,d Russfo to �nbstitute for the antiquated colonial system 
a mo .. e trn><lern o!"le, which offered much higher returns not only 
to the metropolis as such, but also to this metropolis' still shaky 
fina:,ce capital 
In 1;-;;1 an Euglishmau, Hughes, built and put into opcra­
hm '•vo nieta!lurgical plants in Ukraine. He was not achmlly 
·, ;\]. '>0!10'<:'v, op. cit., p. 567. 
,. l/,id, p. l !JI-I. 
, ., 
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an independent entrepreneur. He had the backing of English fi­
nanchl cirdes ,1ml of some high-ranking Petersburg personages. 
Following Hughes, the :\foscow industrialist Pash1khov became 
active in the black metal industry of Ukraine. The development 
of the metallurgical industry assumed wide proportiom in the 
1880's, when t"be large-scale influx of foreign capital came le­
gallv. 
As has been noted, initially Ukrainian industry relied 
mainly on the railroads' demand for iron. Even at that time 
the railroads required annually between 800 and 1,000 engines, 
20,000 to 2,'5,000 freight cars, between 320,000 and 368,000 tom 
of rails, etc. Converted to terms of pig iron, this required an­
nually 640,000 tons a year. "If we take into consideration the 
fact that in 1890 the entire metallurgical industry produced only 
960,000 tons of rig iron, and in 1895, 1,388,800 tons, and its pro­
duction reaehed 2,H28,800 tons only in 1900, it becomes clear 
to what extent the great demand for metals by the railroads 
was decisive for the metallurgical industry."" 
On the average, the railroads' demands for metal reached 
68.8% 0f the tot'.ll production figure. Some plants (Pruzhkovsky, 
Novorossiysky) worked for the railroads 87% to 100% of produc­
tion time .. 
Thi� was t1'P decisive factor in the development of the 
Ukrni!lian met<iU,�rgy (See Table LXIV). 
We ca!l �ee from the above that Ukraine was the supplier 
of goods in great demand: rails, beams, telegraph wire, etc. But 
in the production of goods in mass demand for mass consump· 
tion, such as roofing steel, hardware and universal iron goods 
Ukr1ine was behind other regions. This is clear if we take into 
consxleration the amount of these goods produced in proportion 
to the total amount of metal goods manufactured. Even such a 
branch of metal manufacturing as nails which would appear to 
be ck,sely tied with the manufacture of wire, was underdevel­
oped when com!lared with other regions. 
This one-sided aspect of the metallurgical industry imposed 
upon Ukraine wa� dictated by the desire to conserve the wide 
consumption market for the Urals. It was the cause of Ukrain­
ian industry's conti!lned dependence on railroad construction 
which, ns we shctll see later, facilitated its domination by foreign 
and Rns.-:ian finance capital. And to the extent that railroad con-





Rolli11g•mill products (in paceutagos); 
Pnufoct: rears Ukraine Urals Central Volga North Poland 
Industrial ( l'der.jburg) 
Region 
Be.ims and h.irs ... 1903 81 8 J ' 8 
1912 88 5 J.4. [.(j 4 
Hails 1903 82 18 
1912 79 21 
Wir(' 24 15 16 21 21 
l912 56 ., 6 18 !.5 
Hoof irnn 12 80 .J I 2 2 
1912 24 61 ., 6 l 2 
Light shed ..... HJ03 36 .Jl 7 l 2.5.1912 41 16 0,5 0 4.!5 29 
He.ivy �hcct ............. HJ03 .54 6 8 12 10 JO 
1912 63 7 g 8 7 6 
As.-.orted .......... 1903 35 19 ., 9 9 23 
HH2 47 13 .5 8 8 rn 
Univt'rs;a\ 1903 39 0 .. 5 0.5 3 8 13 
1912 46 5 8 41 " 
Tnud rnlling-mill production (in thousands of tom-): 
1903 LJ(\2.4 496.0 212.W. 126.4 273.6 1912 2,051.2 630.4 320,0.° 244.8 393.6 
1903 ,5().8 20.9 10.0° 5.8 12.,5 HJ12 ."6.4 17.3 6.7 10.7 '" "These figur<:s w·rtain jointly tu the Central Industrial and Volga regions.
'·' l\f. Colman, op. cit., p. 436. 76 Jbid .• p. 43.3. 
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struction was mainly, and particularly during the 19th century, 
undertaken at Government cost, the size of that construction de­
pended upon budget means of some fiscal year. The length of 
newly opened rail lines in the Russian Empire is shown in 
Table LXV, for five-year periods between 1861 and 1915, the 
last item being for a ten-year period (in miles)." In addi-
TABLE LXV 
Years Miles Years Miles Years Miles 
1861-186.5 1,295 1876-1880 2,340 1891-1895 ·1,294
1866-1870 4,349 1881-1885 2,038 1896-1900 5,289
1871-1875 4,922 1886-1890 1,899 1901-1905 4.324
1900-1\JIS 18,932
tion to these circumstances which determined the market for the 
prodwt� of Ukrainian metallurgy to a large extent, imports also 
played an important part in this respect. These also were sub­
ject to the will of the Imperial Government, primarily to its 
tarift p,,\k-y. 
This provides a clue as to why exports and imports of metals 
never :::ichicved an equilibrium. One, or the other showed marked 
fluctuations, and there was no lack of such instances where 
imports, thanks to lower customs tariffs increased, with a con­
current increase in exports, although the latter, because of the 
high railroad freight rates could never be as profitable as selling 
at prices prevailing on the markets of the Empire. Profits of the 
Rus\ian industry on cheap imported metals went hand in hand 
with losses of the Ukrainian industry on exports, from which 
Russia drew the c•xchange to pay for imports. These conditions 
prevailed, as we shall indicate later, until the time whell, Russo­
Frcnc '1 syndical cs were set up for the Ukrainian coal and metal­
lurgir:,J illdmtry. This subjected the home market to a monopoly, 
and the Imperial economic policy conformed with the interests 
of that monopoly, even to the extent of making the tariff policy 
follow its needs. The process did not get into its full stride until 
after 1905. 
Until that period of monopoly the imports of metals and 
metal goods into Ukraine were as shown in Table LXVI ( in 
thousauds of tons)." 
" P. LnshC'henko. op. cit., p. 123. 
'� P. Fomin, op. cit., p. 69. 
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TABLE LXVI 
Iron arni 
Pig iron /ro:n ,md steel TooL1 and 

















18\-J0-99 113.75 6.97 23"9.8�) 32.82 89.63 
1900-09 16,64 .5.28 67.8 46.35 138.47 
Tbns, along with a gradual and systematic increase in the 
impc·rt:1tion of tools an<l machinery, we are able to note sharp 
fluctuations in the importation of pig iron and iron. An<l this 
was at a time of simultaueous and rapid increase of the produc­
tion of these goods in Ukraine which even resulted in a surplus 
after demands oi t·he home market had been met. Thus, the 
cxter.t of imports was not determined hy the home market bal­
ance of metals, only by Hussian industrialists' conjectures in the 
matter of commcn:ial profits. For example, the sharp increase 
of im;:iorts of pig iron during the 1880 to 1889 period was the 
direct result of the 1880 repeal of duty on this item, And al­
though a major part of the imports was not absorbed by the 
economy of Ukraine going merely in transit to Hnssia, neverthe­
less the existen(P of such considerable imports with simultan­
eous , _•xports of thr same kind of goods from Ukraine is indica­
tive of the subjection of the industrial interests of Ukraine to 
the interests of Hn.,sian industrial centers. 
T:1!� one-sided n'ipect of the Ukrainian metallurgical indus­
trv and its <lepmdcncc on the demand by the railroads which 
were nndcr the co<1trol of thc Government ( the factor deter­
minir,f, the legal rf'gulations in the ar€a of economic policy) was 
the m:iin reason for the fad that this industry, in Spite of an 
t1cute shortage of metal goods in the land and a great demand 
for them, neverthd1:ss had to go through a hard marketing cri­
sis in the lfi90's. and an even harder one in 1904-05. As a result 
of th1-'se crises and the artificial decline of the price of stock 
of this industry on foreign exchanges which followed the crises, 
Ukr,1inian capital WflS almost entirely forced out of this indus­
try. and it came under the domination of Russo-French capital. 
T1tis \Vas the cm'i<' of the varions fluctuations in the exporta­
tion of pig iron and iron, alongside an almost unchangeable level 
of exports of manufactured metal goods. 
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1903 .3.5 8.75 1.07 5.+i 2 88 
1904 .RO 6.16 1.16 4 . .'il 1.63 
H)(I,', .94 13.87 1.00 ,Hl2 1.36 
1906 20.38 3!.63 un !UJH. 3.36 
1907 72.78 167.63 .91 6.14. 2.20 
1908 10.38 l(l�J.80 110 6.33. 1.71 
1909 1.l,5. 162.16 1.1() 7.36. 1.84 
1!.llU 2.00. WJ.47 ./-Ji:.) U.79. 1.66 
Hll I 1.07. 77 .. "i,J .80 6.76. 2.,51 
Hll2 .3> 28.43 1.15 12.32. 3.10 
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Table LXVII illustrates the export sihiation in metals during 
the 190:2-191:2 period. Even after the crisis of 1904 Ukraine con-
TABLE L\YJT 
(The figures arc in thou�ancb of ton�. ).79 
lror1 and 
Pig 1nm and J'ig iron steel Tools am/ 
Year iron stcd prmlu,:11· ,irodurts r,,r1thi11Cr!J 
1902 ,53.61 6.40 
tinued to export rails in considerable qnantities because the 
home market was restricted in order to k<'ep prices up. Exports 
of rails amounted to: 1905, 7,184 tons; 1906, 8,480 tons; 1907, 
89,:280 tonS; 190S, 86,232 tons; 1909, 140,320 tons, and in Hll0, 
66,880 tons. 80 
Obviously, nIJder such circumstances the producti\·c capacity 
of the Ukrainian metallurgy always exceeded actual production, 
and because of that, mined ore was exported in large annual 
<tuaritilies abro.'!d, in spite of the fact that there was an acute 
need for indmtri.;1\ t>mployment among the local population. 
This is typical in a colonial land. The amounts of ore exported 
are shown for lhe period between 1901 and 1912 in Table 
LXVJII (in thous:a1ds of tons):"' 
TABLE LXVllI 
HJOl 3.5:2 H)07. 878.48 
19f:2 3K4J 1908. Jfrl.43 
1903 '.'.8::i.GJ 1909. ,50,'>.58 
1904 2,16.70 l\HO. H27.44 
1905 211.15 1911. 865.39 
HJC6 460.24 1912. 647.77 
n G. Kusperovich, Zhelc:wdcl,,telrui!Ja prom�hlcnnm·t v Rossi!}i :'..fl 1903-
13 g. g. (The Irnn-Working Indu#ry in Ru:,,sia during the Years 1903-
1913), �foscow. 1914, p. 41. In his table, the author indudes mils m the 
"Iron �nJ steel"' column. so P. Fumin. op. cit .. p. 72. ;, Ibid., p. 70..
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T!•e main consurncrs of this export itf'm were Germany, 
Great Britain and Hollaml, countries which were siumltaneousl:· 
c"porters of pig iwn and iron ±or the Pdcrsb11rg ind11stry, 
Ub.rai11ian ore wer,t through the Black Sea porls to E11gla11d and 
Cennany, and later in the form of pig iron and prod.nets it 
wen'. through B.t\tic por!s lo nourish the metalworking plants of 
l'dershurg. In 1913 Germany alone took 400,000 tons of Ukrain­
ian ,JrC, ()'{ of tht• total mined. 
\foch light is shed 011 the position of the Vkrai11ia11 metal" 
!urgiml industrv by daia on !he home consumption of mc!als.n
S!atis:ics of c-arlor,dings provide a real insight. If we group then
stati(,11s of loadin!_'" metals ,md �tations of destination of the en­
tire Empire, then \\'e will get the following picture for then
year l!-HL Out of a total of 1,660.6 lhonsand tons of pig ironn
;ml semi-m,mnfactured melal goods, Ukraine accounle�\ forn
�)73.R thousdnd tons, or .ss.n .. But of the latter amounl, onlyn
,HH.3 lhousand tons, or 46%, of Ukrainian carloadiugs were forn
internal Ukrainian destination. The remainder went beyondn
Fkra;ne. lt wa� the same wi!h iron and steel. Out of a Iola\ ofn
l,ml7.l thousand tons of carloadings, Vkraine accounted forn
1,1.'lJ.6 tlwusawl tons. or 56.7'0, of which 463 thousand tons, orn
4lf went for internal Ukrni11ia11 consumption. The followingn
table shows us to what regions of the Empire the metals wcrl'n
destined. Carlo:,dings in 1911 arc shown in Table LXTX ( in 
thmts·.rnds of tons).s"n
According to Lhese fignrt's Ukraine ddiwre<l to the cenh·,t! 
Moscow regions ,':ii% of their pig iron and 49.4% of their iron and 
sleel. Similarly to the Petersburg (Baltic) region went .r;.2:; of 
its pig imn and -1t3_-l'i! of its irou and steel. And to European Hus­
sia in �encral, Ukraine delivercrl -1,1.4'.-h of the pig iron and 46.8'.i 
of the iron and steel. The fact tha! Ukraine alone was consnm­
ing 0•1ly 4f)'; of the pig iron prod11ccd, and only 41% of inm aml 
steel does 1101 !1y :my means prtwe that the Ukrainian markci's 
needs were folly -�•ttisfie<l. On the contrary, Ukraine, satisfying 
mon· than 30'.T of Hussia's metal consumption, imported over 
:32,000 to11s of irrm from the Urals. The Ukr,tinian population 
was supplied with iron and its products on a starYation level; 
9SC; of the pc:is,1.nts' homes were straw-thatched, all ntcnsils 
Wl'H' earthenware not only in the Yillages, but also to a large 
8� P, Fomin, "P- cit., p. Ti, 
l. 
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TABLE LXIX 
Pig iron and semi•riumufactures Iron and steel 
Regions of lm1ding 
Regions oi Empire Empire 
destination Ukraine Urals total Ukraine Urals total 
Northern . . 1.,5 0.25 5.53 
Baltic 109.40 49.30 227.10 115.60 41.20 266.80 
Central Asia 0.32 0.32 3.JH 4.78 7.!Jfl 
l\loscow 
Central . . 112.83 25.90 196.90 153,40 46.00 319.10 
Central 
Volga . . . 89.80 3.82 97.40 47.07 25.28 79.60 
Central 
Chemozem 54.14 0.99 57.02 106.27 17.14 142.35 
Poland 111.88 0.21 279.88 62.40 3.13 313.40 
Ukrairu, 461.37 14.99 486.37 465.02 35.34 ,52'>.70 
Urals 3.95 271.28 276.25 7.50 101.95 109.68 
Southeastern. 1.39 0.67 2.10 
North 
Caucasus .. 2.29 2.W0 65.82 5.54 71.41 
South 
Caucasus. 5.39 5.39 63.98 1.73 66.00 
951.05 366.81 1,628.1)2 1,093.13 283.01 1,909.65 
extent in the cities, carts had wooden axles, gates and doors were 
hung on wooden hinges, All this speaks eloquently as to whether 
or not the peopl�s needs in metal were satisfied, True enough, 
the insignificant consumption of iron can he explained to a 
large extent hy the low purchasing power of the population, 
impo,·erished hy colonial exploitation. But a large part was also 
played hy the nature of the Ukrainian metallurgical industry, 
whose efforts, as has heen pointed out, were concentrated on 
the manufacture of such products as rails, heams, hars, etc. with 
a very limitell production of universal consumption articles. Thl' 
entire in<lmtry was looking not toward the satisfaction of the 
needs of the national economy, only toward satisfying Russia's 
needs for products of black metals and of supplying Russian 
metalworkin?: industries with raw materials and semi-manufac­
tured products. The very nature of manufacturing thus compels 
us to delegate Ukr::i.inian metallurgy to the category of a colon­
ial imlnstry. 
Ukraine did not possess any metahvorking industry with 
the e,:ception of fann machinery manufacturing and a railroad 
equipment ind1•stry. Any other metalworking did not go heyond 
the stage of crafts on a level of hlack and lock-smithing. 
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On the eve of \Vorld \Var I Ukraine had 17 smelting plant, 
aml 6 mills, of which half \Vere rolling mills, and one served 
the ,;hipbuild.ing imlmtry belonging to the :\[ykolaiv Shipbuild­
ing CGmpany. 
\Vt have been cnmidcring three basic branche� of L'krain­
ian i11dmtry: sugar refining, coal mining and metallurgy. \\'e 
have been making only cursory remarks about others because 
it is not within the scope of this work to draw a �tafotical and. 
economic characteristic of the the pre-revolutionary po�ition and. 
development of indnstry of Ckraine. Our task is to di�cover 
the n-al nature of 1hosc social-economic conditions in Ukraine, 
and in Rm�ia, which were decisive in the development and d.i­
rcctiOl! of that indmtry, and which formed. the essence of econ­
omic procc�,e� in L'kraine. \Ve have deliberately paused. to cor1-
sid.e· :hese branches, \vhich were the ba�i� of Ukrainian indus­
try and in whose development L'kraine met \Vith considerable 
�ucce,s. achieving a leading position in the whole Empire in 
these branches. :\Pother reason for consideri11g them in detail 
was lhat they an· hll based. on natural wealth and by rea�on of 
thi� fad possessed a �olid foundation for further development. 
Tt would. seem that thi� nah1ral wealth gave Ukraine the right to 
ex pee t favorable c<:mditions for rounded. development of these 
Lranc.-he� of industry. But, as we have scc,1, even here Hussia\ 
attitude wa� characteristic. It treated. L'kraine's economy as that 
of a cclony. 
Tl.c central pnrpose of Rm�ian economic policy all along, 
was to keep Ukraiuc in a position of a supplier of raw material 
produced. Ly :1<;ric11lturc, and. a market for Hussian i11d.u�triaI 
products. C:011hrrning to this plan, Ckraine should have re­
mained in a sta)!e o± merely rudimentary ind.u�trial development. 
Thi� wa� the ob\ect of the early ruination of L'kraine's industry, 
and ib tran�fer to, and concentration in Russia. As we have 
noted, in manv branches of indu�try, particularly in the produc­
tion of goods :,f ;11ass consumption, the scheme succeeded al­
most 100%. 
Thr first stages of dcvelopmcot of the three industries here­
in analyzed. were met with a desire to apply the same principle 
to tl.nn; to pron:nt their coming into cxistc11cc Ly �etting up 
agai1,�t them appropriate branches of Hussian indmtry. \Ve have 
�ecn that such wa� the ca�e with sugar refineries which were 
beint! estaLlishc·d ir Russia; such was the case with coal, where 
156 Ukraine and Russia 
other mining regio11s, wood as fuel and imported coal were 
nsed :cs means of pn:veuting the emergence of a Ukrainian in­
dustr:,,·, and such wai: the <:ase in metallurgy, i11 the struggle of 
the Urals against Kryvyi Hih. 
\Vhen, howe\"er, economic conditions appeared to be stronger 
than rnch d<'sire�, H.ussia would hegin putting obstacles iu the 
way of the growth endeavoring to make them adjnncts of and 
suhjc·ct to Hussia!J industries. 
Arni final[h
:,,
, when Hussia ,,·as faced with tlw prospect of an 
irresistible superiority of these branches of Ukrainian industry 
over the respective branches of Hnssian industry, and when their 
growth was <lict2trx1 by the economic needs of all of Russia, 
there began thf' conquest of thes" industries with the aid of for­
eign capital. Then came the illtroduction of a modern system 
of colonial exploitation, peculiar to the so-called "European" lype 
of colonies. 
But here we encounter a very special process of financial ex­
pansion into the economy of a colony. The process is special not 
ouly by reason of the fact that foreign capital was drawn into 
partir-ipation, and not only because Russia <lid not have too 
much c,,pitaL The peculiarity of the sihiation lies in the fact 
that ccpnomic �truggle docs not suit Hussian colonial imperial­
ism. Hussian expansion was always based on armed force; on 
brutal compulsion, ,rnd on cementing her political rule hy com­
pletely cleprivi.·1g ,·uhjccteJ people of all rights. The clear<:st 
illustration is provided hy imperialist expansiou conducted by 
Hussi:i. during the very same period in lands of the Middle and 
Far East, whither Russia wanted to extend her colonial holdings, 
lu 1896, Hussian fiuanciers of the "Discount-Loan Bank" gave 
Persia (lran) a loan in the amount of 1 million pounds ster!iug. 
At the same time the Government imposed a treaty upou Persia, 
accarding to which Persia was ohlige<l to 1wgotiate all further 
loans only thr1Jt1gJ, Russian banks. There ,vas a new loan in 
1800, and in 1902 a treaty granting llussia profitahle conces­
sions and trade facilities. In 1907 there was a treaty with Great 
Brita;!i conc('rnin7 the division of spheres of iuterest in Per�ia, 
and finally in 1908 military occupation of Northnn Persia. There 
was an analogous situation in Afghanistan. The same thing in 
China: in 189.5-96 a loan for the payment of China's reparations 
to Japan; and in return, the right to construct the Eastern Chi­
nese Railroad through Manchuria, and huge concessions in 
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P.Janchuria. In 1901 military occupation, the lease of Port Arthur 
and Dalny, and a complete conquest of the oil, sugar and grain 
market through the Hussian-Chinese Bank and the Siberian 
Bank. In 1803, hugt' lumber concessions in Korea followed the 
establishment of military basl's, an<l this finally kd to the Husso­
Japanese War of 19Q.1-1905.�·, 
Always aud everywhere, Russian colonial imperialist expan­
sion ,vas in the n,1ture of compulsion by force of arms and of 
political subjnvtion. 
Russia's policy of the so-called "financial imperialism" was 
c.omb.1cte<l by dcvions ways. It was not a policy of financial in­
vestment in the Ukrainian economy, nor a development of indus­
trial enterprises of the metropolis in the territory of the colony.l
The heart of the process was that Russia, in cooperation withl
foreign capital, by means of various "reorganizations» and ofl
dire,:'. pressme, appropriated Ukrainian industry, and in 1917,l
following the Bolshevik upheaval, extended the expropriationl
also te, foreigr1 capital invested in that industry.l
This proces� of appropriating Ukrainia11 industry and of thus 
conqu('ring the entire Ukrainian economy disdosed the system 
of colonial exploitation of Ukraine most clearly. 
We shall now proceed to illustrate that process. 
'1 Ac;cording to matnial in \t. Colman\ "Russkiy Impcryalizm," pp. 347 ff. 
CIIAl'TER 4 
FINANCE CAPITAL IN UKRAINIAN 
INDUSTRY 
,v estern European Capital 
THAT PERIOD IN UKRAI'.'IIAN economic history 
which hrought a mass influx of foreign capital into industry, 
evokes in ptcople unacquainted with the real nature of thl!Se 
processes a distorted picture of the Ukrainian economy at the 
time. There are also some, who deliberately utilize the situation 
in order to distort the true picture. Some, like M. Wolf, K. Paz­
hih10v and others, perceive in it a colonial dependence of 
Ukraine not upon Hussia but upon foreign capital. Others, like M. 
Bal«banov, M. Hurevych, and partially Peshekhonov, making 
their point of departme the leading position of Ukrainian metal­
lurgy and coal mining as main branches of industry which de­
termined the e•1tir,e industrial level, and par.ticularly from the 
fact of a monopolistic domination of the imperial markets by 
syndkates estahli�hed in thest_' branches, attempt to treat the 
matter in such manner that they allege that Ukraine was not 
the object of colonir:l exploitation, but on the contrary, the 
whoie Empire \VHS economically dependent upon, and subject 
to Ukrainian industry. The most prevailing attitude is, hov ...ever, 
to ignore the specific nature of foreign capita! im-estments in 
the Ukrainian economy, and to dwell upon the semi-colonial <le­
pemL·nce of the whole Empire upon \Vestern Enrope, and upon 
the reparation and localization of labor within the entire Im­
penal economic body. 
Such distortion o{ the real nature of affairs, along with the 
true impact of foreign capital upon the directiou and nature of 
the devdopmc:Jt of industry in Ukraine requires a separate an­
alysis. This is :1ll 1:he more necessary, inasmuch as industrial 
com1itions created In that time played a definite, and no small 
part. in the subsefpte11t economic relations hehveen Ukraine and 
Hussia during Sovint times. 
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\\'r shall begin with the characteristics of foreign (Western 
Enrupean) cap!tal i11 Ukrainian industry, its origin, specific 
gravit�1, and dominant role in places of its highest sahiration. 
There is no complete summary of foreign investments in 
Ukramc because av;:ilahle figures refer mainly to industrial cor­
pon::-icns. Neitlwr ;!re there accurate figures available as to the 
terrilorial rPpariition of foreign capital in commerce, transpor­
tation, or municipc1l enterprises. Xor is there any summary of 
other forms uf capital accumulation, except corporate. And most 
irnpf'r�ant. then' cannot be a determination made of that part 
of capital which flowed into Ukraine through Russian banks. 
Direct investments of ·western European capital in industry 
are a nhenomenon of only the last decades of the 19th and of the 
begir,;iing of tlw 2.0th ·centuries. In addition, foreign capital 
pJa:v�,tl an import·-mt part in the inU11strial development of Hus­
sia, hut rnostly in the form of GovernmC'nt borrowing. Even 
dnri
n,
'c; the time ot Finance 1linister Vishncgradsky, there was 
a conversion of internal loans, placing them abroad, which gave 
the �;overnment almost 1.5 billion rnbles, used almost exclusive­
Iv for the construction of state railroads in Russia. Later, for­
:ign loans were of tremendous importance in the so-called "ex­
traonli11ary budget" which made it possible, as we shall indi­
cate Jr.ter, to arpropriate large sums of money for the Minis­
tries flf Comm11nications and of Finance, of which Russian rail­
roads and indnstry took good advantage. 
The participation of ·western European capital in industrial 
corporations of the whole Empire totalled, in the year 1870, only 
26.5 million rnhler. Bv lSSO the amount had increased to 97.7 
million rnhles, Juring the next ten years to :314.7 million mbles, 
and hy 1900 it had reached 911 mi]lio11 rnbles.' 
Thf' inflnx (>f for<'ign capital i11creased its tempo even more 
from that time on . .-\t the time of World \Var I the nominal value 
of st()t·k owned by foreign capital equalled 1,532 million rubles. 
plus 300 million ruhles worth of bonds. 
In 1917 ou-'.: of a total of 3,185 million rubles representing 
stock and bond c:ipital of industrial corporations in the Empire, 
1.595 million rnbks, or 50.19'. were the property of foreign capi­
tal, :nd out of -171) million rubles worth of stock in hanking cor­
porations, 2:37 millirm or ,19.9'.{, were foreign held. The total of 
-'l65.S :11illion rubles in the two groups was about evenly divided 
P. L�shehenko, Istorir,a uarndnoho kl,o:rr,ar,,·tca SSSJI, JI, 156. 1 
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bdw(-en foreig:1 and domestic capital, the latter owning 1,8.32 
million rubles, or slightly ovn ,'30%.0 
Th1. percent.:ge (,f foreign capital in corporations was stead­
ily increasing, and surpassed the rate of increase of capital ac• 
cumulated from domestic sources. In 1901, foreign capital held 
onh· ,'39,5'.I of the stock in industrial COJl_)Orations ( 608 million 
ont of 1,548 million) and in banking corporations only 6'f 
( 1 lA million oul of 188.4 !fli!Hon). But prior to the Outbrt'ak 
of the revolution this percentage had grown to 50%. This docs 
not mean that all corporations in the Empire \Vere under an 
abwlnte domination of foreign capital, because its distribution 
among the various branches of industry and among the t erri­
tories was V('r.\· uneven. "This is very clear from a comparison 
of the South with the Urals. Foreign capital displayed no desire 
to go iuto the Urals, where remnants of conditions of serfdom 
still existed, and frr this reason domestic capital reigned tlwre. 
The enterprises wne on a small scale with a low technical level 
of production and, besides the rC'gion did not possess its O\VIl 
hard coal. Later, during the pniod of Imperialism, the predomi­
nance of foreigr1 enterprises which entered into monopolistic as­
sociations o� combines with the largest Hussian enterprises, made 
a very marked appearance."·' 
"In the light ( manufacturing) and in the f
a:o
d industries, par­
ticularly in cotton," milling, oil, !C'ath('r, woodworking etc, Rus­
sian national capital wa.� in the majority, and in some regions 
and hrandws ( the central regions and in textiles) it reigned 
supreme. Separate from this group of light industry enterprises 
stood the sugar and the tobacco industry. Becaus0 of the 
nature of its manufacturing (particularly refineries), the sugar 
industry folt an acute need of production and turnover credits, 
and for this rca�on it was the first to fall under the control of 
banks, at first of special local banks ( Ukrainian-Author) and 
later banking monopolies of Petersburg banks."• 
Thus, with tl":e exception of railro�ds and banks, the bulk 
of forC'ign capit'.11a1 vas concentrated in Ukraine, and the two main 
brar.ches of light irnlustry, sugar and tobacco, \vere, in contrast 
to t�ic Russiau, also captured by foreign capital. Th('fefore the 
stakmeut that Rmsia herself was a semi-colony of \Vestern 
2 M. Colman, "Russkiy Imperyalizm," p. 330,
3 P. L:ishchei,ko, op. r:it., p. J.'ll. 




EurLpean capit'.1.1, does not conform to reality. Uhaine, and 
Azerbaijan with it� oil were almost exclusively with object of 
this kind of exploitation, with the possible exception of gold 
mining in Sibvria. It is true that Hussia proper cousumed a 
]argt' dite of foreign capital in the form of state loans, but, as 
we �hall see later, tfw payment of these loans fell in large meas­
ure npon Ukraine. 
'foking all co1;_,orations in the Empire, foreign capital wa� 
invested in the'l1, 'llTOnling to the various branches of industry, 
duri:ig the ten-;1car period 1S90 to 1900, in the amounts shown 
in Table LXX ( in millions of rubles).� Thus, the participation of 
T·\HLE L:XX 
Industn1 11390 1900 
Total corpo- Of this Total corpo- Of this 
rate capital foreign ' rate capital foreign , 
Co.ii mining 85.i 70.l 81.6 492.2 437.9 89.0 
;\ktal 27.8 14.0 50.4 :2.'i7.:3 145.8 .56.5 
Clwmieal 15.6 fi.-1 ,t \.(l 03.fl 2�1.:3 31.2 
Ceramic 0.2- ,1,0-- 59.0 26.8 44.7 
Te-.;til<' l'cl7.5 2tU) n.2 :37.3.7 71.4 19.1 
Food 87.6 7.0 8.7 153.1 11.4 7.5 
All branches 
of im\11stry. 580.l 186.2 ."32.l 1,742.8 911.0 52.2 
European mpital in the most highly developed branches of in­
dustry in Rus�i:i. W'.lS relatively low, in any event such that could 
not gain a dominating position. And if we consider that the 
majr,rity of enterprises in these branches of industry were not 
corpc.rate in form, it is quite futile to spt'ak of any domination 
over Hussian indnstry. Domination of forei
i-,
rn capital applies 
then only lo non-Rmsian territoriPs and primarily to Ukraine. 
Ont of a cor!_lorate capital, the property of foreign investors, 
acconling to the status in 191:3 of 1,,'3-43.5 million rubles was: 
invC'stmcnts in Ukrainian industry, 46)5.7 million; in Polish indm­
try, 126.9 million; in Latvian, 4.5.4 mllion; Lithuanian, 5 million, 
and in Estonian 25 million. flenC'e the amount remaining for the 
rest nf the F.rnpire is 70,'3 million. Hut of this, 200 million was 
invested in Azerbaijan oil and 250 million in banks which, in 
their him, own•·d stol·k in industrial corporations of non-Russian 
5 Ibid., p. 157. 
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territories. Finally, 100 million was invested in railroads serving 
both Russia proper and non-Russian terrain. Thus, the direct 
partkipation of foreign capital in corporations of Russian indus­
trial enterprises did not exceed 10% to 15lt of the total amount of 
suer.. ;nvestments.� 
The best illustration is provided by the repartition of French 
capital in two such industries taken over by it, as coal mining 
and metals. Ont of 102 million rubles of such capital in the coal 
industry in 1903, 81.9 million was invested in the Donets basin, 
18.8 millio11 in the Domhrowa basin (Poland), am.I only 2.3 
million in the Kuznetsk and Moscow regions (Russia). The same 
appliPs to metals: out of 158.4 million rubles, 111.8 million were 
invested in Ukraine; 10.4 million in Poland, and 16,9 million in 
Russia.' 
The most important role in the investment of capital in 
Ukminian indu-.try was played by Franco-Belgian banking syn­
dicates, first place being held by three French banks; Banque 
de l'Union Parisienne, Banque <les Pays Bas and Societe Gener­
ale. Participants were also; Credit Lyonnais, Comptoir National 
d'Escompte, and others. Worth�· of mention is the Belgian So­
ciete Helge du Credit Industrial et Commercial German. ( !vlen­
delsohn, Discon to Gescllschaft, etc.) an<l British banks played 
only a secondary role in foreign capital investment in Ukraine, al­
though Germany nccupied first place in Ukraine's foreign trade. 
Among the foreign financial .industrial enterprises there were 
aboet 20 which were governed by French and Belgian by-laws, 
and one (Spilka chornoyi metalurgiyi: Black 1[etallurgy Com­
pany) had German by-laws. Many of them conducted their busi­
ness records in French. Thus, even as to form, these were com­
pletely alien businesses located on Ukrainian territory. 
J,.ceording to data publbhed at the time in such periodicals 
as "Yt•zhego<lnik Finansov," "Torgovo-Promish!enna Gazeta" and 
"Vestnik Finansov," the distribution of foreign (;apital in tluee 
industrial groups of Ukraine was, in the year 1911, as is shown in 
Table LXXI (in thousand., of rubles). 
The 16,367 thnn,:md rubles under the title of unknown capi­
tal could certain!:, be included in the Franco-Belgian capital 
gronp. because the majority of the associations in this group 
consisted of e,1terpriscs governed by foreign by-laws. Thus, 
'  l' Fomin, '"Ehmornichna kk1ratcrystyka Ukrainy," p. 93. 
'lhid., p. 92. 
2..
TABLE LXXI 
Ind118triul groups Total foreign Out of thl� ca,,ital total 
capital Franco- Franco-
Unknown Belgian British German Gemum 
I.. \ktallurgical smelting ( 16 industrial.
associations). 204,,523 170,546 11,352 1.5,100 7,225 percentages · · · · · · · · · ·""" ' ' LOO 83.4 .5.6 7.,5 3.:, 
Pig iron and metal working.
( 8 as,ociations). 20,492 14,492 6,()(10 
pncentages . . . . . . . . . 100 70.1 29 .. 1 
3 Iron-ore ( 4 associations l .5,437 1,875 .1,562 pen..--entagcs LOO 65A 34.6 
Total of 3 groups 230,452 16,367 180.108 11,3.}2 1:5,400 7,225 Percentages 100 7 84.1 5.3 7.2 3.4 
8 N. Vanag, "Finansoviy kapital v Rossiyi nakanunc mirovoy voyny," 1930, p. 213. 
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about 90'.{ of all forei�n capital iuwstcd in Ukrainian metallurg�' 
was rroYided by French and Belgian hanks. 
This proportio>: (lid not uml('rgo any change until the time 
of tht• revolution. And it must be further emphasized that al 
that t!nw France also occupied first place among the Russian 
Government creditors, because these two circumstances arc, as 
we shall later indicate, to a certain cxtcllt related to each othn. 
Frn1ch capit,tl aho occupied first place in financing of the 
coal mining industry. Ont of 1,39 million rubles foreign capital 
inve�ted in thi5 industry, in tlw branch which was controlled 
by rnet::dl11rgical ,,�sociations: 106 millio11 (/.5.5'.f) viaS Franco­
Belgian capital; 5 million (3.6:f), German; 5 million (0.4:l:,), 
Hritis!1, and 2G.3 million, unknown.'' 
The rok of foreign L:apital, and, h) the sanw token, of the 
Frauco-Bd�iau part in it will become even more dear, if we 
considL'r uot the -'>Hrn of inYestments, lmt the pro<lnction totals 
of t!1c cutcrpri�t's \\·hich were under complete control of this 
capital_, and of t!1l' Hussian banks connected with it. 
P10J11etio11 of �melting eorporntio11s of Ukraiue in HJ13 ( in 
tho,,sands of tons)"' i� shown in Tal,le LXXII.
TAHLF: LXXlJ 
" Fil'. lron Smelting 
/ir1mco­ Franco­
Total Bdgilm British Gemum German 
3,025.6 2,320.4 270.4 I(iOJJ 68.8 
In percentage reLition to total irnp1crfal prodnction, 
66.8 35.8 ,'5.9 .1.6 
111 percentage relation tu total llkrninian prodndion, 
m.1.B 83.2 8.9 5.3 2.2 
b. Iron Ore "1iniugn
5,070.4 4.806.•1 214.4 
In per(·<'nt,tge relation to total imperial production: 
.'54.-t 51.6 2 .. 1 0.5 
In percenlclge reLttion to total Ukrainian prodnction: 
7,'5.4 71 .. "i 3.2 0.7 
c.n Coal Miningn
6,248.0 4.B70A 1,377.6 
In percentag<c rel,11ion to total irnnpnial production:
17.7 13.S -3.9 
In pnc,·nt,ige relation to total Ukrainian prodnction: 
25.00 Hl.5 5.5
"lbid., p, zog_ "'lbid., p. 2lfl. 
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Tbc figures referring to coal do not give a complete picturP, 
becaw-.e the table contains only <lata of such mines as belonged 
to rnl'tallurglml corporations. Another :36% should be added to 
account for the production of mines not owned by smelters, but 
which were also under control of foreign capital. 
Thus, almo.;t the entire metallurgical industry, three-fourths 
of the iron ore mininp; industry. and more than half the coal in­
dust1Y can be c:11lcd Ukrainian only in the sense that they were 
locate:! in Ukraine and were based on its natural wealth. 
Even the part of these industries that was not under foreign 
capital control did not b(']ong to Ukrailw. It was in the hands 
of Russian hank� which also played a large part in enterpris('S 
rnntro!lc><l by European capital. 
Ti1e last fact·or i� of essential significancP. Tt rr-fntcs thP state­
ment that from the time of a mass influx of foreign capital into 
Ukrainian industry, Ukraine C<>ased being a Russian colony, and 
became th(' object of colonial ('x:ploitation by Franco-Belgian 
capital, and includc<l in the colonial system of the \Vest. Snch 
a condusi011 is the obviou5 OIH' to arrive at, consickring the prc­
ponc:erance of foreign i11vestmenls in the basic industries of 
Ukraine. Even M. Volobuyev, who paiIJted the most clear pie­
hire of th<' cohnial position of UkrainP in the Rus'>'ian Empire, 
wrote: "lts ( foreign capital's) influx into Ukraine made sharp 
char,ges in the economic-geographic map of Ukraine, favoring 
a rapid development of productiw forces in th(' region of mining 
and industry. Fordg:n c:..pital was not directly concerned v1.rith 
centralistic, great-1mwer desires of Russian capitalism. It was 
as tli,mgh it had relegated Hussian capital to second place, in­
cluding the Ukrainian economic territory within its system of 
exploitation."' 
11.t Yavorsky went even further, sayiHg: "In this mamiert
Ukndn(' becam,·, thanks to the great demand for her pig iron, 
the first-ranking rroducer of it, delivering its products to all 
corners of Russia regardless of distance, pointing in no dubious 
language to the futnre centrali1.ation of supply. which the Rus­
sian economists bC'o-an to fear so much."'" " 
A1: impression is being created that foreign capital, gaining 
control of indi1strv in Ukrai11e, cancelled the latter's colonial 
ties with Russia, broke the centralistic system, and assumed 
11 M. Volol,uyf'v, "Do problemy Ukrninskoyi C'conorniky."
12 \f. Y11vorsky, Ukraina L' <'pokhu kapitalismu, III, �7. 
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the plac:e of Russia iu continued colonial exploitation of Ukraine. 
It would seem fror,1 the words of Yavorsky that from that time 
Ukraine betamf' a separate body whkh threatened Russia with 
centralization and with domination of Russia's metallurgy. \Ve 
have here, undoubtedly, a confusion of terms and ideas, of 
whic!i many scholars were guilty, some of whom were able to 
clearlv see the triw nature of lhe relations betwecr1 Ukraine 
and Hussia. In spite of themselves tht·y mechanically inter­
chan;,;t· the socic1l-ef'onomic category with the territorial. 
F,�reign capita! not only did not break the Russian eentralis­
tic ivstem in ecouomic life, but, relying 011 that system and 
strengthening it, joined in the colonial exploitation of Ukraine. 
This nevi exploitation did not force out the ol<l Russian, but 
facilitated its increase. And what on first glance appeared to be 
a struggle of the "L'krainian metallurgical and coal industry with 
the Hussian, w;1s nothing more than a struggle within Russian 
capirnlisl industry. It was a fight between the modem and more 
protit:1ble segmPnt which was located in Ukraine, and which 
took advantap;e of Ukraine's colonial statm, and the remnants 
of the antiquated, semi-feudal system in Russia proper. This 
struggle, which contributed lo the rehabilitation of Russian in­
dush,;· which had bf'en halted in its development by the privi­
leges extended to it by government policy, resulted again in 
large losses to Ukrainian national economy. 
The whole matter becomes quite clear when we analyze the 
prof·c�·s of penetration of Western European capital into 
Ukraine's ernwnny and the part played in this process by Rus­
siau hanking monopolies, 
A1 ·ymw becoming acquain1ed with the econornic history of 
Ukraine in that period quite naturally rniscs the question: why 
did not Ukraine, with all tht> economic advantages, embark 
upoll the dear path of creating a national capital? The main role 
in tbJ.0 respect wa� without doubt played by the fact that any 
prOlluction surplus, the basis on which capital is created, was 
exclu,led from tlte Ukrainian economy because of Ukraine's 
colonial position. Nevertheless, why did not at least some part of 
the c:1.pital Slir!Jlu� become invested into Ukrainian industry, 
which offered �uch tempting opportunities? Why was it that 
the hrge amounh s,,ve<l by the peasants for lan<l acquisition, 
wen· not depo·;iteL1 in banks, a.nd then become utilized for in­
dnstrial investmeut? Why did not Ukraine produce more of such 
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types of businessmen like Kharytonenko an<l Tereshchenko, and 
why <lid not the management of Ukrainian industry find ih. way 
into their hands? These are all very proper questions an<l require 
an answer. And the ouly answer complying with the real truth 
is tbat there were external forces which prevented all these 
thing,· from beio� done. 
Ruination of National Capital 
All processes of creating capital, although slow because of the 
posi.tion of Ukraine, were present and discernible. Foreign capi• 
ta! did not come into a vacuum. The Russian Minister of Fiuance, 
Kokovtsev, wrote n letter to the chairman of the Paris Bourse, 
Verneuil. [Vcrneuil had proposed to set up «with the aid of 
friend� a fii1ancially strong group which would be ready to 
study commercial and industrial enterprises existing in Russia 
( i.e. ill Ukraine-Author) that could be developed with the ai<l 
of French capital."] I-le wrote: "I am very happy that you are 
uot i.">tablishing a 1-:cw enterprise, but have in mind helping to 
dewlop those '�"'istiJ.Jg ones which, healthy by nature, suffer from 
a lad, of capital.·,,., 
In the 1870's lo 1890's the process of capital creation in 
Ukrnine was already un<ler way within the national boundaries 
and '.vithin the aspeds of Ukrainian interests. Hence the heavy 
influx of forei�n capital was preceded by a period of ruthless 
stru�gle against th(', as yet, weak Ukrainian industry, resulting 
in its ruin. 
The ruiuation of Ukraiuiau capital iu industry took place 
agai,1st the background of the crisis of the 1890's. In comment­
ing upou that crisi�, we have already noted that it came about 
as tb· result of ah:10rmal conditions of industrial development 
i.mpn�ed upon Ukraine: the m1ilateral direction of the metallur­
gical industry; its complete depeudence upon railroad construc­
tion; 3rlificial restraints of the market for Ukrainiau coal, etc.e
The crisis of iuveutorv accumulation was simultaneous with aue
acute desire for iron among the wide masses of the populatiou.e
The crisis hit the, as vet financially weak structure of the younge
indndry ver�· pal:1fnlly. Iii addition, there came a catastrophice
decH1w of prin's of �tocks representing Ukrainiall imlustrird en­
terprises on foreign exchanges.e
13 r-..•. Vm,ag. op. cit .. p. 129. 
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E:,;:change 'i.1lues of stocks of Ukrainian industrial corpora­
tions, quote<l on th:; Paris and Brussels Bourse ( in thousa11<ls of 
francs) were as show11 in Tal,le LXXIII. 
TABLE LXXlll 
% of 
Oct. 1.5, 18,Y9 Oct. 15, 1901 ded/r,e 
50 metallurgical cnrporntiuns 
18 coal mining corporations 










The crisis deepened by accelerated preparations for the 
currency reform of 1897. They not only iucreased the tight fi­
nancial situation of industry, hut had even more detrime11tal re­
percnssions up0n the whole Ukrainian economy. This, in turn, 
had an effect 011 the position of iudustry: a setback in railroad 
construction had an effect upon the purchasing power of the 
population; losses on exports uf grain fell upon its basic pro­
ducers, the peasants; bank deposits did not grow at the expected 
rate, and the like. 
Prior to the cnrrcncy reform of 1897 there were hvo types 
of curtrency.in the Empire: silver and treasury notes called assig­
nats, and the ex<'hmge of the latter for silver was suspended 
following the Crimean \Var. The continued issuance of notes 
( from 71,'3.5 million rubles in 1862 to 1,12L'l million rubles on 
the eve of the currency reform )t1" without regard to the decline 
of the price of oilver on world markets, brought about a contin­
ual df'cline of the value of the assignat ruble in relation to sil­
ver. Only in the ]880's did the Finance �'1inistry begin to take 
measures in order to curtail the excessive issuance of paper 
money. In the mid-1890's the rate was pegged at l assignat 
ruble or .37 kopecks silver. Ne\'ertheless the internal value of sil­
ver in the Imperial currency system was higher than its value as 
a commodity. During that period the value of silver per ounce 
on the London market \\,.as: 187:3, .59.2 pence; 1881, 51.7 pence; 
1890, 47.75 pence, an<l 189.5, 29.8 pence.16 
1' I'. A. Khromov. Ek,momidu,skm1c rrJZvitiye Rossiyi v XIX-XX t'.V. ( Economic Development of Rn�sia in the J 9th and 20th Ce11fories1), I 950, p. 309. 
1 s M. Koshkarev, Denezlmoye obra�hcheniye v R<wriyi ( Money Circulation iii Russia), Moscow, 18')5. I, 72-73 
1o N.t Ratzig, Finausornya pulitika Rossiyi s 1887 goda (R11ssia'1,· FinancialtPolir11 sinre MFJ7), St. Pcterslmrg, 190.1, p. 47.t
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For this reason the determination of silver and gold by 
wei;:)1l producrd an agio. In 1877 this agio amounted to 48%. 
And to the exteIJt that the Russian Covernment in order to ac­
cum11late gold for the currency re-form and for thP liquidation 
of foreign halanct'S, decided in 1876 to collect customs tariffs 
in i;(,ld, to that exh:::nt this agio ineYitably produced a decline of 
the price of export goods. In order to compensate- himself for 
the gold ruble th" exporter wanted to get a greater quantity of 
goods that he purchased for exportation. Thus the determination 
of internal pric<:s iP paper currency falsely altered the currenc;v's 
real value. "During a period of over 30 years, agio for gold in 
Russia fluctuated to such an extent that exporters who were 
selling grain abroad had to get exchange rate insurance. This 
guarantC'c cost money and lowered our grain prices."" 
The basic export commodity was grain. and its chief producer 
Ukrn'ne. Therefore the losses on currency exchange rates fell 
in tlw largest degree upon Ukraine, and had repercussions on 
Ukrainian industry which, under pressure of the crisis had to em­
bark upon the cxportatio11 of its products. In a memorandum 
on cnrren<'y reforn,, Minister Witte wrote: UFollowing the fluc­
tuafrms of the exchange rate (of money), our grain prices fell 
when they rose or. the world markets, and vice versa, i.e. these 
fluchiations falsified grain prices an<l gave a mistaken direction 
to our exports, increasing and lowering them in a direction 
contrary to the proper course which should have been taken, 
and drawing us into suffering double damages: nudging us 
tow.1rds export; whf'n prices on world markets were detrimen­
tal, a11d curtailing our exports when prices were advantageous. 
From this the agriculh1ral economy suffers most" ( i.e. primarily 
Ukraine-Author) .1" 
:Rut Witte fails to mention that in order to get favorable 
balant·e of exports over imports, the Government used all avail� 
able means, primarily through its agrarian policy, to compel 
the Ukrainian peasants to sell as much of their grain as possible. 
All these currency conditions, we repeat, became the most griev­
ous during the first years of the crisis and deepened it. 
B;mk credits could not save Ukrainian industry during that 
period not only because the crisis impeded the banks themselves, 
"lbid., p. 52. 
1'A. Bukovdsky, (Ed.). I\fateryaly rw dcne:hnoy reforme 1895-97 g. 
(Jfoteri1il.s on the Currency Rtjomi of 113.9-5-91), Mnstow, 1903, p. 19. 
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but mainly bce�.use Hussian banks, clearing the path to Ukraine 
for their own and foreign capital, led a determined attack 
ap;ai1Jst those Ukrainian banks which were still independent of 
them. 
fn this respC'ct the history of the Kharkiv Commercial l3ank 
is most illuminating. Jt was established by a millionaire Ukrain­
ian husinessma11 Akhcvsky, who was at the same time a director 
of the Kharkiv Land Bank and organizer of the Oleksiev Min­
ing Industry A�sociation in 1879. Alchevsky made determined 
demands that Ukrainian industry should be permitted to develop 
independently. He used all sorts of business methods to ac­
cumnlate millions of rubles for the establishment and aid of 
mining-industry enterprises, which he foresaw a.� bdng able to 
yield "a pot of gold." He estimated the opportunities of Ukrain­
ian industry very highly and used all his power to aid it in surviv­
ing the crisis. Nevertheless, he was unable to withstand the com­
mon Russo-French financial front. His bank failed and Akhevsky 
himself committed suicide. "What is the significance of this death 
in a capitalist community?" asks Professor P. Khromov. He 
answers: "It means that weaker capitalists, capitalists of 'the 
second grade· are pushed out by stronger millionaires. The Mos­
lOW millionaire, R)·abushinsky, took the place of the Kharkiv 
millionaire, Alchevsky."19 
The failure of the Kharkiv bank hit the connected industrial 
enterprises very h,1rd, among them one of the largest, the Don­
ets-Yurievsky Associ:ltion. After this, Ukrainian industry was 
helpless to wanl off the appetite of Russo-French financial con­
cerns. 
A similar fate befelI the Oleksiev r-.Hning Industry Associa­
tion founded by Alchevsky. It fought for its independence for 
some time, although «during the crisis it came under some de­
gree of c:ontrol of Hussian banks, the Volga-Kama Bank becom­
ing oue of its larger stockholders in 1900. Nevertheless until 
1905 if_ did not lose its national character."'0 When foreign capi­
tal established the syndicate "Produhol" in 1004, this Oleksiev 
Association was its chief stumbling block, since at that time it 
held first place in production with 780.8 thousand tons. In 1908 
the Franco-Belgian banking syndicate purchased the stock in 
this association from the Volga-Kama Bank and brought it under 
its culltrol." 
19P. Khromov. u/'· cit .. p. 308, "" N. V,u1,1g, o/J. cit., p. 121. "Loe. cit. 
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Similar occurre:1ces took place in Kiev, in connection with 
the second-largest hank, the Kiev Commercial Bank which 
worked with capital of Ukrainian sugar refineries. The Azov-Don 
Bank in Petersburg, using French capital, begau extending cred­
its t,i 1hc sugar reiim'ug industry on easier terms, and bought up 
shares in the Kiev Commercial Bank from sugar refineries. "\Vith 
the aid of FreHch baHks, by 1913 the Azov-Don Bank had bought 
up a majority of :1tock in the Kiev bank, and had become one 
of the principal monopolists in financing the sugar industry."'" 
St,di warfare ?.gainst national-territorial banks \Vent on not 
only ;n Ukraine, but in Russia's other colonies as well. Thus, in 
1908 for exam!)lC, the French baaking syndicate underwrote 
a new issue of stock of the above mentioned Azov-Don Bank for 
the ;pecific purpose of buying up of the stock of the Minsk 
( Belornssian) Commercial Bank. Thus, there was a flow of 
foreign capital in\o wore than Ukrainian industry. At the same 
tinw, against the background of the economically inexplicable 
crisis, a process of destroying the national financial credit sys­
tem and of bohtering the financial monopoly of Hussian banks, 
primarily of Pcter.'iburg, went on, This too was in the .interest 
of fol'(;-ign capital. 
The matter did not end in complete control of banks. There 
was a simultabneous attack against indushy itself. After wreck­
ing the financial basis of an enterprise, ( depreciating its stock 
capitnl, favoring its creditors, etc.) and thoroughly ruining it, 
it ,vould revive with a new complement of shareholdbers-foreign 
and Hussian bank-">. Under the term "financial reorganization," 
s11cl-_ alterations were so widely applied to Ukrainian industrial 
enterprises that they hecame routine, In all justice, this period 
in the hi<.tory of Ukrainian industry should be called a period 
of rna-">s au<l deli1)erately organized financial bankruptcy which 
had no justification either in production conditious of the in­
dustP: itself, or in objective market conditions. In this period 
the few remaining enterprises whose national designation was 
Ukrainian, peric,hed. Since then Ukrainian industry in its main 
branches ceased to exist as such, and became the industry of 
the nwtropolis in colonial territories, 
How very far real conditions of manufacturing and sales 
were from c:i.nsin� !lny crisis and decline of  Ukrainian industry 
is atl('Stecl lo by the evaluation of conditions by French capital 
'" 1.,,,. cit. 
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itself, the sam,� which took an active part in organizing the 
bankruptcies of these enterprises. In 1907, the French periodical, 
Le l•inancier International, said: "France has nevC'r considC'rcd 
that hy underwriting Russian loans it was th11s engaging in auy 
charitable work. Frnnce considered, and still considers. Russian 
securities a very convenient, safe and wonderful location of cap­
italh. f\.ussia reprt'sents a most reliable and remarkably convenient 
debtor. Suffice it to recall the uncounted natural wealth of Rus­
sia (here they had in mind Ukraine-Author), the profitable ex­
ploitation of which cannot be doubted. France should never 
wisl: to lose in the future the convenient position in the exploi­
tation of these immense riches which she is now occupying."'" 
It is dear fror.i these words that the principle underlying 
these "financial reorganizations·· was not any attempt to cure 
an existing evil by providing capital which was lacking, hut 
rather the conquest of such "very convenient positions" which 
had to Le captured from Ukrainian national capital by destruc­
tive means. This had its repercussions on the nature of such 
"reo1�anizatious." The reorganizations ''consisted of writing off 
a part of the initial capital ( depreciation of .�tock-Author), satis­
fying the main creditors, banks ( and depreciating loans of other 
creditors.,.--Attthor), and financing enterprises by issuing new 
stock w hich was purchased by such bank or a banking syndi­
cate \vhich comlucterl this credit operation."" 
A good ex:imple of such "reorganization" is that of the 
Donets-Yurievsl..-y Metallurgical Association carried out in 1907. 
The Banking House of Telman & Co. delivered the following 
ultimatum to the association in the name of French banking in­
terests: "l) Tt is proposed that the association reduce ( re-evalu­
ate-Author) its present capital from 8 million mbles to 3.2 mil­
lion; 2) The association will then undertake a new issue of 
shares in the amount of 12 million rubles; !) ) If these proposi­
tions are accepted by the shareholders meeting, then after 4 days 
Telman & Co. will advise whether it will purchase from the 
Donets-Yurievsky Association all such stock of the new issue 
which will remain undistributed amoug the present share­
holdP,rs."2" 
"' N. \'anag, op. cit .. p. 23. 
21 N. \'anag, "Finansoviy kapital v tyazh,·loy imlustriyi" ("Finance Capital 
in Heavy Industry"), Proletariy (The Proletarian), 1930, p. 19. 
,., Ibid., p. 23. 
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French banks went into negotiations \Vith all the creditors 
of the J)onets-Yuricvsky Associatio11 and guaranteed payment 
of these debts. For this they got 6.1.S million rubles worth of 
prefrued stock ot the new issue at 7'%. Casl1 from the sale of 
the- remaining shares the association undertook tu use for the 
acquisition of coal lands of the O!eksiev Mining Industry As­
sociation ( the same whi('h resisted the "Produhol" syndicate 
for a long time, fighting for its independent existence). 
Almost all "reorganizations" were carried out according to 
this pattern: in 1906, the South-Dniprovske Metallurgical Com­
pany; in 1905, the Tahanrih 1fotallurgical Company; in 1908, 
the Nikopil-1lariupi l  Metallurgical Company etc. "Reorganiza­
tions" often brought along, besides, changes in the financial 
structure, as wt>ll as administrative changes. A Df'W number of 
directors would be e�tablishe<l, such directorships being given 
mainlv to officers of Hussian banks. Thus, new directors Bala­
banm:, Pfeiffer, Burchardt ar,d Mikhailov, of the Hussian Inter­
natinual Bank, Wt'H· appointed to the Nikopil-Mariupil Com­
pany. 
T11e mo�t e-"osc;ntial characteristics of the financial expansion 
of \Vestern European capital in Ukraine were its two goals: join 
in the exploitation of the national economy of Ukraine, and 
strengthen the colonial dependence of Ukraine upon Russia. It 
was riot satisfied with the high profits derived from the develop­
ment and financial strength�ning of industry. It further aimed 
at eradicating all remnants of any signs of a national character 
of the Ukrainian industry by introducing Russian management. 
This is the real cause of the terrible ruin inflicted upon Ukrain­
ian industrial enterprises during the process of influx of foreign 
capi�al. 
By its nahm:', this capital invested in Ukraine should be fully 
described as colonial, hut there is still no basis for maintaining 
that �ince that time Ukraine became a colony of Western Eu­
rope. European capital made it possible for a handful of Russian 
banks to monopolize Ukrainian industry and to increase tre­
mendously Ukmine 's colonial exp loitation, making larger profits 
avail.tble to both_ Without realizing this we could n ot understand 
the true role play:;<l by Russian banks in that time and in that 
conne<..'tion. 
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Russian Banks 
I: is not hard to guess why Western European capital chose 
the path it did. The decisive factor was that colonial capitalist 
expansion was carried out in a territory without any political 
ties with ·western Europe. Jn such situations, capital always de­
sires to take out imurance i n  the form of legal guarantees, or, 
to put it more precisely, to cloak its activities with legality. A 
partn.•rship with Ukrainian banks could not give foreign capital 
adequate protef!tiou, because these banks worked within a sys­
tem of econ01nic dependence on Russia. Moreover, foreign capi­
tal c0uld foresee that in spite of a temporary compleacency, the 
Ukrainian banks would inevitably oppose any excessive colon­
ial e;:ploitation. S11ch a partner would always defend the inter­
ests of the lam l and would strive to shake free of any foreign 
dommation. 
P.nssian banks presented a different picture. Their interests 
were parallel to those of Western European capital. Any 
differences that wonld arise would only be on the plane of a di­
vision of profit,;. Foreign capital then sought satisfactory oppor­
tunities of expansion in territories politically independent of its 
contwl. This capital could not have ignored tl1e prospect that 
even under a compkte subjugation of the Ukrainian economy, 
poli1.kal prerogative�. without which it co�ld not continue, will 
still be in the hand� of the Russian Government. Hence the de­
cisior: to form ties with the Russian political system. The symbi­
osis with Russi:in banks provided a way out of the impasse, be­
cause in their Ukrninian acti\'ities, the Russian banks had not 
only fhe opportunit�, to rely on a favorable policy of the Gov­
ernm�·nt, but wen• dso an (Hganic: part of the official system. 
"Commercial banking corporations had strong ties with the 
state apparatus. Russian ministers of finance nominated direc­
tors of banks (frequently from among their ow,1 officials) 
through the credit bureau, authorized payment of millions of 
subsidies to banh, f'tc. Such subsidies reached as high as 800 
to 1.000 million rubles."e26 
The Russian Government took an active part in the realiza­
tion of this symbiosis of Western European capital with Russian 
banks for the purpo�e of gaining control over the industries of 
colo;,ies, because in this manner it facilitated the floating of 
2,, P. Khromov, np. cit., p, 370_ 
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state loans abroad. ". . Interested in the success of state loans, 
the Government opened the doors wide for the influx of foreign 
capital into the Russian banking system and industry ... The 
'.\,linister of Finance delivered the controlling portfolio of stock 
in the Russian-Azov Bank to French banks in order to interest 
.aFrench capital in Far-Eastern enterprises of the Tsarist Govern-
1ncnt."n 
The participation of Hussian banks in capital stock of Ukrain­
ian industrial corporations, and even more their role of middle­
men in the financiug of these enterprises by foreiagn capital, were, 
for the most part, the result of a deliberate policy, dictated by 
the motives dis,;us�ed above. 
Eloquent testimony on the artificiality of the participation 
of Russian banks in financial activities of foreign capital is pro­
vided by the following excerpt from a letter by Minister Ko­
kovtsev to his deputy Ya. Utin who was at that time, conduct­
ing m'gotiations with French banks: "These ( claims of Russian 
banks to participate) mean that eith�r the profits of the French 
capit'il will have to be cut, or the treasury's expenses to compen­
sate the banks (Ru�sian) will have to be increased, the latter 
haviJ:,g joined a matter in which they have no real participa­
tion.""" 
Similarly the participation of foreign capital in capital stock 
of Russian banks was in large measure organically connected 
with the role which they played in the common cause of exploi­
ting colonial territories. In this manner the community of their 
interests and the interests of foreign banks became more solidi­
fied. The latter, quite naturally perceived a strong guarantee 
of sa1eguarding their common interests. Syndicates of foreign 
bank� frequently aided Russian banks in the issuance of new 
stock which they subscribed, on wndition that the Russian banks 
wouhl use the capital thus raised for the ac(JUisition of shares 
in Ukrainian industrial enterprises. This was the manner in 
which the Russian Internatiaonal Bank acquired shares of the 
Nikopil-Mariupil Company, the Azov-Don Bank, the shares of 
the Tahanrih Company etc, "What reason compelled Parisian 
bank�rs to take an i11tcrest in Russian banks?" This is explained 
in no uncertain terms by M, Davidov, director of the Petersburg 
Chastny (private) Bank, Infonning the shareholders that the 
"synr1icate" gu'iranteed a new issue of stock, he said that "Pari-
"P. Lashc;henko, np. cit., p. :3fi). as'.'\ Vanag, or,. cit., p. 128. 
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sian banks have in mind hy this operation to facilitate Hussian 
credit institutions hemming intermediaries between industrial 
enterprises and Ei,rnpean markets."', 
r,�1t there is no basis from all this for concluding that in the 
matt�'r of colonial exploitation the Hussian hanks were only 
playing a minor part, or that they were merely in the service 
of foreign capital. 
T!ie way the Hnssian ha1iks themselves understood their 
role is best illustrated by the Moscow bmiking tycoou, Hyabu�h­
illsky iu his own words spokell at a commercial congress ill 
�Ioscow. Speaking of the penetration of foreign capital, he said 
"vi.th emphasis: "This does uot mean that ".'e shonld reject for­
eign (·apital, but it is necessary that this capital should not feel 
like a conquerer. It is necessary that we pit our own capital 
again�t it, and for this purpose it is necessary to create- condi­
tions under which it can accumulate and develop."·'0 
T;1e conditions were by no means unfavorable, as far as 
the support given these banks by the Government is eouccrned. 
It is true that t!w general picture of the Russian money market 
ot the period :·ann01- he termed as blooming. This market dc­
pclldcd npon the low sahHation point of the marht for rnanu­
factv.red goods, determiued primarily by the peasants, the basis 
ot tllP -po£}11latio11. For this reason, capital sources outside indus­
try c•mld not take the appropriate part in industrial investments. 
Peoples' savings, ·which would accumulate in a banking system 
and nourish ind11�try were, in a semi-natural economy, very 
insii:;11ificant. In Ukrai11e, as we have indicated above, almost 
the entire cash part of the peasants' budget was swal owed up 
by e.xcessivc taxes, excises mH.1 leases of bnd. Aml wherever 
there was an e•:ce�s of ir1come ahove consurnption in a house­
hold, it would go mainly towanl the acquisition of land. There­
fore the greater part of the surplus pr()(lnction created by !he 
rural econorny accomulatcd in the hands of the lar1<llords and 
was �pcut by them on uou-productive consumption. most often 
abroad. The low level of the popu!atiou·s purchasing power, the 
uarrow market for goods and the restricted possibilities of non­
industrial capital ac-ct1rnnlation were responsible for that perpe­
tual {'<!Sh starvation in the Empire. which was felt all the time 
and 'Yhich contributed to the attraction of foreign capital. The 
rornlition was nn,.'\c more acute because the Tinssian Empire, 
,:, i\. \'.mug, up. cit., p. 139. "'' Ibid .• p. 113. 
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indu·:trially backward, desired to go through historical cycles of 
devekpment at an accelerated pace. 
£ut for all th.it, in evaluatiug the banks' role in the industrial 
ec01nmy, ·we cannot underPstimatf' the resources of inl('rnal 
monev accumvl.iticns, and must determine the role of banks 
men{\· by their own part of stock capital. As Lashchenko cor­
rectlv staks: '"Although in the leading banking corporations up 
to 42% of tlwir stock capital was in the hands of foreign share­
holdc-rs, yet from this it is still a far cry to the same degree of 
depPndence of Hw;.�ian banks and of the entire Hussian bank­
ing �;-,stem upon forei!:,'ll capital. Stock capital comprises only 
betwC'cn one-third and one-fourth of the credits with which 
banks operate, and in the concentration of such credits banks 
dep<>'.lded upon c0uditions of the Hussian money market ... n 
Oue might ar�11P that on the contrary, in this case we should 
speak rather of the domination by foreign capital, of i11ternal 
capitrd accumulatiom in the Empire hy exercising a lea<ling role 
in th'· banks, because such a leading role does not necessarily 
require possession of a controling .":ii% bloc of stock because 
there are always some passive shareholders. This is tnw. Bnt 
in this imtance it could not be so, because behind the :flussian 
banks, in addition to their stock capital, stood also the power 
of tile state whirh determined the legal norms of economic 
proc,:·sses and tlrns greatly strengthened the role of Hussian 
capital. This is all the more important, because in the process 
of bolstering the Russian banking system, the relative import­
ance of foreign capital was gradually diminishing: new issu('s 
of sh,ires always bd a smaller percentage comi11g into foreign 
banks. For instance, in the Azov-Don Bank, French banks had 
,10,0110 shares in 1911 equal to 46% of all stock capital; of tlw­
.1912 issue thcv got 30%, and of the 191a issue, onlv 251. 
In spite or' the foct that the financial market of the Empire 
was underdeveloped in relation to the number of population 
and 11ah1ral opportnnities, ne\·ertheless the process of accumu­
lation of money in the banking system v,:ent on at an increasing 
rate. particularlv <luring the period of the industrial advance 
in the 1900's. For this reason any conception of the true role of 
Russian banks cannot by auy means be narrowed down to the 
accentuation of the important role pl ayed in them by capital of 
forei;m banks. l-11;�e amounts of internal accumulation went 
"'' P. L1shi:henko, op. cit .. p. 36,'5. 
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through the turnover channels of the Hussian banking system, 
which were many times larger than stock capital, and their man­
agem�·nt determined the power of their influence on industry, 
commerce, etc. "In spite of the impressive participation of for­
eign capital, Russian banks managed to keep the controlling in­
iluence in their own hands."·'" 
''A group of n!nc to twelve Petersburg banks, concentrating 
up to 50% of banking stock capital and up to 65% of all bank 
dep,l:,;ts, was actually that banking monopoly in Russian finan­
cial L·apitalism. Combining with industrial monopolies, and 
aided hy foreign capital, it held in its hands the financing of 
the entire industry.""' 
"This process of strengthening the position of the financial 
oligarchy was accelerated, because in Russia, finance capital 
cemented its ties with the state apparatus and made large prof­
its on so-called state enterprises, utilizing for that purpose the 
government's credit, special state loans to industry, etc."'·' 
W€ can get an illea of the amounts handled by the hanking 
syste,n from Tah/e LXXIV, savings, deposits, and current ac­
counts of instih1tious of credit and savings banks ( in millions 
of n,bles). 
\\'t, sec. from this that huge amounts, for that time, were at 
the d isJJosal of corporate banks, and we must bear in mind that 
in re2.Hty the data apply only to about nine gigantic banks of 
Petersburg and �lo�cow. Outside of these all others constituted 
a nC'gligible quantity, without any role in financing industry, 
and whose octivitics were restricted merely to crediting local 
commercial transactions. 
"The total h:ctlarice of corporate hanks as of Jan. 1, 1910 
was 2,611 millhm rubles, of which ten Petersburg banks ac­
cow1t'-'<l for 1,845 million; four �oscow banks for 379 million, 
and all other seventeen hanks for 357 million rubles."·•� The 
nine i?igantic hanks were: Hussian Bank for Foreign Trade; 
Petersburg Intemational Bank; Azov-Don Hank; Russian-Asian 
Bank; United (Soycdinennyi) Bank; Petersburg Private Bank 
of Commerce; Russian Commercial-Industrial Bank; Petersburg 
"Uchetno-Ssudnyi" Bank, and Siberian Bank. In some respects 
we should add: :\foscow Commercial Bank, \Varsaw Commer­
cial Bank and Riga Bank. 
"2 P. L,shehenko, DJ>. cit., p. 374. c3 Ibid .. p. 365. 





Stak Corrwrate Mutual cn•ifil City small credit Sadngs 
Year bank bunks institutions banks (co-ops.) banks Total 
1900 !68 536 178 97 fi62 l,G-11 
1902 25i 613 198 102 i/H 1.95-t 
HJ04 255 7i(', 265 109 \Jll 
1906 249 761 203 109 I,035 2,357 
1'.)08 210 l,OfiO 271 11.'> 113 2.V7fl
WI() 251 1,709 406 146 199 1,397 4,118
1()12 266 2,330 545 183 3()6 [594 5.314 "" 
"" Ibid. 
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The transformation of these banks into a financial monopoly 
came as a result of the centralization of the banking system, 
This was carried out with the very active support of the Gov­
ernment, and national banks of non-Russian areas were simul­
taneously desb'0yed. The United (Soyedinennyi) Bank was 
forml'>{l from the merger of the Moscow International, Orlov 
the South Russian Banks; the Azov-Don Bank from the Peters­
burg-Azov which got control of the Minsk Commercial and 
Kiev Commcr,_<al, the Russian-Asian mngt>d with the North­
ern, de. 
Pc•sonal cor:.nection played perhaps an even more important 
part in the form:ttion of a banking: monopoly. The Petersburg 
finan-�·ial and indvstrial magnate, Putilov, was chairman of the 
board of directors of the largest bank, the Russian-Asian; di­
rector of the Rt'5Si?.n-Chinese Bank; one of the directors of the 
metc1llurgical s_vndicate "Prodamet" based mainly on Ukrainian 
indmJry; chief shareholders of many metallurgical enterprises 
whi< Ji were meP1bers of "Prodamct," also of the Pntilov, Sonnov, 
Bry:,nsk, Koloml'n and other plants, and of the :\Jcva Shipbuild­
ing Y�inls. Simil:cr1y, the chief operator of the coal industry of 
Ukrai,1e, AvdakO\-, was connected with a whole series of indus­
trial enterprises and with influential Russian and foreign banks. 
The �ame a·pplies to Utin aml Plotnikov, directors of the Peters­
burg "Uchetno•Ssudnyi" Bank; Kaminka, chi�f director of the 
Azov-Don Bank and others." 
Both banking houses \\-'ere in Petersburg, and their directors, 
chiet shareholders of Ukrainian industrial enterprises, were like­
wise financial magnates of Petersburg. 
It is \Vithout fonndatiou to maintain, in the light of what 
was said above, that Ukraine as a result of the influx of Euro­
pean capital into her industries, becanw a colonial dependency 
of Fnml'e or Bdgit1m, who had pushed Hussia to the side. For­
eign capital hohtcred the Hussian financial oligarchy, facilitated 
a df'eper penetration into the Ukrainian economy and, leaving 
the management and exploitation of industrial enterprises in the 
hand� of that 0ligarehy, restricted itself to a participation in 
profits. The extent of profits was dctenn ined not only bv con­
venient conditions of the advance of the industries of Ukraine, 
but .1lso by a favorable policy nf the Government, directed at 
increasing the fraT;tcwork ot colonial exploitation. �•fot to men-
'" P. L;shdwnko, op. cit., p. 364. 
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tion Uie legal st.1tm, in economic matters Ukraine c:ontinued, as 
before, in the role of R11ssia's colony, for whom foreign capital 
was cmothcr means of increasing tbc opportunities ol exploita­
tion. 
'The participation ot Hnssiar1 capital iu Ukrainian imlustry 
was _,mailer thcrn of Western European capital. But political in­
fluem:es of H.ussia npou Ukraine were much greater. The policy 
of tlw Hussian Empire in Uhainc in the 20th century mani­
fested itself in the forms of an unconcc,tled econornic-political 
and mitional-culturnl oppression, and curtailment of all and any 
rights of Ukraini:w nationality and c-ulture."'<> 
A convincing argument showing the dominant position of 
Hussbn banks in Ukrainian industry is provided by a roster of 
shareholders of l1krainian industrial corporations. A few are 
cited as an enmple. Ont of 44,0-"!8 outstanding shares of the 
Taha1trih Consolidated :'\frta!lurgy in 1914, 10,000 were in the 
hamls of the Azov-Don Uank, 4,761 i11 the hands of the Rnssian­
:\sian l!ank, and 1,700 in the ha[l(ls of ll. Kamiuka, director of 
the Azov-Don Bank. The total is .'li.,3'.t'.. Nine ,vestern European 
Banh held 12,441 �hares of this cori:,oratiou, 28.2%. 
Out of 46.Cl.'36 shares of the Nikopil-�fariupil Company. 
10,000 belong;,c'd to the P('tersburg International Hank. and 
l.'3,6,'l3 to its directors, Zolin. Grauman and others, The total is 
51'.t. Out of 2-'5J.'12 shares of the Auerbach Mercury Mining 
Company, 11,500 belonged to the Azov-Don Bank, 2,500 to its 
dirertor Karninb, and 2,000 to a member of its board of directors 
Khe;·i1,. The tobl is 64%."'' 
TIK same can be said of many other industrial corporatiom 
in U'Haine. Ev-·n tC'ward the end of the Hlth century when the 
tlow of foreign capital had not yet reached its peak, securities 
ot i1•dustrial eT1t<>rprisPs cnnstih1ted an irnpressive percentage m 
the portfolios of banks in the repartition of their own stock capi­
tal. 
li::lustrial �e':'urities in the portfolios of the then chiet banks 
of Petersburg ( in percentages of their stock capital) were as 
shown in TalJlc LXXV. 
Foreign capital occupied the positions in these banks shown 
i11 Tohlc LXXVI ( in millions of rubles). 









Intemational Uchctno­ Commercial J'ri,;ate 
Yea; bank Ss11dyni Industf"lal Comm,:,rcia/ 
11-iiJf, 2-1.4. 17.9 .11.4 70.4 
l,'187 17.4 4').0 5\/.3 
'-L;lJS 24,-1. 53.3 62.2 
TABLE LXXVI 
C111'itul Of this Of this Percentage of 
H1 11k Stock forcigu German Fr('nch Hrili,h Otl,er forcigu capi11Jl 
llu,siau Foreign Trndl' 60 24.0 24.0 
0 -Petershurg Intematiomil 611 24.0 20.0 I.O 0.5 ~,,') 
A.wv-Don (Petersburg). 611 2'2.() 8.0 10.0 2.0 2.0 .Jtl7 
R11s�ian-.l..sian ( Pctnslnirg). ,55 4J .. ; 2.0 36.0 4.0 1..5 
United ( \Ioseow). · · · · · ·"·""" ' ·  4() 20.0 1.0 18.0 0,5 ,;o.o 
Petersburg Private Bank of Commucc. 40 2-1.2 0.2 22.8 0.2 
Russian Commercial ln<lustrial.
(Petersburg) 35 J.5.0. 1.0 4.0 10,0 42S 
Petersburg Uehdno-Ssudyni . .•... 30 4./l. 4.0 J,J.,1 
Siberian Commercial (Petersburg) . . 2n 8.0. 4.0 4.0 40.0 
Total: 400 18.U. 64-:! \J,5.8 17.2 6.5 46.0 " 
•
1 
• l'. Lasl1d,t·nko, op. cit., p. 372. 
41 P, \'. 01', Inostrnnnyi kapitfil v Ross/yi (J,'oreign Capital in R1is�ia), \!,,.,cow, ]()22, pp. 146-150. 
183 Firumce Capital 
Obviously, we cannot underestimate the importance of such 
a high percentage of foreign capital in Hussian banks. It is 
cqu.1lly obvious that it must have played a large part in the 
activities of industrial enterprises which it financed, hut all this 
does not alter the basic fact: because uf foreign capital, Hussian 
hanks became th,, controlling centers of Ukrainian industry and 
its real managers. They became simultaneously reservoirs of 
the accumulation at money from the whole Empire, and utilized 
their position to strengthen the economy of Russia proper. It is 
true that in their actiYities they safeguarded the interests of for­
eign capital. The reason for this, however, was not subsen·icnce. 
Their interests were identical. 
The Petersburg banks cbncentrated in their hands a monopo­
h· OYt.'f disposal ol all re;,oun.:es of internal accumulation. over 
r�pre�t'nting the intcresh of foreign capital and over administer­
ing it. The�' also cornmanded the huge amounts which the Gov­
ernment collected annually in its budget from the entire 
popnlation of �be Empire and directed to the aid of enterprises 
of Hussian territory proper. \Ve have already indicated that 
state capitalism in�titutions were to be seen in Russia long be­
fore the Bolsheviks: state railroads; .state factories; estates and 
lam:s of the treasury; state concessions, etc. All these constituted 
rarts of a large state industry, located almost exclusively on the 
territory of Russia proper. To finance these, large sums were 
spent out of the budget, the latter being contributed by the 
entirt' populatiou of the Empire. The means of financing these 
indnsiries wcr� mainly concentrated in the hands of the same 
banking monopolies, large smns, indeed large. "In the expemli­
tmes part of the ,,rdinary state budget which in 1913 reached 
3,09-t million ruhlts, a basic part of expenditures, -182 million 
rubles went into the budget of the :Vlinistry of Finance, with 
the inclusion of repayable state credits, 906 million rubles; to 
the i'vfinistry of Roads, 640 million rubles; to the Ministry of 
the Army and �avy, out of the ordinary budget. went 826 mil­
lion nibles.''<8 
"These expendih'res were largely spent by the Government 
in large part on state subsidies, all sorts of premiums to indus­
trial and railroad capitalist�, for the purchase of private enter­
prise� by the tr<>a�11ry, etc."" 
'' l'. Kbrnmov, or,. eit., p. 3i2. 13 · Ibid., p. 3i5. 
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Dw.ining the fu,ancial resoun·es ot the coloaies, in this man­
ucr, placing tlw111 on her own territory concentrating all com­
merce in her hands and hence also the accumulation of all com­
mercial capital. Rus�ia financially exhausted non-Russian terri­
tories, arnl pn�ventcd their organizing any normal financial 
economy. All initial attempts to create a banking system of 
thc-ir own, as has been indicated by examples gin'll of tbe ex­
pPrier:ce of the Kharkiv an<l Kiev Commercial hanks, were 
ruthlessly suppressed in the name of that self-same monopolistic, 
unchallenged rule over the economic life of these territories. 
These occnrrences are not exclusively applicable to the pre­
revolutionary period of the a(kancf' of finance capitalism. but 
to thE entire hi�tory of Hussia's colonial policy. In a work from 
which we have aln:u<ly quoted. N. Yasnopo!:;ky ,vrotc: ";\.ccord­
ing tn Schletzer, even at the beginning of this century (19th) 
the i!lterest ch<trge<l ou capital )oane<l ,vas 6% in the Northwest­
ern gubcrnias, 10.% in 1Ioscow, an<l at thC' same timC' in Tauria 
(Ukraine) 25% ... In Odessa. up to the time of the cstablisb-
111mt of a hauk in HHS, they charged 3% p<"r month, and ahC'r 
the bank was L'Stahlislwd the intcrPst rate was rcdnced to 2% 
and l;l' per month. Even now (the reference is to the 1870's) 
capital in Odessa is not much cheaper: they pay one, one and a 
half. and up to t\',O percent per month, and only against abso­
lutely safe collateral, .10'.l. Acc()rding to 1-foscow manufacturers 
thl'V have credit available at 6'.l' per annum." Yasnopolsky con­
tinu('s and gives the underlying reason at this phl'uomcnnn on 
the basis of r<'ports of the state bank: ''Operations of the State 
Bani.: and its branches are conducted prepon<lerantly in the 
North. In 1866- the:- State Dank, its hrauchC's and counters dis­
co1rnted drafts and other time-paper for 96,104 thousand rubles. 
Out of this arn,unt, Petersburg. Higa and Archangelsk partici­
pated in 60,181 thousand rubles, or 62.5% ... and this lack of 
cre<lit institution� produced Vl"'ry bad results for the industry of 
thl"' South."" 
This is hO\v it was all the time. The conquest o!- Ukrainian 
inclmtry ( and oaf other activities) hy foreign and Hussian capital 
came about as thE" result of continually depriving Ukraine of 
capital hy draining cash internally accumulated. It is there­
fore not surprisiJJg that Russian industry which was nmch more 
advanced, could lean on Russian capital. while Ukraine, from 
"N. Ya.snopolskr, "Ekunomid1cskaya bududmost ... ," lf, /.3. 
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the H'ry heginning ut' a wider industrial devdopmcnl, went into 
c,tpliv1t;,· of alic,1 c,1pital. 
In his sh1dy of the characteri�tics of geographic regions of the 
Empire accontng to the degree of industrial rkvclop,nent, P. 
Lashdwnko pnts the Moscow industrial region in first place, "a 
regi(J;t of prep:m(ln::rn!ly li11ssia11 nation,11 industrial capital all([ 
with a large relative pcrccutage of the commercial." lle gives 
�t•rnnd place to the Petersburg aml Baltic regions, "regions of 
a mi"cd cornpm:iti011 of ill(lustrial capital, Russian and foreign, 
maiuk German" ( the latter was conc-entratcd mosllv in non­
ll 11s�i:Ln areas along tlw Baltic). Tu third place is the· region of 
l'olaw_l_ ··a region ,,J1uust c0111plctcly under the rn,wagernent of 
Ct�rnuu. Polish and Je\\·ish capital." The fourth place is held 
by the Southern h,1nlcoal aud black orc region. i.e. the T,eft 
Ban]- Ckrafnc, a re_gion '"of a couh-olling positiou of foreign capi­
tal ·11Hl Hussia11 capital in subsidiary control." Finally, in fitth 
place C"omcs the Right \hmk Ukraine, the region of the sug,ir 
jll(\i,slry .. with Hns�ian, Ukrainian, Jcwi.'>h an<l Polish capital.""' 
Ii, rcganl !o tbe last-named reg10n. or to he more accnrate, 
iu n g�ml to the sn�ar inrlustry, it would he more ctppropriatc 
tn src;1k ol its c,lmplete cunqnest l1_v Hussian capital, in particu­
lar ;![rer the csrablishmcn! of the .-\zov-Don Bank which swal­
lowed np the Kie\· Commercial lhnk ol- the sugar refiners. The 
situation in the sugar refining industry W<l-'> accurately sum­
mari;,cd by the Jvlinister of Fiuauce KokovtscY, who said; "From 
the e-'.change of idc.'as on the participation of banks in the 
sugar imlustry it has become clear that an influence of hanks 
upon the industry cannot be dt'nicd, that the influc>nce extemls 
he:-.-wl grantin.� of ('rcdits. and that the p,nticipation of lrnnks 
iu c(•rpor.1tc and compan:· enterprises appears to he controlling. 
Some l1anks take: ,t vcr:· actin' part in the �ugar industry, and 
tliis p0:rt consi,t� not only of extending credits, hut also of tak­
ing part in the (•nt.21vrises themseh-es and in trading in sug,n."", 
Almsc of the Ukrainian Eco110111y 
It i� eviden! th,1t in and of itself the fact of tlw devdopmeut 
of industry in Ukraine, even trndcr forcign control. cannot he 
n·gard('d as n11 item on the debit side from the viewpoiut (lf 
tht' tTkr,1luian ('conom\·, �:[crch· the fact that because of this dc­
\·clopmcut there was 'an upsu;ge of th<' employment of Ukrain-
,-. JJ Li,lt(il<'nkn, OJ). cil., p. 428. ": l'. Khrnrnov, op. r:it., p. ;_16.J 
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ian workers, , .. ·as of great importance. But in this evaluation we 
must not overlook that along with the iucrease of the Ukrainian 
national income, there was even a greater increase of that part 
of the income wbich was exr:lu<le<l horn the Ukrainian economy 
in favor of Russia Q.m} of Western Europe in the form of in<lus• 
trial and comn.ercid profits. These profits were very large. 
The pre-revolutionary Hussian Empire ( thanks to a very 
low wage scale tor labor, a favorable tariff policy of the gov­
ernment and a relatively low "absolute" land rent) was a land 
of high industrial profits. The average percentage of industrial 
profit in relation to invested capital was, in the whole Hussian 
Empire, as shown in Table LXXVll ( in millions of rubles). 
TABLE LXX\'!l 
Invested \[ of invested 
Year capital Profit capital 
1900 2,032 284.9 14.2 
1901 2,1.%1 26.5.0 12.3 
1902 2,260 23().,1 10.2 
1903 2,.3.';7 2.'i7.fl 10,9 
19fl4 2.367 277.2 II.7
HJ0,5 2.369 256.l 10.8
1906 2,319 279.0 12.l
1407 2,l'i.:'l0 2Y2.6 11.1
1908 2,726 292.4 10.8
1Y09 2,833 321.8 11.4
l910 2.789 TJ6.4 12,7 
rn11 3,083 396.3 12.8
1912 ,'3,486 460.2 13.2
Hlt3 3,!JOO 509.8 13.l " 
As we can ,cc, the percentage of profit was very high, es­
peeh•lly when cornparC'd to the yield of capital invt->stc<l in 
\Vestern European industry, ,vhere "the usual profit was behvecn 
4% and 5% and lf'ss."'" 
But these awrages for the Empire seem quite small when 
c:omp·1red with in<lnstrial profits in Ukraine. The awrage an­
nual 11rofit of the large metallurgical associations \\�as, in rela­
tion to invested capital in 1912-1914, as shown in Table LXXVIII. 
It was then hvo and one-half times higher than the average 
for the whole Empire, But in order to dctenninc the degree of 
colonial abuse, t�c repartition of these profits is of even greater 
'"�L Colman, op. cit., p. 202. H, Ibid., p, 298. 
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T.-\BLI:: LX.\:\"111 
Sm1tl1-Hu1.,i.rn Dm;,ro ,\.1soci,1l.011 .)/,,]: 
H,,,.,i,,:1 T11\J<• .-\,socic(l!On ,)3.0% 
1{1 ,.,.,ian-lh·lgun .-\s,oc1c<lion 28.1% 
Kr,u,,atorsk .·\s,ociation 2b.O'.f, 
Sulin \\'ml. s 21.8% 
K,m,;t;intim,· \\"orl.., 2:un 
;\l<,an .-\vcr:ivc :l4 l'.f, 
impntance. Ac,"·on.ling to .\-1. Colman, out of that "34.1% profit 
in relation to ir'.vt'sted capital, from 20 to 25'.'£ went toward tht' 
pa; rnent of div:rlcml,, and tlw remaining 9i to J.1;f went toward 
capifa] accumuhlion, i.e. towards a wider re-investment of cap­
ital."·'" 
During thr: period between 1891 and 1914 the total of the 
incrt':1se of inc111,trial capital. of profits rect"ivt"d and of dividenrh 
paid out, reached throughout the Empire the figures shown in 
Table LXXfX. 
I ABU. L\.XJX 
Jrwrerisc of invc,stc,d irnln,trial ,·apital , .. 2,310.0 millirn, ruhl<'s 
Jmlnstn,!l prnf-its n":.·iv"d -1,·119.8 million ruhk.1 
Dindcnd, pai,l 2,0bfJ.7 million ruhk1,
During the same period the amount that \Vestem Europt"an 
capital haU inve�ted in industry, wa� 1,142.2 million rnbles. 
lit'nce, industrial capital accumulation achit'ved intt'rnally was 
1,188 million rubles, (2,3..'30-1,112). lf we make a proportio11 of 
profits and dividends to the5e arnounts, then internal imperial in­
dustrial r:apital had 2,3-19.7 million ruble profits and out of that 
1,063.8 million rubles in diviUemh. 
\\'c must strc's� the relativity of this summarY, because, a5 
ha, bt·r:n noted above, the pt'rcentagc of industrial profits was 
two and one-half times smaller in Hussia than in Ukraine, where 
rnos1 r,f tht' fon,ign capital flm�wl. Therefore the total of profit� 
anU diYidt"nds of European and Hussian capital invested in 
lJkr;;int' shou!U be higher than their proportion to capital. But 
even if we assume ,nch a smallt'r calculation. then "subtracting 
''' \". Ziv, Inostr,mnyi kapital t,' Ih,.1skoy clwrm1-1m;od;k,01.1 promysh/cnm,sti 
rforr'iµn C,,pit"l in the Ih,s1ian 13/ack-,\!i:lr,/ Iw/,io"tr!/), l'ctrograd, lDli, 
P;). 18-JD. 
r,,, .\!. Cohn ,n, up r:it., ;). 30.'.i. Ihirl., ;,. :;08. 
!d 
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from the total amount of 2,089.i million rubles in dividends, 
1,06:J.8 local diyidcnds, there remains the sum of 1,()2;5 million 
rubles which must absolutely be considered as taken out and 
excluded from the process of local accumulation, and charged 
to the profit or foreign shareholders."'" 
Fer the year 1913 the export of industrial profits was esti­
mated at 721 million rubles. ''Foreign capital excluded from our 
land ( reference is made to the J<'.rnpire) during only 20 years 
( 1891-1910) without any erp1ivalent, \Yas almost 2,760 million 
rubles in gold. Russia was compelled to pay such high charges to 
foreign capital, and lowards this went an impressive part of the 
national income of the land."''" 
\Vhat land a.re they talking about here? To what Pxtent were 
these the losses of Rusosia? We have already indicated by sta­
tistics of the rep"1rtition of foreign capital that in Russian indus­
try foreign capital was practically non-existent. It was being 
inve�ted in non-Hussian territories, in colonies, and to the ex­
tent 0f 75%, in Ukrainian industry. Thus, these huge amounts ex­
clud<·d from the national income apply primarily to Ukraine. 
Ilut tnat is not all. As shown above, an amount of �,760 million 
rubles acr:rl)Cd to "local" capital. llut this was not local Ukrain­
ian c:.ipital. It w:1s also alien capital which belonged to Russian 
banks, although part of it was pumped out Qf Ukraine. There­
fore we can estimate \Vithout error that the amount which was 
usuriously drawn from Ukrainian industry during the twenty­
five year period of accelerated industrial development reached 
apprcximately 5 billion rubles, an amount much in excess of 
the total of capital invested in the entire Ukrainian industry. 
This fact cannot be overlooked under anv circumstances if 
we wish to recognize the real position of industry in Ukraine 
and the nature of its development which allcgcclly contradicts 
the colonial status of Ukraine. 
Syndicates 
Syndicates were tremcudously important in the process of 
gaining control 1Jf Ukrainian industry by Russo-European capi­
tal :md in it snbsequent exploitation. They were established in 
the beginning of the 20th century in metallurgy ("Prodamct") 
in coal mining ("Pro<luhol"), in sugar refining and in rail-
,. \I (;olnrnn, ()JJ ,:ii .. p. :lO\J. 
''" S. Stnnnilin, Pwh/emy prom11sh/,m11ngo ko,,ituki p SSSR ( Prnblem of 
Imlw.trial Capital in t/ie USSH), :\1oscow, Ul2:i, p. 11. 
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road equipment ("Proch\·agon .. ). The svmlic,1tcs f:onncJ •tn 
crpu1;c unit wi�h the entire systC'm of impro\'iug colonial cx­
plolb;tion. 
\\'ithin a �harl· timt', such syndicates as "Prodamcf" andi.i'"Pro1!t1hor' became real dictators not onk in the area of markl't­
ing, \Jut also in iarge def--,'Tt'e ill the area of prorluct io11 itself. 
Their dictators!i.ip \Vas not n·strictcd to tllt' st>dms i,1 which 
!lwy were established, but cxte11ded to the entire indnstrial life,i
inasn1:1ch as those two sectors of industry (metallmgy a11di
coal) nonrish man:,,· others.i
�yc,dicates in manufacturing were also being established b:, 
H11sai,lTI industries. and ('\'Cn i11 the same brnnc-lws as iu Ukrniue. 
as for example. "Krovla" (Hoof) in Ural metallurgy. Hut not one 
of !hem sncceelll'd in attaining- as dominant a position as the 
g-iants of Ukrair,('. S(>me even fell at the wayside i11 thi'ir attc111pti
to cmnpek wit'.: the gianb.i
A]!_ 11ough 11cither svndkatcs, ··rrodamcf' Hor "Produhol" con­
fined itself to the borders of lJkrai11e in selection of mem1Jer­
ship ('"l'rodam,,.�" iJ1duded four!·ecr1 Ukrainian plants, niI1<' l'o­
li,h. three Bahe and one Central Hussian), nevertheless most 
irnpm tant were their l"krni11ian plants which accounted for 
rwarh· three-fourths of tl1e total production of tlw Empire. 
This was tlH' .:·,wsc of the syrnlkah's being ldcntifo·d with 
Ukr:cirllan industrv, and hence tht' myth of the colltrolling p11si­
tion of the bttr·r in all i11dustries of the Empire. People who 
were either unahle or unwilling lo make a deeper analysis of 
the silua!ion. dr,-w from this conclusim1s that it \VllS not Ukrai11-
i:m industry tlwt was subject to color1ial exploitation, hut. on 
the contrary, !he whole :industry of the E111pire \Yas its \'assal. 
There is 110 greater l'fror lforn sllch cmwcpt of the nah1re of 
S\Tldicates . 
.. -\11 thme svmli1.•atcs werc established i,1 the form of commm1 
+radi11,r corporatlon�. under 'commission agrccrnents· for tlH.' salei
of the produi't'i of their members. l 11 reality the�· were sh·ictlyi
monopolistic org;mintions which hdd in the hamls of a smalli
group of monopnlists the entire industry a]J(l llictated all marketi
condi�ion� for tlie prolluct,; of industry so important to the na­
tional r·co11om\·.'·.,-,i
\\'ho constituted this "small group of monopolists"? ln 190:?:. 
"Prodarncf' was est<1hlished. ""The shan�s of 'Prodanwf \H'!'t' 
"I'. Kl,wrno\'. ,,,,_ c:it., p . .368. 
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grank<l by law the right to be traded on exchanges and to be 
sold freely to 0nlside persons," They were completely concen­
trated in the h,mds of owners of plants who were members of 
the s::ndicate, ::rnJ those owners, as has already been indicated, 
were Hmsian bcmks and European capital, acting through those 
hank:,. Therefore tht' manufacturing profits of' Ukrainian indus­
try, as well as commercial profits frorn the marketing of their 
production, were in the same hands: Russo-European finance 
capital, Thls fact alone e,duJes the possibility of any separa­
tion of the syndicates from the general system of control of 
Ukrainian industry by foreig11 capital. It also excludes, what has 
unjustifiably be"n attributed to these syndicates, Le, that they 
were the orgar,izers of a national production in the internsts of 
developing a national economy. But in reality lhey were not 
even ,1ccunrnlators ot commercial profits, neither were they crea­
tors of commercial capital. Their only and direct task was the in­
crease of the industrial profits of their member-manufacturers. 
The most convincing proof of this that "frequently there were no 
dividends declared at all, because the entire profit from opera­
tions of the syndicate to its members was not determined by divi­
dend per share, only by an increase of monopolistic prices for 
goods sold:''0·' The managerial centers of these syndicates were lo­
cated in Petersburg. They were headed by persons who occupied 
leading positions in banks (the chairman of �'Prodamet" was P. 
Daren, the real executive of «Produhol" was Gruencl, both rep­
resentatives of French banh). The syndicates themselves were 
nothing but an integral part of the financial structure of the 
Husrn-European bloc for the exploitation of colonies. The mon­
opolirntion of the market by syndieates was the cause of the 
industrial proHt of metallurgical enterprises reaching the un­
preu•::lented level of 3•1.1% in relation to inYested capital. Thois 
profit as has b�en stated above, which was being excluded from 
the national eCfmomy in fayor of Russian and European finance 
capital, was the measure of the colonial exploitation of the 
Ukr'.linian industrv. 
Undeniably these monopolistic prices injured all consumers, 
not o_,1ly the Ukrai11ian. Purchasers of Ukrainian metals in Rus­
sia were also co1.1tributing to these high profits. Bnt the essence 
ot the matter is that profits made in Russia stayed there in the 
national economy, just as did profits from monopolistic prices 
"" P. Lashc:henko, op. cit., p. 2fJ7. 
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of the Russian textile industry. Jn Ukraine they were excluded 
from :lie natimul f'cmiomy. �-forcover, for the purpose of corn~ 
petini with Husshn metallurgy which was outside the symli• 
cate,, prices in Russia were lower thm1 in Ukraine. "At a confer­
ence of participc,_!tts of 'Prodamet' in 1912, prices for assorted and 
roofit1g iron were hxed for Ekaterinburg aml Nizhni Novgorod 
(Russia) at 1.15 rubles per 36 pounds, while for Katerynoslav, 
Kiev, Odessa and Kharkiv they were 1.48 rubles. Thus prices in 
the main iron producing area were 30% to 3.5% higher than 'war' 
prices in the Um! region."5B 
Hegarding competition with the Urals, there is no basis for 
trcati1,g it as a fight between Ukrainian ,md Hussian imlustry. 
It was nothing more than an internal struggle of various finan­
cial groups for supremacy. There was even a struggle within "Pro­
damct," where !wo groups were contending, one headed by a 
majority of French capital (South Hussian Dnipro Association), 
and the other '1y mixed capital, in large part of Hussian banks 
such as the Jutc-rnational. Azov•Don, and Hank for Foreign 
Trade (the Don-Yurievsky Association). The second 1-,rroup won. 
Al5o opposing "Prodamef' was the grm1p of enterprises of 
Hughes ( controlled by British capital), but ln 1905 it knuckled 
m1dPr. Thus, even in this respect the actiYities of the syndicate 
cam·ot by any meflns be considere<l a display of Ukrainian na­
tional-economic rnrsuit. The main thing to bear in mind in 
order to understand the true nature of the syndicates is the fact 
that !he Hussian Imperial Government was backing them. They 
were in the vanguard of the Government's course of policy in 
non-Hussian areas. "Prodamet" was already tightly fused, legally 
and !llcgally, with the governmental apparatus which favored 
its [-,,,'.icy.'·:,  
,vhcn, in HJOR, under pressure of the State Duma, a confer­
ence was callrcJ to consider cur�ailmcnt of the monopolistic 
trend of the syndicate "a large part of the members of the con­
ference consist<"d of representatives of those industrialists and of 
bureaucrats from the 1.finistry of Industry and of Finance. And 
the c,mference llid not think it wise to undertake prohibitive 
measures against the syndicates, being of the opinion that the 
Government should only fight corruption ... Assured by the 
sn1111ort of official circles, the syndicates continued their poli-
cv.""� 
"'' P. L:a.-,heh,•nko, np. cit., p, :JU. :,, !hid., p. 327. 
"P. La�l1dwnk,). nrJ. cit., p. 326. 
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Therefore, �lie symlicatcs not only di<l not promote the in­
tl-rc.,·ts of the Pkr.-1inian 1:co1mrny, hut they acted to its detri­
ment and were an addi1ional, more perfected loo! of tolonial 
exploitation. Aud the damag{· \Vils not restricted to the mere 
,iphc,ning off of h11q: amounts of the national income of Ckraine. 
Industry itself ,;xp,·rienct'(\ terrible ahnse. "I'rodamet" took 11n­
dcr crmtrol 74S of the !o!al pig iron production of the Empire. 
At thf• base of its monopolistic policy "lay thC' aim to restrict pro­
duction, as a mea11s ot increasing prices aml super-profits of 
the leading enterprises .... In reality the policy of 'Prodamet,' 
dirccte!l towarrl restricting production and incrcrising prices was 
supported by tlw Govcrmncnt itsclf."'·11 
Kr>t a single new plant was established dnriug all this time. 
Umkr the protection of the tariff policy \Yhich nndcrweut a 
sharp change thl' momeJJt Ckrainian (•nterprises c;;me under the 
control of Hussian banks. "Prodam{'f' brought the whole Empire 
by HHl to a stal;(c of an acute shortage of pig iron. 1t held pro­
dm:tion of rails at 201 below the 1904 le\·el. With the aim of 
a fmther curtaihrwnt of production it shut dowll two rolling 
milk Starachowice and Nikopil-1lariupil. This caused an im­
mediate 40\". ri,;e in the price of rails. 
Every pl-aut was given a strict prmluction quota by the syn­
clkatt:. Its viola!ion brought f'ittt·s of 10,000 rubles plns 1 ruhle 
for '"\'('fY 36 ponnds of on•r-qnota prodnctiori. And converse!? 
a ph:ut would get a premimn for producing less than c111ota. 
Prn<lndio11 for foreign markets was ontside of the quota. but in 
time this was '-·11 ·.mgt'd. too. \Vhen. for examplt', in 1912 the 
Druzhkov plan� chked "'Prodamet'" for permission to increase its 
productiou for expmts to the .\Iiddle Fast. it was denit>ll. 
"In the pmslrit of t!test' aims 'Prodamef did not take any 
needs of the national cco1 or1w into consideration. It reduc('\1 
the c0lunlrY lo a condition of mdal slai-Yation and chronie u11-
dcrprotl11d itm of nwtals. This ha<l a (ictrimcntal effect O!l tbe (k­
vdo11rnent of �1:d1 imporblllt sectors, as the production of agri­
( nltural machinerv ( a S\'ctor fairly w<"ll developed in Ukraine 
and whose pr(lf_lutts were acutely needed in tht> South of 
l'kraim'-.Author), construction of railroads, commercial ship­
ping. ctc.""0 
''  Ibid., pp .. '31.>, 3:W. '"' P. L1sl1d1,•nko, np. cit., n. :316. 
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\�,mventions o± rnanufacturers of agricultural machinerv in 
CkralPc requesli:d lower metal prices on two occasirms, in 1910 
and hi HHS, and tlKir requests were denied both times. 
Even when the Minister of Commerce, Timashev, feding the 
pind1 of a metal shortage, proposed the erection of uew pla11ts 
to t,1.kc care of the re11uirerncnts of the \Var :\Iinistry, he met with 
an vrganiLed opposition and had to withdraw. 
There is no point in digressing into the characteristics of the 
secrnHi syndicate, ··rroduhol" which was established iu 190-4, 
because what was said above applies in full measure to all syn­
dicatl·� in Ukr,1inian industry. This syndicate also controlled 
751 o! all coal mining in Ukraine. As with "'Prodamct,'· each 
mi1H' had to a<lhcn:· to a strict quota of coal sold, and members 
of ti;,, syndica�e did not receive dividends. only premiums in 
the form of a difference between the b,isic price and the s,1le 
price. Between 190� and HJ08 mines were paid this premium in 
the amount of 2 kopecks per 3fi pounds where their wst price 
was 4.5 to 5 kopecks i.e. 40% to :)0'.{ per cost price, over and 
above normal profit. 
'Trodnho!" abo "used all means to curtail the production of 
coal of enterprises controlled by it .... In other words, the 'Pro­
duhol' monopoly had as its open aim the stifling of the hard 
coal milling indn�tr� .""1e
Ju 1906, the Oleksicv Association which had been working 
with Ckrninian capital for a long time ( until the failure of 
Alche\sky's KbukiY Commercial Bank) and had preserved 
its independence, was ordered to curtail its production consi<l­
crahh- as a prerequisite to being admitted to the syndicate. And, 
it was forced to comply. The Zh�·lov Company was ordered to 
switch to proUucing bri{piettes an<l to "close the mine. . . The 
mine had been produeill)-'; 480,000 tons oF coal annually and em­
ployed over ,'3,000 workers."•;� 
Ql1ota violations were punished by a fine of 10 kopecks per 
3fi pounds, or double their cost price. Aml conversely, "for reject­
ing the assigned quota for the home market, the contracting 
part�, may. with the assent of the syndicate, receive a separate 
rew:1rd."6' 
T11is kind of activity of "Produhol" went beyond the bounds 
of kg:ility, and in 1811 it was hauled into comt. "HoweYer, fi-
,.i P.eL1shch,·11J..o, n11. cit., 11 .. 117.e,., J.:.m·'"!li Arkl1i1;, (Herl A.rd,i, nl, X\'111, p. 13!). '•- l'_ L,_i,]wlwuku, op. !'it .. p. 1,1'5 
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11anci;1l pressure wa� exerted on the part of French banks and 
Hus�ian im!mtrial cirdes, and the French GovenmH-'Bt even 
made a diplomatic intervention. The case was not prosecuted.""' 
i\ few more wcrds about the symlicate in the third basic in­
dmtry of Ukraine, sngar refining. It came into being as early 
as l/,;87 on the h:>sis of a private agreement, uniting 106 out of 
the 226 plants then in existence. As has already been noted, the 
Ukrainian sugar industry, following the capture of the Kiev 
Commercial Bank by the Petersburg-Azov Bank subsequently 
ehanged into the Azov-Don Bank, came under complete con­
trol pf Hussian finance capital, and exports of sugar were mon­
opolized by three Petersburg banks. We have also noteJ, how the 
banks' role in the sugar industry was characterized by the �:Jinis­
ter oi Commerce and Industry. But even this was not enough: 
in 189� the Russian Government look over the regulatio11 of 
production of e-ad1 refinery for the home market, aud thereby 
gavt 1he syndicate a compulsory status. Thus, by ruthlee.sly cur­
tailing the home consumption of sugar (400,000 tons in 1895-96) 
and levying a hi?:h (�xcise tax on sugar ( l.75 rubles per ,'36 pounds 
when the cost prict• wa� 3.25 rubles), the Govcnnncnt used all 
possible means to favor the exportation of sugar abroad, exempt• 
ing 1":porter banks from the excise tax and p:tyi11g export pre­
mium of 80 kopecks per 36 poun<ls. 'Tnder such circumstances, 
at the expense of incr{'asing prices on the home market, there 
arose a possibility of shipping sugar abroad at prices which 
were below cost. The price of l1krainian sugar in London was 
almost three times lowc-r thau in Kiev," thc- center of the sugar 
refining industry."'' 
It is possible that some of this sugar came back lo Petersburg 
again in the form of grain raw materials for further processing 
into crystal by Petersburg refineries. Thi.� is the tme nature of 
syndicates whieh existed in the industries of Ukraine. They were 
the tools by which ,rn increased colonial exploiL1!1on was carried 
ont, industrial development thwarted and sonwtimtes ruined. In 
addition to the exploitation conducted by Russia by means of 
centralizing industry on her own territory, by means of excluding 
a larl_\'c part of th,· national income from Ukraine in the form 
of cnmmcrdal profit, there was yet ,motlwr means. the system 
of fi1 1;mcial cxploi!:1liou of Ukrainian industry. True enough, 
c, !hid., p. 3:3'3. ,,,, P Khmmov, op. cit.. p. 256. 
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forei_:::n capital nov: joined in, but this did not alleviate the ex­
ploitation. 
The Holslwvik Odober upheaval of 1917 freed Hussia from 
this partnnship in the exploitation of her colonies. Hussia cou­
fiscatt>d foreign capital and became absolute ruler of the large 
Ukrainian industry. 
"Ju the course of the hi.�tory of colonial expansion of Russia 
during the perir1J of Tsarism, her political, social and economic 
relati,;ns with conquered people brought Yiviclly to the fore 
these characteristic feature� of a general economic and historical 
development which made Russia 'thi' prison of nations' .... 
Tht' problem of tht' multi-national system of Hussian capitalism, 
and of its colonial-national policy, is one of the most important 
for the understanding of the entire social-economic and national­
ecor<nmic development of Russia."60 
ca P. La,hd1enko, op. cit., pp. 421 et seq. 
CHAPTEl\ 5 
RELATl01'S BETWEEN UKRA!l\E Al\D l\CSSIA 
IN OTHER ECOKO�l!C S'cCTORS 
Transportati01i 
W1:. HAVE ILLVSHL-1.TED the relations between 
Ukrair1e and R1��sia which existed during the period of the de­
velopment of c<tpitr,lism in the provinces of land, industrial 
capital and finac1ce capital. \Ve have shown that at the base lay 
the colonial position and colonial exploitation of Ukraine. \Ve 
could now comider our subject exhausted, at least as lo that 
part \d1ich deals with the times hefore the revolution. As wc had 
irnlic:tted at th<: beginning, it was 1iot our task to provide a 
charaderistic �Jf the development of the national economy of 
Ukraine. \Ve wPrc to show that the entire development, by its 
direction, reach and economic consequences was determined 
by 1hc existence of a colonial dependence of Ukraine upon 
Hussia. More(wcr ,\c wished to sho,,· that the object of creating 
there the kind of agrarian conditions and industrial development 
v,,hicL were created was the extraction of the entire surnlus of 
the production 0f Ukraine for the henefit of Hussia. Lt;ter, of 
course, \Vestern European capital was drawn into the picture by 
Hnssi.t. to tak<' part m this colonial exploitation. 
Cconomic l"On<li1ions in the three sectors aualyzcd above 
gi\'P ;, complch• rictnrc of the real nature of the whole economy, 
bccan�c they arc thP same for the whole. The conditions which 
were created here and cemented by it-gal norms of state econo­
mic policy, ine,·itably had to spread to all economic processes 
and all aspects of economic life, It made Ukraine, instead of be­
ing part of a solid national-state ('C:Onomic body, a restricted ml­
tional area called upon to serve the atiYancement of the state-me­
tropolis. Ukraine, like other national areas comp1cred by Russia, 
was not a "borderland," hnt a colony, which TT]adc possible Rus­
sia's growth into a colonial empire.'. "Hussia's colonial policy of 
the 17th and 18th centmies consisted of the same form of plum!-
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ering the borderland colonies, although not on such a vast scale, 
vet the plundering of Ukrainian localities, particularly during ihc period ot the Muscovite state, was considcrahk. Therdore 
jt would be erroneous to rnai..ntaiu that colonial sources were not 
utili:t.ed both in the primary, as well as in the subsequent period 
of capital accumulation."• 
"le venture the opinion that the trnth of this thesis hecornes 
i□-csbtible iu the light of the facts here cited which charactt·r­
i:t.e the economic relations betwt'en Hussia ,md Ukraine. Capital 
accumulation and economic development in Russia occurred 
in Luge measurl' at tht· expense of h('r colonies, primari]�, of 
tTkraine as the largest of them. It thwarted the e<:onomic growth 
of Ukraine. Conditions in agriculture, industry and tinauce 
irrefutablv attest to this. 
\Ve will JKlll�l' for a short time Oil other sectors of economic 
relations in order to find that they \Vl're also subject to colonial 
exploitation. 
\Ve will start with railroad ,·onstruction as a most important 
brand, of e<:onomic activity, Of itself. it constitntcs a large in­
dustr_v, and, without exception, determines the development of 
all other aspects of the economy. 
The attitude of Hnssia toward the bui\cling of railroads in 
t:h:ti1w c:m he dividetL like industry, into two periods . .-\t frst 
Hussia halted thl' Jeveloprnent of railro,td construction in 
Ukrnine, just as she h,i.d halted the development of industry, 
wishing to keep llkraint' on thl' level of supplier of rav., material 
of agricultural production and consumer of H\lssia's industrial 
production. Subsequent!�', when the natural wealth of l:kraine 
opened \vide opportunities for industrial exploitation and con­
tributnl to the den'lonnwnt of a large indu�try in Ukraine hy 
Husso-Enropl'an capital, the attitude toward railroad construc­
tion changed. Under the new conditions railroads he<"ame an 
indispensable mc·ans toward the realizatio11 of industrial exploi­
tation. The pace of the spreading of railroad co1incc-tions made 
possible by the i11flnx of foreign capital began to outdist111ce 
all other areas of the Empire, and finally placed Ckraine first 
among all areas in length of rnil lines. Bnt even then the direc­
tion of rail lines w:1s not determined hy the interests of llkrai11e, 
only hy th!' ne('tls of capital t'xploiting her. 
1 P. L1shc-lwnko, lsturiy" namd,mhr1 klio:::r,,iy�trn SSSR. II, 12. 
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The first railroad between Petersburg and Tsarsko�·c Selo, 
2.i kilometres in length, \Vas begun in 18:)i, Lt'. not much later 
th-1n the hcginni11gs of railroads iu \\"estl'rn Europe. Almo�t 
simultaneously the \\'2.rsaw-Vilna line was started, .322 kilo­
metres long, and was completed in 184S. In 1851 work was 
begun on the :\"ikolaevsky road bctwE"l'Il Petersburg and Mos­
cow, G50 kilometres iu length. The latter cost the trcas11ry the 
tlwn stagµ,ering amount of Ul million rubles. or 217,000 rub]f's 
per kilometre, as against 2.3.000 ruhk� tor the \Varsaw-Vilna 
line. 
ln 1SS7, on th(' initiative of the Government, and with its 
aid. the corporation "Glavno;,-·e Obshchestvo Hossiyskikh Zhelt>z­
nyk!t dorog" ( Central Assoeiation of Hussian Hailroads) was 
founded. It was to concentrate in its hands all further railroad 
construction. Its capital \Vas set at 275 million rubles_ hut only 
112 million rubles were subscribed, and within a few years it 
was indebted to the treasury for S9 million rubles. 
The principle of faying rml lines by this c011Joratio11 was 
determined in the following onler: l) from Petersburg to \Var­
saw and the German border, 2) from Moscow to Nizhni-Nov­
gorod, 3) from \lo�rnw via Kmsk and Kharkiv to Theodosia in 
the Crin:wa, a11d 4) from Kursk or Orel via Dinahurg to Libau. 
Thus, one of these lines was to bisect Ukraine, connecting her 
with Mmcow. But along with the construction of these frnnk 
lines, feverish construction of railroads connecting �foscow 
with producing regions went on. \Vithin hventy years from 
the beginning of planned railroad constrnction in 1848, a net­
work of lines was open connecting i\loscow with the following 
rcgim,s: the Moscow"Kursk \inc brought to Moscow the pro­
duce of the central chernozem rcµ:ion, the Moscow-Kozlovo­
Vor011izh line brought grain from tlw Southeast, the Moscow­
i\'izhni-NoYgorod connected it with the whole Volga and Kama 
region, the Moscow-Petersburg line opened delivmies of grain 
from the South to Petersburg, and all these lines together opened 
distant markets to products of the :\Ioscow imlustrial region. 
Ukraine was then being take.n into consideration when plans 
were drawn laying out railroads, but only to the extent to which 
it served the interests of Moscow. "The Imperial Government 
was priimuily concerned with the construction of Russian lines, 
in order to (t)mwct the ccn1ral manufacturing region with Baltic 
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ports,": through ,,vhich came most of the imported raw material 
for the t('xtile industry. 
()11Jy after !\\'enty years of railroad construction in Hussia 
was the first lille in Ukraine built, beh"""n Balta and Odes.�a. 
In 1862. when Russia already had 4,030 kilometres of railroads, 
Ukraine had none. In the entire Sonth there was, at that time, 
onlv a 73 kilometrc line hehveen the Volga and Don rivers. Hut 
eY�ll after railroads had already been started in Ukraine, the 
rate of construction lagged far behind Russia. (See Table 
LXXX). 
TABLE LXXX 
Length of Railroads ( in kilometres) 
Year Ukraine R11ssia % t'krai,w 
1869 366 1,211 5.t)
1871 434 12,278 3.5 
Ib7'6 -587 17,652 3.3 
1879 l,(l.57 20.034 .5.3 
• 
Such a miserable percentage applied to Ukraine not onlv 
with respect to railroads, but to roads in general: "In 1864. out 
of a total of hard-surface roads of 7,664 kilometres, Ukraine 
had only 942 kilometres, and even out of this the Kiev-Beresta 
highway goes almost along the northern border nf South Russia 
(Ukraine), the Kharkiv-Moscow and Kiev-Petersburg highways 
h'.lrdlv penetrate Ukraine from the North, and the Simferopil­
Scvastopil are insignificant in length."1 
:--;eedless to say, this deeply affected the Ukrainian economy 
with its \arg{' amount of commercial grain, cattle, sugar and by 
thc11 al.�o coal. The cost of transporting one chelvcrt ( 360 
pounds) of wheat a distance of 100 kilometres cost up to 2 rubles, 
er almo�t 30% of the ya]ue of the wheat itself. We also must bear 
in miud the specific conditions existing in Ukraine as to animal­
dra\\'n transportation. First of all, autumnal rains and spring 
thaws preclude all transportation in the black soil regions. Fur­
ther. the winter ( in Russia this is the main season of transpor­
tation, when a horse can pull three times as mnch on a sled) in 
Ukraine is short and uncertain. The main thing is. however, 
that in Ukraine most of the hauling was done by oxen and not 
"\I. SlahchenJ..o, Materia/11 ... , p .. '312. 'lhid., p. :ll4, 'N'. Yasnopolsky, "Ekonomichcskaya h1duchnost . . .," II, 77. 
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by horse:;. and d1.iring the winter no hauling by O.\("n was possible 
becamt' the:, were used to grazing on the roach (200 feet wi<ll'_). 
During th(• summer heat tlw:,· would not budgc, eitht·r. Thus, 
the transportation perio<l was n•stride<l to .\pril-June and Ang­
ust-October. a period of the greatest activity in the farm fields. 
T n addition the pace of transportation by oxen was e.\tremely 
slow. 10 to J.5 kilomdres per day, and, with the great distances 
from seaports. the c1wnwks ( oxen teamsters) umld mauage to 
make one ,uumal round trip, to the coast with grain, and hack 
with fish or salt. 
Under such cireumstanccs transport•ttion of goods required 
a lot of manpower and other means. Tt is estimated that in the 
Poltava region alone there wen• about 210,000 teamsters in the 
1860\. Two-thirds of all c,u�oes taken i11 the ports of tbe ll\ack 
and Oziv Sea were dclivt'red by chunw.ks. Altho11gh this pro­
vided the peas:wts with some additional income, the time was 
not free from labor in the fields, and thus was costlv. lt was 
otherwisf' in the North. In addition, the financial loal of trans­
portation costs fell upon thf' priee of grain, the basic product 
of the peasants. The cost of h,mlinp; prodm.'c to l1krainiau mar­
kets alnnf' amounted to 100 million rubles every vear.--· 
The above cited is sufficient evidence for us to understand 
how acut�ly Ukraine felt the need of an early development of 
railroad C(•mmunications, and why the landlords of Uhainc 
made such persistent demands upon 1\-Joscnw in this regard. 
B11t "the matter was slowed down by l\,[oscmv patriots who, 
!hrough t!wir mr,uthpiccc Moskm;.�ki Vcdomosti (an organ ofh
official cirdes) said that it is not so neccssar�· to cormect Ukrain­
ian points witb Ukrainian export ccntt"rs, as to connect Russiah
with Ukraine, 11oscow with Kiev and Odessa, so that ties withh
T\Joscow 'the collector of Russian lands' shouhl not be weak­
ened."'•h
The di\·crgent intc·rr·sts of Ukrairic and Russia were prob­
ably wider in the matter of railroad b1ii\ding than in any otber 
field. niis applied to thC' amo11nt of coustruction of lines, as 
well as their direction. "ThC' internsts of the Ukrainian economy 
<lema1;�kd that railroads shonld first be built from Ukrainian 
cC'ntC'rs to Ukrainian Black Sea ports, and also to the \Vt'stern borders of the Empire, i.e. the Austrian and Prussian (through Poland), The hnpt>rial Government, under prC'ssure of t11C' Rns-
s Ihid., p, 78. "\I. Slahcheriko, op, cit., p. 289. 
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sian bourffe!eOisic_ cleci<led upon other directions of the first 
Fkrainiall railroads ( in the first place .\foscow-KharkiY-Theodo­
sia). This dirl'dion, as a hasic one, was inconYcnicn1 to tlw 
Ukrainian economy. All<l if we t:onsidn that it put the brakes 
on other projects of railroad cone>trnction in Ukraine, it is dear 
tl iat it was detrimental to l1krain(:'. The problem of directions 
of railroads caused all animated discussion. Even an official 
Hu'>sian publication ( Central Statisticc1l Committee of t!H' i\fin­
istrv of Internal 1\ffairs) stated in IS64 in a paper O napraden­
i!Ji -zhcleznikh dorog ti Yugo-Zapacbwy llossiyi (011 the dire:·­
tion of ntilroads in Southwestern Russia J that "after the termin­
ation of the Crimean \Var all efforts of the state were concen­
trated on the construction of railroads in the North, whereas the 
S011th. the most productive part of l{nssia, remained neglected. 
Soutlwrn Hussia is feeling more and more con\'inc(•d that her 
interests are. in the eyes of the CovcrnnK'nt, in second place, 
and that the income of the entire state i� being directed toward 
tlw benefit and convenieuce of its northern part. lf such con­
yictirm takes root it can bring about a complete dis1mity of the 
int<'rests of the :\forth and of the Sonth."• 
By means of this policy of railroad construction the H.nssian 
Government of the timf' (up to the 1880's) desired to accom­
plish two ends: first of all to secure the economic dependence 
of Ukraine npon t he metropolis, and in the second place to pro­
mote more actiYit�1 in the Baltic ports which were of much 
more interest to the Petersburg and 1·foscow industrial areas 
than Black Sea ports. This caused an artificial routing of Ukrain­
iau grain over great distances, and as a result there was a high 
differential land rent on the realization of the products of the 
L1krainian agricultural economy, in the form of a difference of 
transportation costs. In the balance of goods aecmmting, the 
profitability of a unit of land in Hussia increawd thereby. 
"Ukraine suffered from thi� n:ry much, being obliged to 
ship grain too far. The relationship between exports through 
Baltic and Black Sea ports was, in the form of a percentage Of 
the Empire's total exports, as shown in TaTJle LXXXT. Thus, com­
JJ1t'ns11rate with the increase of the railroad network the partici­
pation of the Baltic- increases at tlw expense of the participation 
of the Black Sea, adjat:ent to whose shores were directly localed 
the exporting regions of Ukraine, J..:nban and the Don Cossack 
0.rOhlobl)'n, Peredkapitalistychna fabryka, p. 172.r7 
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TABLE LXX.\l 
rear Ha/tic Hlu,:k Seu 
1/fi(l �:'.i r,9:;: 
1871 ::Ooh, ;JT! 






region. Only after railroad construction ( in the South) was in­
creased considerably did a process in the reverse of the one 
indicated above begin taking place."8 
The amount of the surplus profit which fell to the seller of 
1-l.ussiau �rain urn..ler these circumstances can he pretty accurate­
ly imagined from the comparison in Table LXXXII, of prices of 
whc-at and rye in Odessa and Petersburg in 1874 (per unit of 
one cheti:ert-160 pounds). 
TABLE LXX.\JI 
Petersburg Odessa 
Wheat 12 to 16 mbl1:.s 8 to 14 rubles 
Ryt' 7.8 to 8 n,hJe<; ,J.7 to 7 mbles • 
Tt would seem that the needs of the Ukrainian economy for 
railroad couuectiom hctween its producing regions and the 
Black Sea. and the general need of railroads in Ukraine were 
quite obvious. But, as we ha\'e already 11oted, until the end of 
the 1870.s, Ukraine was in reality outsidt> of the plans of rail­
road construction. At the same time in Russia, np to 1877 private 
capital amounting to 878 million rubles and 1.833 million in state 
railroad loans had alrea<ly been spent on railroads. r-.fon,over, 
even iater_ when \Vcstern European C'apital i11tNw·m:d in the 
matter of railroads in Pkrainc, the proposition of a large-scale 
rnnnectio11 with ports of the Black Sea encountered a deter­
mined opposition of Hussian commer('ial and in<lustri,tl circles, 
"which \.Vere stubborn in trying to prove by all possible means 
that it would be a useless loss of money, n.b. not their own, 
but foreip:n British, French .and German lo build railroads to 
thC' l3laf'k Sea. They maintained that freight from Black Sea 
� ?\-1. Slabchenko, op. rit _ p. 278 "//,id., p. 27-t 
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ports to :\farseilles or London is too high compared with the 
closer naltic network of ports, aml the amount of goo<ls too 
small. Furthermore, they saitl, many loads of grain come to the 
ports of the Black Sea by water of the Dnipro, Don and Buh, or 
ll\· O.\Cll froin nearer regions. Only a SJllal! part can he hauled 
by rail. Therefore, railroads in Ukraine will never become an 
importmit mean� of trnnsportating grain a11d they will be unable 
to compete with the dieap chumak. "10 
Basic change> in the matter of railroad construction took 
place in Ukraine in the 1880's un<ler the pressure of new condi­
tions in the Ukrainian coal mining and metallurµ;ical industries, 
in whose conquest Hussian and ,vestern European finance cap­
ital were verv much interested. 
The already then impressiYe network of railroads in Russia, 
amJ its further increase, represented a great demand for coal 
and metals. Satisfying those needs a� heretofore, by imports, be­
c,11ne difficult because of the lack oJ forei�n exchange. ln addi­
tior1. hand in hand with the C'ompwst of Ukrainian industry by 
Husso-F.uropcan capital, the official policy of the state, as has 
been noted ahove, changed also. fn the order of 1857 entitled 
Polo:::.heniyc ob osnornikh 11slodyakh dla ustroystva zheleznikh 
dorog i; Rossiyi ( Order concerning !Jasic conditions of railroad 
co11struction in Russia), section 18 permitted duty-free importa­
tion of all material used in railro.id construction (rails, cars, 
engines, steel, etc). Hut already during the rnnstruction of the 
Kursk-Kharkiv line the Government required that "rails, cars, 
l'tc. m:e<led for the construction of the line must be purchased in 
Hmsia i11 such quantities as Hm�ian factories are able to sup­
ply."'' Only the amount which could not be supplied by domcs­
fr- factories rnuld be imported without duty. Subsequently, 
the rt'strir·tions became more stringvnl. 
A <lut�· was also imposc<l 011 coal. and it was being increased 
all the time. The proprietors of the Ukrainian coal and metal 
industry, TTmsian and French banks, desirous of monopolizing 
the market, did everything ·within their power to isolate the 
market from foreign lands. This helped increase the importance 
of UkraiIJian industry in the economy of the railroads, and simul­
tan('ously in the entire economy of the Empire. Under these 
circ11m.�tancr>s. railroad c-onstruction in Ukraine became an acute 
70 \I. Yavorsky, Ukraina v ernku kartitalism, II, 78. 
"'I C>,,1,,,:• 1·, /'amozhe1mr,!Jl1 rm/itik" 1/0.1.,i,;i, p. 3.1.'i". 
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rn:ct'ssity, flowing from tht' needs of fimmce capital. Tht: \f-iiiistcr 
of Finance. KokO\tse\· gavt' a dear pictnrc of the situation in 
his letter to the French banker, Verncuil. Although the letter 
rdns to a rnbseqnent pniod ( 1908 in connection with tlw con­
struction of �he North-Donets railroad), nevertheless it charac­
terizes completely the motives of foreign capital in the develop­
meut of railroads in Ukraine, it reads: "This matter interests 
the Hussian Covcrrnneut, which admits the whole importance of 
railroad constr11dion in H.ussia, but it intnests equally Frcuch 
capitalists who investe(\ their capital in coal aud metallurgical 
enterprises of the Donets basin. I am even convinced that thcs(· 
enterprise� will not be- able to exist, build up and grow other­
wise tliu11 with the aid of the !\"orth-Donets railroad. \Vithout 
this railroad coal enterprises will 11ot bf' able to transport all 
their prodnction, and metallurgical plants will not have orders 
of which they are acutely in need."" 
Th(• Katerynska railroad was started in 1879 which conm:t:ted 
the iron on· region of Kryvyi Hih with the Donets coal basin. 
From that lime on, railroad construction went at a fast pal'l', 
declining during the pniod of l'rises in the late 189ffs and pi<:k­
iug up again after l!J07 Hailroad construction was partienlarly 
intt'nsin· in_the Donbas itself. ln 1891, there were ouly 118 kilo­
metres o'f railroads there; in 1893, they grew to 1.091 kilometres; 
in 1896, to 2,272 kilomC'tres, and in 1898 to 2,865 kilonlt'tres. At 
the outbreak of the rcvolntion in 1917 Ckrainr posscsse,i the 
railroads shown in Table LXXXIII. Of this, 14,770 kilometres 
TABLE LXXXlll 
Name l.1'ri1dh i11 kilometres.
Donds :1.so.1.8.
Sontlwm :l,270.0.
K aterynska-� loscow-Kiev-\" onmi7h -t.B:12.6
S,mthw,-.stern :1.-110.8
Odessa 1.12,'J.0
Total 16,(103.S kilomdres 
were within the borders of l)kraine, out of the total of 70,:100 in 
the whole Empire or 21;1:_,., 
From a land almost without railroads, Ukraine soon bt"camc, 
in regard to rai\ro:uls, the best equipped territory of the Empire. 
l� :>J. \':maµ, "Finansoviy k�pital ,. Rossiyi nakunne mirnniv ,·ovn,·." p. 111.
"" P. );\imin, for. cit., and Rolshaya Sodctskaya Er1tsikfopcdi,1; \'ol. 5.5,.
['SSR. p. 374. 
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For each 1,000 square kilometres of .area Ukraine had 23.7 kilo­
nwtn·s of railroads, as ag,1iust 22.3 kilometres in the ccntrnl 
black ,oil :1rea; 17.9 kilometres in the central industrial, a11d 
17.) kilometres in the \\'c�tern area. ln the Urals there were 
,it that t:rnc only 2.2 kilomctr<'s of rnilrna<ls p('f 1,000 sqnarl' 
kilonwtres, in Siberia, l kilometre, and iu the Far East only 
5 kilometres.'' 
Fit1ancial sources out of which railroad construction was 
undertaken \H'rG the state budget an-d state loans, floated in the 
main aLroaU, and private capital. mostly foreign as far as 
Ukraine is mucerned. 
Initially, as has been statetl above, the Imperial Government 
started building railroads out of the state budget, Lut subse­
qm•ntly the so-called "conression s;-·:stem" was applied. fts ob­
jectiYC \\·a:,, widc-sprc-ad attraction of foreign capi!al. It existed 
11 util _!.',JD, that is prior to widespread cmistruction in Ukraine. 
The Covernment looked with great favor on associations which 
took conC(!osions for railroad c011stri1ctio11, and gave thC'm vcr�­
conYt'11ient terms. Fir:,,t of all the Co\"ernmcnt guaranteed iutcr­
est and profit on honds, as well as payment of homls. These 
guarantees were issued not to the associations, bnt to each bond­
holder. The same principle was later applied to shares. Jn ad­
dition, the Government knowingly permitted inflated cost esti­
mates, thus facilitatiug the issue of more bonds. The stock cap­
it.11 was supposed to constitute hchvcen one-thinl and one-fifth 
of the cost estimate, but in reality it was ouly one-ninth, one­
twC'lfth_ and lat<"r even one-nineteenth. The fact of the matter 
is that frequently the s.11bs.cription of capita[ was cntirc!y ficti­
tious. The sale of govcniment-guarantced bonds was t:omplete­
[y free of control and the foundn� would subscribe lo certain 
blocks of bonds at low prices, sell part of them at a higher price 
and eukr !he differC'ncc as the payment of their own subscrip­
tion price. 1 '· 
l t w::,s a process of artificial euriehmcut of Hussiau entrf'­
prenenrs at the expense of the state budget, and this gaye them 
the initiatin: to build more railroads. Eveu the railroads which 
\ nTe built <lirecth· out of the budget were, when finished, 
h1rned oyer to these corporations. Hy 1881, all railroads, with the 
'' f'. h.hr(l]11ov_ Ekm,umiclu:skmw m;c[itil}t Ro.1·.,ir1i ... p. ,'337. 
,.-, K. Zagurskiy, 1-:kmwmiku /ra�,.�rwr/fl ( Ecow"";I f!i 'J'nmsporlflti,m), i\l"s-









t'X('eption of one narrow-gauge liue, were in pri\'ate hands.'" 
Beginning in I f-:iSO, after the abandonmPnt of thl' concession 
sy�tem
, the state took over railroad constrn
ction. and soon be­
gan to purchase private railroads, am
ullg; them also those which 
had previously been state-owned. 
On these operations of transferring railroads to private cor­
porations and thC'n buying them
 back and on the guarantees 
of bonds and shares, the Govern
m
ent suffered considerablt' 
losses. 
Capital invested in railroad construction is shown in Tab/C'
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rubles consisted of 4.7 billion rnbles of state and private corpor­
ation loans and 3 billion rublt's out of the state budget." 
Out of the 4.7 billion rubles borrowed, 2.7 billion can be 
apportioned to state loans and 2 billion to loans of private cor­
porations. R1tt evi:11 in the latfr
r 2 hillion there is a certain share 
of the treasury, and prior to the purchase of private railroads 
by the state, the state had contributed up to 90% of the capital 
of these private enterprises. Table LXXXV indicates, at ten-year 
intervals. the accum
nlation of pri\"ate capital in railroad construc­
tion, and the part of the treasury in it ( in m
illiom
 of rubles). 
Thus, even nut of 1.990 m
i1lion rubles which were, on the 
eve of \Vork1 \Var l, in the ham
ls of private capital, one-fourth 
JG
 Ho/,<;l/1/ ya Sodetska ya Entsil.lo pcdi ya, Vol. 24, p. j6()
_ 
17 Ibid., Vol. 24, p. 762. See also, L Glh·its, Zhelezndelatclnaua prom ysh­
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TABLE LXXXV 
1873 1883 1893 





Bonds 1,SOO 1,744 l,J51 1,8/-HJ 
Total 1,791 2,11:, 2, l.';0 1,682 1,990 
Treasury ill above 
Shares . . 8-1.5. 12.7 
Bond,, 7,'i4.l. 891-4. 851 26!J .. 5 265.7 
Treasury guarantee 
and other ,3(),'5.1 869.7 876 106,7 217.6 
Total · · · · ·  . . . . . . . 1,143.7 1,873,8 1.727 376.2 483.3 
In percelltages of total 
amount of capital. 6.3.8 90.2 80.4 22.3 24.,3 " 
belonged to lhc treasury. VVc may therefore figure that out of 
7.683 million rubles capital in the railro.ads, 6,173 million rubles, 
or 80.5%, belonged to the treasury, and only 1,507 million rubles, 
or 19.5'0, to private capitaL It is therefore permissible to consider 
the railroads in the Hussian Empire as nationalized. This is of 
prime significance for the determination of the role played by the 
railroads as an arm of the state economic policy and in regard 
to colonial exploitation. In this regard we can come to full agree­
ment with the conclusions of Soviet Russian economist�. Albeit 
the conclusion was not a(klressed to themselves, nevertheless it 
is to the greatest extent applicable to Hussia: "Colonial railroads 
were, in the hands of capitalist countries, siphons for dra,ving 
from the colonies raw material, a means of colonial exploitation 
of the col01lics in all forms, and finally, a mt'ans of their political 
cnslavenwnt. The policy of state acquisition of railroads of the 
colouies was in this respect in accord with this objective, and 
profitable to foreign finance capital which, on the one hand, 
bleeds the colonies, drawing off local capital and preventing its 
entry into industry, and, on the other hand, strengthens its 
strategic positions in the national economy."00 
This is corret:t because by this means the state takes into its 
hands such a very important economic factor, as railroad tariffs. 
Utilizing this factor, the state has au opportunity to exert a basic 
inflnencc upon the entire et:onomy of the land. "Tariff 1mmage­
ment, instih1ting these, or other tariff payment has as its object 
the inflm•nce 11pou the course and de,·elopmcn! of <'conomi<; 
life of the land in thos,• <lircdinns which, in the opi11ion of the 
'" Dnfalwya Sovict,1ka11a Entsiklopcdiya. loc. r-it. "" Ibid., Vol, 2,1, p. 738. 
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Government, represent at the given time, what is desirable from 
the general-state viewpoint," aml "to solve such problems, as 
to which areas arc to enµ;agc in agriculture, which ill animal 
husbandry, which in cxJ-raC'ling or manufacturing industries, and 
which arc not to do �o, what roads and directions appear to be 
the m,Jst attractive for commercial rclatiom, etc." By means of 
raising and lowering railroad tariffs, the Government has the best 
oppnrhmit� to realize its economic policy in the direction "of 
the best (from the standpoint of the Govcmmenfs interest­
Authot) repartition of C'apital and prodnctive forces of the land 
among the various forrns of in<lustry and commerce, among the 
various producing regions and commercial-industrial centers.""' 
Such was the significance ascrihcd to railroad tariffs in the 
c·crnmmic policy of the state, hy one of the grcate.\t Hussian ex­
perts in this matter, Professor K. Zagorskiy. And we must state 
that the Hussian Government made full use of lhis economic 
fulcrum in its colonial policy. A State Tariff Commission \vas 
established in 1889, aud it was givcn the po\vcr to ciraw up 
tariffs both for state, as well as for private railroads. It worked 
out a very complicalc<l system of tariffs, depending upon the 
nahire of tht• freight and the distance in the form of so-called 
differential t_ariffs, i.e. progressive lowering of the freight rate 
per pood-kilomctrc ( 36 pounds per two-thirds mile) on long 
hauls, 
Gkrainc \vas plat:c<l in a much \\-'orse position thau Hussia 
in all rcspeds, he it in the matter of tariffs according to the 
1tomc1wlatmc of goods, or tariffs according to distance of haul­
age. :\loreover, different freight taritts applied to identical loads 
on Hnssian and Gkrninian railroads. Thns. the frC'ight tariff 011 
grain in Ukrninc was one-thirty-second kopecks per pood-kilo­
mctrc. whilt' in Russia it was one-fortieth to one-fiftkth ko­
pcl'ks." "The losses of grain producers at the place of produc­
tion, because of high tariffs and disorder on railroads amounted 
to no less than 15 kopC'cks per pood, or between 6 and 7 .. 5 rubles 
per dcsiatyna of land, dcpcmling upon the har\'cst.''"' 
It is fit to recall here that the gross profit form 1 dcsiafyna 
of land i11 !he steppe area of t:krainc amounted to 4.5 to ,5 rubles. 
The ('.\CCssivc tariff load on Ukraine can be judged from such 
�1 K. Zagornkiy, op. cit., p. 17D. ' " '.\!. Sbhd1cn1rn, ,,p. di.. p. ,]:::!]. 
"" �. R,lt.<ig, /<'iw1t1s0t·aya po/itika Rossi!)i ,1· 1887 g. (Russia's Financial 
l'oliq1 Since 1887), St. Petersburg, 1903, p. 39. 
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fa('ts. For example, in 1900 the freight on 36 pounds of grain 
from Chicago to New York cost 11.2 kopecks for a distance of 
1,378 kilometres, and for the same distance between Kherson 
and i\loscow it was 22.!56 kopecks, which was the e(tt1ivalcnt 
of 35c; to 4(Yk of the value of the grain at the place of its origin. 
The same applies to other products. ,ve have noted already 
that the tariff on coal from Shakhtna in the southerly direction 
of the Oziv Sea was higher then in the northerly, or :\foscow 
direction. Coal mining industrialists attempted to prove that "in 
connection with high tariffs we have such misunderstandings 
that a pood of coal costs 23 to 25 kopecks, in Kharkiv ( the cost 
pric� at the mine being 45 to 5 kopecks) while wood, a more 
expensive fuel, costs ill the same city of Kharkiv 15 to 17 ko­
pecks per pood.""" 
Hussian industrialists stood firmly behind this tariff policy 
of the Government. It was so favorable to them that iI1 1896, when 
tariffs on grain were being revised, they <lemamled "protec­
tion of Central Russia from the competition of 'borderlands,' 
basing their demands upon the historical merits of the center in 
the matter of the establishment of the Russian state."25 
Ou this occasion the tariff struggle agaiJJst the central man­
ufacturing region was renewed. That region had for a long 
time considered itself the exclusive supplier of manufach1red 
good� to Ukrn.ine. At the commerce and indu�try meeting in 
Odessa, \Veislein, the mill-owner, said: "For a distance such as 
that between 1foscow and Odessa, the freight on textile in inland 
transportation ( within Ukraine) costs 1 rnble, 15.9 kopecks per 
pood, and in through transportation (into UkraiI1e), 41.0S ko­
pecks, i.e. on goods coming out of Moscow the tariff is lowered 
by 6,5% .... A representative of the stock-exchange committee, 
Pctakoros, showed that the railroad tariff policy caused a reced­
ing of freights from such regions hordering directly on Odessa, 
as Bessarabia, to Koenigsberg and Danzig. The system of differ­
ential tariffs had a considerable influence upon the loss of grain 
loadings by the port of Ode�sa particularly because the only 
railroad leading to the port goes in a very crooked line."2n 
\Ve need not pause to consider the particular tariff items 
as to each form of goods. It is sufficient to cite in general that 
"the total income of Ukrainian railroads in 191:3 was 31S.206 
"' !II. Slabchenko, op. cit., p. ,125. "'Ibid., p. -321 
"" \I. Sbbclwnko, np. cit., p. -319. 
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thousand rnbles, which is the equivalent of 16,400 rubles per 
kilometre (,.;erst). If we comrare the net profit of Ukrainian 
railroads ( property of the Russian Go\·ernment) with the net 
profit of railroads in all other lands, it appears that the profit of 
the Ukrainian railroads was the highest in the world.''27 
\\'hen we recall that the Government guaranteed railroad 
shares and bonds as to fixed income, then the annual payments 
of the (;overnment lo the operators of Russian railroads were 
"11ofoinµ; else bu� a system of money grants and premiums. paid 
out not directly from the treasury. but through the intermediary 
of railroad ticket offices," grar1ts really going to Hussian industry 
an<l commerce."' 
But this is not the end of the matter. A� we shall see later 
the load of interest payments and capital retirement of state 
loans incurred for the eonstrnction of railroads, fell in greatest 
measure upon Ukraine, though the railroads wen� built all over 
Russia. 
"'.'Jot only the tariffs, opeuly protective of Russia hurt the 
economy of Ukraine, hut it suffered no less from the 
direction of railroad connections. Just a look at a map of Ukraine 
convinces one that the m,iiu objective of railroad construction 
in Ukraine was uot the safeguarding of the economic iuterests 
of the area. The trunk lines go only in one dirf'ction, North­
South. The North is connected with all the main producing 
areas of Ukraine, agricultural, sugar, metallurgical and coal min­
ing, while withill Ukraine there are no tnmk lines hetween 
tlwsc are,1s. From \Vest to East Ukraine has in rnality only one 
direct rail line, Kovel-Sdrny-Kiev-Poltava-Donbas. All the otlwrs 
are indirect and, considering the high tariff, contribute great­
ly to the incre,1se of costs nf trausportatiou in likrai11e. The 
whole South of Gkraine hclow Katervnoslav has 110 west-east 
lines at all. Such localities, as e.g. the triangle between K:hc-rson, 
Niknpol and \fp]itopol, which hy arc-a is almost as large as all 
of Hdginrn and produces huge quantities of commercial grain, 
have no feeder line at all. Many villages are located between 30 
and ,50 kilometres from the uearest railroad station, in a land 
where, during the trackles;, spring and fall seasons, even a 
distance of 10 kilometres is insurmountable. \Vith a lack of hard 
snrfacPd roads, transporting goods by horse even a short dis-
"' S. O�t.qwnko, "Kapitali7m r1a Ukraini," p. 201. 
L Z,1gnrsl..iy. "T'· cit., p. 184. 
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tance frequently doubled the cost of the load. It must be noted 
that the products of the Ukrainian economy are goods of great 
bulk and weight and are priced low per unit of weight. Costs 
of transportation reflect heaviiy on priee . 
.\'either must we forget that Ukraine had very poor connec­
tions with seaports, in no way commensurate with the real in­
terests of the Ukrainian economy. Ukraine's largest port, Odessa 
has only two tnmk lines, and one of them, Odessa-Petersburg 
(Leningrad) goes along the fonncr frontier, and is of importance 
only to the sugar refining industry. The other, O<lessa-Bakhmach, 
does not connect the sea with either the metallurgical, or the 
coal region. Other ports, such as rviykolaiv and Kherson, have 
only one trunk line. lt is also without direct connection to indus­
trial regions, and the latter Kherson-�Ierda (Kharkiv) which 
was only completed after World \Var J, is used principally for 
hauling grain and other agricuHura.l products to .\Ioscov,'. T11c 
coal producing region is only connected with the port of .\fariu­
pil, and the metallurgical region with au undeveloped port of 
Berdyansk. Both ports are on the unimportant Sea of Oziv. One 
other line leads from the Donhas to Taghanrog, also on the Sea 
of Oziv, but it is beyond Ukraine. 
'With the North, however, all industrial regions are connected 
by many direct trunk lines. To the two previous lines between 
the Donbas and 1foscow, another one has recentlv been added, 
via Starobilsk Luhanske ( Voroshilovgrad). 
As a result of such specific layout of railroad directions, 
freight loads, in the absence of direct and short conl!ections with 
Ukrainian ports, went to the great trnnk lines connecting Ukraine 
with the North. Therefore "The Kursk-Kharkiv-Oziv railroad 
hauled the same grain both north and south The Kiev-Be­
resh:a railroad south and towards the \vestern border.""r 
Lt is not surprising therefore, that the "most overloaded li11es 
were those which cmmected the Donbas and Kryvyi Hih with 
the center ( l\Io�cow ), Leningrad and the Volga region. Over 
them were hauled the main loads of coal. iron ore, metals, lum­
ber, grain, mineral building material, both within Ukraine, as 
well as beyond Ukraine·s borders:·"" 
The development of railroads in Ukraine ,\·as thus sub­
servient to the general goal: tying the Ukrainiau economy with 
"� D. Chnprov, Zheleznodoro:dmoye khoz[[aysti.:o (Railroad "Jlanagnnent), �lnscow. 1897, H. pp. 6D-70.rso Bolsh. Sot>ietsli. Entsikl., Vol. 55, p. 728. 
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the metropolis and making it dq,endent upon it. Western Euro­
pean t·apital, ,vhich played such an important part in the devel­
opment of these railroads, was likewise interested in this layout. 
That tapital, in partnership with Hussian finance capital, thus 
automatically assured itself a monopolistic repartition of the 
products of Ukrainian industry on the markets of Russia. 
llence, the nature of the Ukrainian raillroad economy was 
incomp:i.tihle with the total interests of Ukraine. This reflected 
her colo11ial position and not the re(111irements of internal com­
men:ial-imlustrial exchange of goods, nor foreign tics dictated 
by natural conditions. This explains the disproportion between 
external and internal railroad operations in Ukraine, as compared 
with Hussian regions like the central-agricultural, or the Volga, 
not to mention the central industrial regions. Table LXXXVI 
indicates the percentage relationship behveen external ( through) 
and internal (home) railroad connections. 
TABLE LXXXYI 
Regwn Extern.al connection Internal connection 
Centr,d ngriculturnl 42.1% 57.19% 
Yolg.i rc,gion 47.0% 53.0�, 
Southern Ukrniile 75.4% 24.6'.f 
Southwestern Ukraine 72.8% 27,2� 
Beside the harm from the tariff policy and the railroad lines, 
the routing of the external trade of Ukraine to its natural sea­
ports was in great measure stymied by the condition of the ports 
and freighter fleet. The Hussian Government, interested in in­
n·easing operations on the Baltic, and directing traffic to Baltic 
ports by tHPans of its tariff policy, deliberately neglected the 
development of harbors and shipping in the Black and Oziv 
Sea. The Ukrainian coast of the n ... ·o seas has eight ports, of 
which the three Crimean (Evpatoria, Sevastopol and Yalta) 
are of uo commercial importance. To the remaining five, we 
must add .Mykolaiv am! Kherson, situated on the est11aries of 
the rivers Bob and Dnipro. These seven ports are numerous and 
well enough located to take care of all the needs of Ukrainian 
commerce, but in reality were far from fulfilling their destiny. 
31 P. Lil.slichcnko, op. cit., p. 365.
31 
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The finest and largest of all Ukrainian harbors, is Odessa, 
followed in size and importance by Mariupil, the harbor serving 
the Donbas and Kryvyi Rih. But even these two principal ports 
were very poorly equipped. "Berths, for example, were very 
small. Foreign ships sometimes had to wait for a month an<l a 
half for their turn to unload. Docks were awkwardly located. In 
Odessa the location of the ooal harbor was such that ships could 
uot be berthed lengtlm-isc."''" 
General i11:1der1uacy, and in some localities a complete lack 
of river shipping, also had its detrimental influene:c upon 
Ukrainian overseas commerce. Specific layout of railroads and 
expensive and difficult rail deliveries of goods to seaports 
created a real need for cheap and easy river trahnsportation, 
which was not forthcoming. Ukraine possesses rivers that are 
conveniently loe:ated for commercial purposes. Three great riv­
ers f low through Ukraine from north to south, the Dnister, 
Southern Boh and Dnipro. The big bend of the latter around 
Katerynoslav-Zaporozhe encompasses the metallurgical region 
and comes very close to the Donbas. Donbas in turn, is bisected 
by the river Donets, the largest tributary of the Don. It, in turn 
connects the coal region with the Sea of Oziv. All those rivers 
have tributaries from \Vest and East, covering all Ukraine with 
a fairly deuse network 
The Dnister, 1371 kilometres long, has nine important tribu­
taries, which arc hardl�· used for shipping at all. The river itself 
is used for shipping along only about 800 kilometres although 
it is navigable mu<'ll farther Nurth than this. !vfatters arc much 
worse with the Boh, 750 kilometres long, where steamers go only 
between Vozncsensk and :\lykolaiv, a distance of 100 kilometres. 
The principal river, Dnipro, 2,150 kilometres long, of which 
IAOO is in Ukraine, is utilized for navigation along almost its 
entire length, with the exception of 80 kilometres of rapids ( at 
present flooded and locked, following the construction of the 
Dnipro Electric Power Station). Its tributaries, Pr�·piat and 
Desna, are also navig:.i.ble, But hardly any of the other nine 
large tributaries, as well as the tributaries of the Prypiat and 
Dcsua, arc navigable, because of a complete neglect of the regu­
lation of their flows. Similarly on 1hc river Doncts, in the part 
\Yfoch flows through Ukraine, there is no navigation. 
:<2 ;\I. Sl.,hdwnko, op. cit., p. 291. 
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The large watPT arPas with an annual water (leficit which 
are so badly needed by the Ukrainian economy are not properly 
utilized because this would aid the economic consolidation of 
the Ukrainian 1iational territory contrary to Hussian interests. 
"!liver navigation in the South does not aid the economic de­
vdopmcnt of the land. For each inhabitant there is only 25 
poun<ls of river fn·ight for a charge of 73 kopecks, while in Hus­
sia, in the North it is 300 pounds ±or 3.5 rubles. If, for the better­
ment of South Russian communications, both by water and by 
land, thus far as much had been <lone as in the North, the re­
sults would be greater for all of llussia than herf'toforc, because 
the immense natural wealth makes the land of the South more 
suitable for wider development than the North.""" 
All these circumstances, point to a situation where the 
Ukrainian seas were far from carrying out the task commensur­
ate with natural con<litions. 
The privileged position of the Baltic ports, uphelrl by the 
Government, and the niggardly equipment of the Black Sea in 
tonnage of home registry, influenced existing comHtions. 
In their competition with Baltic ports, lower shipping rates 
were as necessary as favorable railroad connections and pro­
tective railroail tariffs. The freight 011 36 pounds of grain from 
Odessa to London \Vas in the late 1890-s 24 kopecks, while from 
Baltic ports it was only 13 kopecks. "H is not surprising, there­
fore that the latter have such prc-cmi11ence over Southern 
ports."3·1 
Freight cost was in large measure also heavily influenced by 
the la,·k of balance between ocean imports and exports. Steam­
ships had to go empty to Ukraine. In 1912, in the main ports of 
the Black and Oziv Sea 3,718.4 thousand tons \Vere loaded for 
overseas shipment, while only 41G thousand tons were un­
loaded.·'·' 
During the s:une period 75% of tlw ships arriving at the ports 
of the Baltic Sea came fully loa(led. 
\Ve kn-e a different picture in coastwise shipping, i.e. basic­
ally an iutra-Ukraiuiau sea trade. Against 1,766.4 thousand tons 
of lmdi11�;�. Wl' have 2,l.'39.2 thousand Ions of unloadings. These 
figures would have bee!l much higher if the ports had not been 
workillµ: 1111der lmndicaps described above, because, in spite of 
-,_, \I Y."""l"'l.sk;-. 011. l'it., TT, 71'. "' \I. l":11,nopnl,ky, "/). cit .. I. 2:·Vi. 
:,,, T. Fc,,h('h('ukn-Cl1opivsky, Fkonomic"lma hcohrnjiya U ·rainy, p. SI. 
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all difficulties. the advantages of shipping via the Black Sea 
,n"rf' indi\pntahlc, The 1rright cost of ;3fj ponn<ls of oil products 
from Batum via O<lessa to Kharkiv ,vas 38.2 kopcch, and to Kiev 
:13J:i kopecks in �pite of the high railroad tariff in Uhaint'. At 
the same timt', t!"ansporting the same quantity and prodnd by 
rail via Tsaritsin (Stalingrad), l'Wn at the low railroad tariff 
on Hussian railroa(ls cost respPctivcly 42.2 kopecks and 46.9 
kopt>cks. 
This comparison is all the more applicablt• to transportation 
exclusively by water. Thirty-sLx poun<ls of freight from Odessa 
to Vladivostok in the Far East cost 51 kopecks and never more 
than 1 ruble, 12 kopecks. Transportation over the same distance 
via Siberian railroad cost 12 rubles. 
But in �pitc of everything, in spite of the obvious aclvautagt's 
of 11ti!izin_g southern sea rontcs, and in spiir' of the undeniable 
need to connect the commerce of Ukraine with her geographical 
position. the polic:y nf the Russian Government remained un­
changed. Grain deliveries to ports t>f the Black Sea, at a tinw 
when exports of grain wen: on the ilwrease frequently declined 
011 a large scale. Grain dclivcriPS tn Black SPa ports ,verc ( in 
tho1isands of tons j as shown in Table LXXXVII. 
TABLE LXXX \Tl 
JfW.'i Z,823.(; urns. S.SfH.On
IS9G. 2,5!:J8A 1.89D. l.870.8n
18\17,. l ,8S!J.fin moo. 1,704.0n" 
At the same time we can obser-..c such a phl'nomcnon in 
dissonance with natural conditiorn, as an increase of overland 
exports. Thcrf' was such a paradoxical situation: exports df'­
elincd ,vhcn tlw French Govcrnrn(•nt reduced duties to a miui­
mulTl, anJ increased whf'n, in consequence of large imports 
from abroad, the Frcnch tariff wa� i11creased by 287'. "The fact 
that foreign countrie�· demand declined, released the brakes 
upon dom(•stic trade.".-., 
13rakes upon dome�tic trade experienced by L'kraine ,vere 
more effective than a boom on fureil'.Q-1 markets. Things ca111e 
to such a sht_e:e that the Sonthwestern Hailroad attempted to 
escape the rnlt' of the �Iinistrks of Transportation an<l of Fi-
Jt M.nSlabchenko, op. dt .. p. 2D4. "' lhid., p. :!\:16.n
:Zlt:i l"kmim: wul Russia 
nancc and "to condude a separatC' agrcPrnC'nt with German 
rnilrrnHls to combat Hussian protl'diouism hy lowering tlic 
tariH 011 irnportPrl good, and exported sug;ir." ... -
Tliis dearlv shO\vs why so little attention was bcillg paid to 
the problem of rebuilding a home commercial fleet on the 
soutl,cm seas, which had been nearly destroved i11 the Crimean 
\\.ar 
T('ll ports of the llkrainlau coast, irwluding Sevastopol h:id, 
at the outbreak of \Vorld \Var I, a lutal of ,'310 ships with a 11d 
of 20U.0fJO 1ous, and 657 eoastwisc ships weighing 25.:3()0 tons. 
Tht> an•rage weight of one seagoing vessf'l \Vas mm tons. and of 
a coastwise vessel ,'38 tons. Both the numbers, as well as the ton­
nage of ships, JHOYide dear evident:t' of the absolutf' dispropor­
tion between the 1ttcans of water transportation and commercial 
tonnage of Ukrnirw. At that we must bear in mind that !5,S'{ of 
all ocean-going and 62% of all coastal shipping was handled 
by Odessa. Tht> rcmaindc•r has to he apportioned among the 
other nine ports. of which e.g., Skadcwsk, a good harbor close 
to a \Yl's1lthy region. had only one ve��el of 7 tons. 
l1nder such circumstances the role of a honw commercial 
fleet in water transportation was ,er;: iusignihcant. \\'hereas 
the partidpition of domestic ships in transporti11g goods of the 
European part of the Empire was equal to l 1.8%, in the Black 
and Oziv Seas in 1912 it was only ,'5.8%. British ships handled 
47.!)'.l.', Greek lo.l'.Y, Austrian-Hungarian 101, and others lesser 
amo11nts..89 
The situation in river trarn;:portation was no better. On the 
entire Dnipro river with all its trihutarit>s there \\-'ere only ] 87 
freight-passengl'r steamers, total tonnagP, J.:3,500 tons, arid 177 
barges. On the Dniskr there were 14 steamers a11d 7 barges, 
and so on. As of 1900 the e11tire import and export trade of tht> 
Empire by waler is rcprt>sf'ntcd by the figures ( in percentages) 
in Tahle LXXXVIIT. 
Imports Expol'ts 
Baltic S,,,1 7fl.4 -43.6.
Black and Oziv 50.5.
Whitr- .S 3.0.
Ci�1,ian ti.8 
,., Ibid. :m P. Fomin, "Ekrm.omieh1rn kharnktcrystyki Ukrainy," p. 47. 
1" P .f,.Jiromn\ up. <"it .. [). 2.5]. 
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J gnoring the interests of Ukraine in laying out railroads, 
neglecting rin�r tramport.1tio11. iuade(111a1c hi�hway\. these 
were what kept the duJrwslic trade frorn assnn1ing its proper 
proportions. This also explains the disproportionate importance 
of fairs iu Ukraine. The ten largest foirs h;1JJdkd almost half of 
tlw domf'�tic trade in goods in Ukraine. It is aho characteristic 
that out of the kn fair�. eight W!'rc located in close proximity 
to the Ilmsian border: four in Khar ki\', hrn in Kiev an<l two 
in Polt.1va. At these fair5 the bulk of goods produced by Russian 
industry was sold. This system of trade, peculiar to ancient 
times, is a vivid indication of the \Veakness of domestic com­
munications. It is understandable whr, in the middle ot the 19th 
century "all goods sold at fairs were valued per one inhabitant 
of Kharkiv region at J.':i rubles, Poltava at 12 rubles, Katerynos­
la\· at 6 rnbks, whereas in Petersburg proyincc at 35 kopecks, 
\Iosco\\' at 27 kopecks, Tula at :?::3 kopel'ks and Hyazan 20 ko­
pecks. ·11 
J.1arket 
lu the chapter which studied the characteristic of rdalions 
hetwee11 Ukraine and Russia in illdustry, we have already anal­
yzed the extent of track: [n three hasic branches of industry, 
coaL ml't,1l1urgy and sugar. Tlwsc three branches were the lead­
ing ones of Ukrainian industry, and conditions existing thert' 
charaderized the entire system of economic relations with Hns­
sia. Xcvcrtheless, for a more mmplek picture of the colonial 
nature of the L1krainian economy, we sliall pause to corn,ider the 
position of the Ukrainian market This is more important since 
we ha\'<' not clarified the situation i11 the grain trade which was 
ot tremendous irnportn11ce t() the Ukrainian economy, 
Herc again, the center of our attelltion will not he the par­
ticular branch of commc1Tt' alone, h11t the relatiollship bctwc<:n 
Ukraine and Russia in this scdor. 
We shall consider first the problem of the gencml exchange 
of goods in Ukraine as they were subject to official statistics 
of tlie GoYernment, the trade of those enterprises which were 
licensed to do business. For this purpose we arc makin?; use 
of dab on commerce and indnstry tu the regions of European 
Hus�ia. as published by the lvfinistry of Commerce and Indnstry 
in HJOS. \Ve arc unfortunafrly compelled to adhere to regional 
11 ;\/. Ya,nupol�ly, op. cit., 11, FIL 
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boundaries nsed iu the official report. They do not correspond 
to the boundaries of Ukraine. One ot the regious cited, the re­
gion of grain commerce, includes a small part of the South 
of the Dun Laml. But for our purpose snch slight variation in 
the figure� of thlC region is not too important am! can have no 
scriom effect upon the genero.l conclusions. 
The J\linistrv of Commerce and Industry divided Ukraiuc 
into three rt'1,,;ions: 1) g-rain commercial (Nnmber VIII) 
which inclmkd the Oziv SeahoanL tlw Crimea, the Dnipro-Hoh 
strip and lkssarabia; 2) black-industry (iron and coal), (!'\um­
ber IX) including the Donbas, Katcr::noslav and Kryvyi Hih 
regions; and 3) the Southwestern, ( Number X) which took in the 
regions of Kharkiv, Poltava, Kit>\\ Chnnihiv, Volhynia and 
Podilla. The gross business fignres of commerce and irillustry 
of these three regions, are (in thousands of rubles) as seen in 
Table LXXXIX. 
TARLE LXXXIX 
Rehm, Gr<Jss Comm<'l'I"<' Gro.�s fo,l11Mru Total 












According to groups of goods, the gross commcrcl' figurei 
were ( in thousands of rubll's) as shown in Tahle XC. 
According to gronps of goods, the gross figures of industry 
were (in thousand rnhles) ,1s shown in Tahlr XCI. 
Befo1·,:, we begin an analysi.� of the above figures we inust pin­
point two basically important sets of figures, those of the food 
industry and iron and coal industry which, tO)!dher, constitute 
:SW! of the entire gross figure for indnst:ry. 
TABLI:: :\C 
Agrini/tur,i/ A, aimal Miueruls ,\'ot 








































llcgi,m Fu:1d prmluct.,· I.umber. :\tini11g Tnti/e.� Cl,(·mirals .�1w,.ifinl Tntal 
vm 80,147 10,'."i\]4 8.J!J(J .}J.1<)2 3,Pi-t 10,208 7,U17 177,.'5.12 



















42 \li,,i,h'r 'l"orgnvli i Promy�l,knuo<,ti (J\fini,tn of Conn,wrt·e aud ln­
du,try), Toriz,ot:la i pwmy.1h/c,.11c1.1·t Yr·,·ropcysk,1y Rvs,·iyi pv my,iwnn, 
l'J08, VIII-4, IX-.5, X-."i. 
·"· //,;,/,, Vlll-.), IX-6, X-6.
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The gross figure of the food industry is broken down into 
the groups shown ir1 Table XC:Il (in thousands of rubll's). 
T.\BLE \:CJl 
In pcrcnd11g,' 
Regions r,,/.r,tiw, to 
Grnup.1· \'//I I.\ X Tut1,I the total 
�lillin;,, '.J.'l.2,50 lj_271l -1";",(ijf), \lk.2/l,) 22..1 
Sng,u n·finin:� . Hi,WJ\J 2.1-;-.121, 2.=; !,020 :'iH.l 
\Vines arnl 
_,pirits H,.1:;.1 11',liSS 2,"i,181 5.7 
rohaeco 12.'-J/-;;) 11.,2H :!-t,,18 ,'5,6 
\'t·twL1l,!<• oil :3.70:, 2}M4, H,fl rn l..'i 
Conkct\o>rnr�-. 2_:-,n:1 L.714 , .. 117 I::: 
Grits 1,D91 1,991 n.-l 
llakin·! 2.8('2 !Ti-!, ,I_ 5.)f; 1.(J 
.\l,·,1t D,5,'l i-12 l.6'1(1, . 1 
F,,Ji l . .'l/.'3 1 •• 171 ' 
Bn·,1·iE1_l! :?.,.1'.'4 2.-121 .-'.i 
Otlwrs ".-H.> :,_1,0:; ·1.2).'3, 12,.'il/l Q 20 
Total 88,138 21.Hn, -127,414, -!18,71.5 \00.0 " 
0'Jlw gronp ""tlwr,;" in the ,,ffi('rnl rt·p01t also i1tdml,·s some ikm� from,
umnu)! �pecificd group� whil'h Jrr• in ,rnall ,rnwm1\s. 
41 l/1id., VIIJ-1.'3, IX-16, X-15. 
221 Otlwr Economic Helation1· 
Table XCIII is a similar breakdo,vn of figun's of the iron and 
coal industry (in thousands of rubles). 
TAlH .E ,\CJJ I 
lrt pcrccrtlll/!,i' 
R r' g i" n ., relation t11 
GnJUJM \'lll IX X Tot,1/ /()/{!/ 
.\ktalluri:r and 
metal-working 32,731 l lH,66,3 16,832 WJ,228 .5:'i.2 
Coal am! clay 
extraction 1,897 60,680 1,148 72.71<5 24.2 
Iron ore . . . . 529 l J,!l6.5 II 1'.L568 4.0 
Agril'ultunil too� 
aml machinery 3,,5S6 2.31!) 8,94:'i 14,820 4.!J 
Hiieks and 
pottery 2,48.'i 4,J::'8 ,5,:234 11,8,57 3.!:\ 
·r in .,rnl
nwlah\arc 2,0fJO 64 l,D14 4,668 l..'i 
\,.Jt mining 1,823 1,877 3,800 1.2 
�l,·rc11r)'J
,t>i11inl; 1.417 1,417 .4 
�fa1tgarn·s,· ·"miulng 7,'5!) 75!.l 
Repair•�hops J,705 208 l }l68 3,871 1.3 
Cement, chalk, 
alabaster l.615 1.308 l)il4 4.498 1.4 
Gla,s am\ 
foirn('C 1,438 1,.'501 2})39 ,!,) 
Zinc 284 284 .I 
Carriage-
rn,iking ,588 167 676 ],432 .4 
E!edro-
rn,·chanical. .1,',--1 3,54 .I 
Otlwr� 700 �70 3!':i6 1,38B "' 
Total 51,12\l 215,4Fi :rn,9rnl 306Jl06 100.0 
,.,, 
lt is not worthwhile to spl'nd time on the textile industry, 
in spite of its basic impmtmce, because of its very insignficant 
fignre (8 million rubles), and also for the reason that this group 
includes rnostJ�, goods of secondary use such as twine, bags, 
de. Thus we actually find in two main branches of industrial 
production, only two 1-iroups in each which have a preponderance 
over all othl'rs, constituting 80% of the total. In the first it is 
milling and sugar"refining. and in the second, metallurg�· and 
coal. The gross figures of all other groups arc so insignificant 
that their per capita repartition will gin: no more than a few 
"//Ji,/ __ YI\l 17, IX-7. X-11. 
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kopech per pcrsou. Thus, in analyzing tl1<· Ukmi11ia11 ('Cm10111y 
from tlw standpoi11t of the market, we find agai11 the same situ­
atio11 that we ban' alr<'ady ohst·n·r·c\ in thP r('ahn of industry: 
the niam1facturing process h imhspntahly one-sided, v,;hid1 
is a characteristic- ot colonial countries, 
Even rnor<' telling iu this respect is a comparison of the gn)S\
indw,trial aud commercial fi_gun:s. The sales of textiles reached 
:?/58,297 tho11sand rnble�. and this is doubtless an incomplete 
figure, sine<' many textile articles ar<' inclmlcd in the "not -�pcci­
fied"" group. Ukrai11c·s ow11 pro<luction of k;,.tik� rcach<'d only 
8 million rubles, of secondary use. A similar picture is revealed 
in the comparison of production of wines and spirits (2.5 million 
rubles) witl1 sales in this group ( Hil 1nilion ruble�)- From the 
comparison ot just these two groups we mu L'Sti111ak the huge 
amonnts of foreign production consumed by l'kraine, i.e. what 
gredt part of the- national iueume Wt>llt out of tbc Ukrainian 
economy in the forrn of commercial profits. 
O,w might reply to such argmnent that there \Ve-re othc-r 
industries iu UkrainP at the tiuH· prnducin.(!; more than was re• 
rp1irc<l for home comumption (sugar, metals, etc.), an<l tlwt 
these imlnstri_es produced goods which went iIJto foreign econ­
omks creating t omnwn.·ial profits in favor of the l'krainian 
economy. This \Vould be an apt ohs('n·ation, provided th(' indus­
trial and commercial capital cnµ:ageJ in tlwso adivitics had Leen 
Ukraiuian capital, a11d that the pro!ih from tlll'rn accrued to 
Ukraine. But, as ha.\ been amply illustrated ahcJYe, nmw of the 
capital \Vas Ukrainian, and thus the Joss of surplus production 
was not comp('nsatcd for by these rl'turn proe('Sses. 
In support of this, we cite below some data on the distribu­
tion of good;, in the Ukrainiau market accor<ling to production 
clas,�ification groups. It is to lw borne in miml that, in addition 
to commercial distribution as accounted for by the :\-Iinistry of 
Commerce and Industry for lke11.sed enterprises, there was also 
a distrihntion !hrou�h local bazaar;,, where the vendors were 
not subject to licenses. This indndes .�ueh enterprises as peasants 
oflering tli<'ir wares. and local mong\�rs .. \.ccording to Ostap<'n­
ko. this distribution. mostly in agricultural product;,_ addetl np 
to the rnlue of i.':il millimi rubles in 191:3. 
According to the same scholar, the l'kraiuian market handled 
<n1 the eve of \Vorld \Var f, the annual quantitiC"s ot its own 
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TABLE .\Cl\' 
Coal :31,(){J0,0()() Cr,;in H,GOOJI()() 
Cnk,• ·t81l0,(100. Sugar b,·l'l� S,\Jfil),O()O 
Iron me ti,7'::().()(I(). Sug,ir l,2),j0,000 
\iamgant·>•· on· 2,3fi,0(){) Crits 1,600,0{)0 
:i,dt 800.()00 Spit its JGS,000 
l'i" irnn (il(J,mlO l't>talot\s 3,8 J(),000 
trOu ,,nd ste.:l 2, 1()(),1)()() \'c!getnhles ... 352,000 
.\1"d1innv and tools 2.:24.000 Corn ( 11Hli2C I ·180.000
T,·�til,·s · .. -'J{i,0()1) llnrs,·s 26-3,000 Jw,1d
L,·.tlh<cr lti0,00(1 St,:,-1, .ind ,·nws Hl,5,0llO head









1,U00,000 tlm11s. piec-"� 
35,300 tliuus. pJ!'eo:s Toh,1eco 
Oils ( r:dihk 1 43,:200. ;,,,Jilk , . , •.••. J,180,(J()(l IOJL\ 
In addition to the above home prod11ction figmes, Ukraine 
imported. during the Year 1913 the r111,rntities of goods ( iu 
t!iousand tu11s) :.hn\\·11 in Talilc XC\'. 
TABLE .\C\' 
LumlJ('r .. l,24fiJl1io T{•,, J,800 
i\ladtiaer\' and (;_,snlin, ,tml l<,·rus.-11e .:18{1,()l)ll 
metal !,(oods 320.(1()0 Fc-1tiliz,·r H0.800 
T,•,111,·s 80,000 Ce,,l<'nt J:l7.li00 
'.'../UtJ<HIS C;IOO \\-'rn.11 1 li,000 
fkrrings l l:?.,000. l.<>,1tlwr gr><•<ls -18,000.
Otlwr fish 80,000. Fn,ils 8,000." Ricr• J {iJ){)I).
.\t the same time, goods cxporkd from Ukraiue are shmYn in 
Tah!e XCVI ( in thousand tons). 
TABLE .\CVJ 
Coal 0,000_!1()0 Clnl'er s<·t·d \(l,1)(1() 
c;1ai11 7,20(),/1()() ,)\J.20(7 
Su,1!:ar (J(j(),(H)O l'r,ts 160,000 
Ore l l'.:,00(1l.fiOO;OO()
Pi;.'. iron -18fl,0()() Pot,1tn'.;
J_.H/1.ll()()
Com 







;1nd J,emp sc>cd 







ril., p. 21\-1. 
J.,·1llll'r rn,0(10 t,ms 
Akohulic bcver,>)!'.l'S 37 million litn-� 
Agri, ultnr.d 111:ii·hlno:rr --1--!,iillO tons 
Ilorws 100,000 ]wc,d 
Hcmwd eattk :J8'.,,I)()() J.,,ad 
Iln«, 13SJ)OO lwad 
J-'ot;ltry Hl,200,000 piece, 
F.g_r:;s. 70, :!()() tons 
"Ibid., p. 203. 49 Ibid., p. I Ll..
flt•,m., 
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The total export figure of all goods shipped from Ukraine 
m HH:3 wa;, L022,780 thousand ruhh·s, arnl import. 647,9B0 
thonsand ruhles. '" 
Thus. Ukrai11e\ expnrb were in e:-.cess nf imports lH' the 
amount of 374,820 thousand rubles. 
This relation�hip between exports and imports was not a 
matter of ch:rnce, 11or <lid it apply only to the year 191:3. :\L 
\"o]obuycv in<lica{('S that Ukraine's active foreign trade balance 
in 1900 amounted to 367 mil!io11 ruhlcs; in HJ0L to 7 IO million 
rubles; iu HJ02, to 468 million rubles; in 1904, to 287 million 
rubles, and in 190.S, to 301 million rubles.''" 
The annual excess of exports over import� is estimated by 
M.t Shrah for the vcars 1909 to 1911 at 319 million rubles. Outt
of this 202 rnillinu applies to foreign trade and 57 million to tradet
with Russia."'t
Ostapcnko estimates the excess figme for 1912 at 200.4 mil­
lion rubles. There were obvious variations from year to year, 
hut exports always exc('cded imports. In this instance we are 
not so much iutercsted iu the amo1111t of that cxu'.�s as i11 the 
fact of its existc11ce, because it is indicative of thl:' eco11omic rf'­
lations bctwc>cn Ukraine and Rus�ia. The Empire as a whole 
also had an aetivc foreign trade balance, and we have to inquire 
bv what meaus this was achieved. Professor P. Fornin cites 
(TabTe XCVll) the abbreviated trade balance sheet of Ukraiuc's 
foreign trade for the year 1912, compiled hy Professor llalytsky 
(in millions of rnbles): 
TABLE XC\'II 
Execs, 









Raw m:tt<'ri,il .md y•rni-
nianufadur,·d goods 
:\lannfactornl goods 






Total for Ckrnim' iSS.fJ 260.8 (j7i_..j ].tv.3 
Active babnce $:?.S.l 
'� Ibid .. p. 114. 00 �f. Yolobuy<'v, "Do problcmy L'krainskoyi ckonomik
,-
·." 
"' !\I. Shrah. ''Zornislmya torhivl� VSSR ta yiyi hl
:,-
sh,·hi pcn.pcktyvy" ("Foreign Trade of the l'krainian SSR am! its lmmedi.1tc Prnsprcl'ts"}, 
C/icri:rm11 Shlakh (Red Pat/i), Kharkiv, No. G, ICJ24, p, l li. 
'•2 P.. Fornin, op. cit., p. l l '). 
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At the same time, the Empire as a whole exportc<l goo<ls 
abroad of the total Yalue of: 1,276.9 million rubles, and imported 
goods ,·ahwd at 841.9 million rubles which giYcS an active trade 
balance of 4:1.'5 million rubles. This hahmce. as we can sec. is 
93 million rublvs lower than the balance of Ukraine. This means 
that the Empirt', without Ukraiue. imported goods from ahroa<l 
for almo�t 100 millio11 ruble.� more than it exported. H we con­
sider that the Empire also included such non-Hussian territories 
as the Kuha11. ,\zerhaijmi. ck., then Wt' must come to thC' cou­
clnsion that Hussia proper imported nrnch more than she ex­
ported. This ,,·as done :it the expense of the colouics. \Vc ha,·c 
alrcad�, indicated that in commNcc with Ukraiuc, Russia re­
ceived 100 million rubles worth more than she ga\'e to Vkraine. 
Out of tht' total Ukrainian export figure, the amounts sliippt:d 
to Russia W<'re as shown in Table XCVIII. 
TABLE XCVlll 
C-:r.1in aml cere11ls 720,000 tons Coal over 8,000,000 tons 
Iron and pig iron 1.024.000 tons Catt!t, over '.?.(10.0()0 lw,ul 
Sugar 720,000 tous Hogs ..... . 90,000 hc,ul 
See,! 14-1,000 tous. :!\leal rn 000 tons 
Ores and salts 7(;0,000 tons. Cl<1y, linw, ete. 80,000 tons 
Snch was the nature of Ukrafllian f'Xports to Russia, chieflv 
agricultural pro<luct�, ra"· materials an<l scrni-munnfactured 
goods, exports peculiar tu colouies. This situation is even more 
marked iu l:kraiHian exports going outside the borders of the 
Empire. During the period 1909 to 1911 agricultural products 
eonstihitcd 85% of the entire value of expmts from the Empire. 
Thu;,, in spite of the relatin:ly high le\·el of imlustrial develop­
ment. in vxport:-; to foreign comitries L'krainc appeared in the 
role of a t_vpical rolony supplying industrial countrie\ with food 
products. To .H.ussia, h(nYen'r. Ukraine shipped industrial rm-\· 
makriab an<l semi-manufactured goods, playing the role of a 
raw material market for Russia's indush'y. "Economic relations 
hrtwcc11 Pkraine and Hmsla were based on industrie., to the 
extent of 7G'.f, and not on agriculhire.".-,., 
The extent to \Yhich Ukraine· participated in the t'xportation 
of agriculh1ral products of the whole Empire can be determined 
I..Ft·shd,cnko-Chopivsk�-, op. cit., p kl. s-1 \I. Slirnh, op. rit .. p. ll7. 
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from thc- fact that out of a total of 7,107,200 tons of grain ex• 
portt>d by the Empire in 1900, L1kraint> forriislwd .SS52,0ll0 tons, 
or 8-t:. The aver<tge participation of Ukraine during- the period 
moo to 191:3 was about 75'./".. At the sarne time Fkrai,w harvt>stf'd 
2.--t2'."{ of the four principal graiu nops which made up the ex­
port figure. (The total Empirt' figure being 70,70--1,000 tons; and 
Ukraine, 17,136,000 tons.;·•" 
"This rc-gion of hugl' cultivation awl extcmi\'(: grain tanning 
( Ukraine) was hw1sformed iJJto H n"gion of l'apitalist-eommer­
ciul ag;ricultnrc. engaged partially in .'>hipmcnts to home prov­
inces, hut mostly for export. The region was becoming a typical 
colony which dt->livercd its grain products to the metropolis am\ 
to foreign markets, and imported manufactured goods from the 
nwtn1polis ... ''" 
\Ve lmYe deliberately cmphasizt-'d the fact that Ukraine had 
an ac-tiv(: tradti balance with H.ussia. This was not meant to im­
ply that this is, of itself. detrimental to thC' cconom�' of a C'Ollll· 
try. 11uch depends upon the mnditions under which this phe­
nomenon m,1kcs its appe,mmcc, and upon the proprietary rights 
to the trade balance surplns. Under ordinary ciffumstances a 
cmmtry appropriately organizes its connnf'n'e and can a1h·iscd­
ly create reserves for a definite cconomi<.: objective, wch as 
strcngtlwuiH� its currency. etc. This in grncral is ow• of the 
1m.,,ms of a<.Tumulating aational capital. Tlwrefore. in our em­
phasis upon this position of the external trade of Ukraine, it 
was not our intention to evaluate ii as an economic ill ia itself. 
But under the C''l.isting rdatioushirs beh.vccn Ukraine a11d Hus­
s:ia, this cxs:css of exports over imports was yet auother form 
of colonial exploitation. 
The surplus de1frcd from Ukraine's external trade did not 
roin the re.�ervcs of Ukrainian c<1pita] accumulation. lt weut 
into the bands of those who controlled UkrniniaTJ exports. Hus­
sian .:.:nmrncr('ial ,rnd finan.:.:e ('apital was that controlliug factor. 
\Ve han' had ocr.:asion to remark that exports of sugar were ex­
clusively r.:oncc11trated in the hands of two Petersburg banks. the 
"Petersbur� lHternational" ,md the "Hussiau Bank for Forcign 
Trade. . Niuety 1wr cent of sugar exports w1:11t through their 
harnls.'"-" 
-,-, B. IJ/.ink,·ncl,. Pmd11ktsi111i kli/i/)(J l..'kraini (Gra/J, Prorfoction ill i; 
L'krni11e), Kharkiv, 192.'3, No. I, p. 23, and P. Khrumov, op cit .• p. 253. 
P. L-,�hch,,,.l,.o, 1;p cit .. p. 487.
, 
s� :\J, Gohnan, "Ru;�ki" l111pniali;sm," p. 354. 
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The second most important export item, grain, was also 
handled by R\ls�ian t'xporters, primarily by the state bank. 
·111e surplus did not return to Ukrai11c in tlw form of capitalt
accnrnnlation, but was consumed in Russia. H11ssia proper, as 
we have stated, exporte(l less than she imported, and the differ­
ence was cover<'d by the surplus of Ukraine. Russia not only 
shipped more goods to Ukraine than she took from Ukraine, 
hut aho received more from abroad than she �ave at thP cx­
pp11sc of Ukrai11e. 
Hnssia �1ccountcd for her fillancial loan opcratirms with for­
eign countries, floated for the dc\·elopmcllt of her economy, in 
the same mallller. 
"Ukraine, which had been up t{J the time of the war illeg,1lly 
part of the former H11��ian Empire, in spite of being one of 
the wealthiest parts making up the property of thl' autocrats, in 
spite of being one of the basic conhibutors to tht> achievement 
of Hussia's adivt:> foreign trade balance, not onl�· dicl not partki­
pate in the organization of forci,!{n trade. not only did not ap­
pear 011 foreign m::irkets as <lll economic mtit_ but in general 
had very littlf' advantage from the Hussiall active trade opera­
tio!ls ,,·ith foreigu lands. The profits were l15f'd to pay off Rus­
sia's foreign debts, or to the Imperial Tre,1sury, or to the pockets 
of private dealers, who reaped tremendous profits by taking ad­
vantage of the producers, the peasants and workers of Ukraine 
,., -ho wcrt' the supplier� of cheap raw material."'' 
\Ve must also hear in mind that thanks to the monopoly en­
jo�'ed by tlw exportf'rs. profits v,·ere in large measure determined 
by their price policy, aimed at b,vering prices paid to Ukrainian 
product-'rs in spite of constantly rising taxes, excises. and. most 
important. a stormy increase of the land rent in the shape of 
th(' prit:e of land a11d rentak Export prices for basit: proclucts 
of the agricultun' of Ukraine declined in the manner shown in 
Tahlc XCIX [the figures arc in kopecks per 36 pounds (.1 
pood)]. 
TABLE XCIX 
Y,•(IT,\' \Vht',it Ry/" Barley 
1871-7.5 DO.! fi.S.7 60.6 
1876-flO ,'i.5.1 ('n.1 ;){l_[ 
1 <'18 ]-/�,; 7(i,7 G,'U .52.n 
Hl86-80 6·Ul •12,,5 37.6 
lb!.ll-100n .5,).fi 46.6 .1.5.9 " 
'" '.\f. Shrnh. ep. di., p. 101-\. .-,s P. Khr-omov. op. di .• p. 2-5•1. 
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For a Uettcr understanding of the rc1wrcussions upon the 
gt>m'rul profitability of Ukrainian agril:11lt11rc, Wl' must bc,n 
in 1nind that the dedinc in graiu prices between :30'Z and -H.l1 was 
accompanied by an increase in prorluctivity of only 19'{. This 
meam that the Ukrainian peasants, burJcncd by taxes, rents and 
prices, were continually forc0d to sell more aml more of their 
produce, aud thus consume less . .?\Jo�t Pkrainia11 peasants were 
short of food. This went on in a land \Yhid1 was callerl ·'tltc 
hrrndhaskct of Europe" and aboiil \\hi,,_.h tltt! p(wt :\. Tolstoy 
wrote: '"Know you the land where all things breathe alnm­
dancc(' 
S11l'h is the fate of all lanck richly endowed by Gotl, that are 
llladc into colonies. India, the pearl of !hP British <TOWll, ,,as frc­
quC'ntly visited by famine which r;l.\agt'd millions nf the popub­
tion. The fellahin of wealthy Egypt lin:d iu utter ..,qualor. So abo. 
most of the peasante> ,md workers of Ukraine. who \\'('re torced 
to gin· np a large part of their labor's fruits to Russia, liwd in 
misery and the entire Ukrainian population was deprived of 
the opport11nit_v of de,;eloping its national 1.x:on01ny. 
It becomes (JUi!e apparent, thl'n, why those diseases that 
\ ividly indicate Ilic existence of a low material level of life were 
widespread in Ukraine, Typhoid is often called "hungry typhus." 
not without reason. This cannot be charged to the ncgligeucc 
of the lTkrainiam. On the contrary, all ,·isitors from foreign lands 
ha,·c alwa�·s remarked tha! in this respect tlw Ukrninians arc 
far ahead of the Hussians. The qu,1intness and dt"anlirn1ss of the 
Ukrainian 1,wasanfs home ha� become his national pride which 
be bas carried with him wherever fate would compel him to go. 
Under these circumstances the prevalence of some diseases 
traceable to malnutrition is yet another illustration of tlw social 
and economic position of Ukraini'. 
From 1910 to 1914, the incidenc(� of (\isc,tsi· prevailed per 
10,000 of the populati.on,"" as .�hm,·n in Table C. 
TABLE C
Tt1r1h,,/rl T11plws Rec1irre11/ 1yril111i !)1111•,a/('l'r, Di71hl/i(·ria ·
Ukrainr -IJ.� 10.fJ ,1.S :2.1,f; .J,i,\J 
Europ,,,rn 
RH.ISL, 2.:"\. 1 SA 2.-S 22.6 20.-1 
,,,, RoM1. Sm i--lsk. Ent.<ikl, \"nl. .).5, Vkr. SSR. 
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It could not be otherwise: acute- nee<l of cmplovment created 
by ,1grari,1u conditio11s :1.11d a ri'strickd n1arld for labor in in­
dustry con1pd!ed the work1"rs to accept low "·at;es and hard 
cond itious of work. ··The condition of the workers w:ls awful. 
just like that of slaves on plantations . . lu the uutl�rgrouml 
stone quarries of Odessa, workers die\ not come out iuto the air 
for W(-->eks nt a time. thf'y slr�pt on bundles of straw 011 which 
they poured \\·ater. so they wo11ld steam aml keep their bodies 
warm. \\"ithout question first place in crimi11al riegligencc and 
u11fit1wss of dwellings for human habitation goes to the cutn­
prise� of Hughes. The lahorcrs have to shift for thermcfrcs. 
They make dirt hut�, about 60 square feet for two people, ,vith­
nut an; wi)J(lows, damp, musty, sonwthing like animal de11s, 
\\"here it is r,ot only 111orally revolting to eutcr. but frigliteu­
ing."',7 
\Ye han· rna,le this hrid digression from the main subjt'd 
of nuu-kd conditions i11 order to cmphasi,-:e the significant influ­
ence of the policy of colonial exploitation upon the .standard of 
living of thf-> labor classes, aml in onl!·r to \tre�s the falschoo(l 
of statements undf' about the alleged flowering of Ukraine. S11eh 
flowf'ring is impossihle nndcr conditio11s of pcrpehial and exces­
sive diversion of a large part of the national incomf' in favor of 
the metropolis. In respel"t to market eonditions Ckraiue was abo 
the ob_iect of coloHial exploitatiou. Bussia concentrated in her 
hawls the manufacture of goods of u11innsal cou�umptio11, de­
rivl�d large profits from the distribution of the�e goods iu 
Ukraine, and a,;suring lwrself of tlw eoutrol of Ukraine's ties 
with foreign markets, siphoned l:krainc's fa,·ornble trade balance 
to servict" her own foreigi1 debts. 
The Budget 
\\'e havt' uoted above that colonial exploitation consists in 
the cxclusi,m from a natiou·s Cl'tmornic hodv in f,n-or of the me­
tropolb of a part of th,; national incomc-"the surplus produc­
tion" iu the shnp,, of land rent, ind11 strial and commercial profits, 
as \n•ll as of bmlg-et surpluses. Tlw-rdore, in order to provide a 
('Ornplefr pic-tur�· of the nahm• of thf:' econom:, of Ukraine prim 
to tl1e revolution of 1917, we must consider, if oulY brieflv. thei· , 
budget relationship of Ukraine and Hussia. 
,a S. Ost:1p,·11ko, np. cit .. p. 21D. 
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It must lw home in mind, for a better understanding of state 
fi11a11ces of the Hussian Empire, that the Hussian Covennn('11!, 
unlike governments of other large European countries. al­
ways took a larl,!;e and actiYe part in the economic life of the land 
as proprietor of many enterprises. EYen <luring the period of 
serfdom and before industrial capitalisrn, the state owned huge 
tracts of land inhahite<l h;· millions of state serfs. Duriug the 
reform of lSfll the state kept a large nurnhcr of land estates, 
which continued 1111der a forn1 of state feudal °'"'11ership. The 
state cnga\;ed not only in a�riculture and lumbering. EYen dur­
ing th{· reign of Peter I state industries were established, particu­
larly in iron and coal in tf1c Urals. Subsequently the industrial 
developrneut ot the Empire frequently took the shape of state 
enterprises '>nch as state railroads, state dislillcrie, and distrilm­
tion of alcoholic hevemgcs, state banks eJ1gagcd in the opera­
tions of grain exports, state land banks engaged in tmding 011 
the exchauges and in underwriting mortgages and stak owner­
ship of stock in corporations. 
A !I these economic unckrtakings \vcrc ob\'iously of a diffcr­
<.'llt firiaJ1cia\ natnrc thall the ordinary state bmlget and for 
that reason the budget itself had many peculiarities. The appor­
tionment of state income and f'xpewlitures based on eolledion 
of all sorts of taxes from the population was supplemented by 
the .�o-ealled "'extraordinary hndget" which providl'd a close 
link betw('ell the hu<lget and credit financing, banking and 
finance capital, Part of the budget covered the area of finance 
capit.11, and \'ice \'ersa. The latter contributed to the maintenance 
nf state enterprises with the result that the butlget included 
items of t'It'dit "peratious. 
Between lSSi and 1901 a total of 1-600 million rubles was 
cxclucll'd frnm tbe state brnlget in the form o! an exet'ss of or­
dinarv inc,ome over ordinary expenditures, and this amount was 
used for so-called "extraordin.u�· expenditures,'' for enterprises of 
a fisl'al-c'conomic 1wtvr.:·."" 
By l\)(J.3 these "extraordinary expenditures" reached 1 ruble, 
4i kopech per capita of the Empire's population and continnecl 
to increas('- from year to year. Exp(·nditures lor t'lhH'ation weH" 
onl
:,-
· 28 kopecks per capita. This nature of the state c0conom:,-· of 
the Hussian Empire was the cause of a pcculiarit),' of Hussia's 
credit operation� with foreign countries. Russia did not seek for-
,cc K. RatLig, np. cit., p. 40. 
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cign loans to supplement budget deficits caused by unusual oc­
currellccs such as war, but to finanC'e state commcn:ial and imlus­
trial enterprises. This mnst be strC'sscd since the Hussian State 
Government. in servicing thC'sc obligations, exercised its sover­
eign prerogatives and was a direct participant in colonial ex­
ploitation. The economic policy was t}ms adapted to the regula­
tion of industrial and commercial relations, to customs, and thus 
the budget itself was drainiug surplus profits. The im1cbtednc.�s 
vf the Hussian Imperial Government at the C'nd of the 19th cen­
tury exceeded 5 billion gold rubles, or the equivalent of a three­
year bmlget of that period. 
Subsequently the national debt increased at a slower pace, 
but the iucrease still was considerable. See TaUe Cl (in millions 
of gold rnbk·s), 
TABLE CI 
P('rccrit relation 
011tstnnding Annual p11yml'llf� of p1111mcnt 
Yc,1r deht rm debts to state lmdget 
1901 6,3<J2 277 l,'U 
1900 8,62{1 3.'57 J.'i,7 
1!!08 8,8-�2 398 ]fj_.') 
H)(Jg 9Jl.).) :J'::)5 lf:U 
Hill 8,958 399 
HJJ3 8,824 42-1 13.5 
l'J 
These slate lu;ms were floated partly within the Empire but 
in large measure abroad. 
As we have already stated, in addition to state loam, shares 
of private and state corporate enterprises were also floated in 
the financial markets of foreign lands. 
The total amouut of Hus;.i:m securities, according to group 
origim and \ocati011 markets, can be properly e\'alunted acconl­
ing to data for the period l90S to 1912, a period of the peak of 
operations of this sort. See Table CII (in millions of rubles).6' 
The bul"k of the St'Ctuities is located, as we can see, in mort­
gages which almost wholly constitute laud bau"k obligations. 
They were a s11i ge,wris uature, basically like curreut a("counts 
and only withiu the last fow ye,1rs precPding World \Var I did 
foreign exchanges begin !o quote them. They came into exist­
ence as a result of the sale of laud to the peasants by landlords, 
"" �I. Colman, O/J. cit., p. 12. q :'-i. Vanag, op. cit., p. 261. 
]8:] 
,5,203 
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TABLE CII 
1908 1,909 
Total Jll/ssirm Fnrcign Total Ru�-�ian Fnreign 
.state Bonds . . . . :2.72 2111 (i\-) :?.n<.J 7 20S 
'-lnrtga!c!CS 278 278 272 272 
Securities of credit 
institutinns 11 JO 1 2:1 18 5 
Rai\ru,id bonds l ,JG 18 1:'JS l(jf) 70 98 
Industri:11 s!neks 1:17 4(; 12:1 8:1 40 
Tot;1l 900 (j4{j 234 'j!-Jlj 4,30 146 
/'.)/0 1911 
Tri/al Rus.,im1 For,•i;:.u, r .. tal H11.1sian l'ordgn 
SL,te Bonds . . 74 ·12 :12 28 17 11 
i\1ortg,igt·s 4/i:1 4(;:l (l3.J G3,l 
Srcmitic\ nf cn;dit 
mstitution� . . . . 83 r,2 3:J l \,!, 9,3 21 
Railroad bond� 120 41 7q 78 ].5 63 
lndu�trial stoeks 16D 107 62 381 226 \,),5 
Tot�\ \121 71,) 20(1 U.:16 l}':l6 ;2,'j() 
1912 T<>tal 
Total Ri,Hirm Fort'ign Total Ru1wiun Fnrl'igu 
State }fonds ,)7 C ,',,) (i-10 2.Jf; .17-"> 
i\lortga;:;1•s 6-15, ,'54,'j 100 2)\l;l 2,Hl:1 JO() 
Sec·urilies of cTP<lit 
1n;tit11timi\ 171 lfi7 I •I 14, J,50 04 
R,ilro;Hl hornb ;!O.'; :26 179 728 170 5.')8 
ln,l,,stria,l slod,,, 272 15S [1' 1,128 711 417 
Total l,:350 898 4:5:2 :3,fi80 1,514 
'C ,,f /nta/ % nf foreign 
�(;(;llfitif's f/n,it,;,l sccuriti,'s 
Stale Bond� H.3 :1s.n 
�lortgages 4,1, 1, 4.4 
Sec:uritic'S of acrlit institution,. Ul L'Ll 
Rni\ro,1d hond� 14.0 76.8 
I11dml!ial �tot:!.., :21.7 36.7 
Total lO/J.O 29.2 
the peasants making: their pu rchasl'S with 11w aid of credit l'X· 
t<'uded by the Land Bank. These securities were used lo pay off 
the maiu part of the purd1J.se price Jue to the land!onls for 
land sold throu�h the Hank. The latter (landlords) paid off their 
mortgages by these securities. The laudlords owed huge 
amounts of mortgage monies to banks at that time. m,1inly to the 
Dvoryanskv P07:emelny Bank. Thns the real meaning of the 
banking operations could he reduced to the following: by settle• 
mcnt of accouuts between two banks, the Dvon·,rnsky ( '.\lohility) 
and Selyansky ( .Peasants') with the aid of bonds, the mortgagp 
indebtednes� of the lamllord;,: w,1s transferred to the peasants. 
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These operations re'.lched their peak in Ukraine, particularly 
following the Stoltypin reform. 
If we exclude from the total amount of securities issued 
such mortgage bonds theu the percentage of securities floated 
abroad reaehes 48.6% of the total. Part of this indebtedness fall­
ing upon the state cannot merely be rletermine(l by the appro­
priate amount in the cited table, for, as wc have noted, the rail­
roads were almost all the property of the state. Hence the location 
of their boHds on foreigll markets was also an indebtedness of 
the state. In addition, -,.vith sornc securities thc state had assumed 
a gmrantce of payment of both dividends and capital. \Ve have 
had occasion to quote the total amounts payable by the state 
on ere<lit operations with foreign lands. This provides an answer 
to the disproportionately high amom1t of debt service payments 
as tompared with the indebtedness c,f other natiom. The amount 
of interest was ot some significance in this respect, as Russia 
generally had to pay more interest than other nations. Among 
the sewn largest eountries in the ... vorkL the Hussian issue of 
securities during the ten-�·ear period of 1903 to 1912 amounted 
to 10.41. '-Vhik am1ual service payments amounted to 25% in 
th<: year 1910."'' 
It is therefore not surprising that the servicing of loans con� 
stituted such a large part of the budget ( between 13 .. '5% and 16.5% 
as indicated by a preceding table). Some economists ( especially 
Colman) estimate loan servicing at 2,5.21 of the budget. From 
the tables cited it is easy to imagine what a heavy load foreign 
loan servicing put upon the currency balance of Russia's for­
eign trade. Thus e:,,_-ports beeame the main source of covering in­
vestments in Russian industry which were undertaken with the 
aid of borrowed capital. 
Although the balance sheet of payments of the Russian Em­
pire compiled by N. Ole is c·onditioual and statistically imper­
fect, yet it pro\·icles a fairly accurate characteristic of currency 
account settlements with foreign lands. For this reason we arc 
utilizing it in Table Cll l. all the more so, a� our task is an analy­
sis of the nature of economic phenomena, and not so much their 
quantitative expres�ion: 
Balance of PaymC'nls of Russio ( in millions of rubles): 
or, Vrrestnik 1-"inonsoi: Prnm11,,h/ennosli i TrJTgodi (Flflancial, Industrial, ond 
CommcrcWI News), St. l'l'krsburg, HH2. No. 37, p. ,547. 
l,0.50 
TABLE Cll 
1881- 18f)8- 181>1- lRDH-
18.97 191.1 1897 191,1 
!'aynwnts fur imports 8,J.lO 13,31'.3 !JJcornc from cxpr,rtst 10,77'1 17,4,1:?. 
Foreign paynw11t,; of interest Fon·ign cnpit,il investments:t
and dividends 2,900 t:i,000 a) in indnstry .......... . 200 1,300 
Horn! rdircrnent: b)t in railroadst :s.�o 
a)t of banks ...t 100 c)t in ercdit institutionst ,130 
h)t of railroadst 400 d)t ,n munictpalitit'.st 37.'3 
Spent br Ru,siam abnwl. 1,000 2,000 C:ovNmn<'nt loans 2.000 
Other expenditun·s :?.87 41,5 Other income . , 12,5 240 
Inere,1s(, of foreign currency 
reserves 27:3 772 
Totals: 12,700 21,900 12,700 21,897 
.,., I'. Laslwhcnko, op. ,•it., pp. 385, 386. "" 
Totals: .. . ....... ..... . . ..... ... . 
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\Ve can see from the ahove the extent to which exports con­
tributed to the balance of foreign payments. A place of high­
est importance was held by grain exporb., 75% of which was 
contributed by Ukraine, and of equal importance was sugar, al­
most all of which came from Ukraine. "The Tsarist Government 
used all available means to holster exports of grain at the ex­
pense of malnutrition of the workers. '\Ve are not going to eat 
as much as we need, but we shall export' was the cynical re­
mark made by the .\linister of Finance Vishnegradsky.""' 
11ost of the grain came from Ukraine. "The Tsarist Govern­
ment aimed at increasing exports by all means, hecause the 
Government's balance of payments could as a rule he only cov­
ered by having an active trade balance. Industrial development 
required the importation of metals, machines, etc.; it was neces­
sary to make annual payments of large amounts of interest on 
bonds of the Tsarist Government, as well as on loans of private 
railroad companies and interest on other credit amounts. All 
these payments contributed heavily to the passive side of the 
payments balance and were covered in the main by bolstering 
exports, primarily of grain and raw materials, inasmuch as Russia 
did not possess any other worthwhile sources of income ( from 
freights etc.).""" 
It is now clear to what degree the results of Ukraine's com­
merce influenced the Imperial budget. Russia not only withdrew 
from Ukraine more value than she <lelivered, but also balanced 
her foreign payments at the expense of exports of Ukrainian 
grain, sugar, cattle and ores. These foreign payments of Russia 
were for loans negotiated for military purposes and for the de­
velopment of Russia's own industry. "Hence, one can now state 
openly that a large part of what constituted the difference be­
tween the exports and imports of Ukraine was being taken 
away, as capitalist robbery, to pay for debts."sn 
It was not only through the medium of the "extraordinary 
budget," hut also through the ordinary budget that Ukraine was 
a source of Russia's enrichment. In contributions to the state, 
such as taxes and others, Ukraine paid more than the Empire 
spent on Ukraine. Table CIV is the income side of the Imperial 
budget for 1885 to 1913 ( in millions of rubles). 
''' P. KhnJmov, fl/J. rit .. p. 2.5,1. '" Ibid., p. 23'2. 
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1911 223.9 029.7 193.4 1047.0 1,778.2 .8 2,9.'52.0 
Hll2 243.2 (j.'i0.4 198.2 1,092.8 l )382.4. .8 3,l0<'5JJ 
191-3 2-HJ.8 671.0 218.2 l.l3RO. 1,U66.2. .9 3.24(),(j '" 
•" \I. Colnmn, op. di., p. ,176. 
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The column of income from monopolies, C'ntcrpriscs ,.u1d 
estates is very interesting. Tt provided 10.5% of the hml)?;d iu 188.5 
and increased to fj{).7% of tht' hudgd within 28 years. The chief 
item ot this i11<:orne figure is trom the sale of alcoholic lwveragcs 
(nt:arly one billion rubles). It is not surprising that the Hussiau 
budget of that period was called ··the drunken budget." ln ?l'n­
eraL this column provides a good illustration of the extent of 
lhe spread of state capitalism in Hnssia hy that time. Hence the 
present total nationaliz:1tion of the entire Pconom�' had its bl'­
ginnings before 1917. Equall�· notcworth�, arc also im:omes de­
rived from indirt:ct taxes. They more than double direct taxes 
and those coupled with income from the sale of spirits, again 
provid<· a close parallel between the budget of that period and 
thost' of the prescut day, under which indirect taxes, or so­
called receipts taxes, constitute almost 80% of the entire budget. 
\\'c can sec that even then a characteristic of the state econ­
omy was that a dedsin' role in the budget was pla�1ed b)· <:om­
mercial and industrial profits from state enterprises. These were 
based on the appropriation by the- statf' of certain f'nterprises 
and a mouopoh· in certain economic processes, in place of fi­
nancial obligations to the state of the population and business. 
And to the extent that the same state authority was at the same 
time suhject to the law, to that extent the regulation of economi<: 
processes was in a large measure determined by law enforce­
ment ,\·hich ahva�·s stoocl on guard for the interests of the domi­
mmt Hussian e(;onomic svstem. 
The significance of this moment (;annot he 11ndcrestir11atcd, 
inasmuch as it determined Ukraine's losing battle \Yith Russia 
in the realm of economics. \Ve ha,·e emphasized on seYeral oc­
<:asious the part played by statutory regulation and official gov­
ernment polil'Y in agricult1ire, industry, transportation, aud 
!.'.Ommerce. This fonnd its rcpercw,sious in the slrncture of the 
budget. Let us lake, for example, just the irnlirect taxes. Excise 
collections are their backbone. In 1900, the total of 658 million 
rubles indirect taxes consisted of: excise tax on spirits, ,'317 mil­
lion; on tobacco, 41 million; on sugar, 63 million; on kerosene. 
25 million; matches, 7 million, and <:0llection of duties, 2.04 OJJ 
million. As we <:an see, excise taxes were imposed on goods 
chiefly of non-Hussian origin: spirits, toba<:co an<l sugar from 
Ukraine. kerosene from the Caucasus, m,1tches from Finl:md 
and Relorussia. Yasnopohky is correct when he says: "the present 
Ukraine and Russia 
excise taxes on grain, spirits and salt ( there was an excise tax 
on salt at that time-Author) imposes a douhle hurden on the 
agricultural part of Russia, both on the producers, and the con­
sumNs. And that excess ot income over cxp(•nscs which is 
created in the aizricnltural part of Ilussia, is diverted Xorthward 
in impressive amounts for the state treasnry."71 
Excise taxes thwarted the development of the Ukrainian dis­
tilling indm;try, and the tax paid on sngar was lost to the· Ukrain­
ian manufacturers when it weut into the hands of the tv.-o Peters­
burg sngar ('xporting banks. All this indicates that relations be­
tween Ckraine and Russia in the realm of the budget were, sim­
ilarly of a colonial nature. The budget was another tool of colo11-
ial exploitation. 
Yasnopolsky, in his basic text on the geographic repartition 
of state income and expenditures, states that <luring the 13-year 
period "since 1868, the ninr t:krainian gr11Jernias gave thC' Rus­
sian state an income of 2,899.2 million rubles and received from 
the state, 1,749 million rubles."" 
The Ckrainian national et·onomy lost, hy means of the hmlg­
et, l,l.50.2 milliou rnhles. This is nothing but colonial exploita­
tion. 
Jn the same text Yasnopolsky also cites statistics compiled by 
t-.L Parsh. According lo these: ''The Russian state had from 
Ukraine ( during the period of 15 years at the" encl of the 19th 
and beginning of the 2(}th centuries) an income of ;'3,289.6 million 
rubles, and expenditures of 2,60S.2 million ruhles."'j 
ThC" following tablC" of hudgetary income and expenditures 
for tlw y1�ar 1912 is found in the work of Professor Fcshchenko­
Chopivsky:'' 
Ta\Jle CV 








Here ag:lin is a siphoning nf 306 million rnbles from l.Tkraine. 
We might allow that all these statistics are not absolutely ac-
" X. Ya�nopol,ky, op. cit .. II, l lfi 
"" '\!. Yasnnpolsky, 0 /!."Ogmfic/wgknm raspreddc11i11i gosrulurstncm,ik/i dok­
lwdor i ra>khor/ov ( Geograpl1ic Distributiou of Stat<- ln,:,onw :wcl Exp<'!J­
rlih1n-s}. Kiev, l8\J3, p. 6\J. 
7.1 llf. Yavorsky, op, cit .. 11, 123, 
'' I. F,,.•hchcnko-Cl1opivsky, op. cit .. p. 161 
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curate an<l that tht' amonnl a<:tualk tal-e11 ont of Ukraine varies 
Ollt' wav or tht' other. There is room for error iu view of the ab­
c,ence of a proper snbdivision and locali/.ation of cntain catC'­
gories of expenditures iu the offici;"tl sources, although Yasno­
polsJ...y's calculations ha\'e \)t'en made \Vith the utmost regard for 
scrnpulous vemcity. For the purpose of our research any possible 
inaccuracies may properly lw disregarded, inasmuch as onr task 
is not to ddcrniinc the exte11t of colonial {'xploitation, bnt rather 
to find its presr11ce. To prove in other words that economic re­
lations lwtweeu Ukn1ine ami Hnssfrt were based on principles 
of colonial dependence. Hence, it is of no great import how much 
the state hu<l
g:
et succeeded in pumping out ot the UJ...raiuian 
t'cOmHny in ta\·or of Hussia, be it 300 million rubles annually. or 
l,·ss. The g,:ist of the matter is that rneh pnmping existed, that 
Ukraine always paid more than she received, and that this was 
the consequence of her colonial position. "The Tsarist regime 
of tlw second half of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th 
eentnries imposed upon l!kr:iinc a greater financial burden than 
dming the old times ot the Jktmanatc.'·,., 
;\ similar strndure of the lrnpcrial hmlgct on the e:-.penditures 
\ide vividh· illnstrates the diversion of funds of the colonies in 
favor of the metropolis. Table CVI is <l summan· statement of 
budget expenditures in percentage grouping�. 
TABLE CVI 
rnw 1-'Jll 
\lilit.u; cstal>lishnwnb 30.6'>'. 31.7% 
Debts 2rl.6'.\'. 2-"i.2% 
State aclmiuistrn"lion 26.0% 25.7% 
E(l11rnt1nn ' ')'; H.3·;
A!:rit·Lrltnrv 3.5% 3.H%
h,dn.1try ci.'J'>- ,e;_:-n
Total JOO<;: 100'.b 
'" 
\\'c l1anc ,dread�· ampl�· illustrated the part of Ukraine in 
thP repartition of debts. The debts of the Empire were lJeing 
p:1id off h,· Ukrainian grain, th!: proceeds of tho'.>c loans ha\'lng 
heen usc�J b) Hns,ia. Concerni11g expenditures fur the rni!itar\, 
c�tahlishment. their preponderance in the budget mirroVi th·c 
impniabt nature of R.1��ia and her coutirrnous military expan-
c.-, \L Yavorsk:, l'/1. cit .. H, 12·1. -,,. i\f. Golrn:m, 01,. cil .. p. J"i7. 
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sion, something which had nothing in commo11 with the interests 
of Ukraine. Even a proportionate participation of Ukraine in pro­
viding funds for state needs is not justified to the extent that 
the maintenance of part of the state apparalus was not the resnlt 
of the needs of the population but merely an assurance of polit­
ical domination of subjected nations. Only the last three cate­
gories of cxpcndit11rcs, together totaling 17'.? to 18'0 of the Imper­
ial budget can be cousidC'fc--d as giving Ukraine .1 proportionate 
share. In all others, Ukraine gave more than she rcccivt'd. thus 
making it clear that in the state budget branch of the economy, 
part of Ukraine's national income was diverted in favor of met­
ropolitan Russia. 
To repeat our former statements on the nature of colonial­
ism in the sphere of economic relations: its PSSC!lC(' is that the 
surplus production of one national economy is appropriated by 
another national economy hy military and political sHperiority. 
This appropriation goes on by siphoning of land rents, indus­
trial and commercial profits and tax budget burdens out of pro­
portion to expenditures. In order to insure continued exploita­
tiou, the econom:· of the colony is developed in a certain direc­
tion which precludes the creation of a harmonious and unified 
economic body on tlw national territory ot the l'Olon;-· aml for 
this pnrposc legal norms arc promulgated, regulating economic 
processes in the direction desired hy the metropolis. 
We have analyzed all primary branches of the Ukrainian 
economy during the period between the abolition of serfdom 
anrl the rcvolntion of Hll7, i.C'. during tht' period which h just­
ly catlcd thl' pt'riod of imlnstrial-capitalist <levt'loprnellt of the 
Hussian Empire. \Ve have illustrated the natme of the rnain 
and dPcisive economic processe� in their historical dcvclopmt•nt 
during that timt'. arnl we havc invariably conw facC" to facc 
with the fact of the existence of characleristi('S peculiar to colon­
ies. 
This ondcniably justifies to state that duri
n_
g this period 
Ukraine was a 1T1lony of Russia, and that thr: industrial a11d 
eco11omic grn1cth of Russia u;as to a great extent basr'd upmi a 
colonial ex{1luitatinn of Ukraine. 
Unless this i� properly recognizer!. there cm1 be no correct 
evaluation mad(' either of th,.- real nat1tre of the economic den�l­
opment of Hussi,1, or of those peculiar ecol!ornic proces�es which 
took p!acc in Ukraine. 
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This problem kl5. nnfortunately, not been sufficie1ttly clar­
ifil'd to thi� day. Very many people percl'ive in the economic 
centralhm of Hnssia, pccnliar to colonial t'mpircs. a sign of 
ecouomic unity. This le,,ds them to regard the Hon-Russian co­
lonial 11ational territories as provim.·es of Hussia and as compo­
nent parts of a single economic organism. 
For obvious rcasom, this matter has thm far not been given 
sufficient atte11tion either iu the literature of economics, or his­
tory. It is llOt in tht· interest of Rnssia. with her deeply rnotcd 
Imperialism. to have this matter clarified. 
As justly stated by Lashchcnko: "The development of capi­
talism 'in depth' ,md 'in breadth', i.e. the spreading of capitali;,m 
to new terrains . appt'ared with great force and continued 
to spread in Russia following the reform ( of 1861-Aril/wr). 
This most important problem has thus far not been solved 
either by the economists or the historiarn. No sC'paratc- work on 
the development of Hnssian capitalism on national territories, 
nor 011 such new cconmnic conditions which appeared against 
this background. has as yet been ,vritten." During this period 
"the development of capitalism 'in breadth' meant primarily the 
colonial subjugation of national territories .... The Russian state 
be�an to transform into a centralized. multi-nation state in the 
16th and 17th centuries with many nations economically and po­
litically subject forming its composition .... In the t>eonomic re­
spect, the national terrains of Russia were to thl' mctropol is for 
tlw most part colonies or semi-colonies, suppliers of all sorts of 
raw material."'' 
This in no way contradicts another undeniable fact: the de• 
sire of Russia to assimilate Ukraine completely by destroying 
lwr unique national character. Oppressing all manifestations of 
the Ukrainian national spirit, Russia never showed any intt>ntion 
of obliterating the bouncbry in social aml economic relations by 
placing the economy of Ukraine in a position of ('quality ,vith 
the econnmv of Hussia. A Ukraine russificd wonld continue as 
a colom· of Russia and a source of Russia's enrichment. Econ­
omic centralization was b0ing 0arrit'd ont .1):!:ainst the hack-
1-,r 01111d of imperialism. 
Suf'h contradictor\' nature of two lines of Hussia's Ukrainian 
policy obviously acted to stre11gthcn the resilience of the 
Ukrainian peopl(:'. Russianization unified Ukraine spiritually and 
;; P. L:a�l,chenkn, op. cit., pp. 418-421. 
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economic exploitation physically in opposition to the Russian 
steamroller. 
The icl('a of Ukrainian sPparation was, undC'r these circum­
stances, the result of logical thinking in terms of reality. 
M. Volobuyev is therefore perfr-ctly right in his conclusions :
made after an analvsis of the so-callC'd unitv of the Russian 
Empire's economy: :'Those who speak of the 'unity of the pre­
revolutionary economy of Hussia or UkraiuC', have only i11 miud 
the first teudC'ncy ( towards centralism-Author) and forget 
about the second. the centrifugal, or rather the desire to join 
in the world system directly. not through the intnrncdiary of 
the Russian economy. The process of concentration on a capital­
ist basis goes on counter to the forms of autarchic tendencies, 
therefore we should not deceive ourselves by the fact of conN•n­
tra! ing tendencies in tlw Hussian pre-re\·olntionary economy. Bt�­
hind such tendencies wC' must perceive separatist forces of the 
Ukrainian economy. Hence. the question of whether there was 
a single H.ussiau pre-revolutionary economy should be answered 
as follows: it was a single economy on an antagonistic, imperial­
ist basis, but from the viewpoint of centrifugal forces of the 
colonies oppressed by her, it was a complex of national ccon­
omic-s .... The Ukrainian economy was not an ordinary province 
of Czarist Russia, but a land which was placed in a colonial 
position."'' 
This ends the analysis of social and economic processes in 
Ukraine prior to the 1917 revolution. ,ve end by stating that it 
is a proven fac.:t that UkrainP was transformed into a colon:,·. ex­
ploited by Russia for the development of her owu economy. A 
natural question arises. how did this position of Ukraine influ­
ence the thinking; of her population and what were its repercus­
sions upon tlw social trends in Ukrainf'? This question cannot 
\)(' answered by the scope, nor significance of the social-economic 
processr:s herein analyzed. This is quite understandable. \Vhen 
we sp('ak of the history of one or another enslaved nation. the de­
cisive matter is not its subjected position, but rather the realiza­
tion ot the position by the people themselves, and a crystalliza­
tion of the peoples' will around the idea of national and politkal 
liberation. The fador of liberation i5 in no ,vay determined by 
the extent of oppression, but by the strength ot the nation's ,vill 
which comes into existence when the nation realizes its op-
,, I\L Volobuy<>v, Inc cit. 
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pressed condition. In the light of the above it would be essen­
tial to provi.<le an analysis of psychological processes in the 
Ukrainian community and of the social movements. But to do 
this, it would be necessary to write a history of social an<l politi­
cal developments in Ukraine, and this goes far beyond the scope 
of this undertaking. 
Tt is also necessary to postpone an analysis of this problelm 
for the further reason that thus far we have concerned our­
selves with economic couditions to the time of the revolution of 
1917. Almcst forty years have gone by since, forty years of 
weighty events, in all spheres, including economics. ·without any 
change of their inner nature, the processes continued under an 
entirely different set of circumstances. The social structure 
underwent a basic change, likewise the nahuc of social trends. 
To speak of a society's desires as of a factor which determines 
the hi�torical pathways of a nation, the expression of such de­
sires in a single historical moment will not suffice, the general 
trend must be known. 
Our task has been to show that social and economic relations 
behveen Ukraine and Russia prior to the revolution were based 
upon principles of national oppression. This is the kind of soil 
in which the i<lea of nationalism takes root. Therefore, wishing 
to discuss contemporary Ukraine, \Ve must find out whether any 
changes have taken place in this respect, and if so in what direc­
tion. Tt is necessary to illuminate the nature of s11hsequent so­
cial and economic processes. This is the task of our undertaking 
in the second volume of this work. 
There we hope to characterize the awareness of the commun­
ity, its desires and social movements in the entire historical pro­
cess to this day. This might gi\'C us an insight into the future of 
such continued processes. 
\Vithout pausing at the present moment to consider the de­
velopment of a national awareness in the Ukrainian people, or 
the content and course of social movements in Ukraine before 
the revolution of 1917, we wish to quote an historical fact which 
provides a summary of all those so-cial processes an<l constitutes 
their clearly visible peak. 
\Ve speak of the revolution of 1917 in Ukraine. ' From the very first days of the revolution, the problem of re-
shaping the social structure was inextricably connected with 
the national problem. 
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The social-political revolution imrnl'diatclty bl'camc a national 
Ukrainian renJlntion. 
A new social order was lwing introduced into the frammvork 
of a sep:trate natioual-statt' organism. 
ThPre was nothing- smprising about this. It came as the logi­
cal conclnsion to mauy centuries of the Ukrainian uation's ex­
istence, as a fact of hi�torical necessity. 
Ttlat it had to be thus was dear to all v>'ho were aware of 
the real situation in Ukraine. The best testimony to the existence 
of this sihiation is in the words of the most prominent statesman 
in the Tiussian G(H'ernnwnt of the 20th t·entury, Prime :\linistcr 
P.tStolypin, who said as early as 1906:" ... the mtional all(\ po­
litical aims are so closely intertwined in the Ukrainian move­
ment that it is absolutely impossible to separate them."'�t
Neither will thf'y he separated in the future. 
7" S. Shdrngokv, Sm,r,:,mrrmoye L-'krair1.1tvo, yego proiskhozhrle.niye i u1dachi 
:'C:mitempornr:; Ckrainiarmm, its Origin and J\im.1), Kic•v, Hll3, p. 37. 
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Translator's Postscript 
READERS WIIL NOTICE from the method of tran­
scription of certain ·words, especially of geographic designations 
and names of persons, that then• is a discrepancy between this 
method an<l generally accepted transliteration standards for Soviet 
(Russian) names. This discrepancy stems from the fact that the 
ovcnvhelming majority of geographic designations and names of 
persons refer to Ukraine, thus diffNing from their Russian counter­
parts. 
A few examples will illustrate the problem: t hroughout this 
book Kryi;y Rih has been used instead of Krfooy Rog, Tahanrih 
instead of Taganrog, Mykolaio instead of Nikolayrv; also HryJwry 
am! not Grit:orii, Myklwilu and not Mikhail. The rPason for this 
is that the names are Ukrainian, and hence the author, as well the 
translator, believe that they should be emphasized as such in order 
not to confuse them with somewhat similar Russian names anrl 
terms, or \vith names deliberately chaugcd by Russians as part 
of the so-called process of Rus.�illcation. An illustration from a 
different area will bring out the point with even more clarity: 
during their occupation of Poland at the time of World War II, 
the Nazis changed the name of the Polish city of Lodz to Litz­
ma.nnstadt; the city, however, never lost its right to its original 
name, and after the German withdrawal it became Lodz again as 
a matter of course. So it is \vith Kryvy Rih, Mykolaiv and otht>rs; 
uo amount of change hy fiat of Moscow could change their 
original Ukrainian names. 
In this connection, it might be added, according to all Soviet 
official declarations, that the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Rcpublic 
is a soverign nation ( although the veracity of this statement with­
in its \Vestcm meaning is disputed), and as such it has its O\Vn 
geographical terminology, obligatory within its political bound­
aries, \\foch is officially recognized by the other Soviet Jh•publics. 
Once such names and term.� arc used in offic-ial Ukrainian gov­
ernmental designations, they also deserve application outside 
Ukraine. 
Finally, we wish to refer again to the factor of Russification 
or Russianization. For a cOI1siderable length of time, the Russian 
conquerors of Ukraine (particularly since the time of Peter I, 
following Mazepa's and Charles' XU defeat at PoltaYa in 1709), 
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haw: attempted to transfor111 Ukraine to their own image. anJ 
following this policy, they began to impose Russian place names 
in substitution of the original Ukrai11ia11 nanws. Inasmuch as the 
Ukrainians have offered political resistance to these plans of con­
quest and colonization. it is on1y fair that a concession to the 
fig,;htiug Ukrainians shouh.l he made in the realm of terminology. 
Ukrairw and ll11ssia 
27. 
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